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Abstract 
This thesis focuses on the privacy interests of those subject to a criminal process. 
The thesis investigates the extent to which the privacy interests of those subject to 
such a process are recognised and afforded adequate protection in England and 
Wales. Over the last thirty years policing has become increasingly proactive and 
preventive. Advances in technology have given rise to new policing strategies, which 
emphasise the need to manage ‘risky’ groups and individuals through the collection 
and retention of disparate pieces of personal information. Whilst there is a significant 
body of criminological literature documenting this trend, and raising the possibility 
that these developments could pose a threat to the privacy interests of those subject 
to such preventive policing measures, criminological theorising alone cannot provide 
a defensible normative model for assessing the impact of such developments. 
Moreover, criminal procedure scholarship tends to focus on human rights insofar as 
they regulate adjudicatory policing measures geared towards the prosecution of 
suspected offenders. This procedural scholarship does not focus centrally on the 
wider functions of the police in maintaining order and protecting the public by 
gathering intelligence on ‘risky’ individuals and groups.  
 
This thesis aims to fill this gap in the literature through an assessment of how such 
policing activities set back privacy related rights. An interdisciplinary method is used, 
which draws on philosophical literature, European and domestic human rights and 
criminal procedure jurisprudence, and relevant policing and criminal justice 
scholarship. The first broad task for the thesis is to develop a normatively defensible 
model which can identify where privacy interests are set back as part of a criminal 
process, and articulate why it is important for those tasked with regulating such a 
process to recognise and appropriately protect these interests. This normative model 
is then used to assess English law’s response in different contexts to the police use of 
privacy interfering measures against those subject to the criminal process. It is noted 
that the European Court of Human Right’s Article 8 jurisprudence has (generally 
	
	
speaking) had a positive impact on English law in this area, but concerns are raised 
that domestic lawmakers consistently fail to strike a fair balance between the privacy 
interests of those subject to a criminal process and the legitimate crime prevention 
goals of the police. 
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Introduction 
Have advances in policing technology and methods shifted the balance between the 
legitimate functions of the police and individual privacy interests too far in favour of 
the state? To what extent are the privacy interests of those subject to the criminal 
process (i.e. those investigated, arrested, charged or subject to other coercive 
measures in connection with a criminal matter) recognised, and afforded protection, 
in England and Wales? To what extent should they be recognised? This thesis offers 
an answer to these questions. It does so using an interdisciplinary method which 
draws on philosophical literature, European and domestic human rights and criminal 
procedure jurisprudence, and relevant policing and criminal justice scholarship. The 
details of the approach to be taken will be set out towards the end of this 
Introduction. But first, the salience of the research questions will be elucidated, in 
two stages. First, criminological literature, which highlights how contemporary 
Western democracies have put an increased focus on managing ‘risky’ - but not 
convicted – sections of the population, is briefly surveyed. This literature flags up the 
possibility that such changes pose an undue threat to the privacy interests of those 
subject to the criminal process. However, it does not offer a method for 
understanding what these interests are, much less for resolving questions concerning 
the extent to which constraints in the pursuit of ensuring other public goods are 
justifiable.1 Turning then to the second point of elucidation, the thesis’s specific focus 
on privacy interests, and not more ‘mainstream’ criminal procedure rights, will be 
explained.  
 
1. A Criminological Theory and Penal Policy Context 
Over the last three decades the capacity of public authorities to interfere with the 
privacy related interests of those subject to the criminal process has increased 
																																								 																				
1 Public or common goods, as referred to in this thesis, relate to those goods that are not the sum of the 
good of individuals but to those goods which serve the interests of people generally in a conflict-free, non-
exclusive and non-excludable way. See J. Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1994) 52. These broadly defined goods serve the importance of our ‘lives in common’ in liberal 
democratic thinking. See J. Horder, Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law (8th edn. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016) 49.  
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exponentially. However, the relationship between the rapid development of privacy 
eroding technologies and their use against those subject to the criminal justice 
process is complex. Lyon has commented on how technological developments and 
social processes mutually shape one another ‘co-constructing’ surveillance.2 As the 
technological means to subject individuals to intrusive scrutiny advance, they shape 
the ways in which crime is controlled; in turn, the changing nature of the agencies 
responsible for controlling crime (integrated within larger sociocultural shifts) has a 
role to play in driving the development of particular policing technologies.3 Whilst 
privacy interfering measures targeted against suspected offenders are often accepted 
as a necessary function of the police for the prevention of disorder or crime, their 
proliferation as a tool in the fight against crime over the last twenty years has taken 
place in the context of broader socio-political and economic changes in society. 
Compelling accounts have emerged to explain why advances in such technology in 
post-industrial societies have led to the proliferation of their use against those 
subject to the criminal process.  
 
In his seminal work, Discipline and Punish, Foucault describes Bentham’s Panopticon 
as the architectural form of disciplinary power. The Panopticon is a prison designed 
with a watchtower in the centre where the guards can constantly observe the 
transparent cells around the circumference of the prison whilst concealing 
themselves, thereby creating the aura of omnipresence.4 For Foucault, this design 
was emblematic of the disciplinary society. This invisibility, for Foucault, was crucially 
important to the maintenance of order; it led the subjects to internalise the idea that 
they could be under observation at any time, and thus to self-regulate:  
Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of 
conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of 
power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, 
even if it is discontinuous in its action; that the perfection of power should tend 
to render its actual exercise unnecessary; that this architectural apparatus 
																																								 																				
2 D. Lyon, ‘Surveillance Technology and Surveillance Society’ in T. Misa, P. Brey, and A. Feenberg (eds.) 
Modernity and Technology (Boston: MIT Press, 2003) 161-184 at 178. 
3 ibid at 178. 
4 J. Bentham, Proposal for a New and Less Expensive Mode of Employing and Reforming Convicts (London, 
1792).  
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should be a machine for creating and sustaining a power relation independent 
of the person who exercises it; in short, that the inmates should be caught up 
in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers.5  
 
Foucault terms the effect of this permanent surveillance, and the automatic 
functioning of this disembodied power, ‘panopticism’.  Whilst Bentham presented the 
Panopticon as an architectural design for a particular institution, Foucault viewed it as 
‘the diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form.’6 For Foucault, the 
Panopticon is a figure of political technology detached from any specific use, such as 
the prison model described by Bentham:  
There are two images, then, of discipline. At one extreme, the discipline-
blockade, the enclosed institution, established on the edges of society, turned 
inwards towards negative functions: arresting evil, breaking communications, 
suspending time. At the other extreme, with panopticism, is the discipline 
mechanism: a functional mechanism that must improve the exercise of power 
by making it lighter, more rapid, more effective, a design of subtle coercion for 
a society to come.7 
 
This society to come was to be the disciplinary society, where power relations were 
maintained through panopticism. According to Foucault, whilst the laws in modern 
society appear to fix limits on the exercise of power; through panopticism, the 
disciplines operate on the ‘underside of the law’. Panopticism goes beyond the limits 
of the law: ‘whereas the juridical systems define juridical subjects according to 
universal norms, the disciplines characterise, classify, specialise; they distribute 
along a scale, around a norm, hierarchise individuals in relation to one another and, 
if necessary, disqualify and invalidate.’8 
 
Panoticism, then, operates as a parallel law. It regulates and disciplines those in 
society beyond the extent of the formal law. Surveillance and other risk management 
techniques are important to maintain order in such a society, not only because they 
allow public authorities to monitor individuals in society, maintaining order through 
the effective investigation and prosecution of those who violate the law; but also 
																																								 																				
5 M. Foucault (A. Sheridan trans.), Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (London: Penguin, 1997. 
Originally published 1975) 201. 
6 ibid 205. 
7 ibid 209. 
8 ibid 223. 
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because they give the impression of omnipresence. Surveillance is one way in which 
discipline is exercised in society. If one does not know when one is being subject to 
surveillance, and more importantly, when one is not, but knows that it is possible at 
any time, then one inscribes the power relation between surveiller and surveilled 
upon oneself, becoming the principle of one’s own subjection.  
 
In short, for Foucault, discipline is a mode of governance: it renders populations 
measurable through categorisation, separation, and sorting into hierarchies and 
power relations. Panopticism is a function that maintains these hierarchies and power 
relations by creating among individuals in society a sense that they may be subject 
to surveillance or other forms of monitoring or management, at any time. This 
Foucauldian conception of how power operates in society goes beyond the traditional 
notion that the state holds power and wields it over society; in disciplinary society, 
power relations subdivide between institutions and a range of official actors. This 
suggests that the policing measures under study in this analysis may have a wider 
role than simply to help state authorities detect and prosecute serious crime. More 
than just a tool for observation, panopticism transforms the individual’s relation with 
him or herself, to maintain discipline in society. Thus, the well-documented use of 
such policing measures and the laws permitting their use may serve the function of 
maintaining discipline. 
 
Foucault’s account of how changes in criminal justice and crime control can be 
situated in a wider context has been widely influential. In particular, Foucault’s work 
drew attention to the nature of surveillance and the subtle role it plays in governing 
populations. Building on Foucault’s theorising, Shearing and Stenning observe how 
more recently discipline and order are driven by the ‘instrumental’ aims of private 
corporations.9 Using the example of how order is maintained in Disney World, 
Shearing and Stenning show that control is deeply embedded in the architecture of 
																																								 																				
9 C. Shearing and P. Stenning, ‘Say “Cheese”!: The Disney Order that is not so Mickey Mouse’ in C. 
Shearing and P. Stenning (eds.), Private Policing (California: Sage, 1987) 317-323. 
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the site so that it is invisible yet ever-present and pervasive.10 Other criminologists 
have drawn upon ‘governmentality’ literature to explore how prevailing modes of 
governance in society can account for the ‘need’ to develop and deploy ever-more 
intrusive surveillance methods against those subject to the criminal justice process.11 
Whilst these accounts differ to varying degrees in what they describe as the 
fundamental processes at work which have led to these modern crime control 
techniques, they all attempt to explain changing criminal justice and crime control 
orientated policies in a social context. Such endeavours are important. Social and 
cultural changes inevitably impact upon policing, security and crime control.  
 
For Feeley and Simon, the ever-increasing use of surveillance and other information 
gathering, processing, and disseminating practices which function as crime control 
mechanisms are symptoms of a paradigm shift from the ‘old penology’, with its focus 
on the identification, prosecution, punishment, and treatment of offenders, to the 
‘new penology’, which is concerned with managing and classifying groups in terms of 
the danger they pose.12 In the latter, probability calculations based on the traits of 
the person or group take precedence over individualised evidence-based suspicions 
that a crime has been committed. As a result, justice is becoming more ‘actuarial’ as 
it focuses on assessing risks and controlling crime pre-emptively. Policing strategies 
have increasingly focused on managing different groups within society and managing 
the risks they pose to social order. Evidence of this paradigm shift might be found in 
the increased use of mass surveillance and profiling techniques that have become 
more ubiquitous over the last thirty years.  
 
																																								 																				
10 ibid at 322. 
11 K. Stenson and R. Sullivan, Crime, Risk and Justice: The Politics of Crime Control in Liberal Democracies 
(Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 2001). 
12 M. Feeley and J. Simon, ‘Actuarial Justice: The Emerging New Criminal Law’ in D. Nelken (ed.) The 
Futures of Criminology (London: Sage, 1994) 173-202 at 175. 
6	
	
These trends are also said to be indicative of a broader societal transition towards the 
‘risk society.’13 Giddens, drawing on Beck, defines the concept as ‘a society 
increasingly preoccupied with the future (and also with safety), which generates the 
notion of risk.’14 This occurs because modern societies are subject to new risks as a 
result of the modernisation process itself. Giddens terms these types of risk 
‘manufactured’. Examples of such risks include those associated with nuclear energy, 
or human driven climate change. The emergence of such ‘manufactured’ risks has led 
to changes in the way societies organise themselves in order to defuse and manage 
such threats.15 Thus, with the introduction of these manufactured threats to human 
society, social relations have changed. One consequence is said to be that 
widespread consideration is given to precaution and preventive measures to reduce 
risk levels in society.16   
 
In the context of policing, Ericson and Haggerty argued that risk serves a dual 
function of identifying both problem and procedure.17 Firstly, risk identifies deviant 
groups or individuals as ‘risky’. Then risk analysis offers procedures and technologies 
for managing the dangers posed by risky populations. These categorisations 
perpetually sort people and organisations in terms of whether they are more or less 
efficient, useful, or qualified instead of focusing on the moral blameworthiness of 
individuals. Ericson and Haggerty invoke the metaphor of a ‘transmission society’ to 
describe this process:  
It regulates the pace of contributions to society by rating credentials, personal 
handicaps, creditworthiness, productivity and so on … Some people are 
destined for the autobahn, others relegated to highways with speed limits, and 
still others to local roads with speed bumps.18 
 
																																								 																				
13 See generally U. Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London, Sage Publications 1992); A. 
Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998); U. Beck, 
World at Risk (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008) 1-47; A. Edwards and G. Hughes, ‘The Preventive Turn and 
the Promotion of Safer Communities in England and Wales’ in A. Crawford (ed.) Crime Prevention Policies 
in Comparative Perspective (Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 2009) 62-85; A. Williams and M. Nash, ‘The 
Realities of Legislating Against and Protecting the Public from Risky Groups’ in K. McCartan, Responding to 
Sexual Offending: Perceptions, Risk Management and Public Protection (London: Palgrave, 2014) 1-19; A. 
Ashworth and L. Zedner, Preventive Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).  
14 Giddens, n 13, 3.  
15 ibid. 
16 R. Hopkins-Burke, An Introduction to Criminological Theory (3rd edn. Cullompton: Willan, 2009) 315.  
17 R. Ericson and K. Haggerty, Policing the Risk Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 39.  
18 ibid 40.  
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This ‘risk society’ relies on information to sort individuals into categories based on the 
risks they pose to order. In risk society, the focus of the police shifts from repressive 
and deterrent measures to control those who have violated the criminal law, rooted 
in moral considerations, to a focus on surveillance to produce knowledge of 
populations for the purpose of administering them based on the level of risk posed. 
Thus, surveillance is a tool used throughout society to organise populations and 
manage the risks they pose to other populations and society itself. Those populations 
that pose the most significant risk will be subject to the surveillance systems of the 
police, welfare, and mental health services among others; whilst those populations 
that pose lesser risks, and in turn receive more trust, are subject to the less intrusive 
regulatory and surveillance systems of taxation, education, licensing, and health 
services.19 Thus, risk drives crime control policy and furthers technological 
innovations with disciplinary potential. More recently, commentators such as Kohler-
Hausmann have noted how the police are increasingly functioning to control sections 
of the population without pursuing a criminal conviction or imposing a criminal 
sanction.20 According to Kohler-Hausmann, penal power can effectively operate 
without the pursuit of criminal convictions as information recorded about individuals 
as part of a non-adjudicative criminal process (e.g. arrest records) can be used to 
assess, evaluate, and manage the individual now and into the future.21 
 
Criminologists have advanced numerous theories which attempt to grasp how social 
changes have affected penal policy and administration. The present discussion cannot 
cover them all. However, one consistent theme in the literature is that crime control 
has increasingly become a more proactive, pre-emptive, and preventive pursuit. 
Questions remain as to whether or not shifting policing priorities which focus on 
economic rationality, the management of risk, and the prioritisation of controlling 
																																								 																				
19 ibid 41.  
20 See generally B.E. Harcourt, Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial Age 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007); I. Kohler-Hausmann, ‘Misdemeanor Justice: Control Without 
Conviction’ (2013) 119 American Journal of Sociology 351-393 at 353; A. Ristroph, Regulation or 
Resistance? A Counter-Narrative of Constitutional Criminal Procedure (2015) 95 Boston University Law 
Review 1555-1617. 
21 Kohler-Hausmann, ibid; Ristroph, ibid 1557-1565. 
8	
	
populations, unduly undermine the privacy interests of those subject to the criminal 
justice process. Criminological theories explain social trends in crime control and 
also, inevitably, raise the question: so what? That is to say, what is the impact that 
social and technological developments have on the way individuals experience 
policing? Do they, as one might assume, adversely affect the fundamental rights of 
those identified as ‘risky’? And, if so, can such strategies be squared with the due 
process values which underpin liberal democratic criminal justice systems?  
 
This thesis aims to fill at least some of the normative gap left behind by this body of 
literature. It focuses on the impact such changes have had on individuals 
investigated in connection with, but not convicted of, a criminal offence. Such 
individuals fall outside the remit of the legitimate role of various criminal justice 
agencies in censuring and sanctioning individuals for criminal wrongs. However, as 
we shall see, such individuals can be particularly vulnerable to privacy interferences. 
They can lawfully be subject to a range of coercive measures as part of the evidence-
gathering process and, increasingly, as part of police attempts to manage and 
monitor any future risks they might pose to society. Often measures geared towards 
the latter aims can infringe on the fundamental rights of the individual long after the 
conclusion of the proceedings in which he or she was initially an object of official 
suspicion or inquiry.  
 
2. Why Privacy Now?  
Legal commentators have predominantly focused on the effects that social changes 
have on ‘mainstream’ criminal procedure rights, such as the right to liberty and fair 
trial rights, rather than on privacy.22 This is unsurprising given that many of the 
																																								 																				
22 See, for example, S. Trechsel, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006); J.McEwan, ‘From Adversarialism to Managerialism: Criminal Justice in Transition’ (2011) 31 Legal 
Studies 519-546; Ashworth and Zedner, n 13, 51-72; L. Weber, E. Fishwick, and M. Marmo, Crime, Justice 
and Human Rights (New York: Palgrave, 2014) 129-147; A. Amatrudo and L.W. Blake, Human Rights and 
the Criminal Justice System (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015) 18-34. There are, of course, some 
commentators that have focused on how social changes can present a threat to back privacy interests in 
the context of criminal proceedings: K. Starmer, Criminal Justice, Police Powers and Human Rights 
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protections that regulate the fair treatment of defendants do, incidentally at least, 
protect privacy interests. For example, whilst the legal principles of the right of 
silence, the privilege against self-incrimination, and rules governing the admissibility 
of improperly obtained evidence primarily operate to ensure due process and limit 
miscarriages of justice,23 they also protect privacy interests by regulating the conduct 
of police in searches, interviews, and other investigatory activities. However, in the 
context of movements towards pro-active, intelligence-led styles of policing, which 
focus not only on ensuring effective prosecutions, but also on the management of 
risky sub-populations, questions remain as to whether a focus on these procedural 
rights is sufficient to fully understand the normative consequences of such changes. 
Ristroph, for example, suggests that traditional procedural guarantees focus primarily 
on the resistance of state punishment and miscarriages of justice; relegating 
constraints on coercive policing to a subsidiary consideration.24 Indeed, in many of 
the cases to be considered in this thesis, the coercive activities of the police are not 
geared towards any form of criminal prosecution. Rather, they are focused on 
intelligence gathering, crime prevention, and the management of individuals and 
groups who, despite not being convicted of any criminal offence, are, for whatever 
reason, considered by the police to be legitimate targets of such measures. Miller has 
observed how such non-adjudicative exercises of police coercion are often under-
regulated to the detriment of the due process rights of the individuals targeted by 
such measures.25 Drawing on policing scholarship, Miller outlines various functions of 
the police role which are adjudication-independent:  
Much police activity on the street does not aim at criminal prosecution or the 
imposition of criminal punishment, but instead seeks to impose non-criminal 
sanctions, to identify individuals as subject to surveillance, to report individuals 
to coordinate state institutions outside the criminal justice system, to resolve 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																					
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 80-94; B. v.S-T. Larsen, Setting the Watch: Privacy and the Ethics 
of CCTV Surveillance (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011). 
23 J. Jackson, ‘Re-Conceptualizing the Right of Silence as an Effective Fair Trial Standard’ (2009) 58 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 835-861; P. Roberts, ‘Groundwork for a Jurisprudence of 
Criminal Procedure’ in R. A. Duff and S.P. Green (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013) 379-408. 
24 See generally Ristroph, n 20. 
25 E. Miller, ‘Challenging Police Discretion’ (2015) 58 Howard Law Journal 521-556 at 522-524; E. Miller, 
‘Policing Criminal Justice: A Fair Cop and a Fair Trial’ (2016) Unpublished conference paper at: Obstacles 
to Fairness in Criminal Proceedings, University of Nottingham, September 1-2, Nottingham. 
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petty disputes, to pre-empt public wrongdoing, to restore public order, and so 
on.26 
 
In England and Wales, the use of such measures is often challenged on the grounds 
that they constitute a violation of the individual’s right to respect for private life 
under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, Article 8 
legitimises the use of such measures for many of these non-adjudicative, preventive 
policing purposes. Where a measure which interferes with the Article 8 rights of the 
individual is considered lawful and necessary it may be used by the police if, through 
its use, the police aim to prevent disorder or crime.27 Thus, where lawful, 
proportionate, and necessary, the police may deploy the tools of criminal justice not 
only to remediate wrongdoing or disorder, but to obviate it.28 
 
Most forms of electronic surveillance, including the targeted use of CCTV cameras, 
Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking, and phone tapping can be used not only to 
investigate crimes that have been committed, but also to gather intelligence on the 
movements of individuals and groups with a view to preventing future criminal 
activities.  The police also construct databases containing the personal information of 
individuals who have usually been categorised based on some information which is 
thought to make them worthy targets of such ‘dataveillance’.29 The UK National DNA 
Database (NDNAD), for example, holds DNA and fingerprint samples taken from 
those arrested for recordable criminal offences, which are retained for varying 
lengths of time depending on the seriousness of the offence, the disposal, and the 
age of the arrestee. Other police databases contain intelligence reports and records 
of individuals belonging to particular subsets of the population for numerous reasons, 
such as their political affiliations, participation in protest movements, or association 
with known offenders. Such non-adjudicatory information may also be disclosed to 
employers, public authorities, or even members of the public in order to prevent 
																																								 																				
26 Miller, ‘Policing Criminal Justice: A Fair Cop and a Fair Trial’, ibid 4. 
27 Harcourt, n 20, 77-80. 
28 Miller, ‘Policing Criminal Justice: A Fair Cop and a Fair Trial’, n 25, 5. 
29 See generally, D. Lyon (ed.), Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy risk and digital discrimination (New 
York: Routledge, 2003).  
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crime or disorder. For example, Enhanced Criminal Records Certificates, which are 
disclosed to employers where an individual seeks to work in certain positions of trust, 
may contain non-conviction information contained in police records pertaining to 
previous arrests, investigations, or convictions of known associates.30 Moreover, the 
Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme permits the police, in certain circumstances, to 
disclose non-conviction information about the individual to his or her partner, or a 
concerned third party, if based on the information stored in their records the police 
determine that the partner is at risk of falling victim to domestic violence.31 
 
It is not suggested here that all non-adjudicative applications of legitimate police 
coercion will necessarily set back privacy interests. For example, if the police were to 
impose containment measures to ensure the orderly running of a public protest, this 
non-adjudicative coercion would, on the face of it, limit the contained individuals’ 
exercise of their liberty interests and not necessarily their privacy related interests. 
However, many non-adjudicative measures will involve some interference with what 
might broadly be described as privacy related interests. It is, therefore, important 
that the domestic legal framework regulating the use of such measures recognises 
and affords adequate protection to these interests. However, a defensible normative 
model, against which the domestic legal framework might be measured, cannot be 
developed through criminological theorising alone. Instead, attention to the 
underlying normative structure, values, and priorities of liberal democratic societies is 
required. This thesis aims to fill some of the normative gaps, which cannot be 
addressed through criminological theorising and are left largely undiscussed in 
criminal procedure scholarship. The exposition is structured as follows:  
 
Chapter 1 reflects on the concept of privacy. It lays the theoretical foundations for 
the thesis, giving an account of how we should approach questions concerning the 
scope, content, and value of the concept. This analysis reveals that, to overcome the 
																																								 																				
30 Disclosure and Barring Service, A Guide to Eligibility for DBS Checks (London: OGL, 2015) 1. 
31 P. Strickland, Clare’s Law: The Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme (London: House of Commons 
Library, 2013).  
12	
	
difficulties theorists have had with defining privacy, it is important to recognise that 
privacy is a pluralistic concept. This approach recognises that privacy interests are 
not amenable to a narrow, monistic definition; they are broad, covering a range of 
considerations that are often distinct, yet related in the sense that they limit the 
extent to which the individual can be accessed by others. From here, it is argued that 
privacy has value relative to the function it serves in a particular context. Whilst the 
value of privacy may be ranked differently depending on one’s broader commitments 
in political morality, Chapter 1 concludes that privacy is an important social and 
individual value for all who view individual well-being as a central concern. 
 
Building on this philosophical analysis, Chapter 2 assesses the impact of Article 8 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights and the associated jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), both in terms of its interpretation of the 
scope of the right to respect for private life, and the framework Article 8 offers for 
weighting privacy interests against competing societal claims and aims. The chapter 
outlines the structure and scope of Article 8. It reveals how the scope of ‘private life’ 
has expanded over the last quarter of a century. The merits of a broad interpretation 
of ‘private life’ are stressed. The ECtHR’s approach to resolving conflicts between 
Article 8 and other interests is then analysed. This chapter concludes that, despite 
some flaws, the ECtHR’s approach to interpreting Article 8, considered in general 
terms, offers a rational structure for resolving tensions between privacy and the 
legitimate functions of public authorities. 
 
Chapter 3 focuses specifically on the privacy interests of those subject to a criminal 
process. It maps the different ways in which privacy interests are set back as part of 
this process before summarising the key interpretive principles in the jurisprudence 
of the ECtHR in three areas: (i) where personal information is collected from those 
subject to the criminal process, or they are subject to physically invasive measures; 
(ii) where personally identifiable information is retained or processed by the police; 
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and (iii) where such information is disseminated by the police. The first three 
chapters, taken together, establish a conceptual and normative framework for 
assessing the adequacy of the domestic law. The subsequent three chapters develop 
this assessment, focussing on three areas of activity: (i) overt photography; (ii) DNA 
and fingerprint retention; and (iii) Enhanced Criminal Record Certificate disclosure. 
These areas were selected to illuminate a broad typology of different privacy 
interferences. 
 
Chapter 4 considers the extent to which the privacy interests of those overtly 
photographed by police as they occupy publicly accessible space are recognised and 
protected in England and Wales. The focus is on elucidating how such photography is 
used against those subject to the criminal justice process, and on how such targeted 
surveillance is regulated under the domestic law of England and Wales. In particular, 
the degree to which domestic law and operational practices comply with the 
normative philosophical framework and ECHR norms expounded in the previous 
chapters is assessed.  
 
Chapter 5 focuses on issues pertaining to the retention and processing of personal 
information. In particular, the legislative framework regulating the retention of DNA 
and fingerprint data taken from those subject to the criminal process is subjected to 
critical scrutiny. The chapter documents legal and political developments in this area, 
from the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to the Protection of Freedoms Act 
2012. This section highlights a lack of recognition of how DNA and fingerprint data 
retention sets back privacy related interests, and assesses the extent to which the 
domestic legal framework poses an unjustified threat to the privacy interests of those 
subject to the criminal process.  
 
Chapter 6 focuses on the disclosure of non-conviction information as part of an 
Enhanced Criminal Record Certificate (ECRC). This sets out and examines the current 
14	
	
legal framework regulating such disclosures in all its complexity. The aim is to assess 
the legal framework regulating the dissemination of such information by the police in 
terms of how it recognises and protects the privacy interests of those subject to such 
disclosure. In contrast to DNA and fingerprint retention, the domestic law has, for the 
most part, consistently recognised that the disclosure of non-conviction information 
stored in police records represents a serious affront to privacy interests. This chapter 
raises concerns regarding inconsistencies in the way the law has been applied in this 
area. 
 
The thesis concludes that in each of the specific areas considered in detail, English 
law fails fully to appreciate and protect the privacy interests at stake when the police 
use non-adjudicative measures against those subject to the criminal process. This is 
due to myriad factors ranging from the political climate over the last twenty years to 
a general view of privacy as an individual right, and the lack of recognition for its 
social value as an aspect of the common good. Whilst there are signs of an increasing 
recognition of the need to respect the privacy of those subject to the criminal 
process, the thesis argues that the balance between such interests and competing 
aims and values needs to be redressed and considered afresh. 
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1 The Theoretical Foundations of Privacy 
 
This chapter surveys philosophical literature on the scope and value of privacy. It 
explores key philosophical debates surrounding privacy and explains why it is both an 
important and contested concept in moral and political philosophy. The chapter 
suggests that privacy is significant as a moral, political, and jurisprudential concept in 
contemporary liberal democracies. It demonstrates that to exist in a condition of 
privacy is important for a number of collective and individual ends. These ends are 
broad and diverse. Thus, the value of privacy can only be determined through an 
assessment of the function it serves in a particular context. This theoretical 
conclusion motivates the rest of the thesis where the interplay between privacy 
interests and competing interests in different criminal justice contexts will be 
considered.  
 
The task for this chapter is twofold. Part 1 surveys different approaches to defining 
privacy. It attempts to ascertain the scope of the concept. This part proposes that 
privacy is best understood as a condition of limited access. It also charts some of the 
problems theorists have encountered when attempting to define privacy. The 
reductionist position, that the task of defining privacy should be abandoned, will be 
rejected. I conclude that privacy is a pluralistic concept. To exist in a condition of 
privacy can mean different things, and the extent to which one can be said to exist in 
such a condition can only be assessed contextually. The definition offered here is 
necessarily broad, reflecting the diversity of ways in which privacy interests can be 
engaged. This understanding of privacy recognises that the scope of the concept 
changes depending on other contextual factors.  
 
This primarily expository chapter clarifies basic concepts and establishes the 
theoretical foundations for the argument developed in the thesis. Part 2 of the 
chapter explores the value of privacy. It contains two subsections. The first looks at 
the content of the concept and the values privacy protection can further. Several 
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accounts of the value of privacy are considered. These can be grouped as autonomy-
based accounts and dignity-based accounts. Privacy can enrich both personal 
autonomy and dignity. However, the normative value of privacy is not constant. 
Indeed, in many cases violations of privacy can be detrimental to both the individual 
and society. From here, a number of competing theories on where the value of 
privacy should rank next to other competing interests are surveyed. This analysis 
shows that the ranking of privacy depends on one’s broader commitments in political 
morality. Nonetheless, this section concludes that the protection of privacy is 
important for all in contemporary liberal societies.	
 
1. What is Privacy?  
The scope of the concept of privacy has been fiercely contested in philosophical 
literature over the last century.32 However, this controversy has not prevented it 
from being credited with underpinning a range of normative interests such as the 
interest in controlling personal information about oneself;33 control over access to the 
self;34 and the interest in developing social relationships.35 This situation led Gerety 
to observe that, to its detriment, privacy has ‘a protean capacity to be all things to all 
lawyers.’36 This part surveys a number of prominent attempts to conceptualise 
privacy since the turn of the twentieth century. In doing so, it highlights some of the 
difficulties with defining privacy and aims to bring clarity to discussions of the 
normative significance of when an individual’s privacy is threatened. It is from this 
vantage point that we can begin to consider what is at stake when privacy interests 
are threatened, and explain the value of privacy. This part assesses some of the 
strengths and weaknesses with conventional attempts to account for the essence and 
scope of privacy. These attempts are broadly categorised as follows: (i) claim-based 
																																								 																				
32 See A. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York: Atheneum, 1967) 7; J.C. Inness, Privacy, Intimacy, and 
Isolation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) 3-5. 
33 Westin, ibid, 7.  
34 H. Gross, ‘Privacy and Autonomy’ in J. Chapman and J. Penncok (eds.), Nomos XIII, Privacy (New York: 
Artherton, 1971) 169-182 at 169. 
35 J. Rachels, ‘Why Privacy is Important’ (1975) 14 Philosophy & Public Affairs 323-333. 
36 T. Gerety, ‘Redefining Privacy’ (1977) 12 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 233-297 at 234.  
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definitions; (ii) control-based definitions; (ii) condition-based definitions; (iv) 
reductionism; and (v) the pluralistic contextual approach.  
 
1.1 Privacy as a Claim 
Claim-based conceptions tend to assert that privacy is a claim or right which is 
positively asserted by the individual. Perhaps the most prominent claim-based 
conception of privacy derives from Warren and Brandeis’ celebrated 1890 article, The 
Right to Privacy.37 Privacy, according to Warren and Brandeis, should be defined as 
‘the right to be let alone’;38 but the authors did not elaborate much further on what 
this meant, or on the scope of the concept. Warren and Brandeis’ conception of 
privacy has subsequently been invoked in US Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.39 
Despite this, the formulation of privacy as ‘the right to be let alone’ does little to give 
us a philosophical understanding of the scope and normative value of the concept. 
Instead of focussing on developing a conception of privacy, Warren and Brandeis’ 
article aimed at filling gaps in United States common law torts. The ‘right to be let 
alone’ conception is palpably too vague and imprecise for conceptual clarity. For 
example, behaviours that would not typically be associated with privacy, such as 
assaults or acts of vandalism, seem, on the face of it, to constitute privacy violations 
under Warren and Brandeis’ conception. 
 
The ‘right to be let alone’ definition focuses on the normative value of being let alone 
without giving due attention to the conceptual parameters of privacy. The argument 
is that the various interests an individual has in being let alone should be protected 
by a legal right to privacy. However, Judith Thomson draws attention to two 
conceptual problems with this interpretation. Firstly, this definition seems to ignore 
those privacy interferences which take place without interfering with the autonomous 
																																								 																				
37 S. Warren and L. Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1890) 4 Harvard Law Review 193-220.  
38 ibid at 195. 
39 See, for example, Eisenstadt v Baird (1972) 405 U.S. 438, 454; Stanley v Georgia (1969) 394 U.S. 557, 
564. 
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action of the individual. According to Thomson: ‘The police might say, ”We grant we 
used a special X-ray device on Smith, so as to be able to watch him through the walls 
of his house… but we let him strictly alone: we didn’t touch him, we didn’t even go 
near him – our devices operate at a distance.”’40 This, according to Thomson, 
highlights a flaw in the ‘right to be let alone’ definition. Thomson argues that privacy 
invasions may occur without any interference with the individual’s autonomous action 
taking place.  
 
Thomson proposes that attempts to define privacy as a specific claim are too 
ambitious and that a better alternative would be to establish what constitutes a 
privacy violation, why this is the case, and what, if anything, would justify labelling 
something an invasion of privacy.41 The concerns raised by Thomson may also apply 
to other claim-based definitions of privacy. The difficulty of identifying the specific 
qualities of a claim-based definition of privacy is exemplified in the scepticism 
expressed by English common lawyers at the prospect of developing a legal tort of 
privacy.42  
 
Westin suggests that ‘privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to 
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to others.’43 However, definitions which view privacy as a claim to 
determine how one’s information is communicated to others are criticised for being 
too narrow and for leaving privacy at the discretion of the individual.44 Solove 
highlights why it may be problematic to define privacy as an individual’s claim to 
information, pointing out that such a conception of privacy may fail to account for 
aspects of privacy that are not informational, such as bodily or proprietary privacy.45 
																																								 																				
40 J. J. Thomson, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1975) 4 Philosophy & Public Affairs 295-314 at 295. 
41 ibid at 296. 
42 This scepticism is well encapsulated in the following comment from Mummery LJ: ‘As to the future I 
foresee serious definitional difficulties and conceptual problems in the judicial development of a 
“blockbuster” tort vaguely embracing such a potentially wide range of situations.’ Home Department v 
Wainwright [2002] QB 1334 at [60].  
43 Westin, n 32, 7.  
44 D. Solove, ‘Conceptualising Privacy’ (2002) 90 California Law Review 1088-1154. 
45 ibid. 
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One overarching problem with the claim-based definitions of privacy is that it is 
difficult to determine the scope of the claim to privacy. These difficulties constitute no 
fatal objection to the theory that privacy is a claim of some sort. Rather they put the 
onus on the proponents of such definitions to elaborate on the detail of what should 
be protected by such a claim and the practical implications of their elucidation.46 
Crucially, claim-based understandings of privacy do not appreciate the complex and 
multifarious nature of the relationship between consent and losses of privacy. 
According to McCloskey, claim-based definitions imply that the self-disclosure of 
personal information involves no invasion or loss of privacy and that habituation to 
invasions; and further losses of privacy that lead to acquiescence or consent to such 
invasions, causes them to become neither invasions nor losses of privacy.47 For 
example, the proliferation of social networking and social media, along with advances 
in surveillance and data monitoring technologies, has led to vast numbers of people 
freely accepting significant inroads into their privacy.48 However, on a claim-based 
definition, privacy is no longer at issue so long as the individual has relinquished his 
or her claim to privacy. This does not seem to capture the essence of the concept or 
its normative significance.  
 
1.2 Is Privacy a Control of Realms?  
Others have characterised privacy in terms of the ‘control’ it affords to the 
individual. Fried argued that privacy is ‘not simply an absence of information about 
us in the minds of others; rather it is the control we have over information about 
ourselves.’49 On this view, to have privacy is to have control over personal 
information. This definition of privacy may also be too narrow. With its focus on 
information, Fried’s conception of privacy overlooks aspects of privacy that are not 
informational and instead concern access to intimate parts of the body. More 
																																								 																				
46 H.J. McCloskey, ‘Privacy and the Right to Privacy’ (1980) 55 Philosophy 17-38 at 23. 
47 ibid at 23. 
48 JUSTICE, Freedom from Suspicion: Surveillance reform for a digital age (London: JUSTICE, 2011) 82. 
49 C. Fried, ‘Privacy’ (1968) 77 Yale Law Journal 475-493 at 482 (emphasis in original).  
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recent variations on this theme focus on the control over access to the self.50 
These perspectives tend to draw on Goffman’s The Presentation of Self in 
Everyday Life, and the idea that, to flourish, the individual needs to have control 
over the discrepant roles which are said to make up his or her everyday 
interactions with others.51 Privacy is the control over presentation or access to the 
self, and is said to be useful for a range of normative ends. 
 
These conceptions cover a more diverse range of privacy interests than controlling 
personal information. The control-over-access-to-the-self and control-over-the-
presentation-of-self conceptions can capture objectionable incursions into the 
personal space of an individual, which may or may not concern information that is 
personally identifiable to the individual. For example, where an individual is subject 
to covert observation whilst getting undressed, such an observation may be 
considered a privacy related intrusion as it circumvents measures the individual 
might have taken to control who does and does not have access to him or her, but it 
does not necessarily relate to information. Even if the observer gleans no novel 
information about the individual, the observation removes the individual’s control 
over who can and cannot observe him or her. Thus, it may engage privacy interests.  
 
In focusing solely on ‘control’, these conceptions nonetheless unduly limit the scope 
of the concept, overlooking circumstances where privacy exists beyond the control of 
the individual. For example, if an individual is placed in solitary confinement 
(assuming the individual is not subject to surveillance or other forms of monitoring), 
the individual is undoubtedly left in a condition of relative privacy, even though he or 
she has no control over this. Inness disagrees on this point, suggesting that privacy 
is a positively valued status and that, as such, an individual is not in a condition of 
																																								 																				
50 B. Röessler, The Value of Privacy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005) 116; A. von Hirsch, ‘The Ethics of 
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51 E. Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (London: Penguin, 1990) 87. 
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privacy when subject to such isolation.52 Inness derives her support for this position 
from what she describes as ‘our privacy intuitions and linguistic usage [of the 
concept]’.53 Inness suggests: ‘We can imagine a shipwrecked person running to her 
rescuer and offering thanks for the relief of her isolation, but it is awkward at best to 
imagine this person praising her rescuer for relieving her privacy.’54 The implication is 
that, with the absence of control over the isolation, the individual does not have 
privacy. However, the response of the person in this scenario seems to be based 
more on the relief one would feel at being rescued from such a grave situation as a 
shipwreck, than indicating anything about the value of privacy. Inness’ position 
commits her to suggesting that the shipwrecked person is somehow not in a 
condition of privacy. On the contrary, it seems that the enjoyment of privacy would 
be one of the few plus sides of finding oneself in the dreadful situation of the 
shipwreck. At least, it might be argued, the shipwrecked person can engage in 
whatever activities he or she chooses safe from the prying eyes of others. Indeed, it 
would seem to constitute a graver situation if the individual’s plight were to have 
privacy intrusions added. Let us imagine the shipwrecked person’s struggle for 
survival is covertly documented in all its grim detail and broadcast to anyone who 
should want to observe. Here, the individual has no less control than before, but is 
surely further removed from a condition of privacy than in the original scenario.55  
 
Several commentators with otherwise opposing views regarding the normative value 
of privacy agree that privacy is a form of control an individual can exercise in order 
to achieve a normative end. Gross argues that privacy is the control over 
acquaintance with one’s personal affairs.56 This means that privacy describes the 
limits an individual sets on his personal affairs which provide a physical area, or an 
area defined by social convention, in which the individual has exclusive control of 
access.  
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53 ibid 44. 
54 ibid. 
55 ibid.  
56 n 34 at 169.  
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Gross goes on to account for privacy’s normative value as integral to the promotion 
of self-determination and self-discovery.57 Parker expands on this definition, arguing 
that privacy is control over when and by whom various parts of us can be sensed by 
others.58 The ‘parts of us’ to which Parker refers include parts of our bodies, our 
voices, and objects that are closely associated with us such as material possessions; 
and by ‘sensed by others’ Parker means received through the senses (i.e. smelled, 
touched, seen, heard or tasted).59 
 
Parent contends that all such control-based definitions should be jettisoned:  
To see why … consider the example of a person who voluntarily divulges all 
sorts of intimate, personal and undocumented information about [her]self to a 
friend. She is doubtless exercising control … But we would not and should not 
say that in doing so she is preserving or protecting her privacy. On the 
contrary, she is voluntarily relinquishing much of her privacy.60  
 
Parent raises an interesting point. By divulging information about one’s self, an 
individual is exercising control over who he or she grants access to personal 
information, whilst seemingly relinquishing the ability to keep the information 
private. However, Moore replies that this does not undermine control-based 
definitions of privacy. Instead Moore suggests that when an individual yields control 
over such information to others the condition of privacy is diminished or no longer 
obtains.61 Therefore, to be in a condition of privacy is to have control of access to the 
self or information about the self regardless of whether, in exercising this control, 
you then cease to be in such a state.  
 
The premise that privacy describes an individual’s control over access to him or 
herself or personal information is accepted by all of the control-based definitions 
examined above. They state that privacy is the control over some X. However, these 
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59 ibid. 
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definitions have different normative connotations attached. They do not describe a 
condition of privacy as a situation where others simply do not have access to an 
individual or information about him or her. Such definitions refer to privacy as an 
access control to places, bodies, or personal information.62 One advantage of such 
control-based definitions of privacy is that they can incorporate different values 
associated with privacy. However, Thomson finds the premise underpinning control-
based definitions puzzling. She argues that whether or not someone has control is 
not important when attempting to establish a descriptive definition of privacy. In her 
counterexample, somebody possesses an X-ray device which enables him to look 
through walls - thereby depriving his neighbour of the control over who can see him 
in his home – but does not train the device on his neighbour’s house.63 With this 
example, Thomson shows that an individual can have privacy without having control 
of access because the man with the X-ray device has control of access to his 
neighbour but chooses not to exercise it. Thus, whilst the neighbour has lost control 
of access, no loss of privacy seems to have occurred. Control-based definitions posit 
that privacy necessarily requires some form of ‘control’. Such conceptions do not 
seem to adequately reflect the empirical reality of privacy.  
 
1.3 Condition-Based Definitions and the Neutral Conception 
of Privacy 
Allen views privacy as the condition of limited accessibility.64 On her account, ‘the 
conditions that “privacy” is properly used to describe are conditions in which, to some 
extent and in some respect, accessibility is restricted.’65 Other theorists have 
described privacy as ‘a condition of limited access to an individual’s life experiences 
and engagements,’66 and as ‘related to our concern over our accessibility to others: 
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65 ibid. 
66 D. O’Brien, Privacy, Law, and Public Policy (Santa Barbara: Praeger Publishers, 1979) 22. 
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the extent to which we are known to others, the extent to which others have physical 
access to us, and the extent to which we are the subject of others’ attention.’67 
 
Such theories have been criticised as falling back on the identification of universally 
accepted privacy-related interests, which, according to Hughes, simply do not 
correspond to the way we each experience privacy differently.68 Modern variations on 
the limited-access approach address this supposed shortcoming. Moreham 
conceptualises privacy as a condition of desired inaccess or ‘freedom from unwanted 
access.’69 In her own thoughtful conception, Hughes takes this further, drawing on 
social interaction theory to explicate how such inaccess is experienced and achieved 
in a social setting.70  
 
These accounts are illuminating as they extend beyond control to grasp why 
interferences with the personal space or solitude of another may constitute privacy 
invasions.71 In his taxonomy of privacy interferences, Solove describes the exposure 
of certain ‘primordial’ physical activities or attributes to others as a form of 
information dissemination which sets back privacy interests.72 For example, if a 
media outlet were to print pictures of an individual defecating or fornicating, this act 
might be said to diminish the individual’s privacy. However, it is not only when such 
information is disseminated to others that privacy is diminished. If, for example, an 
individual were to covertly observe another person as he or she took a shower, the 
continued observation of the individual diminishes privacy not (or at least not only) 
because information about the individual is being collected, but rather because 
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identifiable limits (the bathroom door, curtains, etc.) the individual has set on how he 
or she can be accessed whilst engaged in such an activity have been breached.73  
 
However, like the ‘right to be let alone’ conception, limited access conceptions of 
privacy tend to fall foul of the ‘too broad’ critique.74 That is to say, such theories tend 
not to differentiate between those forms of access that diminish privacy and those 
which do not. For example, if an individual subjects me to a passing glance as I walk 
down a public street, then he or she has gained some degree of access to me (i.e. 
through perceptual experience of me). However, any construction of a moral or legal 
protection to privacy stretching this far is bound to be as unworkable as it would be 
undesirable. This point does not defeat the notion that privacy is best conceived of as 
a condition of limited access. Rather it emphasises the need for any moral or 
jurisprudential protections based on this conception to contain a threshold criterion 
for determining the extent to which a measure limiting access is sufficiently serious 
to warrant justification. The details of how such a threshold might be established are 
discussed in subsequent chapters of the thesis. 
 
Gavison argues that a value-laden interpretation of the concept of privacy will 
potentially pre-empt inquiries into the normative value of privacy, and laws 
protecting privacy interests.75 To avoid this methodological problem, Gavison 
conceptualises privacy as a condition of life or as ‘a situation of an individual vis-à-vis 
others,’76 rejecting claim and control orientated definitions. This ‘neutral concept’ of 
privacy is not irreconcilable with claims or control in determining the normative value 
of privacy. Rather, the ‘neutral concept’ allows for any subsequent normative analysis 
to develop without just reiterating the normative aspects of the definition. Value-
laden interpretations of the concept of privacy potentially pre-empt important 
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definitional questions regarding what constitutes a condition of privacy. They also 
conflate the question of what constitutes a condition or state of privacy with 
questions concerning how that condition is, and should be, preserved or controlled.  
 
As a methodological starting point, Gavison suggests that a person is in complete 
privacy when he or she is completely inaccessible to others: ‘in perfect privacy no 
one has any information about X, no one pays any attention to X, and no one has 
physical access to X.’77 If X, and everything about X, were completely cut off from 
the rest of the world, then X would appear to be in a condition of perfect privacy. 
However, such an observation does not tell us much about the scope of privacy in 
terms of its essential characteristics. Therefore, whilst a definition which simply 
describes the condition of privacy can avoid pre-empting normative questions 
regarding the value of privacy, it is largely uninteresting.78 As Gavison acknowledges, 
the definition of privacy as a condition of splendid isolation does not resolve debates 
concerning the characteristics of privacy.79 Gavison suggests that, because this state 
of perfect privacy and the extremity of a complete loss of privacy are almost 
impossible in any society, we should turn our attention to losses of privacy.80 Here, 
Gavison argues that the crucial test for a proposed concept of privacy is its 
explanatory power in capturing the tenor of most privacy claims and in facilitating 
coherent reasoning for the legal protection of such claims.81   
 
The neutral conception of privacy outlined by Gavison is advantageous as it does not 
beg the question regarding the normative values protected by privacy. However, 
Gavison’s conception becomes too narrow when she identifies the three elements 
which constitute the ‘irreducible elements’ of privacy: secrecy, anonymity, and 
solitude.82 This conception seems to exclude Government interferences which might 
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82 ibid. 
27	
	
prohibit certain decisions regarding one’s health or sexual conduct, which do not 
seem to relate to matters of secrecy, anonymity or solitude.83 Moreover, a descriptive 
account of privacy as a form of splendid isolation does not offer much insight into 
privacy as a concept related to other similar, yet distinct, concepts such as dignity 
and autonomy. Gavison’s ‘neutral conception’ is simply too abstract to answer 
complicated questions about the scope of privacy, and to establish the unifying links 
between seemingly disparate types of interference with an individual’s privacy. Whilst 
the notion that privacy is a condition predicated on being withdrawn from others to 
some degree does help to burn off some of the fog which arises when normative and 
definitional aspects of privacy are conflated, the idea that privacy is a condition of 
limited access does little to assuage concerns that privacy is too unwieldly a 
concept.84 Thus, more is needed to clarify which types of access limit an individual’s 
privacy and which do not.  
 
The difficulties in outlining the conceptual parameters of privacy that have been 
encountered so far have led to calls to abandon the concept altogether. This 
reductionist position will now be considered.  
 
1.4 The Reductionist Challenge 
Addressing a series of failed attempts to conceptualise privacy in the preceding 
decade, Thomson observed in 1975 that ‘the most striking thing about the right to 
privacy is that nobody seems to have any clear idea what it is.’85 Referring to the 
moral right to privacy, Thomson suggested:  
[t]he right to privacy is itself a cluster of rights… it is not a distinct cluster of 
rights but itself intersects with the cluster which the right over the person 
consists in and also with the cluster of rights which owning property consists 
in.86 
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Thomson’s simplifying hypothesis presents one of the most prominent challenges to 
the notion that there exists a discernible moral right to privacy. This hypothesis 
proposes that privacy can be reduced to discussions of other rights from which the 
right to privacy derives. Thomson argues that most conceptions of privacy are too 
broad, too narrow, or both.87 According to Thomson, when justifying the claim to 
privacy in moral theory, privacy theorists ultimately refer to principles that are 
independent of privacy.88 This view is reductionist in that it views privacy as 
something that can be reduced to discussions of other rights and interests. Privacy, 
on this account, is a derivative concept with no discernible scope. Using the example 
of a person training an amplifier on her home to listen to a marital argument with her 
husband, Thomson seeks to demonstrate that, whilst this might traditionally be 
viewed as a violation of her right to privacy, the amplifier operator is in fact violating 
her right not to be surreptitiously listened to by unknown others, which is derivative 
of a cluster of rights Thomson describes as ‘the rights over the person and property 
rights.’89  
 
Thomson seeks to demonstrate that privacy can be reduced to a cluster of other 
rights, which intersect with one another. Thus, privacy is merely derivative of other 
‘grand’ concepts such as the right to liberty, the right not to be hurt, and property 
rights.90 So, whilst Thomson is not denying the existence of privacy, she argues that 
discussions of its scope are futile because it is conceptually incoherent and refers to a 
mesh of different claims.91 According to Thomson, this means for example that:  
I don’t have a right that no one shall torture me in order to get personal 
information about me because I have a right to privacy; … it is because I have 
these rights that I have a right to privacy.92 
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91 ibid at 309. 
92 ibid at 312. 
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Thomson concludes that, if she is correct, there is no need to settle disputes 
regarding the boundaries of the concept of privacy because it is possible to explain 
how we came to have each right in the right to privacy cluster without reference to 
the right to privacy.93 Thus, any discussions of the violation of privacy per se are 
superfluous. According to Thomson, discussions of the concept of privacy should be 
‘reduced’ to discussions of the other concepts from which privacy is merely 
derivative.  
 
The notion that discussions of the concept of privacy can be reduced to discussions of 
other concepts, such as property or autonomy, is certainly thought-provoking. If 
true, it suggests that philosophical attempts to conceptualise privacy are essentially 
futile. At first glance, the argument also seems to hold some water. Looking at 
another individual’s correspondence would typically be considered a privacy violation. 
It also can be described as a violation of a property right: ‘He tampered with my 
telephone line, and looked at my e-mails without permission.’ Similarly, interferences 
with the person typically described as privacy invasions might also be talked about in 
terms of rights over the person: ‘She filmed up my skirt!’ 
 
In her detailed critique of this reductionist challenge, Inness demonstrates that, 
whilst this relationship between privacy and other concepts is certainly plausible in at 
least some cases, privacy often extends beyond the particular claim of the right from 
which privacy is said to derive:  
To illustrate this, imagine that I have written a number of love letters to 
another person. By sending these letters to the person, I relinquish possession 
of them, yet although the letters are no longer mine, my privacy is still violated 
if my lover copies the letters and distributes them to others without my 
consent. In this case, my claim to privacy with respect to the love letters can be 
disconnected from ownership, the claim continuing to have a foundation even 
when my ownership rights have been relinquished (although we could clearly 
argue about the strength of the claim).94 
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Thomson focuses on the derivative normative value of the moral right to privacy 
without specifying a clear conception of privacy. This does not trouble Thomson 
because she suggests that there is no need for a clear conception of privacy as it is 
simply an umbrella term for a number of other related interests.95 However, Reiman 
replies that, even if privacy is derivative in the way that Thomson suggests it is 
(which is by no means self-evident), to conclude that there is thus no need to seek a 
conception of privacy is a non sequitur.96 Reiman makes the comparison between 
criminology and privacy, arguing that criminology is probably derivative of sociology, 
law, and other subjects in the same way that Thomson holds privacy to be derivative 
of other interests and rights to person and property. But this does not mean that 
there is no good reason to find a unifying theme of criminological studies or to 
establish the scope of criminology; the same goes for privacy.97 Whilst Thomson 
successfully demonstrates that privacy has a complicated relationship with a number 
of other interests and moral rights, this does not pre-empt discussions of the scope 
and boundaries of the concept of privacy or the significance of conceptual 
clarification.  
 
Thomson’s careful analysis made a significant contribution to debating the concepts 
of privacy, raising important questions regarding the relationship between privacy 
and other rights. It is clear that an individual’s privacy can be violated if his or her 
property or person is subjected to the unwanted scrutiny of another. This makes 
Thomson’s counter-intuitive argument seem appealing. However, from a closer 
analysis of the premises underpinning reductionism, two conclusions emerge. First, 
whilst privacy overlaps with other concepts, it seems to track dimensions of 
experience that cannot be captured through discussions of other, overlapping 
notions.98 Secondly, even if privacy is conceptually derivative, it is not clear that this 
is cause for abandoning the use of the concept or establishing its parameters in 
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relation to other concepts. The best understandings of the concept of privacy to 
emerge so far recognise that privacy is a term used to refer to a condition of limited 
access. The ways in which the individual can be accessed and thus removed from this 
condition vary in both type and degree. The next section shows how, from this 
conceptual baseline, the specific content of the concept must be determined 
contextually.  
 
1.5 A Method for Developing the Content of the Concept: 
The pluralistic contextual approach  
In response to the ‘disarray’ surrounding the concept of privacy, which was said to 
have become too large and nebulous to be of much use as a philosophical or legal 
concept,99 Solove draws on Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘family resemblances’100 to 
explain how, even though the concept of privacy has many different uses, these uses 
are related.101 Thus, privacy is a pluralistic concept. According to Solove, this 
approach represents the best way to overcome the problems of over-and/or under-
inclusiveness which have plagued attempts to conceptualise privacy in terms of a 
single common denominator. Solove observes that it is ‘no accident that various 
things are referred to under the rubric of “privacy.”’102 He argues that we should 
classify something as involving privacy when it bears resemblance to other things we 
classify in the same way. This, according to Solove, must be done at a certain level of 
generality, allowing the concept of privacy to ‘transcend the particularities of specific 
contexts and thus giving it wide-ranging applicability.’103 However, to avoid the 
problems of an overly-broad conception, Solove borrows from the philosophy of 
pragmatism104 to argue that the conceptualisation task should begin with a focus on 
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understanding privacy in specific contextual situations.105 This emphasis on the social 
context in which privacy issues arise is important when it comes to assessing the 
weight of an individual’s privacy interest against other interests in a particular 
situation. It recognises that privacy norms vary temporally and geographically.  
 
In another attempt to understand privacy as a pluralistic concept, Nissenbaum 
explicates a framework of contextual integrity, which, she suggests, captures the 
meaning of privacy.106 According to Nissenbaum, social activity is governed by 
context-relative norms, which regulate information in terms of ‘appropriateness’ and 
‘flow of distribution’.107 From this picture of social interaction, Nissenbaum concludes 
that we have a right to privacy, which she describes as a ‘right to live in a world 
where our expectations about the flow of personal information are, for the most part, 
met’.108 The contextual integrity framework ties adequate privacy protection to the 
norms of specific contexts. According to Nissenbaum, this conception can help 
overcome the problems of being unable to account for the value of privacy in public 
space, which are associated with previous accounts focusing on the control of 
information.  
 
Both Nissenbaum and Solove make compelling arguments regarding the significance 
of context. Indeed, to understand where the line should be drawn between privacy 
and countervailing interests, it is necessary to understand the circumstances of the 
particular situation. A number of commentators have drawn attention to cultural 
variations in privacy norms and have even suggested that cultural attitudes to 
privacy are so divergent as to undermine the usefulness of a unified concept.109 
Notably, Whitman argues that differences in privacy law in the United States and 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																					
‘Pragmatism’ in G. Gunn (ed.) Pragmatism and Other Writings (New York: Penguin Books, 2000, 1907) 24-
25. 
105 n 72, 47. 
106 n 71, 14. 
107 ibid 135-184. 
108 ibid 231. 
109 See D. Rosen, ‘Private Lives and Public Eyes: Privacy in the United States and Japan’ (1990) 6 Florida 
Journal of International Law 141-175 at 151-155; J.Q. Whitman, ‘Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity 
Versus Liberty’ (2004) 113 Yale Law Journal 1151-1221. 
33	
	
Europe stem from fundamentally different conceptions of privacy. According to 
Whitman, European conceptions of privacy have a deeper concern for human dignity, 
whereas in America privacy is valued for its liberty enhancing qualities, particularly 
the negative liberty from Government intrusions it affords to the individual. Thus, 
Whitman concludes:  
[T]he emphases and sensibilities of the law on either side of the Atlantic remain 
stubbornly different, whatever careful philosophical logic might allow or dictate. 
Privacy law is not the product of logic. But neither is it the product of 
"experience" or of supposed "felt necessities" that are shared in all modem 
societies. It is the product of local social anxieties and local ideals. In the United 
States those anxieties and ideals focus principally on the police and other 
officials, and around the ambition "to secure the blessings of liberty," while on 
the Continent they focus on the ambition to guarantee everyone's position in 
society, to guarantee everyone's "honor."110 
 
Different populations undeniably experience privacy differently. Solove, however, 
views this perspective as too essentialist, arguing that the differences can be boiled 
down to enforcement strategies rather than conceptual differences, and that 
Whitman’s approach overlooks the extent to which similarities exist between the two 
continental perspectives.111 It is also noteworthy that, when speaking of Europe (or 
the United States) as anything like homogenous legal or cultural entities, there is a 
danger of oversimplifying the infinitely complex differences within these regions. 
Although the socio-cultural context in which the action takes place is certainly a 
factor to be taken into account, the diverse range of issues which might be said to 
set back privacy interests are, if not universal, remarkably consistent across 
contemporary western societies. Whitman’s sceptical conclusion, that the divergent 
nature of privacy interests makes a general theory of privacy impossible (or at least 
not worth the effort), seems mistaken. Solove posits that an adequate theory of 
privacy must incorporate the general features of the concept and provide a means of 
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resolving the particular tensions which may arise in particular contexts. Thus, one 
ambition of the general theory is to explain the diversity of privacy interferences and 
show how they are linked within identifiable social or institutional processes.  
 
Solove develops a taxonomy of privacy ‘problems’, determining what is private by 
looking to social practices, without any a priori conception of privacy.112 He argues 
that the focus on problems in our experiences allows us to generalise in a useful way 
about privacy whilst still being flexible enough to take account of contextual factors. 
Solove rejects other focal points for a conceptual analysis of privacy interests, such 
as the nature of the information or matter, a focus on the preferences of the 
individual, or criteria specifying reasonable expectations of privacy.113 His taxonomy, 
comprising problems posed by ‘information collection’, ‘information processing’, 
‘information dissemination’, and ‘invasion’, is useful in navigating the problems 
associated with previous conceptions, especially over- and under-inclusiveness. 
Solove’s attempt to delineate a taxonomy is not intended to represent the end of the 
conversation regarding privacy interests. Subjectivity is inevitable in such an exercise 
and new privacy ‘problems’ will continue to arise after the taxonomy has been 
completed.114 However, Solove’s contribution does offer a basis for us to shift our 
focus in the search for a useful concept of privacy from a preoccupation with unifying 
essences, towards encompassing the value and functions of privacy adopting a 
‘critical reflective attitude.’115  
 
The most serviceable description of privacy is as a condition of limited access. This 
definition serves as the baseline for establishing whether privacy is ‘in play’ in a 
particular situation. For example, if the state inserts a listening device into the home 
of an individual and monitors his or her conversations, this is a privacy issue as the 
individual has been removed from a condition of limited access. From here an 
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assessment of whether a particular form of access gives rise to privacy violations can 
only be made contextually. Privacy is a condition where the individual is inaccessible 
from some form of intrusion to some degree. Whether a type of intrusion engages 
privacy depends upon the manner and degree to which it increases the accessibility 
of the individual. This access may be physical, or involve the collection, retention, or 
dissemination of information. From this starting point, we can begin to discuss 
whether or not a particular form of access sets back privacy interests to the extent 
that it warrants legal protection, and whether or not, in any case, the interference is 
justified. These questions will be addressed in Chapter 2 of the thesis. However, 
before we reach this stage, more theoretical groundwork is required. The next part 
considers the value of privacy, and surveys the normative ends which adequate 
privacy protection can serve. The following discussion elucidates the value of privacy, 
both in terms of the normative interests it can protect for the individual, and its 
salience as a moral, political, and jurisprudential protection in liberal democracies.  
 
2. What is the Value of Privacy?   
This part demonstrates that privacy, as well as being a pluralistic concept, holds 
pluralistic value. It shows that, whilst privacy overlaps with concepts of dignity and 
autonomy, its value cannot be explained through reference to either one of these 
concepts alone. From here, rival perspectives in political morality will be surveyed in 
terms of their competing theories of how privacy ranks next to other societal 
interests.  
 
2.1. The Autonomy-Based Accounts 
Numerous theorists locate the value of privacy in the role it plays in furthering an 
individual’s interest in making autonomous choices and actions. Stanley Benn 
suggests that privacy is normatively valuable as it provides the necessary conditions 
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for the individual to be respected as a chooser.116 Benn’s argument is predicated on 
the assertion that there are two types of privacy invasion: (i) unwanted overt 
observations, and (ii) covert observations.117 In the case of unwanted overt 
observations, Benn argues that, in certain scenarios, to subject an individual to 
sustained observation without consent is to treat him or her as an object and not as 
a subject with sensibilities, morally responsible for his or her own decisions.118 Benn 
argues that such observations have an impact on the way an individual acts by 
transforming the options available to him, thus failing to respect him as a chooser.119 
He elaborates, suggesting that, whilst not all unwanted observations change the 
person’s choices in a given scenario, the lack of respect shown for a person in such 
observations is what violates the moral right to privacy:  
A’s uninvited intrusion is an impertinence because he treats it as of no 
consequence that he may have effected an alteration in C’s perception of 
himself and the nature of his performance.120 
 
This argument suggests that the manner of the intrusion – regardless of how it 
affects the conditions in which the person can make choices – makes it a violation of 
the right to privacy. However, to suggest that the attitude of the violator of an 
individual’s right to privacy is the most important factor in determining whether or 
not a violation has occurred seems misplaced. An individual can violate the privacy of 
another without having an indifferent attitude towards the observed person and his 
choices.121  
 
Regarding covert observation, Benn suggests that this violates an individual’s privacy 
‘because it deliberately deceives a person about his world, thwarting, for reasons that 
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cannot be his reasons, his attempts to make a rational choice.’122 The claim is that 
such covert observations alter an individual’s conditions of action and thus deprive 
him of the ability to make choices by altering the choice-situation in a way of which 
the observed person is unaware. To indulge in such observations, according to Benn, 
is to fail to respect a person as a chooser and thus to violate his or her right to 
privacy.123 However, this theory may give away too much privacy protection. It would 
mean that privacy is at issue wherever a person is observed covertly or observed 
overtly when he or she does not wish it. This, it might be argued, affords people the 
right not to be observed even in the most trivial of day-to-day interactions.  
 
Another strand of autonomy-based accounts for the value of privacy focus on the role 
privacy can play in providing the individual with control over his or her social 
relationships. In An Anatomy of Values, Fried argued that privacy is important for the 
creation of social relationships.124 This sharing of private information and controlling 
of who has access to intimate information about ourselves allows us to form intimate 
social relationships with others:  
Love and friendship … involve the voluntary and spontaneous relinquishment of 
something between friend and friend, lover and lover. The title to information 
about oneself conferred by privacy provides the necessary something.125 
 
 
Underpinning this theory is the notion that privacy serves an important role in 
allowing us to form social relationships with one another. Building on this idea, 
Rachels argues that privacy is necessary if we are to maintain the variety of social 
relationships with other people that we want to have.126 Rachels suggests that we 
behave differently around the people we have different social relationships with in 
our lives. For instance, the behaviour a person might permissibly indulge in when out 
with his friends might not be permissible if it were repeated in the workplace. These 
changes in behaviour we exhibit in different contexts define our social relationships. 
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According to Rachels, the value of privacy lies in its affording us the ability to choose 
autonomously who has access to us, who knows what about us, and to allow us to 
maintain the variety of social relationships with other people that contribute to 
personal well-being.127 
 
These accounts do succeed in identifying interests that a right to privacy could 
protect. Indeed, a degree of privacy can undoubtedly help individuals manage the 
range of social relationships they maintain in everyday life. However, an account of 
the value of privacy focused solely on allowing us to develop social relationships 
seems insufficient as a general account of the normative value of privacy. It implies 
that an individual who is sentenced to life imprisonment in solitary confinement128 or 
a person in a permanent vegetative state does not retain a right to privacy because 
he or she has no foreseeable capacity to develop social relationships. However, this 
suggests that intrusions to such individuals, which might normally warrant legal 
justification, can be applied indiscriminately. Moreover, if Thomson were to reply to 
such arguments, she could simply say that, on this account, privacy rights are 
derivative of the right to form social relationships. This is because, on this view, the 
right to privacy is contingent on the individual having the capacity to develop social 
relationships with others. The argument plays into Thomson’s reductionist position 
that was rejected in the previous section.  
 
Other commentators suggest along similar lines that the value of privacy comes from 
the protection it can afford to personal autonomy. Inness states that ‘privacy is 
valuable because it acknowledges our respect for persons as autonomous beings with 
the capacity to love, care, and like − in other words, persons with the potential to 
freely develop close relationships.’129 Röessler contends that privacy is a necessary 
condition to lead an autonomous life. According to Röessler, respect for privacy is 
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important as a precondition for respecting autonomy in the following three 
‘dimensions’: decisions, information, and the home.130 
 
To what extent is privacy valuable in furthering autonomy? This question demands a 
closer enquiry into the concept of autonomy. Like privacy, autonomy is not a 
straightforward concept. As Dworkin states, we face ‘one concept and many 
conceptions of autonomy.’131 Moral philosophers have understood autonomy as 
synonymous with liberty;132 synonymous with self-rule;133 or as acting ‘from 
principles that we would consent to as free and equal rational beings.’134 Arguably at 
opposing ends of the spectrum of these conceptions sit the perspectives of Immanuel 
Kant and John Stuart Mill. Mill’s arguments for experiments in living for the sake of 
‘free development of individuality’135 have influenced the contemporary ideal of 
personal autonomy which promotes ‘self-authorship’ and views autonomy as the 
freedom of action. Raz describes how this conception of personal autonomy 
encompasses the values underpinning personal autonomy as essential to individual 
well-being: 
The idea of personal autonomy … holds the free choice of goals and relations as 
an essential ingredient of individual well-being. The ruling idea behind the ideal 
of personal autonomy is that people should make their own lives … The ideal of 
personal autonomy is the vision of people controlling, to some degree, their 
own destiny, fashioning it through successive decisions throughout their 
lives.136 
 
This conception of autonomy is broadly concerned with the development of 
individuality through the choices, decisions, and actions an individual takes in the 
course of his or her life. On this view, what makes a person autonomous is the ability 
to control, to some extent, his or her own destiny. This, according to Raz, is essential 
for individual well-being. Such a view of autonomy is focused on the action of the 
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individual. It suggests autonomy is the decisional capacities and material 
opportunities an individual possesses to take actions according to his or her own 
choices. 
 
An alternative view of autonomy derives from the work of Immanuel Kant. Whereas 
Razian personal autonomy is based on the idea that the individual is (somewhat) free 
to control his destiny, Kantian ‘moral’ autonomy is based on the idea that moral 
agents are not only subject to moral requirements, they are in some sense the self-
addressing legislators of these moral requirements.137 This is different to personal 
autonomy as, for Kant, autonomy does not consist in being possessed of the freedom 
to take actions according to one’s own unconstrained choices. Kantian autonomy is 
based on the idea that moral laws are laid down by oneself and these laws have 
authority over oneself.138 In this sense autonomy is not a psychological or 
motivational capacity, such as the capacity to control one’s own destiny, but is a 
normative concept which describes the independence of the rational will of the 
individual from externally imposed directives. As Kant put it:  
[M]an is subject only to laws given by himself but still universal and he is bound 
only to act in conformity with his own will, which, however, in accordance with 
nature’s end is a will giving universal law.139 
 
Kant thought of autonomy as a fundamental principle of morality, which suggests 
that, when one acts freely he grounds universal laws of morality. This cautions 
against the ‘material’ principle of morality which bases morality on an end that is 
given independently of a rational agent’s input.140 At the heart of the distinction 
between ‘personal’ and ‘moral’ autonomy, then, is that moral autonomy refers to the 
capacity of an individual to impose objective moral laws on oneself, whereas personal 
autonomy is not limited to questions of morality; a person can violate his own 
interpretation of the moral law whilst retaining personal autonomy. However, both 
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conceptions of autonomy refer to the individual’s capacity to think, act, or be 
motivated in a way that is not completely coerced by external forces.141  
 
Both moral and personal autonomy concentrate on an individual’s capacity to make 
choices undetermined by the influence of external forces. However, personal 
autonomy builds on this idea, as it can only be enjoyed in certain environments that 
are conducive to leading an autonomous life.142 To make this distinction clear, Paul 
Roberts gives the example of a political prisoner of an authoritarian regime who is 
denied his personal autonomy in the modern liberal sense, as his choices and life-
chances are reduced, whilst still retaining the capacity for Kantian moral 
autonomy.143 Whilst Kant argues that a man is only bound to act in conformity with 
his own will, he also states that ‘a will… is designed by nature to give universal 
laws.’144 This, according to Feinberg, gives with one hand and takes away with the 
other, since an individual can only act in accordance with a will designed externally 
by nature.145 When seeking to establish the nature of the relationship between 
privacy and autonomy, it is important to know which concept of autonomy we are 
referring to. As Roberts’ example illustrates, Kantian autonomy is possible even in 
circumstances where personal autonomy and privacy would be severely constrained. 
The link between this form of autonomy and privacy therefore seems uninformative 
to debates concerning the meaning and scope of privacy as a workable criminal 
justice right.  
 
Personal autonomy is generally understood to refer to one’s capacity to live one’s life 
according to choices that are one’s own and not the product of manipulative external 
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forces.146 Autonomy, in this sense, clearly overlaps the concept of privacy referred to 
in the forgoing discussion. Many acts that might be said to set back privacy interests 
could also be said to set back personal autonomy. For example, an individual 
subjected to an involuntary strip search might argue, on several grounds, that his or 
her privacy has been invaded. This individual might also argue that his or her ability 
to live life according to his or her own choices is impaired by the person conducting 
the involuntary strip search.  
 
The precise nature of the relationship between privacy and autonomy is less clear. It 
seems that privacy is essential for leading an autonomous life anywhere where 
personal autonomy is a prevailing ideal. Without privacy, an individual would not 
have the space to contemplate or experiment in different activities free from ridicule, 
censure or scrutiny. This would impede the opportunity an individual has to make 
choices autonomously. However, there are times when someone can make an 
autonomous decision to relinquish his or her privacy. For example, consider a 
naturist who, of his own volition, reveals intimate aspects of his body to passing 
observers on a regular basis. Furthermore, there are circumstances where privacy 
seems to be violated without any impact on the personal autonomy of the individual. 
For example, if I were to spy on an individual as he or she slept, I may not deprive 
the individual of the ability to make an autonomous decision, yet such actions still 
seem objectionable. A counter-argument might suggest that I could harm the 
individual because the information I retain about his or her sleeping habits could be 
made public at some point in the future, thus setting off a chain of events which 
could jeopardise the subject’s autonomy. However, in focusing on the disclosure of 
such private information, this argument moves away from the issue of whether or not 
the covert observation of a sleeping person is morally objectionable in itself. Such 
observation seems to engage privacy interests in and of itself, in ways that cannot be 
explained through reference to autonomy alone. 
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Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that whilst privacy can contribute to the conditions 
for the exercise of personal autonomy, this only accounts for part of the value picked 
out by the concept. The foregoing discussion suggests privacy may be grounded in 
other values. For example, if someone obtains unknown or otherwise unwanted 
access to another individual and finds out some embarrassing information about that 
person he or she may have invaded the privacy of that person without necessarily 
jeopardising autonomy. Whilst such forms of access may not set back autonomy 
based interests, they could interfere with the individual’s overlapping interest in 
having his or her dignity respected.147 
 
2.2. The Dignity-Based Accounts 
Other accounts of the value of privacy focus on human dignity. According to Taylor, 
dignity refers to ‘our sense of ourselves as commanding respect.’148 Respect for 
dignity then would be respect for the self by oneself or by others. Wicks notes how 
the concept of dignity in human rights treaties tends to imply that dignity is an 
essence in all living human beings.149 This view seems to take for granted that all 
individuals are possessed of dignity as it is an integral part of our being. It draws on 
the Kantian concept of autonomy, distinguishing humans from other beings and 
implying that they should not be treated as objects.150 However, this understanding 
of human dignity is criticised by Dupré for being too abstract: 
The highly autonomous subject of rights born with dignity, who goes through 
his theoretical life, apparently effortlessly asserting his political preferences and 
living a private family life, does not exist in reality. Real lives are complex and 
messy; people are not all born in dignity.151 
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Against the conception of dignity as a fundamental essence of all living human 
beings, Dupré argues that, whilst autonomy is linked to dignity, it offers an 
incomplete foundation for defining the concept.152 Dignity, according to Dupré, should 
be understood in a more pluralistic way in terms of (i) the inner mental and 
emotional worlds of the person; and (ii) the outer social being of the person.153  
 
Dupré raises an interesting point. Individuals are not isolated monads who should be 
understood solely from the perspective of their individual autonomy. People usually 
have complex inter-relationships with others, socially, in families, and in their 
working lives. Though an exhaustive analysis of the concept of dignity is not needed 
here, it is noteworthy that under different circumstances individuals may have 
different views of what it means to respect dignity as a result of the conditions in 
which they find themselves. A person who works in a call centre might find the work 
of a coal miner to be lacking in dignity and vice versa. Therefore, a conception of 
dignity which reflects the complex nature of the social world seems necessary in 
order to develop a fuller understanding of what it means to be in a condition of 
dignity.  
 
Dignity may also deviate from personal autonomy. Whereas personal autonomy 
values each individual’s personal choices, dignity has been invoked as a reason for 
prohibiting certain behaviours. For example, courts have prohibited the activity of 
dwarf-throwing as it is considered inherently undignified, irrespective of the 
autonomous choices of participants in this activity.154 Beyleveld and Brownsword 
suggest that human dignity is a ‘two-edged sword’ which can both subvert and 
enhance personal autonomy.155 On the one hand, to view dignity as the foundation 
for having one’s own choices respected, purely for the reason that they are one’s 
own, is to view dignity as something that empowers individuals (this was the 
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argument of the dwarves choosing to be thrown). On the other hand, dignity can be 
understood as an overriding value which should be respected by all members of 
society. Such a view of dignity makes personal autonomy a non-determinative factor 
when assessing whether or not certain acts may undermine dignity.156 Dignity is 
evidently a complex concept. Appeals to dignity can be made to constrain or to 
empower personal autonomy: whether or not the French court was correct to decide 
the case as it did in order to protect dignity or other interests is another question. 
However, it is clear that for an individual to have dignity, that individual should be 
respected independently of his, or any other, subjective preferences.  
 
Proponents of a dignity-based theory of the normative value of privacy argue that the 
importance of privacy is founded on an entitlement to respect for each individual’s 
dignity. As well as suggesting privacy can further personal autonomy, Benn’s 
arguments might also support a dignity-based account of its value. Benn proposed 
that to invade a person’s privacy is to show less than proper regard for human 
dignity, and that, consequently, privacy is grounded in the principle of respect for 
persons: 
A general principle of privacy might be grounded on the more general principle 
of respect for persons. By a person I understand a subject with a consciousness 
of himself as agent, one who is capable of having projects, and assessing his 
achievements in relation to them. To conceive someone as a person is to see 
him as actually or potentially a chooser, as one attempting to steer his own 
course through the world, adjusting his behaviour as his appreciation of the 
world changes, and correcting course as he perceives his error.157  
 
Whilst this account does not directly prescribe dignity as the fundamental basis for all 
privacy concerns, it certainly views the interest in privacy as something that is based 
on respect for the individual, regardless of his or her subjective preferences. Benn 
argues that privacy is founded on the idea that individuals should have respect for 
other persons because ‘every human being, insofar as he is qualified as a person, is 
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entitled to this minimal degree of consideration.’158 Therefore, Benn suggests that if 
someone were to remove another from a condition of privacy this may fail to 
fundamentally respect that person, regardless of whether or not any material harms 
are also inflicted.159 Charles Fried likewise suggests that privacy is valuable in 
ensuring respect for human dignity. Fried proposes that invasions of privacy injure 
the individual in his or her very humanity.160 Thus, in Fried’s view, privacy is a basic 
right in the Kantian sense; it requires the recognition of persons as ends.161  
 
The claim that privacy is valued because it furthers human dignity is advantageous in 
explaining why invasions of privacy, which seemingly do not impinge on personal 
autonomy (e.g. covert monitoring or surveillance), nonetheless still seem 
objectionable. However, like autonomy, dignity does not seem to provide the basis 
for all privacy concerns. As the dwarf-tossing example illustrates, attempts to 
regulate activities or behaviours with a view to protecting human dignity can set back 
privacy related interests. Whether or not privacy is valuable for promoting dignity 
related ends, autonomy related ends, both of these, or none of these, seems to be a 
question that can only be answered contextually. Thus, it might be instructive to 
think of privacy as what Andrew Roberts describes as a ‘mid-level’ principle, a 
concept which ‘mediates what the more abstract ideals and precepts of basic moral 
and political theories require in particular circumstances.’162 Privacy can further a 
number of different ends. However, the questions of how and when privacy does this 
can only be answered contextually, in relation to particular situations. As Feldman 
suggests, a focus on a single underlying value of privacy is likely to be positively 
misleading;163 privacy is both autonomy-related and dignity-related, protecting the 
individual from outside interference in numerous contexts for various ends.  
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2.3. Is Privacy a Relative Value?  
Recent accounts of the value of privacy have acknowledged that privacy is a 
pluralistic value, useful for a number of ends.164 This is undoubtedly true. Whilst 
privacy allows individuals to manage social relationships, it also enables the 
individual to limit access to his or her personal information, and to limit access to his 
or her personal space. 
 
Solove suggests that conventional attempts to ascertain the value of privacy offer no 
guidance in resolving conflicts between interests. He observes that there is no 
consensus regarding a theory of the value of privacy. Thus, Solove suggests we 
should understand privacy in terms of its practical consequences, and ascertain its 
value through balancing it against opposing interests. Solove’s rationale is as follows:  
Because privacy conflicts with other fundamental values, such as free speech, 
security, curiosity, and transparency, we should engage in a candid and direct 
analysis of why privacy interests are important and how they ought to be 
reconciled with other interests. We cannot ascribe a value to privacy in the 
abstract. The value of privacy is not uniform across all contexts. We determine 
the value of privacy when we seek to reconcile privacy with opposing interests 
in particular situations.165 
 
From this methodological precept, Solove posits that the value of privacy in such a 
balancing exercise should be determined contextually. As we have seen, Solove’s 
attempt to move beyond finding the common denominator in all privacy interests and 
to assess the value of privacy based on concrete problems appropriately reflects the 
complexity of the concept. However, his own account of the value of privacy is 
similarly under-specified. First, Solove provides little detail as to how the privacy 
‘problems’ described in his taxonomy can or should be ‘balanced’ against competing 
interests.  
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Furthermore, as Thierer suggests, at some point law-makers regulating privacy 
interests will have to decide, in the abstract, where privacy interests rank among 
various other interests.166 For example, all other things held equal, the right to life 
trumps the right to privacy. If the Government were to take the life of an individual, 
this would be a more serious interference with that individual’s rights than just about 
any privacy interference one could reasonably imagine. This is not to say that privacy 
rights cannot trump the right to life in certain circumstances, but that in all but the 
more extreme circumstances the right to life would take precedence. Exceptions 
could only be made where the degree of severity of the interference with privacy 
rights, and the certainty with which the interference will occur, ‘outweigh’ that of the 
interference with the right to life. In focusing solely on the context of the particular 
interference, Solove attempts to sidestep the fact that, to explain why one right 
trumps another, it is necessary to examine the political value of privacy, not only as 
an individual interest, but as an aspect of the common good. 
 
Amongst modern privacy theorists, it is common ground that privacy is a broad 
concept which overlaps with a number of other moral interests and rights.167 Whilst 
there is no single value of privacy, the cluster of privacy interests has normative 
significance irreducible to the source from which they are derived. The fact that 
certain interests relating to the person, social relationships, and property can be 
placed in a privacy cluster, in a manner that is not just arbitrary, suggests that they 
share something in common. For example, an individual can violate the property 
rights of another, say by stealing his or her car and driving it, but it is questionable 
whether or not this act alone would violate the car owner’s privacy. However, if the 
individual were to steal someone’s personal diary and read it, this violation of a 
property right seems also to violate the privacy rights of the diary owner.  
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In summary, Solove’s pragmatic conception of privacy offers an approach for 
avoiding the ‘disarray’ in privacy scholarship. This conception, which treats privacy as 
a convenient label to describe a range of disparate ‘privacy problems’, denies that the 
concept serves any general theory or other fundamental values. However, this 
approach ultimately lacks the necessary coherence of a conception of privacy which 
carries moral weight. From the literature discussed so far, it is reasonable to infer 
that any attempt to conclusively resolve the disagreements over the concept of 
privacy, its definition, scope, content, and value will be futile. Andrew Roberts 
suggests that this ongoing disagreement is a manifestation of disagreements over 
fundamental moral and political principles and values.168 This suggests not only that 
the search for a consensus regarding the underlying value of privacy is futile but also 
that a satisfactory account of privacy must explain its relationship to the set of moral 
and political values that it serves.  
 
The following sections of this analysis turn attention to how perspectives in political 
philosophy account for the value of privacy. They show that a range of perspectives 
in political morality support privacy as a moral, political and jurisprudential concept. 
Perspectives in political morality which have suggested that privacy is a socially 
detrimental value will also be considered. I conclude that, even though there is merit 
in some of these sceptical claims, privacy is an important aspect of the common 
good, which protects significant individual and collective ends. Privacy has value as 
an individual right and social value. This must be recognised in any society which 
places importance on safeguarding individual well-being.  
 
2.4. Privacy and the Liberal Orthodox 
Liberal societies generally accept that individuals should have their privacy protected 
to a greater or lesser extent. The Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides, for example ‘the right of the people to be secure in their 
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persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures…’169 This suggests that, unless there is sufficient reason to limit the Fourth 
Amendment in a particular circumstance, US citizens have the right to keep their 
person, their home, and information about their person private. Article 8(1) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) stipulates that: ‘Everyone has the 
right to respect for his private and family life, his home, and his correspondence.’ 
Whilst the limitations that can be imposed on this right under Article 8(2) will be 
discussed in the subsequent chapters of this thesis, the primary Article 8(1) right 
shows that privacy related interests are considered to be worthy of respect in 
contemporary liberal societies that are signatories to the Convention. 
 
Liberalism is a political philosophy that advocates individual liberty and the ability of 
citizens to choose their own values and ends, free from the over-weening 
interference of the state or other individuals.170 On this view, the state should not 
impose a preferred way of life upon citizens. This means that, even if it were in the 
interest of society to prohibit certain behaviours, such as abortion or the watching of 
pornography, these should not be prohibited because what might be considered good 
cannot override the free choices of individuals so long as such choices do not conflict 
with the liberty of others.171 There are many different types of liberalism and the 
extent to which liberal values such as toleration, equality, and liberty can override 
other societal values is a matter of continuous debate.172 However, there are two 
main perspectives which provide the moral basis for liberalism – one broadly Kantian, 
and the other utilitarian.  
 
According to the characteristically liberal anti-perfectionist perspective, the state 
should not impose a preferred way of life upon its citizens, even if this is in the 
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interests of its citizens, in part, because doing so will have worse consequences than 
if individuals are allowed to make their own choices. Mill argued that it is important 
for individuals to construct their own version of the good in their own way, so long as 
they do not attempt to deprive others of theirs and that this principle rests on the 
principle of utility: ‘I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but 
it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man 
as a progressive being.’173 On this view, liberal ideals are justified on the grounds 
that they maximise utility. That is to say, they aggregate the amount of ‘happiness’ 
among individuals in society. On utilitarian grounds, the values and preferences of 
individuals should be aggregated in any calculation of the good, and not judged on 
the basis of their quality. 
  
However, this aggregation of welfare is criticised by Kantian liberals for overriding the 
values and preferences of the minority in any liberal calculation. For instance, if the 
majority feel that the prohibition of homosexual activity is to the benefit of society 
then, on a utilitarian calculation, the suppression of homosexual activity would be 
justified on the grounds that this would maximise utility in society as long as the 
intensity of the preferences on either side was equal. Such a calculation, according to 
Kantian liberals, is unfit to serve as a basis for moral law because it involves 
privileging the interests of the majority and failing to respect the differences between 
persons.174 Paul Roberts criticises this approach:  
… the utilitarian’s professed egalitarianism is a sham equality in which all 
persons ‘count’ the same only because everybody ultimately counts for nothing 
under the tyranny of familiar monist consequentialisms… Embodied individual 
wellbeing, rather than aggregated abstract welfare, should be the government’s 
ultimate ethical consideration; reflecting liberal deontology’s insistence that 
human beings are intrinsically valuable, Kantian ends-in-themselves.175 
 
Kantian liberals tend to argue that a distinction should be drawn between individual 
rights and the ‘good’. On a Kantian liberal account, there should be a framework of 
																																								 																				
173 n 135, 15. 
174 See for example, n 134, 560-565. 
175 P. Roberts, ‘Criminal Law Theory and the Limits of Liberalism’ in A.P. Simester, A. du Bois-Pedain and 
U. Neumann, Liberal Criminal Theory: Essays for Andreas von Hirsch (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014) 327-
360 at 332-333. 
52	
	
basic rights, and individuals should have the freedom to pursue their own 
conceptions of the good within that framework. Sandel uses the example of the right 
to freedom of speech to demonstrate this position: 
It is one thing to defend the right to free speech so that people may be free to 
form their own opinions and choose their own ends, but something else to 
support it on the grounds that a life of political discussion is inherently worthier 
than a life unconcerned with public affairs, or on the grounds that free speech 
will increase the general welfare. Only the first defence is available on the 
Kantian view, resting as it does on the ideal of a neutral framework.176 
 
Thus, Kantian liberals advocate a neutral framework within which individuals and 
groups are assured the freedom to choose their own values and ends, whilst 
respecting the rights of others to do the same. Such a perspective privileges equal 
rights among persons, rather than a utilitarian system where the rights of the 
minority may be overridden in the interests of the greater good. However, there is 
notorious disagreement among Kantian liberals over what rights are 
fundamental.177  
 
Liberalism promotes a distinction between the private and the public, which can 
foster individual liberty and limits the power that the state can have over individuals. 
The liberal argument is that privacy protects the individual in society by providing a 
space where the individual is closed off from the outside world. This space can exist 
in the home or in public places and can protect the individual’s thoughts, personal 
information, or physical space. However, the definition of what should be considered 
private and what should be considered public remains disputed. For instance, the 
scope of what is considered private varies across liberal societies, and within liberal 
societies over time.178 Whilst privacy may serve an important function in protecting 
individuals in society, there is a great deal of variation in what societies feel should 
be covered by this interest. An absolute right to privacy in political society would be 
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socially dysfunctional.179 For example, if a suspected terrorist had an absolute right 
to privacy, the authorities would struggle to prevent any attack he or she might be 
plotting as they could not monitor any of his or her activities, communications, or, 
where necessary, detain the suspect for questioning. For many commentators, 
privacy is viewed as socially detrimental, since it can shield undesirable behaviours 
and action at the expense of other legitimate crime prevention and public safety 
concerns. Such perspectives will now be considered.  
 
2.5. Does Privacy Threaten the Common Good? 
The communitarian perspective conflicts with Kantian liberalism, in criticising a value 
system which, it argues, is founded on the idea that individuals are isolated monads 
and ignores the individual’s role in, and obligation to, his or her community. This 
perspective emphasises the point that individuals are embedded in communities, and 
that values should consequently be rooted in communal interests and the individual’s 
commitment to others. For communitarians, this ethical system reflects a more 
accurate conception of reality than liberal perspectives;180 and prevents liberal rights 
from providing nearly absolute protection for any and all self-interests.181 For 
instance, Etzioni argues that, whilst liberal values may have helped earlier societies 
break away from totalitarian and authoritarian rule, the expansion of individual rights 
in modern liberal societies has gone too far:  
American society has suffered from excessive individualism, a grand loss of 
commitment to the common good. In the 1960s, expressive individualism 
spread, which encouraged people to walk away from their societal obligations in 
order to “find themselves,” to develop their identities and heed their innermost 
desires. In the 1980s instrumental individualism added insult to injury as 
Reagan, like Thatcher, made a virtue out of watching out for oneself. On top of 
these two waves of individualism came an explosion of a sense of entitlement 
and litigiousness, in the name of what was due to the individual, with precious 
little concern for the effects on others and the common good. In this society it 
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was necessary to rein in excessive individualism and to shore up the common 
good.182  
 
 
From this basis, communitarians such as Etzioni argue that rights should be relative 
and subordinate to other societal goods. However, the reply from liberals tends to be 
that communitarian political morality can pave the way to prejudice, intolerance and 
totalitarianism.183 Etzioni views individualism as a form of egotism. The liberal retort 
would suggest that liberal individualism is not a doctrine of greed or self-regard. 
Rather, it is a precondition of personal freedom, to make choices, and to be the part 
self-author of one’s own life.184  
 
Communitarians argue that, whilst privacy is useful and necessary to prevent 
totalitarianism and unwarranted public control, the expansion of privacy rights in 
liberal democracies has gone too far. Etzioni states: ‘important social formulations of 
the good can be left to private choices – provided there is sufficient communal 
scrutiny! That is, the best way to curtail the need for governmental control and 
intrusion is to have somewhat less privacy.’185 Essentially, this communitarian 
perspective counters the liberal argument that individuals should enjoy the privacy to 
make choices that might be to the detriment of the wider community, subject to 
certain limitations. Instead, the communitarian perspective advanced by Etzioni is 
based on the idea that privacy should not be privileged over the common good. 
Etzioni argues that his communitarian approach to privacy avoids the failings of a 
static liberal conception of a right to privacy that ignores the contextual nature of 
privacy and the demands of public health and public safety.186 Furthermore, the 
liberal conception of a right to privacy does not recognise that the more permissive 
society becomes, in allowing people to have unrestrained privacy in a given period, 
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the more controls will be needed in subsequent years to maintain the same level of 
public order.187 
 
The communitarian perspective is interesting for a number of reasons. First, it offers 
a solution to the problems that have emerged in societies where a framework of 
rights has extended to the point where it allegedly allows individuals to make 
decisions that are harmful to communities. Also, by introducing the community as a 
‘third realm’ between the state and the individual, Etzioni offers an alternative 
method of resolving disputes positioned between the need to ensure the common 
good is protected, and the need to prevent religious fundamentalism, extremism, 
totalitarianism, or tyranny. Like liberals, communitarians tend to oppose such 
controlling mechanisms by recognising the need to have privacy. However, 
communitarians maintain that the common good should not be compromised, if 
individual well-being in society is to be truly prioritised over the interests of those 
who wish to harm others.  
 
However, for Etzioni to hold that the community has interests above the individual is 
misleading. If individual well-being is the criterion for a communitarian system of 
political morality, it is unclear how a system where the community has a higher value 
than its constituent individuals can maximise such well-being. The individual does not 
just have obligations to the community, he or she is embedded in it. The community 
is a structure capable of exercising pressure on individuals to behave a certain way 
and, as a result, the individual should have rights against the community. If 
collective interests are held to be fundamental in the way that communitarians 
prescribe, and these interests are derived from the community itself, this puts the 
individual at risk of being sacrificed for the interests of the community. To prevent 
injustice and ensure that individual well-being is afforded maximum protection in a 
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society, liberal values such as privacy, autonomy and human dignity should provide 
the justification for obligations imposed on individuals in a political community.188  
 
Furthermore, the communitarian view that associates privacy with the individual is 
misleading. Whilst legal protections for the distinction between the public and private 
lives of individuals are useful to further a number of our ends as individuals in 
society, such protections are also important in serving collective purposes.189 Regan 
suggests that privacy is essential to ensure democracy as it limits the power of the 
state.190 To illustrate the point, one only has to think about how the Stasi, Gestapo, 
and other secret police organisations used privacy-interfering measures to stifle any 
political dissent which might be mounted against the totalitarian regimes under which 
they operated. Furthermore, Andrew Roberts suggests that privacy is valuable in 
securing the republican aims of self-government and non-domination. According to 
him, privacy is a pre-requisite for effective participation in political life.191 Along 
similar lines, Goold highlights how part of privacy’s social value stems from its 
importance to the exercise of other fundamental rights:  
It is difficult to imagine, for example, being able to enjoy freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, or freedom of religion without some 
accompanying right to privacy. Individuals not only need to be able to be alone 
with their own thoughts, but they also need to be free to share those thoughts 
with others without being subject to the watchful, possibly critical, eye of the 
state. Indeed, one of the greatest dangers of unfettered mass surveillance… is 
the potential chilling effect on political discourse, and on the ability of both 
individuals and groups to express their views through comment, protest and 
other forms of peaceful civil action.192 
 
From these accounts, it is clear that privacy is important not only as an individual 
interest but also as a political value which enhances liberal democracy in various 
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ways. Privacy is not a mere indulgence of the individual at the expense of communal 
interests. Rather it is one aspect of the common good, which can in some 
circumstances conflict with other aspects of the common good. Thus, even if 
communitarians are correct in proclaiming that individual privacy interests should not 
prevail over the interests of the community at large, this provides no ground for 
disregarding the benefits to the community that adequate privacy protection can 
foster. 
 
2.6. Does Privacy Entrench Gender Inequality? 
Privacy has been criticised by feminist theorists for shielding male violence and 
entrenching gender inequality. MacKinnon argues that the distinction between what is 
‘public’ and subject to the scrutiny of society, and what is ‘private’, can shield men 
from accountability for dominating and abusing women in the home.193 This feminist 
perspective is based on the idea that privacy can be dangerous for women when it is 
invoked to conceal the subjection of women in the domestic sphere: ‘The law of 
privacy … translates traditional liberal values into individual rights as a means of 
subordinating those rights to specific social imperatives.’194 According to MacKinnon, 
this process: 
[e]nforces male supremacy with capitalism, translating the ideology of the 
private sphere into the individual woman’s legal right to privacy as a means of 
subordinating women’s collective needs to the imperatives of male 
supremacy.195 
 
 
Mackinnon advances a damning critique of the right to privacy as it operated in the 
U.S. Supreme Court cases of Roe v Wade196 and Harris v McRae.197 Essentially, 
Mackinnon suggests that the right to privacy, as interpreted in these two cases, 
perpetuated sexual inequality in a number of ways. First, construed as the right to be 
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free from state action, the right to privacy only protects the freedom and equality of 
powerful individuals in society, and second, it enables men to oppress women: 
[I]f inequality is socially pervasive and enforced, equality will require 
intervention, not abdication, to be meaningful. But the right to privacy is not 
thought to require social change. It is not even thought to require any social 
preconditions, other than non-intervention by the public.198 
 
 
Thus, Mackinnon argues, the right to privacy justifies the exploitation of women by 
protecting illegitimate differences between men and women in society. Mackinnon 
claims that the focus of the privacy doctrine on intimate relationships allows privacy, 
as a legal right, to shield ‘battery, marital rape, and women’s exploited labour; [has] 
preserved the central institutions whereby women are deprived of identity, 
autonomy, control and self-definition; and has protected the primary activity through 
which male supremacy is expressed and enforced.’199 Thus, Mackinnon concludes that 
the right to privacy, as construed in the U.S. Supreme Court’s leading cases, is 
incompatible with genuine equality for women in society.  
 
Mackinnon’s analysis offers a thought-provoking challenge to liberal assumptions 
regarding the value of privacy. Indeed, privacy claims may perpetuate certain 
undesirable social structures. There are numerous examples of social life where legal 
protections of privacy seem to have detrimental effects on social justice. In the late 
1980s, a number of empirical studies suggested that police officers often neglected to 
deal with cases of domestic violence in a robust manner because of concerns that 
they should be dealing with issues concerning public order, rather than interfering in 
the private and family lives of citizens.200 Such practices lend credence to 
MacKinnon’s claims that the liberal focus on the need to protect the private lives of 
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individuals from the interference of the state may endanger victims of violence that 
takes place in private spaces, such as the home.  
 
However, there are circumstances where privacy protection may be in the collective 
interests of women. To use another criminal justice example, a number of recent 
legal developments in England and Wales sought to protect the privacy of 
predominantly female rape complainants when they are cross-examined by defence 
barristers at trial.201 Whilst, in certain circumstances, the liberal interest in protecting 
the privacy of individuals may conflict with the interests of certain groups in society, 
the argument that this is sufficient reason for jettisoning such interests would be 
overblown. However, when drawing the line between those behaviours and activities 
that should be protected from outside interference and those that should not, it is 
important that the full spectrum of interests is considered. In a detailed response, 
Lever highlights how the right to privacy and equality need not conflict. Rather, she 
argues, ‘rights to privacy which justify sexual inequality depend on dubious premises 
about equality and individuals.’ According to Lever, privacy and equality are 
interdependent. Hence, the meaning and justification of privacy must be squared 
with the meaning and justification of equality.202 Indeed, many of Mackinnon’s 
arguments focus on cases where the right to privacy has been understood as a legal 
constraint on state interference with the individual, which can be problematic in 
societies where women are structurally disadvantaged. However, the 
interdependence of these interests explains why they need not conflict. Rather, 
conflicts between these interests can be resolved through revisions of the content 
and justification of each.203 Privacy, as a concept, need not be shackled to an out-
dated interpretation of the public/private dichotomy, which oppresses women. And 
the broad conception of privacy advanced in this thesis can help us see ways in which 
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privacy can be valued where it furthers pro-social goals and norms of behaviour and 
rejected in contexts where it does not.204 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has surveyed theoretical perspectives on the scope and value of privacy 
as a basis for assessing the extent to which the privacy interests of those subject to 
the criminal process are recognised and afforded adequate protection in England and 
Wales. Privacy has proven difficult to define. No attempt to identify a common 
denominator between privacy related interests is entirely satisfactory. This, it seems, 
is because privacy is a term employed to describe a range of distinct, yet related, 
interests. Our conclusion is that the most useful way to understand privacy is as a 
condition of limited access. Types of access which may remove one from a condition 
of privacy are varied. One may be accessed physically (if, for example, one is subject 
to a strip search), or may have the limits on one’s accessibility diminished through 
the collection, processing, or dissemination of personal information. Whether or not 
existence in a condition of limited access is valuable depends on contextual factors. 
Nonetheless, this chapter has shown that privacy can support human flourishing by 
creating a space in society for individual choices and preferences. This can further the 
ends of human dignity and personal autonomy. Furthermore, the chapter has shown 
that, on any account of political morality which views human flourishing as a central 
concern, some degree of privacy in certain situations is important for a range of 
collective and individual ends. 
 
However, the description of privacy as a condition of limited access does not offer 
much guidance in establishing a threshold for determining whether or not a moral 
(let alone legal) right to privacy has been engaged or violated in a particular 
situation. For example, to subject an individual to a passing glance on a public street 
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would diminish the extent to which that individual is in a condition of limited access. 
However, the casual glance surely does not constitute an interference that could or 
should be recognised in law. Thus, any properly formulated legal protection of 
privacy needs a threshold for determining whether an act, which limits an individual’s 
existence in a condition of inaccessibility, should be circumscribed on privacy 
grounds. In some circumstances, privacy interests can justifiably be overridden in 
favour of competing interests. Privacy is not an absolute right that cannot be limited 
or sacrificed in the interests of ensuring public safety or preventing crime. Assessing 
where and how the line should be drawn between privacy interests and other 
conflicting interests is a significant undertaking.  
 
This chapter has shown that privacy is an important social and individual value. 
Privacy is of fundamental importance in protecting various autonomy- and dignity-
based interests. Consequently, assuming principles of liberal democracy, the capacity 
of the state to interfere with privacy interests should be restricted, subject to 
legitimate overriding interests which may conflict with privacy. Chapter 2 examines 
Article 8 of the ECHR (and its associated jurisprudence) as a frame of reference to 
identify an appropriate threshold for establishing where forms of ‘access’ should be 
permitted, and for considering how disputes between privacy interests and these 
other interests should be settled.   
 
 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
62	
	
	
2 Privacy and Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights 
 
Chapter 1 focused on why privacy is an important concept in contemporary liberal 
democracies. One of the main conclusions to emerge was that the social and 
individual value of privacy is relative to the functions it serves in a particular context. 
But how does, and indeed how should, one set about making such assessments of 
the value of privacy in contexts where an individual is subject to the criminal process 
in England and Wales? A plausible starting point to answer this question is an 
analysis of the framework offered by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR). This provides:  
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence;  
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.205 
 
Under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998), it is unlawful for any 
public authority to act in a way that is incompatible with such a Convention right.206  
 
Article 8 might be termed a ‘qualified’ Convention right. It is protected, but with the 
proviso that it may be interfered with to a minimal extent in pursuit of certain 
legitimate aims stated in Article 8(2).207 Though there is no official hierarchy of ECHR 
rights, according to Ashworth, the qualification in Article 8(2) (which is mirrored in 
Articles 9, 10, and 11, the other qualified rights) is a major point of differentiation 
between this and other, stronger Convention rights which cannot be limited in the 
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same way.208 Thus, at the outset we can infer that the right to respect for private life 
is not an absolute (human) right. This seems to reflect the idea discussed in the 
previous chapter that the value of privacy is relative to the function it serves in a 
particular context and may be overridden if there is a weightier countervailing 
interest at stake.  
 
Chapter 2 takes another step towards preparing the ground for later enquiry, by 
setting out the structure of Article 8 ECHR. The aim is to examine the framework for 
protecting privacy interests set forth under Article 8 (and the associated 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)). In particular, 
Chapter 2 seeks to understand the (implicit) philosophical values underpinning the 
reasoning of judges in the court in cases where privacy related interests are at issue. 
It is hoped that the body of philosophical literature discussed in Chapter 1 can inform 
our understanding of how Article 8 is being applied, and how it should be applied, to 
protect privacy-related interests. 
 
The chapter is divided into two parts. Part 1 focuses on Article 8(1) of the ECHR. In 
particular, this part considers the development and content of the core Article 8 
interests, the scope of the right, and how the ECtHR determines whether or not 
Article 8(1) is engaged. Part 2 focuses on how, once it is determined that Article 8 is 
engaged (i.e. the measures taken on behalf of the Contracting State have interfered 
with the Article 8(1) rights of the applicant), the ECtHR adjudicates the conflict 
between Article 8 rights and countervailing interests. This requires an analysis of the 
criteria set forth in Article 8(2) ECHR. The chapter shows that Article 8 offers the 
outline of a useful framework for interpreting the scope of privacy interests. The 
ECtHR has developed a right, which recognises that privacy related interests are 
broad, distinct, yet related. Article 8(2) also offers a coherent framework for 
resolving conflicts between these interests and other societal concerns. This chapter 
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provides necessary background on Article 8. The approach of the ECtHR to protecting 
the privacy interests of those subject to a criminal process, and how this 
jurisprudence has been applied domestically, will be evaluated in subsequent 
chapters. 
 
1. How Does the ECtHR Interpret the Scope of Article 
8? 
The provisions of Article 8(1) set out the basic interests protected by Article 8, 
namely respect for ‘private life’, ‘family life’, ‘home’, and ‘correspondence’. In its 
Article 8 analysis, the ECtHR has to consider whether or not Article 8(1) is 
engaged.209 However, the legal protection of ‘privacy’ or ‘private life’ is a relatively 
new phenomenon. Prior to World War II, the constitutions of liberal democratic 
societies generally protected aspects of privacy, such as the inviolability of the home, 
or the body of the individual. No state constitution, however, set forth a more 
expansive right to privacy, or right to respect for private life.210 In this way privacy 
bucks the trend of ‘hard core’ fundamental rights guaranteed in liberal state 
constitutions becoming international human rights.211 When formulated as an 
international human right, privacy went beyond anything in state constitutions from 
its very beginning.212 Revisiting the drafting processes of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), Diggelmann and 
Cleis note how the human right to privacy had a ‘silent birth’. That is to say, in the 
drafting processes of all three of these international instruments, there is little 
evidence of a conscious decision to create an overarching human right, which 
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protects anything near the range of privacy-related interests discussed in the 
previous chapter:  
Umbrella terms were introduced, eliminated and replaced as if such decisions 
were merely editorial details. Explanations were rarely offered. A vague - and 
not even uncontested – consensus on the necessity to include protection of 
privacy was regarded as a sufficient basis for the editorial work.213 
 
Whether or not the drafters of the ECHR foresaw that the use of the umbrella term 
‘private life’ in Article 8(1) would open the door for a broader range of privacy 
interests falling within the scope of Article 8(1) (and in all likelihood they did not),214 
this undoubtedly did happen. The scope of Article 8 now stretches far beyond 
avoiding the ‘horrors, tyrannies and vexations’ of fascist and communist inquisitorial 
practices215 to include the regulation of the civil status of babies,216 homosexual 
relations,217 and freedom of association for those imprisoned.218 This raises two 
questions for consideration in this part: (i) what is the scope of Article 8? And, (ii) is 
Article 8, as some detractors suggest, too unwieldy and imprecise in its scope to be 
of jurisprudential value?  
 
The Convention sets out positive and negative obligations for Contracting States to 
ensure that they 'respect' the interests in Article 8(1).219 The negative obligation is 
that the Contracting State and its public authorities refrain from interfering with the 
rights protected in Article 8(1).220 This means, for example, that the Contracting 
State has a duty to desist from authorising public authorities, such as the police, to 
use arbitrary powers which interfere with the interests protected under Article 8(1) 
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unless the criteria in Article 8(2) are satisfied. The ECtHR has also set out the 
principle of positive obligations. This puts an obligation on the Contracting State to 
take steps to secure the Article 8 rights of individuals against interference from 
private organisations or other individuals: 
[W]hile the essential object of Art.8 is to protect the individual against arbitrary 
interference by the public authorities, it does not merely compel the State to 
abstain from such interference: in addition to this negative undertaking, there 
may be positive obligations inherent in an effective right to respect for private 
or family life. These obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed 
to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of relations of individuals 
between themselves.221 
 
It is not sufficient for Contracting States to refrain from interfering with the Article 
8(1) rights of individuals; to the same extent, they must also ensure that others do 
not interfere with these Article 8(1) rights. However, this positive obligation is not 
without difficulties. The ECtHR has suggested that, so far as positive obligations are 
concerned, the notion of ‘respect’ is not clear-cut, and that: ‘having regard to the 
diversity of practices followed and situations obtaining in the Contracting States, the 
notion’s requirements will vary considerably from case to case.’222  
 
The ECtHR has also stated that whether or not Article 8 imposes a particular positive 
obligation will depend on whether a fair balance between general interests and the 
interests of the individual has been struck in each case.223 The ECtHR is concerned to 
ensure that Contracting States cannot rely expressly on Article 8(2) to justify a 
breach of a positive obligation. However, the provisions in Article 8(2) will still be 
relevant when determining whether or not a fair balance has been struck.224 Article 
8(2) refers to ‘interferences’ with the Article 8(1) right by the Contracting State and 
is, therefore, concerned with the negative obligations.225 This has not prevented the 
ECtHR from taking a strong stance when Contracting States fail in their positive 
obligation to ensure individuals’ interests enshrined in Article 8(1) are protected. In X 
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and Y v Netherlands,226 the applicant argued that the Netherlands Government had 
failed to respect her private life because a procedural gap in the domestic law 
prevented her from seeking an effective remedy against a family member who 
subjected her to sexual abuse.227 The court found that the lack of an effective 
remedy for the applicant constituted a violation of her Article 8 rights:  
The Court finds that the protection afforded by the civil law in the case of 
wrongdoing of the kind inflicted on Miss Y is insufficient. This is a case where 
fundamental values and essential aspects of private life are at stake. Effective 
deterrence is indispensable in this area and it can be achieved only by criminal-
law provisions; indeed, it is by such provisions that the matter is normally 
regulated.228 
 
The peculiarity of the gap in Dutch procedural law, the violent nature of the offence, 
and the vulnerable status of the victim in this particular case make it difficult to 
assess how widely this positive obligation should be interpreted by domestic courts. 
This early decision demonstrated that Article 8 may impose a positive obligation on a 
Contracting State to ensure that the private lives of individuals are respected through 
other individuals’ compliance with the law. However, as the primary focus of this 
thesis relates to the negative obligations in Article 8, the scope of the positive 
obligations on the Contracting State will not be explored in depth. The focus is on the 
circumstances under which the activities of a public authority violate the Article 8 
rights of those subject to this process. The proceeding survey does not attempt to 
provide an exhaustive list of situations where Article 8 has been or might foreseeably 
be engaged. Rather, it draws out the principles adopted by the ECtHR for establishing 
the scope and content of each of the interests in Article 8(1), with respect to the 
negative obligations each puts on the public authorities of a Contracting State.   
 
The four core interests in Article 8(1) cannot be clearly distinguished from one 
another. There are instances where a public authority’s intrusion upon the residence 
of an individual may engage Article 8(1) as it fails to respect ‘private life’ and ‘home’. 
Whilst the four interests may overlap, and whilst an applicant can bring Article 8 
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proceedings before the court without specifying which interest is concerned in the 
individual case,229 each of the interests has specific distinguishing features. In its 
application of Article 8, the ECtHR has taken a flexible approach to the definition of 
the rights protected by Article 8. For instance, when considering the scope of private 
life, the ECtHR noted that respect for private life should not be interpreted 
restrictively:   
The Court does not consider it possible or necessary to attempt an exhaustive 
definition of the notion of ‘private life’. However, it would be too restrictive to 
limit the notion to an ‘inner circle’ in which an individual may choose to live his 
personal life as he chooses and to exclude entirely the outside world not 
encompassed within that circle. Respect for private life must also comprise to a 
certain degree the right to establish and develop relationships with other 
human beings.230 
 
This lack of definitional precision has allowed the court to interpret Article 8 in line 
with social and technological developments, and evolving standards of what 
constitutes a privacy setback. The flexible approach to interpreting the scope of 
Article 8(1) has expanded the range of activities falling under its protection.231 The 
approach is consistent with the ‘living instrument’ doctrine which has emerged in the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR. The living instrument doctrine was first referred to by 
the ECtHR in Tyrer v United Kingdom, where, in finding a violation of Article 3 for the 
use of corporal punishment, the court held that it ‘cannot but be influenced by the 
developments and commonly accepted standards in the penal policy of the Member 
States of the Council of Europe in this field.’232 The metaphor of a living instrument 
describes the position that the Convention must be interpreted in light of present-day 
conditions. Thus, if most Council of Europe Member States prohibit corporal 
punishment as a form of inhuman and degrading treatment, this should influence the 
way the ECHR is interpreted by the Strasbourg Court.  
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Another idea underlying the living instrument doctrine is that the Convention should 
be subject to teleological, and not literal, interpretation. As Baroness Hale observed 
in a public lecture, ‘there is no room for the more extreme versions of the American 
doctrine of originialism, whether this is based on what the original drafters must be 
taken to have actually meant (intentionalism) or on what original readers must be 
taken to have thought they meant (textualism)’ when interpreting the scope and 
meaning of ECHR rights.233 Instead of attempting to give the language of the 
Convention its plain meaning, the ECtHR interprets the language of the Convention in 
such a way as to give effect to its purpose. For example, in Golder v United Kingdom, 
the applicant argued that the denial to exercise what was established as his ‘civil’ - 
for the purposes of Article 6 ECHR - right to access to a solicitor violated this 
Convention right.234 In finding a violation, the ECtHR observed that although no such 
right of access is expressly provided for in the wording of Article 6(1), the provision 
enunciates rights which are distinct but, taken together, make up the Article 6(1) 
provision. Thus, it was for the ECtHR to interpret whether or not access to the courts 
constituted an aspect of this right.235 In forming the conclusion that it did, the ECtHR 
relied upon Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which, 
although not yet in force, afforded priority to the ‘object and purpose’ of the ECHR in 
interpreting Article 6. This led the ECtHR to the conclusion that, as access to the 
courts is an essential prerequisite to the rule of law, and as the rule of law is one of 
the central ideals underpinning the purpose of the Convention, the right of access 
‘constitutes an element which is inherent in the right stated by Article 6(1).’236 
Defending this conclusion, the court went on: ‘This is not an extensive interpretation 
forcing new obligations on the Contracting States: it is based on the very terms of 
the first sentence of Article 6 (1) read in its context and having regard to the object 
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and purpose of the Convention, a law-making treaty, and to general principles of 
law.’237 
  
The purposive and evolutive approach to the interpretation of the scope of Article 8 
and the ECHR is not without controversy. In Golder, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice dissented 
on the court’s Article 6(1) ruling that this section sets forth a right of access.238 
Suggesting that the court may have been trespassing on the border of ‘judicial 
legislation’, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice opined that the court’s approach to interpreting 
the Convention should be more cautious, especially where the meaning of a provision 
might be uncertain, or ‘where the effect of imposing upon the Contracting States 
obligations they had not really meant to assume, or would not have understood 
themselves to be assuming.’239 This reflects what has now become one of the main 
criticisms of the ECtHR by its detractors in the United Kingdom that, as Sir Nicolas 
Bratza summarises, ‘the “living instrument” doctrine has increasingly been used as a 
fig-leaf to cover the court’s enthusiasm for judicial activism, at the expense of the 
Convention’s scope which its drafters had intended, and that the court has 
overreached itself in its methods of interpretation of the Convention and transgressed 
into the realm of policy-making.’240 
 
Without treading too far into debates on the extent to which the living instrument 
doctrine, generally speaking, is a force for good in the interpretation of Convention 
rights (a matter falling beyond the scope of this thesis), a sensible conclusion would 
seemingly recognise that, whilst it is important to guard against judicial activism in 
interpreting the Convention, it is also important to recognise that the ECtHR has done 
this, to some extent at least. Though the court is not bound by its previous 
judgments, it has stressed as a guiding principle that, in the interests of 
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foreseeability and legal certainty, the ECtHR should not depart without good reason 
from precedent laid down in previous cases.241 Moreover, whilst the living instrument 
doctrine may be criticised for overstepping the intention of the drafters of the 
Convention, in the case of the four rights enshrined in Article 8 - and especially the 
right to respect for private life - this section draws upon Chapter 1 to demonstrate 
that the most normatively coherent interpretation of Article 8 recognises that its 
scope is necessarily broad and changing in line with broader contextual 
developments. 
 
1.1 Private Life 
The ECtHR has not provided a comprehensive definition of ‘private life’. It has, 
however, given guidance in a number of cases about the meaning of the term. One 
standard the ECtHR has applied to assess whether the right to respect for private life 
is engaged for the purposes of Article 8(1) is whether or not there exists a 
‘reasonable’ or ‘legitimate’ expectation of privacy.242 That is to say, whether or not, 
on the facts of the particular case it was reasonable for the applicant to expect that 
the activity he or she was partaking in should remain private. In contrast to a ruling 
to the contrary from the UK Supreme Court in In re JR38,243 the ECtHR has not 
employed the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ standard as a mandatory 
precondition for the application of Article 8 in all cases. Instead, whilst referring to 
reasonable expectations on occasion, the court’s primary focus seems to be on 
assessing how the particular interfering measure may or may not set back the 
privacy interests of the individual, and the degree of any setback.  
 
We can delineate some of the principles the ECtHR has established for defining the 
scope of the right through a brief survey of the court’s jurisprudence. In Niemietz v 
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Germany,244 the ECtHR ruled that the notion of ‘private life’ should encompass 
aspects of an individual’s life that stretch beyond that which he or she deliberately 
excludes from the outside world.245 The notion of ‘private life’ embraces certain 
activities that may take place in a public setting. Furthermore, in Pretty v United 
Kingdom,246 the ECtHR indicated that personal autonomy is an important principle 
underpinning the right to respect for private life.247  
 
In L v Lithuania,248 the ECtHR observed that human dignity and quality of life are 
important aspects of private life, a notably expansive interpretation. In Amann v 
Switzerland,249 the ECtHR ruled that respect for private life comprises the right to 
develop relationships with other human beings and, therefore, cannot exclude 
activities of a professional or business nature, even if these activities take place in a 
public context.250 However, there are limits to which activities can be considered part 
of an individual’s private life. For example, in Friend and Countryside Alliance,251 the 
ECtHR considered whether or not the ban on fox hunting in the United Kingdom 
constituted a violation of Article 8. The court held that, because hunting was a public 
activity, done for personal fulfilment alone, the ban did not amount to an interference 
with the right to respect for private life.252 The ECtHR determined that, as there was 
not a ‘direct link’ between the actions of the state and the private lives of the 
applicants, Article 8 was not engaged.253 Whether or not there exists such a direct 
link seems to come down to a value judgment by the court on whether the activity 
that the state seeks to prohibit is a sufficiently important aspect of the individual’s 
private life. The court in Friend and Countryside Alliance distinguished the ban on fox 
hunting from a ban on joining the Lithuanian Civil Service owing to prior previous 
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membership of the KGB in Sidabras v Lithuania.254 This distinction was made on the 
basis that the fox hunting ban did not adversely effect the applicants’ possibility of 
earning a living, and the ban did not stigmatise the applicants.255 Notwithstanding 
the decision in Sidabras, the ECtHR has consistently held that the Convention does 
not guarantee a right to choose a particular profession.256   
 
This jurisprudence, though informative, still begs the question: what is the scope of 
the right to respect for private life under Article 8? Different commentators have 
come up with different ways of categorising the private life interest.257 Their 
categorisations cover broadly the same interests. The first is the interest in physical 
and psychological integrity. This is the protection from assaults or humiliating forms 
of treatment by public authorities that do not meet the severity of treatment 
requirements needed for the purposes of Article 3 of the Convention (which protects 
individuals against torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment).258 
For example, in Wainwright v United Kingdom, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 
8 where the applicants, two visitors to a local prison, had been strip-searched to an 
extent that was held to be disproportionate.259 The court found that the physically 
invasive strip search should automatically engage Article 8(1) as this provides 
protection for physical and moral integrity under the private life head.260 Indeed, any 
coherent conception of privacy must recognise forms of access to the physical self. 
As Moreham suggests, the interference in these cases is sensory: through use of the 
senses (listening, touching, watching) the interferer physically accesses the 
individual, which can set back privacy interests in a range of contexts.261 
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The right to respect for private life also covers the protection of personally 
identifiable information. It is well established in the jurisprudence of the court that 
the state has a negative obligation to refrain from monitoring or recording private 
information about individuals.262 There is significant overlap here between the right 
to respect for private life and protection for correspondence. Telephone conversations 
are covered under both the notions of ‘private life’ and ‘correspondence’ for the 
purposes of Article 8.263 In Rotaru v Romania,264 the ECtHR ruled that Article 8(1) is 
applicable in cases where public authorites systematically collect and store 
information about an individual, irrespective of whether the information is of a 
private or public nature.265 The applicant brought proceedings before the court 
because the intelligence services in Romania retained information about his political 
activities and his criminal record.266 The ECtHR held that ‘any information relating to 
an identified or identifiable individual’267 could fall within the scope of ‘private life’. 
Thus, the right to respect for private life can include the protection of information 
relating to the public life of a person, including past criminal convictions or political 
activities.268 The court has also held that the systematic collection and storage of 
such information will engage Article 8(1), even if such information is not of a 
particularly sensitive or personal nature: 
[I]t is not for the Court to speculate as to whether the information gathered on 
the applicant was sensitive or not or as to whether the applicant had been 
inconvenienced in any way. It is sufficient to find that data relating to the 
private life of an individual were stored by a public authority to conclude that, 
in the instant case, the creation and storing of the impugned card amounted to 
an interference, within the meaning of Article 8, with the applicant’s right to 
respect for his private life.269 
 
The ECtHR clearly acknowledged that an important part of the normative interest in 
privacy concerns the freedom from having one’s personal information accessed or 
used by others. Indeed, drawing on the findings from Chapter 1, the storage of such 
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information removes an individual from a condition of limited access.270 The court’s 
fairly recent recognition that privacy can protect an individual’s personal information 
as well as incursions into the physical space of the individual provides further 
vindication for the court’s purposive and evolutive approach to the interpretation of 
Article 8. Over the last quarter of a century technological advancements have posed 
a significant threat to the individual’s ability to limit access to information about him 
or herself. Numerous academic commentators have highlighted the adverse impact 
such developments can have on privacy interests.271 Technological advances make 
the individual vulnerable to surveillance by state authorities or other third party 
individuals or organisations. Such activities can involve treating the individual as an 
object to be looked at, or found out about at a whim and not as an autonomous 
subject.272 Thus, the ECtHR’s recognition of such informational privacy interests is a 
welcome development. 
 
The Strasbourg institutions have also embraced sexual autonomy as an aspect of the 
right to respect for private life. In Laskey v United Kingdom,273 a case where the 
applicants were convicted for a series of violent offences relating to their participation 
in sado-masochistic activities, the European Commission on Human Rights 
(ECommHR) swiftly concluded that ‘the conduct of the applicants, carried out in 
private and for the purpose of mutual sexual gratification, must be regarded as 
falling within the scope of [Article 8(1)].’274 Returning to Pretty v UK,275 the court 
considered whether or not the forced prolonging of life against the wishes of an 
individual constituted an interference with the right to respect for private life. The 
ECtHR held that the state’s imposition of criminal measures prohibiting the 
																																								 																				
270 Chapter 1, Part 2.2. 
271 See C. Fried, An Anatomy of Values: Problems of Personal and Social Choice (Cambridge: 
Massachusetts University Press, 1970) 140-144; J. Reiman, ‘Privacy, Intimacy and Personhood’ (1976) 6 
Philosophy & Public Affairs 26-44; T. Nagel, ‘Concealment and Exposure’ (1998) 27 Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 3-30; B. v-S.T. Larsen, Setting the Watch: Privacy and the Ethics of CCTV Surveillance (Oxford: 
Hart, 2011); A. Marmor, ‘What is the Right to Privacy’ (2015) 43 Philosophy and Public Affairs 3-26. 
272 S. Benn, ‘Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons’ in J. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds) Privacy: 
Nomos XIII (New York: Atherton Press, 1971) 1-26 at 7. 
273 Laskey v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 39. 
274 ibid at [47]. When the case reached the ECtHR, the Court accepted that these sexual activities fell 
within the scope of the private life only because this was conceded by the UK Government. See ibid at 
[36]. 
275 Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1. 
76	
	
applicant’s husband from taking steps to encourage or assist her suicide or to kill her, 
interfered with the applicant’s right to respect for private life.276   
 
This is a sensible approach for the court to take, so long as the right to respect for 
private life is not stretched to the point where it becomes a legal synonym for 
personal autonomy interests. The ECtHR approach correctly acknowledges that 
privacy interests are important, at least in part, for fostering an environment where 
autonomous action can take place. Whether or not the use of positive criminal law by 
the UK government in the Pretty case can be justified morally (all things considered) 
and under the provisions in Article 8(2) is a separate matter falling beyond the scope 
of this thesis. However, this case shows that the ECtHR recognises that privacy 
protections can overlap with, and secure, the protection of personal autonomy.  
 
The purposive approach has been criticised on the grounds that it has made the 
‘private life’ indefinite; lacking any coherent or discernible structure.277 On balance, it 
is submitted that whilst the court’s broad interpretation of the ‘private life’ is 
commendable, the approach lacks threshold criteria for determining whether a 
setback to a privacy related interest is sufficiently serious. Instead, the court seems 
to make such assessments on an ad hoc basis, occasionally having regard to whether 
the individual might hold a reasonable expectation of privacy. The full implications of 
this approach for those subject to the criminal process will be considered in 
subsequent chapters. However, the lack of such a threshold to determine an 
interference represents a missed opportunity to provide domestic courts with 
sufficient guidance to ensure consistency on the types of activity of a public authority 
that are likely to engage privacy interests. The ad hoc approach, which involves the 
ECtHR declaring which activities are protected on a case-by-case basis, presents 
difficulties for domestic judges and legislators in predicting how the ECtHR would 
interpret the scope and applicability of ‘private life’ in cases where there is not a clear 
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precedent. To ensure consistency and maximise legal certainty, the ECtHR should be 
more forthcoming in offering guidance to domestic courts on how the scope of Article 
8 should be interpreted.  
 
1.2 Family Life 
Taking account of social change since the inception of the ECHR, the court has 
extended the meaning of family life beyond the family based on a traditional 
marriage.278 Therefore, when establishing in a particular case whether or not a 
‘family’ exists within the meaning of Article 8(1), the court will consider a number of 
factors, including the length of a relationship or cohabitation, and the nature of 
relationships with any children arising from such cohabitation.279 The Strasbourg 
institutions have confronted a number of difficult questions when attempting to 
define family life. For instance, in X, Y and Z v UK,280 the ECtHR has considered 
whether a law preventing X, a female to male transsexual, from registering as the 
father of Z, the child of Y – with whom X had been in a permanent relationship since 
1979 – constituted a violation of Article 8 because it failed to respect the family life of 
X.281 The Court found that Article 8 was engaged in this case because there were de 
facto family ties linking all three applicants.282 
 
Despite the eventual conclusion that there had been no violation of Article 8, the 
Court found that the relationships enjoyed by the applicants fulfilled both the 
appearance and substance of ‘family life’.283 The expansion of this right to protect 
non-traditional family relationships such as that in the above case is a clear example 
of how the evolutive and purposive approach to the interpretation of the ECHR has 
allowed the Strasbourg institutions to apply the language of the Convention to 
situations which may not have been contemplated by the original drafters, but are 
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appropriately covered by the terms used, and are consistent with the underlying 
principles of the Convention.284 As an ECHR concept, ‘family life’ evidently does not 
rely on the existence of a biological relationship between parents. The court has also 
ruled that the relationship of a cohabiting same-sex couple living in a de facto 
partnership constitutes a family life in the same way that it would for a heterosexual 
couple in the same situation.285 Other non-traditional family relations can also fall 
within the scope of family life under Article 8(1). For example, cohabitation is not a 
necessary precursor to the existence of a family life under Article 8.286 Moreover, the 
concept of ‘family life’ includes the relationship between step-parents and step-
children,287 and between children and non-parent legal guardians.288 In short, family 
life is interpreted broadly for the purposes of Article 8.  
 
In establishing whether a particular ‘family life’ falls within the ambit of Article 8, 
much turns on a contextual assessment of the effectiveness of the ‘personal ties’ in 
question. In Soderback v Sweden, the ECommHR and ECtHR ruled that the 
applicant’s relationship with his infant daughter fell within the scope of Article 8(1), 
despite the fact that he had only met her on sporadic occasions:  
[T]he Commission considers that Article 8 cannot be interpreted as only 
protecting family life which has already been established but, where the 
circumstances warrant it, must extend to the potential relationship which may 
develop between a natural father and a child born out of wedlock. Relevant 
factors in this regard include the nature of the relationship between the natural 
parents and the demonstrable interest in and commitment by the natural father 
to the child both before and after the birth.289   
 
In this case the limited number of contacts between the applicant and his daughter 
was not held to create the ‘exceptional circumstances’ necessary to break the 
personal ties between them. However, in G v The Netherlands, the ECommHR 
determined that a man acting as a sperm donor cannot invoke a right to respect for 
family life after the birth of his child without the existence of a close personal 
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relationship with the child.290 In this case the applicant father agreed to donate his 
sperm on the understanding that a lesbian couple known to him would raise and take 
full custody of the child after its birth. The Commission considered that a ‘situation in 
which a person donates sperm only to enable a woman to become pregnant through 
artificial insemination does not of itself give the donor a right to respect for family life 
with the child.’291 In concluding that insufficient other personal ties had emerged 
between the applicant and child for the relationship to fall within the scope of Article 
8 protection, the Commission had regard to the lack of financial contribution from the 
applicant to the child, and that the applicant had only met the child briefly and 
infrequently. This shows that in determining the scope and meaning of the family life 
concept the Strasbourg institutions will take into consideration a number of different 
factors, and that much turns on the circumstances of each particular case assessed in 
its context. Like the private life concept, the court does not adopt a strict definition or 
threshold for establishing the existence or non-existence of family life in a particular 
case. Instead, it proceeds on the basis that the concept is not amenable to 
exhaustive definition, and its scope is to be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
 
1.3 Home  
Article 8(1) also confers a right to respect for home, which is distinct from the right 
to a home. The scope of this protection is broad, covering houses, flats and even 
business premises, regardless of their legal status or use.292 So, what does and does 
not constitute a ‘home’ under Article 8? In acknowledgment that the home serves an 
important role in an individual’s private life, the ECtHR has found that the two 
concepts overlap. This is why, in Miailhe v France,293 the ECtHR did not examine 
whether or not the search of two houses used as business premises, involved the 
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‘home’ as the actions of the state were sufficient to constitute an interference with 
the right to ‘private life’.294  
 
In Selçuk and Asker v Turkey,295 the court found that the deliberate destruction by 
security forces of the applicants’ home violated Article 8 on the grounds that it 
constituted an unjustified interference with the applicants’ rights to respect for home 
and the free enjoyment of their possessions.296 Whilst such a right may stem from 
ownership of the possessions, it goes beyond traditional property rights. The right to 
respect for home affords the individual the freedom to enjoy his or her home and the 
possessions contained within. The court shows a sophisticated understanding of the 
role the home plays in affording an individual the space to enjoy his or her 
possessions and live in private. Thus, the right to respect for home protects the 
normative interest in privacy as it affords the individual the space to exist free from 
the interferences that the state might legitimately place upon individual liberties in 
publicly accessible spaces. 
 
The right to respect for home is a broad right which protects a physically defined area 
where private and family life can take place:  
Breaches of the right to respect for the home are not confined to concrete or 
physical breaches, such as unauthorised entry into a person's home, but also 
include those that are not concrete or physical, such as noise, emissions, smells 
or other forms of interference.297 
 
It is for this reason that it has long been established that the failure of public 
authorities to deal with environmental pollution affecting the ‘home’ can also engage 
Article 8.298 The right to respect for ‘home’ affords the individual the freedom to 
create a space where he or she can have quiet enjoyment free from the interference 
of public authorities or other third parties. This goes beyond the right to respect for 
private life per se, which does not necessarily encompass the right to enjoy a 
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particular physical space free from external interferences. The ‘home’ is given an 
autonomous meaning. In determining its existence, the ECtHR will, once again, have 
regard to a number of factors – including an assessment of the existence of 
‘sufficient and continuous links’ with the property in question.299  This approach 
seems consistent with the court’s interpretation of the other protections set forth in 
Article 8.  
 
1.4 Correspondence 
As with the other interests protected under Article 8, the right to respect for 
correspondence is interpreted broadly in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. According to 
the court, all written communication is covered throughout the channel of that 
communication.300 The right to respect for correspondence also covers telephone 
conversations, and other forms of communications such as text messages and e-
mails.301 In A v France,302 the ECtHR also found that the right protects the means of 
communication irrespective of the content of the communication. Here, the 
Government argued unsuccessfully that Article 8(1) was not engaged by the 
recording of a telephone conversation between the applicant and a third party, 
because the applicant was discussing her criminal activities during the phone 
conversation.303 The court found that Article 8 had been violated because the 
recording of the telephone conversation constituted an unjustified interference with 
the applicant’s right to respect for her correspondence.304  
 
There are limits to the scope of the right to respect for correspondence. The right 
does not put a positive obligation on the state to ensure that postal or other 
correspondence services should run perfectly.305 There may be expectations of 
confidentiality in cases where a special relationship between the sender and recipient 
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of the correspondence exists (e.g. lawyer/client or doctor/patient).306 This shows 
that, in cases where interference with correspondence is at issue, private life and 
correspondence complaints may overlap. In such cases, the court normally considers 
private life and correspondence considerations together.307 However, in the case-law 
it is clear that the right to respect for correspondence is properly recognised as a 
stand-alone right.308 The right to respect for correspondence provides an added level 
of protection to individuals where their correspondence has been interfered with but 
in the absence of consequential interference in their private life. For instance, if the 
authorities were to withhold or delay the mail of a prisoner, without reading it, this 
might constitute an interference with the right to respect for correspondence under 
Article 8(1),309 without engaging broader privacy concerns. The court has determined 
that any form of correspondence will be prima facie protected from the imposition of 
restrictions or other interference from a public authority unless such an interference 
meets the criteria set forth in Article 8(2).310 However, the ECtHR has suggested that 
if an applicant were to receive prior warning that his or her communications could 
lawfully be monitored (by an employer on a phone owned by the employer, for 
example) this may fall outside the scope of Article 8 protection.311  
 
1.5 Assessing the ECtHR’s Approach to the Interpretation of 
Article 8(1): The purposive and evolutive approach 
vindicated? 
The four interests protected under Article 8(1) each serve a unique role in protecting 
privacy-related interests. In the Chapter 1, we saw how privacy interests are various, 
overlapping, yet distinct.312 These values range from familiar interests in personal 
autonomy and human dignity to the much-less discussed interest in not having one’s 
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pornographic picture looked at, as in Judith Thomson’s (abstract) thought 
experiment.313 The aim of this section has been to briefly survey the four interests in 
Article 8(1) with a view to assessing the scope of the privacy related interests 
covered in Article 8 and the persuasiveness of the ECtHR’s interpretation of this right. 
Two main conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, the purposive and evolutive approach to 
the interpretation of the scope of Article 8 has enabled this right to cover a broad 
array of interests. This is entirely consistent with the findings from the previous 
chapter that privacy is a broad term covering a plurality of different activities; the 
scope of any interest in privacy can only be determined having regard to the context 
in which it is invoked.314 The ECtHR has recognised and protected privacy interests in 
public spaces, and has recognised a broad range of informational privacy interests. 
Secondly, from this survey of the ECtHR jurisprudence, there is a lack of a clear 
threshold for determining whether a setback to a privacy related interest is 
sufficiently serious to warrant the protection of Article 8. The ECtHR has had regard 
to the ‘reasonable expectations’ of the applicant at the time of an alleged 
interference. The merits and drawbacks of this approach will be explored in 
subsequent stages of this thesis. However, it is worth noting that the ECtHR does not 
seem to adopt the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ standard as anything like a 
mandatory precondition of Article 8 engagement in most cases. No such similar 
precondition is made explicit in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Instead, the court 
seems to assess whether Article 8 is engaged through a contextual assessment of the 
seriousness of the impact of a particular measure on the private life of the individual. 
This may unduly limit the clarity of the scope of Article 8(1), presenting a danger that 
the right may be interpreted inconsistently at the domestic level. The next section of 
this analysis will consider how the court assesses the legitimacy of any interference 
with Article 8(1) rights under Article 8(2) of the Convention. 
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2. When is an Interference with Article 8 Justifiable?  
Under Article 8(2) of the Convention, any interference with Article 8(1) must be 
justified as being (i) in accordance with the law; (ii) in pursuit of a legitimate aim; 
and (iii) necessary in a democratic society. This section will consider how, once an 
interference is established, the Strasbourg institutions have determined whether or 
not it is justified under Article 8(2). Particular attention will be paid to principles that 
have emerged in the jurisprudence of the court which structure the judicial process in 
this area. 
 
2.1 In Accordance with the Law 
A measure which interferes with an Article 8(1) right must be ‘in accordance with the 
law’. One principle underlying this criterion of Article 8(2) is that any such 
interference must have a basis in domestic law.315 ‘The law’ refers to the domestic 
law of the Contracting State in question, which includes statute law, common law, 
and other non-statutory instruments such as codes of practice and guidance.316 The 
mere existence of such legal instruments to regulate an interference is not sufficient 
for a measure to be considered ‘in accordance with the law’. The ECtHR also assesses 
the quality of the domestic law that is in place to regulate any interference with 
Article 8(1).317 This means the court takes a leading role in assessing the quality of 
the legal safeguards which permit public authorities to undertake interfering 
measures. 
 
A second principle is that the law must be adequately accessible. In Silver v United 
Kingdom,318 the court found that Article 8 had been violated when prison authorities 
stopped and delayed the applicant prisoner’s mail. The court found ‘[t]he law must 
be adequately accessible: the citizen must be able to have an indication that is 
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adequate in the circumstances, of the legal rules applicable to a given case.’319 The 
interference was not ‘in accordance with the law’ because orders and instructions 
accompanying the Prison Act 1952, which gave a legal basis for the interference, 
were not published.320 Here, the court demonstrated the active role it takes in 
assessing the quality of domestic safeguards that are in place to regulate the 
Contracting State’s use of interfering measures. 
 
An aspect of accessibility is that the domestic provision must be foreseeable. In 
Olsson v Sweden, where the applicants unsuccessfully argued that their Article 8 
rights were violated when their children were taken into care,321 the ECtHR ruled that 
the domestic law should be formulated with sufficient precision:  
A norm cannot be regarded as a 'law' unless it is formulated with sufficient 
precision to enable the citizen—if need be, with appropriate advice—to foresee, 
to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a 
given action may entail.322 
 
Despite this, the court also underlined the importance of affording appropriate 
discretion to public authorities:  
To confine the authorities' entitlement to act to cases where actual harm to the 
child has already occurred might well unduly reduce the effectiveness of the 
protection which he requires. Moreover, in interpreting and applying the 
legislation, the relevant preparatory work provides guidance as to the exercise 
of the discretion it confers.323 
 
This led the court to find that the domestic law in question was ‘in accordance with 
the law’ for the purposes of Article 8(2), as the scope of the discretion conferred on 
the authorities by the domestic law was deemed to be reasonable for the purposes of 
Article 8.324 This foreseeability requirement cannot apply to cases of secret 
surveillance, where the individual could adapt his conduct if he knew he were the 
subject of such measures.325 However, in such cases, the ECtHR does recognise the 
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need to guard against such powers being exercised arbitrarily; hence, the need for 
clarity is emphasised in domestic legal provisions which permit the use of secret 
surveillance.326 In this context, the court also details a number of minimum 
safeguards in the case-law, which should be set out in statute law to avoid abuses of 
power through secret surveillance.327 These safeguards include a definition of the 
categories of people liable to having their telephone tapped; a limit on the duration of 
telephone tapping; and procedures for examining, storing and using the data 
obtained.  
 
The principle of legality contained in Article 8(2) is an important component of Article 
8 jurisprudence. It necessitates that any measure taken by a public authority, which 
interferes with the Article 8 rights of the individual, must not only comply with 
domestic law, but also be compatible with the rule of law. As part of the latter 
requirement, the ECtHR has taken an active role in assessing the quality of the 
domestic provisions regulating interferences in Contracting States, considering 
whether the domestic provision is sufficiently accessible and foreseeable. This 
demonstrates the point that the ECtHR made in Golder v United Kingdom that the 
reference to the rule of law in the preamble of the Convention is more than a 
rhetorical reference, devoid of relevance for those interpreting the Convention.328 The 
ECtHR seeks to uphold the rule of law in interpreting the Convention. The effect of 
this provision in England and Wales will be subject to scrutiny in subsequent sections 
of this thesis.  
 
2.2 In Pursuit of a Legitimate Aim 
To justify an interference with Article 8(1), Contracting States must also show that an 
interference was in the pursuit of a legitimate aim. This requirement restricts the 
Contracting State to interfere with the Article 8 rights of the individual only in pursuit 
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of an objective that is considered so important that it can offer a basis for an 
interference. A Contracting State cannot interfere with an individual’s Article 8 rights 
for the purpose of demonstrating its military might, even if it does so only to the 
minimum degree required to achieve the objective. The aims are interpreted broadly 
by the court and the legitimate aim requirement restricts the power of the 
Contracting State to the effect that Article 8 can only be limited to protect the 
specified interests, which are of fundamental importance for the effective functioning 
of society. The requirement puts the onus on a Contracting State to show that the 
basis for an interference is sufficiently important to the interests of wider society.  An 
aim forming such a basis should be of significant importance to the wider interests of 
others in society. This is perhaps the least controversial of the requirements in Article 
8(2). It is rare that a Contracting State will challenge an Article 8 claim where it is 
not using an interfering measure squarely in the pursuit of a legitimate aim.329 Each 
of the legitimate aims contained in Article 8(2) are invoked for particular types of 
cases by Contracting States. The aim of protecting national security and public safety 
is often invoked where Contracting States aim to show that special measures such as 
secret surveillance are needed to prevent acts such as foreign espionage,330 or 
terrorism.331 However, in Smith and Grady v United Kingdom,332 the court found that 
the British armed forces’ protracted investigations into the private lives of the two 
homosexual applicants did not pursue the legitimate aim of protecting national 
security and public safety.333  
 
Unlike the other legitimate aims which may be used to justify an interfering measure, 
the aim of securing ‘the economic well-being of the country’ is unique to Article 8 of 
the Convention.334 The court recognises that there may be occasions where the 
Government may need to interfere with the rights enshrined in Article 8(1) in order 
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to pursue aims that are in the interests of the economic well-being of the country. 
However, this added aim may dilute the force of Article 8. It is not clear from the 
drafting process why this was seen as a legitimate aim exclusively for interference 
with Article 8. The extent to which this should provide a legitimate basis for 
interference is seldom discussed in the case-law. In Powell and Rayner v United 
Kingdom,335 for example, it was accepted by the applicants and the court that the 
development of a large international airport pursued the legitimate aim of protecting 
the country’s economic well-being, even though it was developed in a well-populated 
urban area.336 However, the ECtHR’s silence on this point is not especially surprising 
given the constitutional role of the ECtHR is to interpret the scope of the legitimate 
aims and not to redraft them.  
 
Article 8(2) also allows for interfering measures to be used to prevent disorder or 
crime. Many of the police powers to subject individuals to surveillance, or to retain 
and use personal data taken from those subject to the criminal process will be 
undertaken in pursuit of this aim. The aim of preventing or detecting crime has been 
invoked in cases where prisoners’ correspondence has been supervised,337 and in 
certain search and seizure cases.338 Again, this aim is a relatively easy hurdle for the 
Contracting State to clear.339 The Contracting State only has to convince the court 
that the measure pursues the aim. Whether or not it is successful in this pursuit falls 
to a consideration of whether the measure is ‘necessary in a democratic society’. In 
pursuing this aim the public authority can also simultaneously prevent the harms to 
privacy and other interests which would ultimately result if crimes were to go 
unpunished, investigated, or prevented. In this sense the legitimate aim and the 
Article 8 right are complementary in ensuring privacy interests are protected. 
However, to maximise the extent to which the interests of individuals and society are 
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realised, it is important that the aim of preventing disorder or crime and privacy 
related interests must be balanced where they conflict. 
 
A fourth legitimate aim mentioned in the text of Article 8(2) and recognised by the 
ECtHR is to use an interfering measure ‘for the protection of health or morals’. In 
such cases, the Contracting State justifies an interference on the grounds it is 
necessary to protect the health and morals of society in general, or of particular 
groups within society.340 In Laskey v United Kingdom,341 the ECommHR and ECtHR 
held that the criminalisation of sado-masochistic activities pursued the legitimate aim 
of protecting health and morals.342 Here, the Commission determined that, even 
though the activities of the applicants were consensual and fell within the scope of 
their private lives, the fact that they involved the infliction of serious injury was 
sufficient to form a basis for an interference by the Contracting State, on health 
grounds. Finally, the legitimate aim of ‘protecting the rights and freedoms of others’ 
has considerable overlap with the protection of health and morals.343	
 
The court took account of both legitimate aims in finding a violation of Article 8. The 
‘protection of rights and freedoms of others’ as a legitimate aim is, essentially, an 
acknowledgment that there are occasions where the Contracting State may have to 
interfere with the Article 8 rights of an individual or group of individuals to protect 
the legitimate interests of other individuals in society. For instance, in Chapman v 
United Kingdom,344 the court held that the eviction of gypsies from land that was 
occupied without effective planning permission pursued this legitimate aim as there 
were environmental factors relating to the gypsies’ occupation of the land in 
question, which posed a threat to other members of society.345 The legitimate aims 
are couched in general terms which Contracting States have generally had little 
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trouble meeting. The ECtHR has been notably deferent to domestic lawmakers at this 
stage. Once an interference is deemed to be supported by a legitimate aim, the final 
– and somewhat more difficult - hurdle to overcome for Contracting States is to 
justify the interference as necessary in a democratic society. This is a much more 
exacting task. 
 
2.3 Necessary in a Democratic Society 
The final stage in determining whether or not an interference with Article 8(1) is 
justified requires the Contracting State to show that the interference is ‘necessary in 
a democratic society’. This criterion must be satisfied wherever a qualified right has 
been engaged. This section shows how the Strasbourg institutions have evolved a 
version of the globalised four-part proportionality analysis.346 In Handyside v United 
Kingdom,347 the court outlined a number of principles relevant to the assessment of 
whether or not an interference was ‘necessary in a democratic society’ for the 
purposes of Article 10(2) of the ECHR. Whilst this case did not concern Article 8, the 
principles which emerged have subsequently been drawn upon by the court in the 
case-law of Article 8.348 The ECtHR found that Contracting States are afforded a 
margin of appreciation to assess the ‘necessity’ of an interfering measure.349 This 
margin of appreciation serves as a recognition that state authorities are best placed 
to determine the content of a restriction on an ECHR right, and to determine whether 
an interfering measure is necessary for that particular Contracting State:  
[I]t is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various Contracting States 
a uniform European conception of morals. The view taken by their respective 
laws of the requirements of morals varies from time to time and from place to 
place... By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of 
their countries, State authorities are in principle in a better position than the 
international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these 
requirements as well as on the 'necessity' of a 'restriction' or 'penalty' intended 
to meet them.350  
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This margin of appreciation is essentially a space for manoeuvre which the court 
grants Contracting States in order to determine how the Convention should be 
codified and applied in domestic legal systems.351 The court acknowledges that it is 
important that the ECtHR take into account the cultural, religious, historical, and 
philosophical differences between Contracting States when assessing whether or not 
a measure interfering with a Convention right is ‘necessary in a democratic society’. 
The margin of appreciation is a power conceded to the Contracting State with the 
intention that the state will address the various elements of the Convention when 
assessing the justification for an interference with a Convention right.352 
 
The function of the ECtHR is to ensure that the Contracting State does not exceed 
this margin of appreciation in any particular case. Thus, the court has played a 
‘subsidiary’ role to that of national legal systems in protecting human rights.353 This 
margin of appreciation doctrine allows the Convention to accommodate different legal 
systems and different conceptions of the rights contained within it, thus affording the 
Contracting State the capacity to determine how their obligation to respect 
Convention rights can be balanced against their sovereignty.  Whilst the Contracting 
State is afforded this margin to decide whether an interfering measure can be 
considered necessary, the ECtHR is empowered to give the final ruling on whether or 
not an interfering measure is justified.354  
 
In Sunday Times v United Kingdom,355 the court elaborated on the scope of the 
margin of appreciation to suggest that it will change according to the legitimate aim 
that is pursued by the Contracting State, and the level of common ground amongst 
Contracting States regarding the type of interference concerned.356 If the legitimate 
aim pursued by the Contracting State is ‘the protection of morals’, the Contracting 
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State would be afforded a wide margin of appreciation because the requirements of 
morals varies from time to time and from place to place.357 Therefore, because there 
is a lack of common ground on what constitutes ‘the protection of morals’ in the 
domestic laws and practices of Contracting States, they are afforded a wider margin 
of appreciation in this area.358 Other aims, such as the need to ensure public safety, 
will attract a narrower margin of appreciation due to an increased level of consensus 
across Contracting States. The principle of subsidiarity, which underpins the margin 
of appreciation doctrine, has gained an increasingly high profile in recent years.359 In 
2013, the ECHR was amended under Protocol 15 (not yet in force) to add reference 
to the principle in the preamble in the following terms:  
Affirming that the High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms 
defined in this Convention and the Protocols thereto, and that in doing so they 
enjoy a margin of appreciation, subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Human Rights established by this Convention.360 
 
This legal reform, which brings the term subsidiarity explicitly into the Convention, is 
consistent with a number of other reforms undertaken by the ECtHR as part of the 
interlaken process, which aimed to increase the efficiency of the ECtHR and improve 
the protection of human rights at the domestic level.361 These reforms came at a time 
where the court had faced unprecedented criticism for its supposed ‘human rights 
imperialism’,362 and for second-guessing domestic policy choices and judicial rulings 
in the national application of human rights.363 ECtHR judges have generally 
responded to such criticisms with persuasive arguments that the court has for a long 
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time accepted and incorporated a principle of subsidiarity.364 Whilst this analysis will 
not stray into debates regarding the scope of the constitutional role of the ECtHR, the 
move in recent years towards an increased emphasis on ‘applying a robust and 
coherent concept of subsidiarity’ and, thus, increasing diversity in the protection of 
human rights is noteworthy.365 It may indicate a degree of sensitivity from the ECtHR 
towards political and popular backlash against the ‘human rights revolution’, 
particularly in the UK where the Human Rights Act 1998 conferred upon domestic 
courts the power to scrutinise the actions of both public authorities and Acts of 
Parliament and assess the extent of their compliance with the ECHR – a move which 
profoundly shifted the constitutional balance of power between the judiciary and the 
legislature.366 
 
In Handyside, the court also explained the meaning of the term ‘necessary’ as 
follows:  
The Court notes at this juncture that, whilst the adjective 'necessary', within 
the meaning of Article 10 (2), is not synonymous with 'indispensable', neither 
has it the flexibility of such expressions as 'admissible', 'ordinary', 'useful', 
'reasonable' or 'desirable'. Nevertheless, it is for the national authorities to 
make the initial assessment of the reality of the pressing social need implied by 
the notion of 'necessity' in this context.367 
 
This suggests a fairly strict interpretation of the term ‘necessary’, which implies the 
existence of a ‘pressing social need’. Furthermore, in Olsson v Sweden,368 the court 
refined what is meant by ‘necessary’ by including a requirement of 
‘proportionality’.369 
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To understand how the court establishes whether or not an interference with Article 8 
is justified then, it is important to understand the meaning of these terms and the 
exercise of establishing the necessity of an interfering measure in the jurisprudence 
of Article 8. The next sections focus on elucidating the content of these concepts, as 
used by the ECtHR in its Article 8 jurisprudence, and the overlapping relationship 
between them. 
 
2.3.1. Pressing Social Need 
When considering whether or not a pressing social need exists the court will consider 
whether or not the interests pursued through the interfering measure could have 
been achieved in a way that did not interfere with the applicant’s rights under the 
Convention. For example, in Ploski v Poland,370 the court found that the failure of the 
domestic authorities to allow the applicant leave from prison, where he was held on 
remand, to attend the funerals of his parents violated Article 8. The applicant was 
refused permission to attend the funerals because he was a habitual offender who 
may not return to prison and the offence for which he was subsequently convicted 
(larceny) involved a ‘significant danger to society.’371 
 
The ECtHR found that the interference was in accordance with the law and also 
pursued the legitimate aims of ‘public safety’ and ‘the prevention of disorder or 
crime’.372 However, the court was not satisfied that the interference responded to a 
pressing social need.373 The concerns of the Contracting State could have been 
addressed through the use of escorted prisoner leaves, which were available at the 
time.374 Thus, a violation of Article 8 had occurred as the concerns of the Contracting 
State could have been addressed through less intrusive means. 
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The ‘pressing social need’ requirement puts the onus on Contracting States to show 
that any interfering measures they impose are not only done in pursuit of a 
legitimate aim, but are also done to the minimal extent to fulfil this aim, after any 
alternative options have been given due consideration. However, the interpretation of 
what exactly the ‘minimally intrusive means’ principle requires from a Contracting 
State is controversial in the ECtHR jurisprudence and academic commentary.375 In 
the Animal Defenders International v United Kingdom case, the ECtHR observed:  
The more convincing the general justifications for a general measure are, the 
less importance the court will attach to its impact in a particular case … The 
central question as regards such measures is not, as the applicant suggested, 
whether less restrictive measures should have been adopted or, indeed, 
whether the state could prove that, without the prohibition, the legitimate aim 
would not be achieved. Rather the core issue is whether, in adopting the 
general measure and striking the balance it did, the legislature acted within the 
margin of appreciation afforded to it.376  
 
 
This suggests that, so long as a measure is generally expected to fulfil the legitimate 
aim, the court will be less exacting in its assessment of the extent to which the 
measure is minimally intrusive. However, this departure from previous authorities 
has faced criticism for its unprincipled interpretation of the minimally intrusive means 
test.377 Conversely, in Hämäläinen v Finland,378 the joint dissenting opinion of Judges 
Sajó, Keller, and Lemmens presents an alternative view on how the court should 
assess the existence of a pressing social need. The court found no violation of Article 
8 when the Finnish Government required the married transsexual applicant to 
transform his marriage into a registered partnership in order to obtain full legal 
recognition for his change of gender.379 The court reasoned that the requirement to 
change the marriage to a registered partnership would have minimal or no effect on 
the applicant’s family life and, consequently, that the maintenance of this system was 
generally justified.380  
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Strasbourg Jitters?’ (2014) 77 Modern Law Review 460-474 at 473. 
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However, Judges Sajó, Keller, and Lemmens argued that the ‘pressing social need’ 
requirement had not been sufficiently observed by the court:  
The Government have not argued that there would be significant practical 
difficulties if married transgender individuals were allowed to obtain legal 
recognition of their post-transition gender. The only interest in issue is, in plain 
terms, the public interest in keeping the institution of marriage free of same-
sex couples. While we do not purport to deny the legitimacy of the State’s 
interest in protecting the institution of marriage, we do consider that the weight 
to be afforded to this argument is a different question and one that must be 
considered separately.381 
 
The dissenting judges point out that the issue of whether the Government has struck 
a fair balance between the protection of the institution of marriage and the Article 8 
rights of the applicant is a separate issue to whether the interfering measures 
respond to a pressing social need. So, whilst the measures taken by the authorities in 
Hämäläinen may have been proportionate to the aim of protecting the institution of 
marriage, which is subsumed within the broader aim of protecting morals contained 
in Article 8(2), it did not respond to a pressing social need.382 In the view of the 
dissenting judges, the existence of a pressing social need for such a measure is 
dependent on whether or not the measure is needed to prevent significant practical 
difficulties for the Government in question.  
 
In Animal Defenders, the ECtHR seems to diminish the effect of the pressing need 
requirement to put subsidiarity before a rigorous review of necessity. The extent to 
which this has happened in Article 8 cases where the applicant is subject to the 
criminal process will be considered later in the thesis. However, it is submitted that 
such a course dilutes the proportionality analysis. If an applicant can show that a 
public authority could reasonably have achieved the same objective, to the same 
extent, through less intrusive means, then it is surely disproportionate for the public 
authority to have opted for the more intrusive means of achieving the same 
objective.   
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2.3.2. Proportionality 
The next stage in assessing whether an interfering measure is ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’ requires the court to consider whether or not the measure is 
proportionate to its stated legitimate aim. This principle of proportionality is recurrent 
throughout the whole of the ECtHR jurisprudence.383 The principle has also become 
the globalised standard for resolving conflicts between constitutional values, which 
has generated a vast body of literature discussing its scope and proper use.384 In 
Soering v United Kingdom, the ECtHR observed that ‘inherent in the whole of the 
Convention is a search for a fair balance between the demands of the general 
interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s 
fundamental human rights.’385 The proportionality principle requires the court to find 
a fair balance between interests pursued by the Contracting State and the need to 
protect the fundamental human rights of individuals. The need to find this balance is 
made explicit in the text of the qualified rights of the Convention. The principle of 
proportionality requires the intensity of the interfering measure to be (metaphorically 
speaking) proportional in relation to the legitimate aim that is pursued.  
 
In judging the proportionality of an interference, the court has taken numerous 
factors into account. Firstly, the court may consider whether or not the interfering 
measure leaves some scope for the exercise of the right that has been interfered 
with. In Jacubowski v Germany,386 the court found that an injunction preventing the 
applicant – a former employee of a news agency, who was dismissed for financial 
mismanagement - from disseminating adverse comments about his former employers 
in a circular was a proportionate interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of 
expression under Article 10 of the Convention.387 The court found that because the 
injunction did not prevent the applicant from voicing his opinions in ways other than 
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in the circular, it left scope for him to exercise his right to freedom of expression by 
other means.388 
 
Secondly, the context in which the interference takes place has a significant bearing 
on proportionality assessments. In Murray v United Kingdom,389 the six applicants 
had their home entered and searched by British Army personnel in connection with 
the first applicant’s suspected involvement in the collection of money for the 
purchase of firearms for the Irish Republican Army in the USA.390 The applicants 
complained that the entry into and search of their family home by the Army, 
including the confinement of five other applicants for a short while in one room, 
violated Article 8. In finding no violation of Article 8, the court considered the 
‘conditions of extreme tension’ in Northern Ireland at the time of the case to be a 
significant factor when assessing whether or not the interfering measures taken by 
the Army were proportionate to the legitimate aim of preventing crime.391  
 
A third factor the court will consider in making proportionality assessments is 
whether there is sufficient basis for believing that the particular interest the 
Government seeks to protect through the interfering measure is in peril. In Hertel v 
Switzerland,392 the court found that an injunction preventing the applicant from 
making statements about the dangers of microwave ovens violated his freedom of 
expression under Article 10 of the Convention as it was not ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’.393 The prohibitions imposed on the applicant by the Government 
were intended to protect consumers and suppliers from the dissemination of 
misleading information about the characteristics of services and goods on offer. It 
thus pursued the legitimate aim of the ‘protection of the rights of others’.394 
However, the court found that measures taken by the Government could not be 
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considered proportionate because the means by which the applicant disseminated his 
views – a specialist periodical with a small subscriber base - were unlikely to have a 
measureable impact on the sale of microwave ovens.395 
 
The court found that the objective pursued by the Government was not logically 
furthered by the means employed as the applicant’s conduct did not have sufficient 
impact to threaten the rights of others. Thus, if an interfering measure limits the 
exercise of a Convention right which, through its exercise, does not imperil a 
competing interest, it will be considered a disproportionate interference.396  
 
Fourthly, the nature of the burden put upon an individual will be balanced against the 
competing interest. In Z v Finland,397 the applicant complained that there had been a 
violation of her right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 when details 
of her medical history were included in criminal investigation files, including her HIV 
status, and were subsequently presented to an appeal court in the manslaughter trial 
of her husband, X.398 The court found that the private and family life considerations 
to be weighted in a proportionality calculation were especially significant in this case, 
due to the fact that the disclosure of confidential information about the applicant’s 
HIV infection might dramatically affect her private and family life, as well as her 
social and employment situation.399 Here, the domestic court had acted in pursuit of 
a legitimate aim and ensured that the use of the material was necessary for the 
purpose of fulfilling that legitimate aim. However, the nature of the burden on the 
individual was sufficient for the court to find that the interfering measures were 
disproportionate. 400 
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The principle of proportionality is now entrenched in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. 
Whilst the court has not provided a prescriptive methodology for weighting the public 
interest against fundamental human rights, it has outlined several factors it will 
consider at this stage. The principle of proportionality gives the court a means of 
assessing each Contracting State’s application of its margin of appreciation. The 
proportionality assessment is a tool for interpretation of the Convention that is used 
by the court to assess whether or not the interfering measures taken to protect the 
interests of the community or a collection of individuals are justified. However, these 
attempts to balance human rights against wider community interests are not 
uncontroversial.401 Whilst, the proportionality framework provides a degree of 
structure to ensure that conflicts between qualified human rights and community 
interests can be settled in a systematic and coherent fashion, it has been criticised on 
a number of grounds. The next section considers the extent to which the 
proportionality analysis is an appropriate tool for balancing constitutional values.  
 
3. Is Balancing an Appropriate Method for 
Adjudicating Article 8 Claims? 
To better understand the significance of the role of the proportionality analysis in 
Article 8(2), it is useful to temporarily broaden the scope of the analysis to consider 
the principle of proportionality as a core element of constitutional rights reasoning. 
As constitutional law is becoming increasingly globalised, balancing, as part of a 
proportionality analysis, has become the ‘dominant technique of rights adjudication in 
the world.’402 However, the expansion of proportionality, and balancing, as the 
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‘multipurpose, best practice standard’403 of human rights adjudication has been met 
with severe criticism. Tsakyrakis, for instance, views the proportionality analysis as 
‘an assault on human rights.’404 Webber argues that proportionality analyses pretend 
to ‘balance values’ while wrongly circumventing political and moral questions inherent 
in the process of rights reasoning.405 It is not an aim of this analysis to add, by way 
of an exhaustive discussion of the proportionality analysis, to the vast amount that 
has already been written on this subject. Rather, this section of the analysis aims to 
give an overview of some of the merits and limitations of the proportionality analysis 
as it is applied in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, particularly in Article 8 cases.  
 
The structure of the proportionality analysis in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
(broadly)406 covers the same well-established four steps as Robert Alexy’s 
proportionality assessment,407 and other proportionality analyses adopted by a range 
of domestic jurisdictions. These steps are as follows: (i) an assessment of whether 
the measure pursues a legitimate aim; (ii) whether the measure is suitable or 
rationally connected to achieving the legitimate aim; (iii) whether the measure is 
minimally intrusive (i.e. no more than is necessary to achieve the legitimate aim); 
and (iv) whether the measure is proportionate in the narrow sense (i.e. whether it 
produces a net gain, when the interference with the right is weighed against the 
realisation of the legitimate aim.)408 In the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, for the 
interference to be considered ‘necessary in a democratic society’, it must respond to 
a ‘pressing social need’ and be ‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’.409 The 
former test requires that the reasons advanced in justification are ‘relevant and 
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sufficient’,410 whilst the latter requires a fair balance between the competing interests 
at stake.411  
 
Kumm illustrates how the proportionality analysis operates in the adjudication of the 
Article 8 case of Lustig-Prean v United Kingdom,412 where the applicants complained 
that their dismissal from the armed forces on the grounds that they were practising 
homosexuals constituted a violation of their rights under Article 8.413 In doing so, 
Kumm also effectively illustrates the relevant stages of a proportionality analysis: 
First, the [ECtHR] addressed the existence of a legitimate aim. In this instance, 
[Article 8] limited the kind of aims that were legitimate for the purpose of 
justifying an infringement of privacy. The U.K. offered the maintenance of 
morale, fighting power, and operational effectiveness of the armed forces – a 
purpose clearly related to national security – as its justification for prohibiting 
homosexuals from serving in its armed forces.  
 
The next question assessed whether disallowing gays from serving in the armed 
forces was a suitable means of promoting the legitimate policy goal. This is an 
empirical question… In this case, a government-commissioned study had shown 
that it would pose integration problems for the military system if declared gays 
were to serve in the army… 
 
A more difficult question was whether the exclusion of homosexuals from 
military service was necessary… In this case the issue was whether a code of 
conduct backed by disciplinary provisions, certainly a less intrusive measure, 
could be regarded as equally effective. Ultimately the court held that the 
government had not shown that this alternative could not adequately deal with 
any behavioural issues that might arise.  
 
Finally, the court had to assess whether the measure was proportional in the 
narrow sense, applying the so-called balancing test, based on what Alexy calls 
the “Law of Balancing”: “The greater the degree of non-satisfaction of, or 
detriment to, one principle, the greater must be the importance of satisfying 
the other.” To further guide the exercise, Alexy suggests a three-level scale 
distinguishing between serious, moderate, and relatively minor infringements, 
on the one hand, and very important, moderately important, and relatively 
unimportant gains on the other… The decisive question in the case of the gay 
soldiers discharged from the British armed forces was whether, on balance, the 
increase in the morale, fighting force, and operational effectiveness achieved by 
prohibiting homosexuals from serving justified the degree of interference in 
their privacy.414 
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Thus, the legitimate aim requirement in Article 8(2) specifies the interests that may 
count as a ‘legitimate’ basis for an interfering measure under the first step of the 
proportionality test. The necessity and proportionality requirements in Article 8(2) 
also cover the second and third steps combined, and the fourth step of the 
proportionality assessment.415  
 
Tsakyrakis identifies two controversial assumptions underlying this approach: (i) that 
public interests ‘can always be weighted against human rights’; and (ii) ‘that 
measures aimed at promoting a public interest may prevail unless they impose an 
excessive restriction compared to the benefit they secure’.416 According to 
Tsakyrakis, the first assumption leaves advocates of balancing faced with the 
problem of incommensurability. The metaphor of balancing is said to ‘conceal the 
impossibility of measuring incommensurable values by introducing the image of a 
mechanistic, quantitative common metric.’417  
 
Klatt and Meister identify, and effectively respond to the two main variants of the 
incommensurability objection.418 The first variant highlights that not all principles are 
amenable to quantification and comparison.419 Whilst some rights are closely linked 
to a monetary valuation (for e.g. property rights), others - particularly those related 
to privacy which are difficult enough to define, let alone quantify – are not. This 
objection is premised on the (mistaken) assumption that balancing depends upon an 
exact quantification of colliding principles. However, as Klatt and Meister observe, 
‘balancing works fine as long as it is possible to assign weights to [competing 
interests] with the help of Alexy’s triadic scale ‘light, moderate, and serious’.’420 
Whilst the attribution of a weight may be disputed, this is a matter of external 
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justification (through, for example, practical moral reasoning of the sort undertaken 
in Chapter 1) rather than a criticism of the use of a metric such as the triadic scale.421 
 
The second variant of the incommensurability objection is that, even if relevant 
principles can be quantified, they do not belong to a common scale.422 Thus, in 
creating an artificial scale (such as the triadic scale) to compare incommensurable 
values, balancing masquerades as being morally neutral, whereas in fact what is 
necessary is to establish priorities for principles through moral reasoning. However, 
this view seems to overlook the fact that balancing, in the form outlined above, 
provides for moral reasoning and demonstrates at what stage and to what extent 
such reasoning is necessary in the process of rights adjudication.423 
 
Tsakyrakis’ second criticism of balancing is that it puts rights and the public interest 
on an equal footing, putting rights at risk of being overridden in favour of the 
majoritarian interests of the public. As Tsakyrakis puts it, the balancing approach 
‘reduces conflicts between rights and between rights and the common good to 
comparisons of relative weights and thus overlooks the justification-blocking function 
of rights.’424 Habermas famously suggested that balancing breaks down the ‘fire wall’ 
that constitutional values should represent.425 Thus, through balancing, rights are 
deprived of their proper normative power. However, the model of rights adjudication 
outlined here can overcome this criticism. First, this is because only stated legitimate 
aims are able to compete with rights. This guarantees that only those aims that are 
of particular importance can form the basis of justification for an interference with a 
right. Second, the fact that the principle of proportionality does not prioritise 
																																								 																				
421	The classification of interferences as light, moderate, or serious is a heuristic tool designed to represent 
an evaluation of the degree of interference with Article 8(1). This is not to be mistaken for an attempt to 
quantify principles, but rather as an attempt to rank the degree of interference caused by an interfering 
measure. This is roughly based on Alexy’s triadic scale, which helps make explicit the structure of the 
balancing exercise: see R. Alexy, ‘The Weight Formula’ in J. Stelmach, B. Brozek, and W. Zaluski (eds.) 
Studies in the Philosophy of Law: Frontiers of the Economic Analysis of Law (Krakau: Jagiellonian 
University Press, 2007) 9-27.	
422 See Webber, n 405 at 194; n 401 at 471. 
423 Klatt and Meister, n 408, 62. 
424 n 401 at 489. 
425 J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996) 258. 
105	
	
individual rights over collective public interests at the structural level, does not mean 
(as proponents of Tsakyrakis’ second criticism seem to assume) that such a priority 
cannot be given adequate expression within that structure.426 Moreover, the rights 
contained in the ECHR are afforded differing levels of priority. Article 3 (the right to 
be free from torture, inhuman or degrading treatment), enjoys the status of an 
‘absolute’ right, meaning that it is not subject to limitation for the pursuit of a 
legitimate aim. Articles 5 and 6, the ‘intermediate’ rights in the Convention, are not 
subject to explicit qualification and, at a minimum, require stronger justification for 
interference than that required to interfere with a qualified right. Taken together, 
these considerations allow for the proper status of a right, whatever that is in a 
particular case, to be reflected in any balance.  
 
The main issue with the criticisms of the proportionality analysis coming from 
Tsakyrakis and others is not the internal coherence of their criticisms but rather that 
the criticisms take the proportionality analysis for something that it is not. The 
proportionality analysis is not a utilitarian calculation that attempts to quantify all 
values and compare them on a common scale. Nor is it a theory of rights. Rather it is 
part of a two-stage process of rights adjudication. The first looks at the scope of the 
interest, and the second focuses on striking a fair balance between the interfering 
measure and competing interests. As Letsas highlights, ‘the language of balancing 
rights and public interests, is merely a rough conceptual framework that courts use 
to establish what rights litigants have. The framework has not precluded courts from 
recognising and upholding strong anti-majoritarian moral rights.’427  
 
Conclusions 
The ECtHR has interpreted the scope of the application of Article 8 appropriately 
broadly. The right protects diverse privacy related interests, from prisoners’ mail to 
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sadomasochistic practices, from arbitrary interference by a public authority. The 
court also assesses the seriousness of an interference having regard to a range of 
contextual factors. This approach to the interpretation of Article 8(1) seems to reflect 
an understanding from the ECtHR that, as was discussed in Chapter 1, privacy is a 
pluralistic concept; with a normative value relative to the function it serves in a 
particular context.428 The ECtHR has recognised that the scope of the Article 8 right 
cannot be untrammelled and, as such, has imposed some limits on the scope of the 
interests it protects. In doing so the court has referred to the existence of a ‘direct 
link’ between the activity of the state and the individual’s private life. It has also 
referred to the existence of any ‘reasonable expectations’ the individual might hold to 
be free from the interfering measure. However, neither of these considerations has 
been applied as a mandatory precondition for Article 8 engagement and, for reasons 
to be explored in subsequent chapters of this thesis, nor should they. The ECtHR 
determines an interference on a case-by-case basis, without adopting a consistent 
threshold criterion. Whilst this might be said to allow the ECtHR to take an ‘evolutive’ 
and purposive approach to the interpretation of Article 8, it might also invite criticism 
for reducing the extent to which an individual can predict whether a particular 
measure unlawfully interferes with his or her Article 8 rights. The need for such a 
threshold was highlighted in Chapter 1, and the attempts of domestic courts to use 
the existence of a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ as the threshold test for Article 
8 engagement will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
Article 8(2) of the ECHR specifies the criteria under which measures interfering with 
Article 8(1) can be justified by Contracting States. The domestic courts of Contracting 
States and, ultimately, the Strasbourg Court are required to reconcile the 
fundamental human rights of individuals with wider community interests. Whilst the 
legality and legitimate aim requirements (at this stage) are relatively uncontroversial, 
the necessity criterion requires an assessment of whether or not the interfering 
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measure can be justified in pursuit of its legitimate aim. This inevitably requires the 
court to engage in a process of balancing, which can only be done on a case-by-case 
basis. One criticism of this balancing approach is that the rulings of the court could 
be seen merely as the result of its own arbitrary preferences, rather than principled 
evaluations of how the balance between human rights and other interests should be 
achieved. However, this criticism can be answered, to some extent, by the principles 
that have emerged from the jurisprudence of the court, which offer at least some 
formal structure to assessments of necessity in this area. Whilst this chapter has not 
sought to engage in an exhaustive assessment of the framework set forth in the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR for adjudicating Article 8 cases, it has described the 
relevant stages of the framework and commented on its key features, with the aim of 
illustrating how the ECtHR identifies an interference with Article 8(1), and determines 
whether or not this interference violates the Article 8 rights of the applicant.  
 
The next chapter extends the theoretical framework developed in Chapters 1 and 2. 
It maps the numerous ways in which an individual’s privacy related interests can be 
set back as part of a criminal process. The chapter goes on to consider how the 
ECtHR framework discussed in this chapter protects the privacy interests of those 
subject to the criminal process. Chapter 3 will complete the task of setting out how, 
from both a moral and legal standpoint, domestic courts can and should draw upon 
the ECtHR jurisprudence to assess whether or not a public authority has struck a fair 
balance in its use of privacy interfering methods as part of a criminal process. 
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3 Article 8 and the Criminal Justice 
Process 
The previous chapters established the foundations for an assessment of the privacy 
related interests of those subject to the criminal justice process, and how these 
interests are protected in England and Wales. But how should such an analysis be 
structured in more detail? This chapter extends what has been covered in the first 
two chapters to focus specifically on the privacy related interests of those subject to 
the criminal process, and on how these interests are protected at the level of the 
ECtHR. The chapter outlines a range of privacy interests that are typically engaged as 
part of a criminal process. It shows that such a process can set back privacy interests 
in numerous ways that are not typically acknowledged or protected through legal 
provisions and principles geared towards ensuring procedural fairness, such as the 
privilege against self-incrimination, the right to silence or the presumption of 
innocence. The chapter also shows that, if interpreted appropriately at the domestic 
level, the Article 8 ECHR framework can afford adequate protection to those subject 
to the criminal process.  
 
The task is two-fold. Part 1 considers several prominent attempts at developing a 
taxonomy of privacy related interests. It assesses some of the merits and limitations 
of developing such a taxonomy, with a view to providing the necessary background 
for identifying and categorising the privacy interests of those subject to the criminal 
process. These interests are then mapped drawing on the philosophical literature 
covered in Chapter 1. Part 2 applies this literature to the jurisprudence of Article 8, 
paying attention to how the ECtHR has interpreted the scope of the right to respect 
for private life and established how the limits on this right should be interpreted in 
the context of criminal investigations.  
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Before engaging in this analysis, it is instructive to outline what constitutes being 
‘subject to the criminal justice process’. In its Article 6 jurisprudence, the ECtHR has 
held that criminal proceedings begin at the moment a person has been ‘charged’ with 
a criminal offence.429 However, the term ‘charge’ should be subject to autonomous 
interpretation and could be ‘the date of arrest, the date when the person concerned 
was officially notified that he would be prosecuted, or the date when preliminary 
investigations were opened.’430 For the purposes of this analysis the term ‘subject to 
the criminal justice process’ will be given a broader meaning. To be ‘subject to the 
criminal process’ for the purpose of this analysis means that an individual has been 
targeted either formally or informally by the police for any of its legitimate functions 
related to the prevention or investigation of crime. This broader meaning captures 
potentially coercive activities of the police that do not form part of a police 
investigation targeted against a particular individual.431 
 
 
1. Mapping Privacy Setbacks as Part of a Criminal 
Process 
1.1 How Can Privacy Interests Be Categorised? 
Before attempting to set out how privacy interests can be set back as part of a 
criminal process, it is instructive to look at previous attempts at developing 
taxonomies of privacy interests or setbacks. These attempts can offer useful insights 
into the range of activities that can set back privacy interests, and can be drawn 
upon to assist in the task of understanding the range of ways privacy is diminished 
as part of a criminal process. Most prominent attempts to develop a taxonomy of 
privacy interests include some form of interest in protecting personally identifiable 
information about oneself. Prosser’s well-known attempt at constructing a privacy 
																																								 																				
429 For example, see Eckle v Germany (1983) 5 EHRR 1. 
430 ibid at [73]. 
431 See Introduction, Part 2. See also: E. Miller, ‘Challenging Police Discretion’ (2015) 58 Howard Law 
Journal 521-556 at 522-524; E. Miller, ‘Policing Criminal Justice: A Fair Cop and a Fair Trial’ (2016) 
Unpublished conference paper at: Obstacles to Fairness in Criminal Proceedings, University of Nottingham, 
September 1-2, Nottingham. 
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taxonomy through an analysis of U.S. tort case law counts the following as groups of 
setbacks to privacy related interests: (i) the public disclosure of private facts about 
an individual; and (ii) the appropriation of an individual’s name or likeness.432 Each of 
these forms of setback involve the appropriation or use of information that is 
identifiable to an individual (henceforth ‘personal information’). Discussing the first 
type of setback, Prosser emphasised that the disclosure must be public, and it must 
be of private facts about the individual.433 Thus, in protecting the individual from 
such disclosures, a right to privacy may protect aspects of the reputation of the 
individual.434  
 
The second type of setback occurs when the individual’s personal information is used 
without his or her consent to ‘advertise the defendant’s product, or to accompany an 
article sold, to add luster to the name of a corporation, or for other business 
purposes.’435 Prosser argues that this strand of the taxonomy protects the individual’s 
identity. It is worth remembering that Prosser’s taxonomy was based on an analysis 
of tort case law. However, this type of setback may be encountered in a criminal 
justice context where, for example, a public authority discloses private facts about an 
individual for purposes related to the operational function of its organisation.436  
 
Prosser’s privacy taxonomy underlines the significance of the relationship between 
privacy and personal information. Indeed, the significant role privacy plays in limiting 
the extent to which information about an individual can be accessed by others, in the 
furtherance of a range of normative ends, has been well-documented in privacy 
																																								 																				
432 W. Prosser, ‘Privacy’ (1960) 48 California Law Review 383-423 at 389. 
433 According to Prosser, privacy protection in this context extends only to those facts that have not been 
left open to the public eye: ‘Certainly no one can complain when publicity is given to information about 
him which he leaves open to the public eye, such as the appearance of the house in which he lives, or to 
the business in which he is engaged.’ See ibid at 394. 
434 ibid at 398. 
435 ibid at 391-402. 
436 See, for example, the Peck case where public authorities disclosed public CCTV images of a man whom 
they had detained after his attempted suicide with the aim of inspiring public confidence in CCTV, and 
deterring crime Peck v United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 41 at [69]. 
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scholarship.437 However, no matter how many cases or works are surveyed to reach 
the point where a definition of the phenomenon exists, the taxonomy relies on a 
judgment by the author over which are relevant, and cannot cover new cases and 
problems that arise after the taxonomy has been completed.438 Nonetheless, such 
taxonomies are useful in that they allow for our understanding of privacy to continue 
to develop in line with changes in society.  
 
More recent attempts at mapping out privacy interests have acknowledged that 
privacy can be interfered with physically, and through interference with an 
individual’s personal information. Allen’s attempt focuses on what she terms 
‘unpopular privacies’: privacies that are disvalued or disliked by their intended 
beneficiaries. Allen recognises the (sometimes unwanted) physical privacy interests 
of ‘seclusion’ and ‘modesty’, and informational privacy interests in ‘confidentiality’ 
and ‘data protection’.439 After charting some of the new risks posed to privacy 
through technological advancements, and a generalised indifference to some of these 
risks in the general population (for example, the risks to an individual’s reputation 
through the wide accessibility and permanency of social media posts, and the 
seeming indifference to this risk from some of those who post regularly on social 
media), Allen argues that coercive, paternalistic regulations are warranted to combat 
these threats.440 This work is useful in that it highlights particular privacy interests 
that can exist despite the individual’s particular regard for them. However, in 
focussing on just these forms of privacy, the taxonomy neglects forms of privacy 
interest that individuals, generally speaking, will actively seek to protect. Whilst this 
is not a criticism of Allen’s taxonomy, it is merely to state that, with its focus on 
these interests, the taxonomy is of limited use for the purposes of this analysis.  
 
																																								 																				
437 See J. Rachels, ‘Why Privacy is Important’ (1975) 4 Philosophy and Public Affairs 232-333 at 325; B. 
Röessler, The Value of Privacy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005) 116; A. Marmor, ‘What is the Right to 
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438 P. O’Callaghan, Refining Privacy in Tort Law (London: Springer Heidelberg, 2013) 14. 
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Solove’s taxonomy of privacy setbacks is based on United States privacy law more 
generally.441 This contemporary contribution also recognises how technological and 
societal developments have changed the landscape of privacy interests:  
Modern privacy problems emerge not just from disclosing deep secrets, but 
from making obscure information more accessible (increased accessibility) or 
from consistent observation or eavesdropping (surveillance).442 
 
 
Solove’s taxonomy focuses on problems that have occurred in the United States, 
explaining how they might set back an individual’s privacy interests. This taxonomy 
consists of the four following groups of setback: (i) information collection, (ii) 
information processing, (iii) information dissemination, and (iv) invasion. These 
groups are arranged around the individual, whose privacy related interests are 
affected by the activities in question. Thus the ‘information’ in question is information 
pertaining to the individual. The first three groups move the control of personal 
information progressively away from the individual, whereas the latter group, 
invasions, do not necessarily involve personal information.443 Instead, these setbacks 
intrude into the life and physical space of the individual.  
 
Solove’s taxonomy goes much further than Prosser’s earlier attempt. In particular, 
Solove’s taxonomy places significant emphasis on personal information, taking 
account of the expanding ways in which information about the individual can be 
collected, processed, or disseminated as information technologies continue to 
advance. Privacy interests, and threats to these interests, change contextually and 
temporally.444 Thus, no attempt at developing a taxonomy of such interests can mark 
the end of the conversation. However, Solove’s categories of ‘invasions’, ‘information 
collection’, ‘information processing’, and ‘information dissemination’ do seem to 
effectively capture the different ways in which privacy interests are engaged by 
public and private bodies in the twenty-first century. Drawing on Solove’s attempt, 
and on broader privacy and criminal justice scholarship, this part aims to map how 
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442 ibid at 560. 
443 ibid at 488-489. 
444 See Chapter 1, Part 2.3. 
113	
	
privacy interests are set back as part of a criminal justice process. The aim is not to 
give an exhaustive list of every example of how such a setback can occur. Rather, it 
is to develop a general understanding of how certain common features of a criminal 
process will likely set back the privacy interests of the individual.  
 
A comprehensive coverage of all the ways in which those subject to the criminal 
process may have their personal information collected, processed, and disseminated 
is not feasible within the parameters of this research. In part, this is due to the wide 
discretion afforded to front-line police officers. ‘Lower-level’ police officers that work 
‘on the beat’ are frequently left to make discretionary decisions with regard to when 
they should investigate, arrest, search, or collect personal information.445 
Consequently, in many cases, the decision to collect personal information from an 
individual, or subject him or her to physical coercion will fall to the police officer 
responding to a particular incident. The circumstances under which a police officer 
may decide it is necessary to collect the personal information of potential witnesses, 
victims, or suspects are innumerable. This is because the ‘encounters’446 a police 
officer may engage in are numerous and diverse; they can range from the minimally 
intrusive and unregulated exchanging of pleasantries to the more intrusive stops, 
searches, or surveillance measures.447 A full analysis of whether this discretion is 
exercised in a manner that gives due regard to the privacy interests of the individual 
cannot be conducted solely through looking at the legal regulations in place. It would 
require empirical research falling beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
Even if the analysis is limited to where privacy interests are set back within the 
strictures of legality, the number of different provisions permitting public authorities 
to set back the privacy interests of those subject to the criminal justice process is too 
great for an exhaustive analysis of each using the methods of this inquiry. The focus 
																																								 																				
445 See S. Bronitt and P. Stenning, ‘Understanding Discretion in Modern Policing’ (2011) 35 Criminal Law 
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instead will be on looking in-depth at different types of setback and how these are 
protected at the domestic level. However, first I will set out what these types of 
interest are, and how the protection of these interests should be approached, 
drawing on the philosophical literature and European human rights jurisprudence 
already discussed. 
 
1.2. Information Collection and Physical Invasions 
Solove argues that information collection creates disruption because it involves data 
gathering.448 He identifies two methods of information collection in this context: 
surveillance and interrogation. Though Solove does not give a specific definition of 
surveillance, he argues that it can have problematic effects as it can lead to 
discomfort, self-censorship, and inhibition.449 Whilst covert surveillance does not 
have the same effects, according to Solove, its harm lies in the ‘panoptic effect’ it 
may have on people who know they could be watched at any time but do not know 
when or at what times they will be watched.450 Solove’s succinct analysis gives an 
accurate account of the potential setbacks to privacy related interests which may 
arise as a result of modern surveillance techniques. The collection of personal 
information through monitoring and recording certainly removes the individual from a 
condition of limited access to a significant degree.   
 
Interrogation is identified as the second form of information collection said to set 
back privacy related interests. This is defined by Solove as ‘the pressuring of 
individuals to divulge information.’451 For Solove, part of the issue associated with 
interrogation comes from the degree of coercion involved. However, even where no 
compulsion or coercion to answer questions exists, interrogation and the asking of 
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449 ibid at 493. See also A. von Hirsch, ‘The Ethics of Public Television Surveillance’ in A. von Hirsch, D. 
Garland, and A. Wakefield (eds.) Ethical and Social Perspectives on Situational Crime Prevention (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2004) 59-76. 
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unduly probing questions can set back privacy related interests as it may cause an 
individual to feel uncomfortable and concerned about how his or her responses might 
be perceived.452  
 
The purpose of asking questions which are ‘none of your business’ is undoubtedly to 
collect, or attempt to collect, personal information from another and, irrespective of 
the degree of coercion employed, it can set back privacy interests. To stop a stranger 
in the street and ask probing questions about his or her private life, his or her 
medical history, or criminal record is to subject the stranger to unwarranted scrutiny, 
even if this individual is under no obligation to answer those questions.  
 
A further way information collection can set back privacy interests is through 
biometric sample collection. Biometric or other samples of information that are 
identifiable to an individual comprise a part of that individual’s personal information. 
In the criminal justice context, individuals can be put under pressure or coercion to 
provide such samples. For example, the request for DNA samples from a particular 
subset of a population who may fit the profile of a suspected offender (otherwise 
known as a DNA dragnet) may constitute an interrogation under Solove’s 
interpretation, or an infringement on the privilege against self-incrimination,453 as 
individuals may feel pressured into proving their innocence or fear the associated 
stigma and suspicion which may arise if they refuse to provide a sample.454 The 
extent to which such requests for samples or other such information constitute an 
‘interrogation’ is questionable. However, even in the absence of such a request (for 
instance, where the sample is collected from a crime scene by forensic investigators), 
it is undeniable that personal information is contained within such samples.  
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453 See, for example, Saunders v United Kingdom (1994) 18 EHRR CD23. 
454 Issues concerning the extent to which such DNA dragnets involve voluntary and informed consent are 
discussed more fully in D. Wilson, Genetics, Crime and Justice (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2015) ch. 3. 
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There is often a degree of overlap between measures involving the collection of 
information and physical invasions in the criminal justice context. Most methods of 
surveillance and searches, for example, not only gather personal information; they 
also seem to be, on the face of it, invasive (perhaps with the exception of secret 
surveillance measures). Solove identifies two types of invasion: intrusion and 
decisional interference. Intrusions probe into one’s life.455 These involve an incursion 
into a physical space that, taking into account contextual factors, constitutes a part 
of the individual’s private sphere. They can also be non-physical. For example, 
through prolonged staring at an individual. Intrusions can account for the wrongness 
in invading the physical space of an individual (without occasioning an assault etc.) 
or covertly watching an individual get undressed where no new information is 
collected about the individual.456 Decisional interference involves unwanted incursions 
into an individual’s decisions. Protection from what Solove refers to as ‘decisional 
interference’ can, for all intents and purposes, be equated with setbacks to 
autonomy-based privacy interests.457 
 
The collection of personal information and invasions are a central feature of criminal 
investigation. To identify a suspected offender, or mount a prosecution against an 
individual, it is often important for the police to request information about an 
individual from witnesses, to collect samples from a public space, or to ask probing 
questions of an individual they believe may have committed a crime. Such 
information collection often also involves physical invasion, either through decisional 
interference, or intrusion into the life of the individual. In England and Wales, much 
of this activity is governed by implicit common law powers and requires no specific 
legal authorisation. As Paul Roberts states:  
Just as you or I can stop a stranger in the street to request directions, to ask 
the time, to solicit a donation to charity or for any other lawful purpose, the 
police are similarly entitled to stop a stranger in the street and ask him or her 
what he or she is doing, whether he or she has seen anything suspicious, where 
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he or she lives, etc… Any conduct that takes place in plain view is liable to be 
observed, photographed, recorded and reported, by amateur or professional 
sleuths; any property or other matter (say blood spatters or a fingerprint) 
abandoned in the street or other public venue can be recovered by the police as 
evidence, just as it might be appropriated by a tinker or made into modern art 
by a passing conceptualist.458 
 
The police can investigate crime without having or requiring formal or codified legal 
powers to use measures of coercion beyond that which is permissible for all citizens 
through implicit common law powers. However, when the gentle approach to 
gathering personal information is insufficient, the police may invoke a range of 
statutory powers authorising them to forcibly collect bodily samples and biometric 
information, to use intrusive covert surveillance methods, to search an individual and 
seize his or her property, or to detain and interrogate him or her for long periods of 
time.459 But how do these different types of information collection and physical 
invasion, as used by the police, interfere with individual privacy interests?  
 
Solove highlights how interrogation can interfere with privacy interests because it 
makes an individual feel uncomfortable and concerned about how his or her 
responses might be perceived.460 Part of the harm that can arise through 
interrogation depends upon the degree of coercion applied. At the extreme end, 
physical torture as part of an interrogation is manifestly harmful, not least to privacy 
interests.461 However, even where the degree of coercion is minimal, such as in 
circumstances where an individual has volunteered to be interviewed by the police as 
part of a criminal investigation, interrogation can set back privacy interests. Where, 
for example, an investigating officer is tasked with eliciting information from an 
interviewee, the officer may pursue a line of questioning which concerns an intimate, 
or even incriminating, part of an individual’s life. Such interrogations can be 
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embarrassing or upsetting for the individual; putting pressure on him or her and 
causing emotional discomfort.462  
 
In England and Wales, the extent to which this pressure may be exerted is limited by 
procedural safeguards restricting interrogations, such as the privilege against self-
incrimination, the right to silence, and statutory provisions governing the conduct of 
police during investigations such as the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, 
designed to give effect to these broader principles.463 Whilst these procedural 
safeguards are primarily in place to ensure accurate fact-finding and protect the fair 
trial rights of the suspect, they can also protect an individual from setbacks to 
privacy interests. These procedural safeguards can preempt the need to discuss the 
privacy interests set back through some measures, such as interrogation, at length. 
If an individual subject to the criminal process is not compelled to discuss any 
personal information about him or herself during an interview, then the individual can 
be said to be in a condition of limited access in this context. However, if such 
procedural safeguards were to be diminished, this may pose a threat to the privacy 
interests of those subject to the criminal process as such persons may be put under 
pressure to disclose information about themselves which may be distorted or made 
to fit a pre-existing narrative the interrogator has formed in his or her own mind.464 
However, a full discussion of the extent to which these procedural safeguards are 
currently being protected, and how effective such regulation is in practice is beyond 
the parameters of this study.465 Owing to the fact that interrogations have significant 
potential to setback the privacy interests of the individual, and to impact upon the 
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2013). 
119	
	
individual’s fair trial rights, such measures are subject to generally more stringent 
regulation than the types of interfering measures discussed in this thesis. 
 
Various samples may be taken from an individual as part of a criminal process. A 
non-exhaustive list of the types of samples that may be collected includes the 
following: photographs, DNA data, fingerprints, body samples such as hair, urine, 
saliva and blood, dental impressions and voice samples. Samples are commonly 
taken from arrestees at a police station, whilst some are also taken in public or 
private spaces by police officers on patrol.466 The extent to which the collection of a 
sample interferes with privacy interests depends on the content of the personal 
information in the sample, and on the context in which the sample is taken. For 
example, to collect an impression of an individual’s shoeprint by requesting that he or 
she stand on an impression generator would constitute a relatively minor setback to 
his or her privacy interests as this does not require the individual to reveal intimate 
parts of his or her body, and the content of the information is only minimally 
revealing of the identity, characteristics, and behaviour of the individual (e.g. 
approximate shoe size, design, and how much the shoe has been worn). Conversely, 
a sample of pubic hair may require much more invasive techniques to obtain, contain 
genetic information which can be identified to the individual with greater precision, 
and reveal much more detail about the individual and his or her characteristics, than 
a shoeprint. The collection of this sample would likely constitute a more severe 
setback to the privacy interests of the individual. 
 
Any collection of a sample containing personal information involves some kind of 
engagement of individual privacy interests. It removes the individual from a condition 
of limited access to some degree. However, this fact alone does not mean that an 
individual has a right to the protection of this information. Even where a blood 
spatter is abandoned in the street, as in Roberts’ example, the collection of that 
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sample by the police sets back the privacy interests of the person from whom the 
sample originated as it involves the collection of information that is personally 
identifiable to the individual which has the potential to be processed in a number of 
ways. The question of whether or not the collection of such information is legally 
permissible turns on whether the privacy interests pertaining to the information are 
sufficient to warrant protection of the information, and whether the collection can be 
justified for the purposes the collector sought to achieve.  
 
Methods of surveillance can set back privacy interests in a number of ways. The 
intrusion into spaces that are ‘private’ to the individual will plainly set back privacy 
interests, removing the individual from a condition of limited access in such a way 
that might be corrosive to his or her privacy and autonomy based privacy interests. 
As Benn argues, covert observation treats the individual as an object, undermining 
his or her autonomous decisions and disrespecting the individual as a human 
being.467 When occupying ‘public space’, one’s claim to privacy is reduced as one is 
open to the scrutiny and judgment of other people who are using the same public 
space at that time. Social conventions and legal prohibitions curtail the extent of such 
scrutiny in ‘real-space’ appraisal.468 Others cannot persistently touch me or harass 
me beyond acceptable limits as I use public space as this may be against the law.469 
The dictates of social convention also suggest that others should only subject one to 
casual and fleeting face-to-face scrutiny. However, when public CCTV cameras are 
used to subject an individual to targeted surveillance, they go far beyond what would 
be considered acceptable when an individual is subject to ‘real-space’ appraisal, and 
in a number of ways.470 First, such surveillance is purposeful and systematic, not 
casual. The individual is being targeted for a particular purpose. Second, such 
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470 This is not to say CCTV that is not targeted to particular individuals in this way is innocuous for privacy 
interests. Such CCTV usage falls outside the focus of this section.  
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surveillance might be more problematic if it is covert. In such cases the observer has 
the benefit of monitoring the individual subject to the criminal process without that 
individual being able to see the observer or detect that he or she is being subjected 
to such targeted scrutiny. The individual might also be subject to closer scrutiny than 
he or she could be if such cameras were not used. Public CCTV can overcome 
physical barriers when used from vantage points.471 Such surveillance poses a clear 
threat to the privacy related interests of individuals subjected to it as it significantly 
reduces the control an individual has to determine who can gain access to his or her 
person and personal information about his or her movements and conduct in public 
space. As a result, such surveillance undermines the personal autonomy of the 
individual as the knowledge that he or she could be subject to such observations at 
any particular time, whilst simultaneously having no way of knowing if he or she is 
being observed by public CCTV cameras at any particular time, creates a situation 
which may impact upon the autonomous decisions and actions of the said 
individual.472 Of course, this argument relies on the individual having knowledge that 
he or she could be the object of such surveillance, and not on the surveillance itself.  
 
However, even when the individual concerned does not know of such surveillance 
measures or the conditions under which such measures may be used; this does not 
mean the use of such measures is any less objectionable. Such surveillance 
measures are objectionable because this covert monitoring can pose a threat to the 
individual dignity of the subject concerned as it treats the individual as an object to 
be managed, categorised, and monitored, disregarding the individual altogether. In 
short, where privacy interests are set back to a significant degree, having regard to 
the nature of the information collected and any relevant contextual considerations, 
this must be justified by a compelling and conflicting need to occasion the setback. 
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1.3. Information Processing 
Solove gives the following definition of information processing:  
Information processing refers to the use, storage, and manipulation of data that 
has been collected. Information processing does not involve the collection of 
data; rather, it concerns how already-collected data is [sic] handled.473 
 
Thus, information processing can involve the storage and manipulation of personal 
information, but is differentiated from the dissemination of that information to 
others. Drawing on Solove’s taxonomy, five types of processing are potentially 
harmful to the privacy interests of those subject to the criminal process, namely: 
aggregation, identification, insecurity, secondary use, and exclusion. 
 
1.3.1. Aggregation 
Aggregation involves gathering together various pieces of information about a 
person. Solove argues that this form of processing is significantly more problematic 
in the information age where technological advances have increased the capacity of 
data processors to engage in ever-more sophisticated and intrusive forms of analysis 
of such aggregated information. Aggregation can curtail the individual’s personal 
autonomy as profiles of personal information can be used to evaluate and manage 
the individual.474 As an example of how such aggregation can occur in a policing 
context, consider how information from Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) 
systems can be aggregated. 
 
ANPR cameras are capable of extracting vehicle registration numbers from 
registration plates. In addition to being mounted within police vehicles, ANPR 
cameras can be placed on roadsides or above motorways to collect the registration 
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plate data of passing vehicles.475 ANPR systems are often aggregated with 
information from other policing or law enforcement databases that fall outside the 
ANPR system’s immediate remit.476 Accordingly, personal information from public or 
privately owned insurance databases, and police databases (such as the Police 
National Computer (PNC)), can be aggregated with other information stored on ANPR 
systems to create a ‘hit’ database.477 These ‘hit’ databases can then be linked to 
ANPR cameras so that when a vehicle of interest to the police passes an ANPR 
camera (for example, vehicles reported stolen, or suspected of being used in the 
commission of a crime), the ANPR system can automatically notify police officers of 
the ‘hit’, and the details of when and where the vehicle passed the ANPR camera in 
question.  
 
This example shows how separate pieces of personal information about an individual, 
such as his or her vehicle particulars, registration plate, and separate information 
attached to the vehicle and owner can be aggregated together by police to assist with 
apprehending suspected offenders. Aggregation is beneficial in increasing expediency 
and efficiency in the prevention and detection of crime. However, the processing of 
personal information in this way can pose a threat to individual privacy interests. For 
instance, where an individual has disclosed personal information pertaining to his or 
her vehicle for one purpose (e.g. registering the vehicle so he or she can drive it on 
public roads) and this information is then combined with information from ANPR 
systems to track an individual’s location, this form of processing has further removed 
the individual from a condition of limited access. Such aggregation and secondary 
use not only disregards the individual’s preferences for how his or her personal 
information is used, it can, if left unchecked, result in the use of arbitrary and 
disproportionate practices against an individual or subset of individuals in society 
(e.g. through intensive surveillance or tracking of the individual’s activities). 
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1.3.2. Identification 
Identification involves linking information to an individual. This can set back privacy 
interests as it can link the individual to information which he or she may want to 
dissociate with, limiting the extent to which the individual can exist in a condition of 
limited access. This goes a step further than aggregation as it links the aggregated 
profile of an individual to the person in real space. This represents an example of 
Ericson and Haggerty’s ‘transmission society’ which, they suggest, ‘regulates the 
pace of contributions to society by rating credentials, personal handicaps, 
creditworthiness, productivity, and so on.’478 This ‘transmission society’ can pose a 
threat to the personal autonomy of the individual as the different forms of personal 
data that are aggregated can be used to make assessments of the individual and can 
be used to limit the individual’s capacity to pursue a life of his or her choosing by, for 
example, denying the individual of the opportunity to obtain credit, pursue his or her 
chosen career, or pass through a controlled border.  
 
In the context of contemporary criminal justice, there are numerous ways in which a 
person can be identified in connection with previously collected personal information. 
Information stored on police records can be used identify an individual as part of a 
criminal process in a range of contexts. Whilst such forms of identification may well 
be justifiable, they are often threatening for an individual’s autonomy-based privacy 
interests. For example, if the police store information that an individual has been 
arrested, this may pose the constant threat to the individual that he or she may be 
identified as an arrestee either by the police in a future investigation, or by the 
public. According to Nissenbaum, this threat of judgment or continuous passive 
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monitoring forces the individual to take others into account in determining his or her 
actions or decisions, undermining the extent to which such actions are voluntary.479 
 
1.3.3. Insecurity 
Insecurity is the failure to protect stored personal information from improper access 
by others. This can set back the privacy interests of individuals as their personal 
information may be used for purposes to which they have not consented. Solove cites 
the example of identity theft as a problem that may arise as a result of insecurity.480 
Insecurity of stored information may pose problems for those subject to the criminal 
process. Such information is inherently of a sensitive nature and, consequently, any 
security breaches or losses of this information could have adverse consequences for 
the autonomy or dignity based privacy interests of the individual.  
 
1.3.4. Secondary Use 
Secondary use occurs where personal information is used beyond the purposes for 
which it was initially collected. This sets back privacy interests as it thwarts the 
individual’s expectations of how his or her personal information will be used by the 
information processor. Secondary use goes hand-in-hand with what Lyon describes 
as ‘function creep’, where ‘subsequent novel uses are devised for existing technical 
systems, which are added to the original panoply of functions.’481 The effect of 
function creep is that the individual’s personal information is used beyond the 
reasons for which it was originally collected, circumventing proper consideration of 
whether this further use constitutes a justified setback to the privacy interests of the 
individual. Even if the prospects of such secondary use are not realistically 
foreseeable, the fear of such secondary use, on the basis that personal information 
has been taken and stored by the police, may engender anxiety in the individual and, 
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consequently, have a chilling effect on his or her autonomous actions, or decision 
making.482 Such effects may be detrimental not only for the individual but also for 
broader social interests such as the interest in preserving free speech as a pillar of 
democratic self-government.483 If an individual fears that, as a result of becoming 
politically active or participating in public discourse on an issue, information about 
him or her stored on police records may come to light as a result of the heightened 
scrutiny he or she is likely to be faced with, this may dissuade the individual from 
such participation to the detriment of the common good.484 
 
1.3.5. Exclusion 
Exclusion deprives the individual of the ability to know the extent of the personal 
information a data processor is holding about him or her, and how such information 
is used. Solove suggests that this can set back the privacy interests of the individual 
as it creates a sense of vulnerability and uncertainty.485 Exclusion, like the other 
potential threats listed, deprives the individual of the power to control how others use 
his or her personal information. In the criminal justice context, personal information 
taken from public protestors or individuals who police officers encounter on the street 
may be stored and processed on databases such as the National Domestic Extremism 
Database without the individual knowing about this.486 
 
1.4. Information Dissemination 
Dissemination occurs where personal information about the individual is revealed, or 
where the threat of the revelation of personal information exists.487 Dissemination 
can set back the privacy interests of those subject to a criminal process in a number 
of ways. Even the dissemination of truthful personal information about the individual 
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without his or her consent can be stigmatising.488 The potential harm in such 
disclosure lies in the effect it may have on the reputation of the individual, and the 
effect it could have on his or her ability to control presentation of the self in public.489 
 
1.4.1. Exposure 
Exposure involves the revealing of certain physical and emotional attributes about a 
person to others. Solove refers to the exposure of so called ‘primordial’ activities an 
individual will engage in such as sex, nudity, or defecation.490 As we have been 
socialised to conceal such activities, the exposure of an individual whilst partaking in 
them can cause embarrassment or humiliation.491  
 
1.4.2. Increased accessibility 
This is where personal information that is already available to the public is made 
more accessible to a greater number of people. Increased accessibility can set back 
privacy related interests as it may widen disclosure and increases the likelihood that 
personal information is misused by others.492  
 
1.4.3. Distortion 
Distortion involves the manipulation of the way an individual is perceived and judged 
by others.493 This involves an inaccurate portrayal of an individual which affects the 
way he or she is perceived in society.494 For example, where information about an 
individual subject to a criminal process is disseminated to the media, or other non-
state actors, there may be a risk that the disclosed information is distorted or 
sensationalised to the detriment of the individual concerned.  
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The dissemination of personal information about those subject to the criminal justice 
process can set back privacy interests in various ways. Many of these harms are 
related to the reputation of the individual in public and aspects of his or her personal 
autonomy. They tend to affect the life of the individual in public. Contemplating the 
ways in which conventions and attitudes towards the private lives of public figures 
have changed in recent years, Nagel observes that ‘[t]he public, followed 
sanctimoniously by the media, feels entitled to know the most intimate details of the 
life of any public figure.’495 
 
According to Nagel, this social environment can create situations where an individual 
is subjected to unwarranted levels of exposure which can leave the individual 
tarnished and discredited.496 Scrutiny deprives the individual of the opportunity to 
control how he or she presents his or herself to others, and can undermine the 
individual’s interest in maintaining a public reputation. This is important not only 
because limitless exposure to the public can be demeaning for the individual, but also 
because an inability to present oneself to the public in a desired light may limit one’s 
opportunities.497 
 
Dissemination of personal information about the individual can open him or her up to 
uninvited scrutiny, to the judgments of others, and the consequences of these 
judgments.498 These consequences are numerous, potentially impacting the 
individual’s feelings of self-worth, and how he or she defines him or herself. Such 
judgments may also have implications for the individual’s social standing in society. 
Exposure may harm one’s capacity to build relationships with others or advance in a 
chosen career. Even with the advent of social media, where people are seemingly 
opening more and more of their private lives to the scrutiny of others, privacy, and 
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the control over what personal information is uploaded, and how far it may 
permissibly be disseminated is of concern to users.499  
 
For those subject to the criminal justice process, the dissemination of information 
about involvement in this process may have particularly negative consequences. 
Fenton and Rumney discuss how the stigma associated with sex offences is such that 
those merely suspected of committing such crimes can find themselves in a social 
world where distinctions between those who are accused and those who are 
convicted are not necessarily recognised, once information of an official suspicion has 
been disclosed to the public.500 Even where the individual is suspected of committing 
a more socially tolerable offence, this may colour perceptions of that individual in a 
range of different contexts. To bring this into focus, consider how the disclosure of an 
arrest for theft, or another offence related to dishonesty, on a job application, might 
impact upon a potential employer’s perception of a particular candidate. Even though 
one might consciously make the distinction between suspicion and conviction, it is 
not difficult to envision how the association between an individual and such offending 
may subconsciously affect perceptions of the individual. 
 
Most instances of collection, processing, and dissemination of personal information, 
and invasions of those subject to the criminal justice process will set back privacy 
interests in some respect. When determining whether or not such setbacks are 
justifiable as part of the criminal justice process, it is necessary to consider not only 
the degree to which a measure sets back these interests but also the ends achieved. 
The remaining sections of this analysis will consider how the ECtHR strikes this 
balance with regard to the privacy interests of those subject to the criminal justice 
process, and societal interests in maintaining public safety or the prevention of crime. 
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Once again, particular attention will be paid to the principles underpinning the 
decisions of the ECtHR, and the extent to which these principles guide the on-going 
development of a regulatory framework for reconciling the competing individual 
privacy interests, and societal interests in the criminal justice context. 
 
2. To What Extent Does the ECtHR Recognise and 
Protect the Privacy Interests of Those Subject to a 
Criminal Process? 
This section of the analysis focuses specifically on how the ECtHR (and the now 
disbanded ECommHR) determines whether or not measures taken as part of a 
criminal process violate Article 8. Firstly, the focus will be on identifying how the 
ECtHR establishes an interference with Article 8(1) in the criminal justice context. In 
Chapter 2 a number of principles for identifying an interference with Article 8 were 
established through a synthesis of relevant Article 8 case law. The first section of this 
analysis focuses on how these principles have been applied in cases where an 
individual is subject to the criminal process. Secondly, the focus will be on 
determining how the ECtHR assesses whether an interference with Article 8(1) as 
part of a criminal process is justifiable. In subsequent chapters, the ECtHR framework 
will be drawn upon when assessing the extent to which the privacy interests of those 
subject to the criminal process are afforded adequate protection in England and 
Wales. 
 
2.1. Identifying an ‘Interference’ with Article 8(1) 
This section shows that the purposive and evolutive approach to the interpretation of 
Article 8 has allowed the court to protect a broad range of privacy interests as part of 
a criminal process. Attention is drawn to some puzzling quirks of the ECtHR 
jurisprudence in this area, which, it is submitted, the court should clarify to help 
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ensure the consistent recognition of the privacy interests of those subject to a 
criminal process across all Contracting States. 
 
2.1.1. Information Collection and Invasion 
The collection of personal information using invasive and targeted surveillance 
methods will, in most foreseeable circumstances, engage Article 8. Furthermore, 
where officials of the state compel an individual to provide personal information, this 
will interfere with the right to respect for private life. For instance, in X v United 
Kingdom,501 a compulsory public census including questions on sex and marital status 
was held to interfere with the Article 8(1) rights of the applicant.  
 
In Friedl v Austria,502 the applicant complained that the taking and storage of his 
photograph, name, and address whilst he participated in a public demonstration, 
violated his Article 8 rights. The ECommHR found that, whilst the taking and 
retention of photographs of the applicant did not interfere with his Article 8 rights, in 
establishing the applicant’s identity and recording his personal data, the Government 
did occasion an interference.503 Thus, it would seem the Commission held processing 
to constitute a greater intrusion into the private life than the collection or mere 
retention of this personal information. Regarding the taking and retention of 
photographs, the court took into account the fact that the photographs related to an 
incident occurring in public, that they were taken for the purposes of recording the 
character of the incident, and that the photographs remained anonymous, meaning 
the individuals concerned were not identified through any processing.504 Whilst this 
seems to have indicated a reluctance from the Commission to acknowledge a right to 
privacy in public space for those subject to a criminal process, the Commission did 
observe that the questioning of the applicant, done for the purpose of establishing his 
identity, did interfere with Article 8(1). Despite the fact that this information 
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collection took place in the course of the public demonstration, the Commission 
confirmed that intrusive questioning and interrogation can interfere with the right to 
respect to private life.505 This stance was reaffirmed in Adamson v United 
Kingdom,506 where the requirement for a sex offender to register his personal 
information with the police at regular intervals for an indefinite period constituted an 
interference with Article 8(1).507 The Commission recognised that interrogations do, 
in certain circumstances, interfere with the Article 8(1) rights of the individual.508 
 
The ECtHR has broadened the scope of ‘private life’ ruling that Article 8 may be 
engaged once a ‘systematic or permanent’ record comes into existence of personal 
information taken from the public domain.509 For example, where a CCTV camera is 
monitoring public space, an interference may occur where a record of what is 
monitored is made, or where attempts are made to extrapolate personal information 
from the images collected. 
 
In Rotaru v Romania,510 the ECtHR held that personal information available in the 
public domain can fall within the scope of private life where it is collected and stored 
by public authorities. The information in question was the applicant’s historic 
convictions and political activities, which were collected and retained by the 
Romanian Intelligence Service. The court ruled that the accuracy of the information 
in question was a significant factor, as this was disputed by the applicant. The 
interference was particularly pronounced due to the injurious effect it had on the 
applicant’s reputation.511 Thus, the ECtHR recognised that privacy interests are 
intricately linked to the reputation of the individual and his or her interest in 
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managing such a reputation.512 Indeed, to exist in a condition of privacy is important 
not only for creating a space for an individual in society, but also for allowing the 
individual to manage and negotiate social relationships in day to day life.513 The focus 
on the accuracy of the information may indicate a recognition from the ECtHR that 
the spreading of false or possibly false information can be particularly pernicious for 
the individual. It is one thing to remove an individual from a condition of limited 
access through spreading information about the individual that is stigmatising or 
harmful to his or her reputation, the individual is further wronged if such effects are 
suffered through the spreading of information that is inaccurate or completely false.  
 
The collection and retention of bodily samples will also interfere with Article 8(1). In 
PG and JH v United Kingdom,514 the ECtHR found that the recording of the applicant’s 
voice, in a police station, for the purpose of identifying the applicant through 
comparison with other voice data interfered with Article 8(1). However, the court 
emphasised that this was, at least in part, due to the fact that the police had 
processed the data collected in this case.515 In McVeigh v United Kingdom,516 the 
ECommHR held that the taking of photographs, and DNA and fingerprint data to 
ascertain the identity an arrestee collectively constituted an interference with the 
right to respect for private life.517 However, the court left open questions of whether 
or not the collection and retention of particular forms of personal information, 
separately, would constitute an interference with Article 8(1). It is noteworthy that 
the ECtHR has not established that all personal information, once stored, forms part 
of an individual’s private life for Article 8 purposes. 
 
The Friedl case confirmed that not all forms of personal information collection in the 
context of criminal investigations would fall within the scope of Article 8(1). In ruling 
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that the measures taken against the applicant fell outside the scope of Article 8(1), 
the Commission limited the scope of ‘private life’. Considering the disinhibiting and 
discomforting effect that such information collection methods can have on the 
individual,518 the notion that the collection of this personal information might not fall 
within the scope of the ‘private life’ seems to unduly narrow the scope of Article 8(1). 
In Peck v United Kingdom,519 the court declined to revisit the issue where a suicidal 
man was filmed carrying a knife by the police as he occupied public space. In this 
case, the court focused instead on the dissemination of the collected images to local 
newspapers.520  
 
The collection of any personal information and use of invasive search or surveillance 
techniques as part of a criminal process can in principle interfere with Article 8(1), 
but whether or not it will in fact do so depends on contextual factors, the nature of 
the information collected, and how the information is subsequently processed. In 
terms of context, where the individual is compelled to provide personal information to 
the authorities, and where personal information is collected through intrusive 
surveillance measures, it will most likely fall within the scope of private life due to the 
way in which it is collected. This contextual interpretation allows the ECtHR to adopt 
a flexible approach in assessing the extent to which the measures used to collect 
information interfere with Article 8(1). The court acknowledges that at least part of 
the harm arising from the collection of personal information about the individual can 
derive itself from the manner in which the information is collected. Marmor illustrates 
this point using the example of intimate photographs on a laptop:  
Suppose you have an intimate photo of yourself saved on your laptop. You keep 
it for yourself, and you really do not want anyone to see it. One day you learn 
that Janet happened to see your photo. Has she violated your right to privacy? 
We cannot tell; it all depends on how she got to see it. If Janet hacked into 
your computer, then she clearly violated your right. If it turns out, however, 
that you e-mailed her (and perhaps many others) the photo by mistake, then it 
is not so clear that she violated your right.521 
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This shows that the manner in which the photographs are accessed by another can 
either aggravate or mitigate the deleterious impact of the privacy setback.522 The 
contextual factors the ECtHR take into account when assessing whether Article 8 is 
engaged are logical. Whilst it is appropriate for Article 8 to encompass the privacy 
interests an individual may hold in public space, or in the absence of any physical 
interference, where an individual is physically invaded by another this reduces the 
scope for argument over whether a measure engages Article 8.  
 
Regarding the nature of the information collected, two factors have a bearing on 
whether or not a particular measure interferes with the right to respect for private 
life: the accuracy of the personal information, and the extent to which it contains 
information identifiable to the individual.523 For example, in S and Marper v United 
Kingdom, a distinction is made between the amount of identifiable information which 
exists in fingerprints, and in cellular DNA samples and DNA profiles.524  
 
The ECtHR recognises that, even where information is not proven (such as 
allegations, hearsay etc.), this information is still subject to regulation as personal 
information. The ECtHR recognises a significant potential for setbacks to privacy 
related interests where inaccurate information about the individual is disseminated in 
a manner that affects the way society perceives an individual. This is because it is 
the act of disseminating the information that is likely to harm the individual’s privacy 
interests. However, in Rotaru, the mere collection and storage of such information 
interfered with Article 8(1) based on the likelihood that it could be disseminated in 
the future.525 This approach is flexible enough to account for how the potential future 
uses of such personal information can set back the individual’s reputation and 
personal autonomy based interests.  
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The principles for establishing an interference with Article 8(1), where authorities 
collect personal information from those subject to the criminal justice process, are 
sufficiently broad and flexible to protect myriad privacy related interests from 
managing a public reputation to being free from intrusive and inhibiting surveillance 
measures. This contextual approach is useful. However, it is difficult to discern from 
the jurisprudence in this area how different factors are assessed against each other 
to determine whether or not a measure is sufficiently serious to constitute an 
interference with the individual’s Article 8 rights. Whilst the ECommHR and ECtHR did 
not appear to give due regard to the ways in which certain forms of information 
collection can set back privacy interests in its earlier rulings, more recent authorities 
seem to have broadened Article 8(1) to include wider informational privacy interests.  
 
2.1.2. Information Retention and Processing  
It has long been established that the mere storing of data relating to the private life 
of the individual amounts to an interference within the meaning of Article 8(1), and 
that the subsequent use of such information has no bearing on this interference.526 
Thus, once it is established that stored personal information relates to the private life 
of the individual, its retention will automatically amount to an interference. However, 
not all personal information involves aspects of the individual’s private life. As 
discussed above, in establishing whether or not information retained by authorities 
does form part of the individual’s private life, the ECtHR will consider the context in 
which the information is retained, the nature of the records, and the manner in which 
they are processed.527  
 
The court recognises that where personal information is processed for the purposes 
of identifying an individual this can set back privacy related interests.528 In S and 
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Marper v United Kingdom,529 the court held that the indefinite retention of fingerprint 
and DNA data of the applicants (two individuals arrested on suspicion of separate 
offences), after the termination of criminal proceedings against them, fell within the 
scope of the applicants’ private lives. Interestingly, the ECtHR made a distinction 
between the retention of fingerprint data and DNA data, on the ground that DNA 
data, such as cellular samples and DNA profiles, have a stronger potential for the 
future processing of personal information.530 The court found that an individual’s 
concern about how the Government might put retained private information to future 
use is a legitimate concern.531 In addition, the court noted that the highly personal 
nature of cellular samples was a factor in determining an interference, as these 
samples contain information about an individual’s health and ‘genetic code’.532 The 
ECtHR gave weight to the nature and amount of identifiable information contained 
within these samples, concluding that the retention per se must be regarded as 
interfering with the applicants’ right to respect for private life.533 This shows that 
where data contains more personally identifiable information, its retention will 
interfere with Article 8(1) no matter how minimal the degree to which the data are 
processed, or the duration of the retention. 
 
Recalling PG and JH v United Kingdom,534 the ECtHR held that where personal 
information collected from the public domain by a public authority is processed in the 
context of other information for the purposes of identifying an individual, this will 
interfere with the individual’s rights under Article 8(1).535 The fact that a permanent 
record of the voice samples had been made and the information had been processed 
through a comparison with other samples led the ECtHR to conclude that the 
measures interfered with the applicants’ rights under Article 8(1).536 Here, the court 
applied a broad definition of ‘private life’, superseding the narrower approach 
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adopted in the Friedl case. The ECtHR noted that, whilst an individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy in public space is not a conclusive factor in determining an 
interference with Article 8(1),537 private life considerations may arise where a 
systematic or permanent record comes into existence of such material from the 
public domain.538 Thus, whilst the ECtHR may take the existence of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy into account in the context of criminal proceedings, it does not 
make the applicant’s reasonably held expectation of privacy a precondition in 
determining the scope of Article 8.  
 
In Perry v United Kingdom,539 the ECtHR found an interference with Article 8(1) 
where images of an individual suspected of participating in a series of robberies were 
obtained from a CCTV camera in a police custody suite and subsequently used in a 
montage of other CCTV images as part of an identification tape for witnesses.540 
 
Whilst the court ruled that CCTV images of an individual do not constitute a part of 
his or her private life per se, the subsequent processing of these images may 
constitute an interference.541 This stance is contestable. Though not the primary 
focus of this thesis, the proliferation of CCTV certainly restricts the extent to which 
individuals can be said to exist in a condition of limited access in public space, and 
this can be normatively problematic for a number of reasons, particularly when such 
images are collected by state authorities.542 In the immediate case, the ECtHR noted 
that the processing which took place did interfere with the applicant’s right to respect 
for private life because the footage ‘had not been obtained voluntarily or in 
circumstances where it could be reasonably anticipated that it could be recorded and 
used for identification purposes.’543 Here, the ECtHR puts emphasis on the reasonable 
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expectations of the applicant and broader contextual factors such as the fact that he 
had not waived any interest in maintaining his privacy by, for example, giving the 
authorities permission to process or disseminate his image.  
 
Generally speaking, where a public authority processes information pertaining to the 
‘private life’ of an individual subject to the criminal justice process, this will interfere 
with the individual’s rights under Article 8(1). Thus the main consideration for the 
ECtHR in establishing an interference in such cases is whether or not the information 
in question constitutes a part of the individual’s private life. However, the scope of 
private life is not explicitly defined by the ECtHR. Accordingly, it is difficult to discern 
that personal information which falls within the scope of Article 8 and that which does 
not. Notwithstanding this unclear distinction, the court has interpreted Article 8 
broadly where a public authority processes personal information pertaining to a 
criminal investigation. 
 
Recalling S and Marper, the ECtHR emphasised that the potential for future 
processing of personal information was an important consideration when establishing 
whether the retention of such information interferes with privacy interests. Advances 
in technology continue to expand the horizons of what processors can do with such 
information, and continue to outstrip legislative attempts to regulate the use of such 
information in criminal investigations.544 Examples of fairly recent advances in 
genetic technology in this area include the use of familial testing, where intentional 
searches for partial matches are made on a DNA database to narrow the search for a 
potential suspects down to a particular family, or phenotyping, which involves genetic 
testing to identify an individual’s observable physical characteristics or traits.545 The 
ECtHR’s approach acknowledges some of the potential pitfalls of secondary use in 
relation to genetic information. In making a distinction between genetic and 
fingerprint data, the ECtHR also recognises that different forms of biometric data will 
																																								 																				
544 For a full discussion see D. Wilson, Genetics, Crime and Justice (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2015) ch. 
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inevitably hold different amounts of personal information about the individual which 
can be used for a number of ends, and some of these ends have greater potential to 
set back privacy interests than others.  
 
Information processing shifts the power relationship between the individual and 
institutions of the state in favour of the state and, in finding an interference with 
Article 8(1) in both Perry and PG and JH, the ECtHR seems to recognise that such a 
shift can set back the privacy interests of individuals. Processing is not just 
potentially harmful to the interests of those subject to the criminal justice process 
because it may lead to a prosecution case being built; it also deprives the individual 
of an opportunity to influence the circumstances under which his or her personal 
information may be taken and used by public authorities. It removes the individual 
from a condition of limited access and, as has been explored, can have a range of 
adverse normative consequences for the individual and society at large.546 As such, 
the processing of personal information should only be done where the criteria in 
Article 8(2) are satisfied. The ECtHR has generally recognised the impact that 
technological advances have had on the extent to which public authorities can set 
back the privacy interests of those subject to the criminal process. However, it 
remains unclear why the ECtHR has not established that all such processing will 
engage Article 8(1).  
 
2.1.3. Information Dissemination 
Where personal information is disseminated to a degree that is beyond what might 
be considered foreseeable, this can constitute a serious interference with Article 
8(1).547 In Peck v United Kingdom,548 CCTV images of the applicant, recorded in the 
aftermath of his suicide attempt, were disclosed to the public and media outlets. In 
finding an interference, the ECtHR distinguished Peck from the cases of Friedl v 
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547 n 519 at [61]. 
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Austria549 and Lupker v the Netherlands,550 where images of the respective applicants 
had not been disclosed to the general public, and, consequently, the applicants’ 
images were not used beyond the limited policing purposes for which they had been 
collected.551 In Peck, the ECtHR noted that the applicant’s images were not 
adequately masked and that this resulted in the disclosure of his personal 
information far beyond what he could have reasonably anticipated at the time they 
were collected.552 
 
The ECtHR recognises that dissemination, in such circumstances, can set back the 
privacy related interests of the individual.553 It is also noteworthy that this was 
described as a serious interference by the court. The distinction the ECtHR makes 
between Peck, and Friedl and Lupker suggests that the ECtHR recognises that the 
dissemination of personal information about the individual can set back his or her 
privacy related interests. However, the reasoning of the court in Peck, in terms of the 
normative arguments for why this instance of dissemination set back the applicant’s 
privacy related interests, can be interpreted in a number of ways.  
 
In one sense, the ourt appears to focus on the personal autonomy of the applicant. 
The ECtHR noted how the footage of the applicant, and other personal information 
had been broadcast to hundreds of thousands of people.554 Though the court does 
not speculate on the means by which this might set back the private life of the 
individual, its focus on the scale of the dissemination of this information may be a 
recognition that the individual’s ability to pursue an autonomous life after this 
information has been disseminated may be hampered in various ways. 
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A second interpretation of the ECtHR’s finding is that the court finds the impact such 
dissemination may have on the dignity of the applicant is sufficient to interfere with 
Article 8(1). Solove argues that ‘exposure’, which involves the dissemination of true 
information about an individual in certain primordial physical or emotional states of 
being,555 can cause embarrassment or humiliation because it undermines an 
individual’s dignity. The ECtHR noted that the applicant was ‘deeply perturbed and in 
a state of distress’ at the time of the incident.556 Thus, the court’s finding may have 
been rooted in the fact that this dissemination threatened to exacerbate the extent to 
which the recording of this footage exposed the applicant in an undignified or 
primordial state at the time of his attempted suicide.557 Indeed, the ECtHR’s finding 
may have been based on both of these considerations. As we have seen, both are 
certainly important privacy related interests.  
 
In MM v United Kingdom,558 the ECtHR considered the extent to which the disclosure 
of the applicant’s past criminal caution interfered with her right to respect for private 
life. First, the ECtHR determined that although criminal record data is in one sense 
public information (as it relates to a criminal matter), its disclosure long after the 
event may fall within the scope of the applicant’s private life.559 This reaffirmed the 
court’s stance in PG and JH that personal information collected from the public 
domain can become part of the private life of the individual when public authorities 
attempt to store, process, or disseminate the information. 
 
Second, the ECtHR held that, even though the information was disclosed voluntarily 
by the applicant, the fact that this was done in response to a demand by her 
potential employers meant that the applicant had no real choice in the matter.560 
Accordingly, the measures taken to disseminate the caution information so long after 
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the events leading to the caution constituted an interference with Article 8(1) of the 
ECHR. 
 
In Sciacca v Italy,561 the applicant, a school teacher, was investigated as part of a 
criminal investigation in relation to fraud and extortion offences. As part of this 
process, the police disseminated an image of the applicant, taken as part of the 
investigation for identification purposes, to local newspapers.562 The ECtHR 
determined that there was an interference with Article 8(1) and that the applicant’s 
status as an ‘ordinary person’ (and not a public figure or politician) enlarged the zone 
of interaction which may fall within the scope of private life.563 Notably, the court also 
held that the fact that the applicant was the subject of a criminal process did not 
curtail the scope of private life in this regard. Thus, the ECtHR does not make a 
distinction between the scope of the private life of those subject to criminal 
proceedings before conviction and those who are not. If a measure interferes with 
Article 8(1), it matters not that this interference was occasioned as part of a criminal 
process. This point, it seems, is relevant only in considering the extent to which an 
interfering measure is justified in accordance with Article 8(2). 
 
The aforementioned cases may have implications for the circumstances under which 
police authorities can disseminate images of those subject to the criminal justice 
process in order to publicise the effectiveness of particular policing strategies or 
crime prevention technologies. Furthermore, the rulings may have implications for 
the regulation of new police technologies in Contracting States, such as the use of 
body worn video cameras, and in particular, for the storage and dissemination of any 
personal information obtained from such cameras, which stands in need of 
justification. 
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2.1.4. Article 8(1) and the Criminal Justice Process 
The ECtHR has recognised that, where an individual is subject to the criminal 
process, his or her privacy interests can be set back in numerous discrete ways. This 
vindicates the court’s purposive and evolutive approach to the interpretation of 
Article 8, which has allowed it to keep pace with technological advancements that 
pose particularly pernicious threats to the privacy related interests of those subject to 
the criminal justice process. It is commendable that the ECtHR makes no distinction 
between the privacy interests of those subject to the criminal process and those who 
are not in determining the applicability of Article 8. That privacy interests are set 
back as part of a criminal process should have no bearing on whether Article 8 is 
engaged, and becomes relevant in assessing the extent to which an interference is 
justifiable under Article 8(2). However, the lack of a definitive threshold test for the 
applicability of Article 8, which was discussed in Chapter 2,564 makes it difficult to 
predict whether or not the use of a particular measure will fall within the scope of 
Article 8(1). For instance, it is not clear whether and under what circumstances the 
use of public CCTV cameras to identify particular individuals, as part of a criminal 
process, will engage Article 8(1). Moreover, the ECtHR has not made the political 
value of privacy central when discussing whether an interfering measure engages 
Article 8 in the context of a criminal justice process. As Hughes suggests, ‘to 
adequately deal with surveillance one needs to consider the broader impact that such 
measures can have upon society and the cumulative effect of seemingly justifiable 
limited erosions of privacy.’565 The ECtHR’s analysis of the detrimental impact that 
coercive policing measures can have on democratic society is limited in this regard. 
 
Notwithstanding these issues, the ECtHR has developed some guiding principles for 
establishing an interference with Article 8(1). Where personally identifiable 
																																								 																				
564 Chapter 2, Part 1.5.  
565	K. Hughes, ‘The Social Value of Privacy, the Value of Privacy to Society and Human Rights Discourse’ in 
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information is collected using physically invasive techniques, is processed, or is 
disseminated by a public authority in the context of criminal investigation this will, in 
most foreseeable circumstances engage Article 8. However, if such personal 
information is collected as the police happen to be photographing a public event, or 
passively monitoring a public place, this will be unlikely to engage Article 8, unless 
the information is subsequently processed or disseminated.  
 
2.2. Justifying Interferences with Article 8(1) 
Many of the measures applied as part of a criminal process will involve the collection, 
processing, or dissemination of an individual’s personal information, or invasion. The 
finding that a measure interferes with Article 8(1) does not automatically mean that 
there should be legal redress for the use of this measure. If an individual is actively 
planning a terrorist attack, for instance, it may be perfectly justifiable in the effort to 
protect the lives of others for state authorities to set back his or her interest in 
maintaining a private life. This section considers the specific issues at stake when the 
court assesses the extent to which an interference with Article 8(1) is justified in 
those cases where an individual is subject to the criminal process.  
 
2.2.1. ‘In accordance with the law’ 
When determining whether an interference pertaining to the personal information of 
those subject to the criminal justice process is ‘in accordance with the law’ the ECtHR 
has developed similar principles for establishing a violation, irrespective of whether 
the interfering measure involves invasion, or the collection, processing or 
dissemination of personal information. As discussed in Chapter 2, the general 
principles used by the ECtHR to determine whether an interference is ‘in accordance 
with the law’ are: (i) that the interfering measure should have a basis in domestic 
law; and (ii) that it meets the quality of law requirement. This quality of law 
requirement puts an obligation on Contracting States to ensure that the law is 
foreseeable (i.e. that the individual concerned should be able to foresee the law’s 
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consequences for him), and that the legal framework is compatible with the rule of 
law.566 For domestic law to meet these requirements, it must afford the individual 
adequate legal protection against arbitrariness and must indicate, with clarity, the 
scope of the discretion conferred upon competent authorities in the manner of its 
exercise.567  
 
The domestic legal basis requirement also puts an obligation on public authorities to 
ensure that the measures under examination comply with the domestic law providing 
for the interference. In the context of criminal investigations, this point was 
highlighted in Perry v United Kingdom,568 where the court considered the taking and 
use of video footage for identification purposes to have sufficient basis in domestic 
law, but still held the activities of the police, in undertaking such measures, were not 
‘in accordance with the law’ as they failed to comply with the procedures contained in 
the domestic legal framework in a number of ways.569 
 
Prior to the introduction of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, the legal 
framework in England and Wales regulating the use of covert surveillance measures 
was successfully challenged on a number of occasions for failing to meet the quality 
of law requirement of foreseeability.570 At the crux of this series of challenges to the 
domestic regime was a conflict between the aims of such surveillance (e.g. to 
monitor the activities of those suspected of being involved in criminal activities), and 
the requirement that the laws regulating the collection of such personal information 
are foreseeable and accessible to those citizens. If an individual can foresee exactly 
when he or she is being subject to such surveillance, this can undermine the ability of 
public authorities to prevent and detect crime as the suspect can simply modify his or 
																																								 																				
566 See, for example, Lambert v France (2000) 30 EHRR 346 at [23]. 
567 See Malone v United Kingdom (1984) 7 E.H.R.R. 14 at [66]-[68]; n 510 at [55]. 
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her behaviour at times when he or she becomes aware of the fact that surveillance 
measures are being undertaken.  
 
To address this tension, the ECtHR has developed through its jurisprudence the 
following minimum safeguards, which should be set out in the legal framework to 
ensure that covert surveillance operations are ‘in accordance with the law’: (i) the 
nature, scope, and duration of the possible measures; (ii) the grounds required for 
ordering them; (iii) the authorities competent to permit, carry out, and supervise 
them; and (iv) the kind of remedy provided by national law.571 All of these 
safeguards are in place to ensure that covert surveillance methods, which inherently 
interfere with the right to respect for private life, cannot be used arbitrarily by 
domestic authorities. The need for detailed and clear rules governing the scope and 
application of an interfering measure used against those subject to the criminal 
justice process extends beyond the use of measures which gather personal 
information through covert surveillance. In S and Marper v United Kingdom,572 
referring to the laws governing the collection and retention of DNA and fingerprint 
data, the ECtHR reiterated this point:  
[i]t is as essential, in this context, as in telephone tapping, secret surveillance 
and covert intelligence gathering, to have clear, detailed rules governing the 
scope and application of measures, as well as minimum safeguards concerning, 
inter alia, duration, storage, usage, access of third parties, procedures for 
preserving the integrity and confidentiality of data and procedures for its 
destruction, thus providing sufficient guarantees against the risk of abuse and 
arbitrariness.573 
 
Thus, in the case of DNA retention and processing, there remains a need to have 
clear and detailed rules governing the scope and application of the measures. 
However, as the collection and processing of personal information in the S and 
Marper case differs - in terms of the content of the information collected, and the 
ways in which it will be retained and processed - from that in the covert surveillance 
cases, the types of minimum safeguard that need to be in place are also different. 
																																								 																				
571 See Uzun v Germany (2011) 53 EHRR 24 at [61]; Liberty v United Kingdom (2009) 48 EHRR 1 at [62]; 
Shimovolos v Russia (2014) 58 EHRR 26 at [69]. 
572 n 524. 
573 ibid at [99]. 
148	
	
Whether the interfering measure involves an act of invasion, information collection, 
processing, or dissemination, the requirement that appropriate safeguards are in 
place to prevent arbitrariness remains. 
 
In the covert surveillance cases, the minimum safeguards (or lack thereof) were 
analysed as part of the legality test, and, when these were considered insufficient, 
this led to a violation of Article 8 without consideration of whether the interfering 
measure was ‘necessary in a democratic society’.574 In S and Marper the ECtHR took 
a different approach. Noting that the questions relating to adequate safeguarding 
were closely related to the issue of whether the interference was ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’, the ECtHR did not determine whether the domestic legislation in 
the immediate case was ‘in accordance with the law’ and instead turned its attention 
to the necessity requirement, combining the two limbs of Article 8(2) in its 
judgment.575  
 
According to Murphy, this combined approach in cases concerning the exercise of 
police powers against targeted individuals may indicate a growing recognition by the 
court of the overlap between legality and necessity tests in this particular context: 
The combined approach recognises that issues are sometimes better addressed 
in tandem and considered in context, as opposed to being arbitrarily 
segregated. The adoption of the combined approach could represent the Court’s 
attempt to correct the artificiality of the traditional separation of the 
questions.576  
 
This argument seems to have some traction. In S and Marper, as part of the 
necessity analysis, the ECtHR seems to suggest that the domestic legal framework 
permitting the interfering measures did not meet the requisite level of minimum 
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safeguarding that would need to be in place for the interference to be considered ‘in 
accordance with the law’. The ECtHR stated that:  
The retention is not time limited; the material is retained indefinitely whatever 
the nature or seriousness of the offence of which the person was suspected. 
Moreover, there exist only limited possibilities for an acquitted individual to 
have the data removed from the nationwide database or the materials 
destroyed; in particular, there is no provision for independent review of the 
justification for the retention according to defined criteria, including such factors 
as the seriousness of the offence, previous arrests, the strength of the 
suspicion against the person and any other special circumstances.577  
 
The court indicated that the rules governing the interfering measures did not meet its 
own standards pertaining to the foreseeability requirement. For instance, the court 
observed that there were no minimum safeguards regarding the duration of storage 
and use of the genetic material, and that the domestic legislation was limited in 
terms of the guarantees it offered against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness. From 
this, it seems clear that the ECtHR could have found that the measures were not ‘in 
accordance with the law’ without addressing questions of necessity. In proceeding as 
it did, the court considered a number of other factors in its assessment of necessity, 
which might otherwise have been overlooked. As Murphy highlights, a combined 
approach may give the ECtHR the opportunity to elaborate more on the principles 
underlying the ‘necessary in a democratic society’ stage of the Article 8 analysis.  
 
The ECtHR’s seeming departure from such a formalistic analysis of the law as that 
employed in the surveillance cases - which, it might be argued, obviates the need to 
consider the necessity of a measure - allows for a richer discussion of the way in 
which privacy interests and countervailing societal interests can and should be 
reconciled in such cases. Murphy warns that if this combination approach is applied 
incautiously it could diminish the protection of private life by blurring the function of 
the separate requirements in Article 8(2).578 However, the ECtHR’s decision in MM v 
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United Kingdom casts doubt on whether the S and Marper judgment was truly 
indicative of a sea change in the way these two limbs of Article 8(2) are analysed.579 
 
In MM, the court found that the interference with the applicant’s right to respect for 
private life was not ‘in accordance with the law’ and this fact, according to the court, 
overshadowed the need to determine whether the interference was ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’ for one of the legitimate aims detailed in Article 8(2).580 However, 
as part of its analysis of the formal aspects of the legal regime in Northern Ireland, 
the ECtHR did consider certain factors which might more appropriately form part of 
an analysis of the necessity of the interfering measures. For instance, the ECtHR 
drew upon statistical information that: ‘[i]n 2008/2009 almost 275,000 requests 
were made for ECRCs [Enhanced Criminal Record Certificates] alone.’581 The court 
also noted that: ‘[i]n the majority of cases, an adverse criminal record will represent 
something of a “killer blow” to the hopes of a person who aspires to any post which 
falls within the scope of disclosure requirements.’582 Thus it seems that, in assessing 
the legal framework against the backdrop of the serious implications the interference 
has for the autonomy of the individual, and statistical information regarding the 
broad reach of the measures, the ECtHR is open to using factors relevant to the 
proportionality of the measures in order to assess the extent to which the legal 
framework meets the quality of law requirement. This might lend credibility to the 
suggestion that the ECtHR is moving towards a combined approach in cases 
pertaining to those subject to the criminal justice process, notwithstanding the 
ostensible concentration on formal legality in MM. 
 
If the ECtHR is indeed moving towards a combined approach, there could be a range 
of implications for the protection of the privacy related interests of those subject to 
the criminal justice process at the domestic level.  In the surveillance cases of the 
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1980s and 1990s, the ECtHR’s judgments avoided politically contentious issues at the 
heart of the debate between the need to prevent crime and the right to respect for 
private life.583 De Hert and Gutwirth suggest that the necessity test serves an 
important function in dealing with political questions to do with how the balance 
between the societal aim to prevent and detect crime, and privacy interests should 
be struck.584 
 
Thus, whilst the finding that a particular measure is not ‘in accordance with the law’ 
can lead to changes in the precision, accessibility, and transparency of laws 
governing interferences in this area, there is a danger that, in neglecting to pay 
detailed attention to the necessity of the interfering measures, the ECtHR may have 
missed valuable opportunities to offer useful guidance and criteria to Contracting 
States for assessing the extent to which the collection, processing, and dissemination 
of personal information is justified. This is no truer than in the murky area of criminal 
investigations, where individuals subject to these coercive measures are legally 
presumed innocent. The introduction of a combination approach, therefore, might 
have the impact of encouraging domestic legislators to carry out more systematic 
assessments of whether or not the domestic law regulating the use of privacy 
interfering measures against those subject to the criminal justice process is 
proportionate to its aim. However, in combining the two criteria and giving more 
detailed assessments of the proportionality of interfering measures, the ECtHR may 
be fuelling the argument that it is outgrowing its natural limits and straying into 
judicial activism, overstepping the margin of appreciation it affords to domestic 
lawmakers to make such assessments, and undermining the sovereignty of 
Contracting States.585  
 
2.2.2. ‘In pursuit of a legitimate aim’ 
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Where the police use interfering measures against those subject to the criminal 
justice process as part of their core functions in detecting, preventing, or managing 
crime, it is usually uncontroversial that this serves both the aim of ‘public safety’ and 
‘the prevention of disorder and crime’ as stated in Article 8(2). There is no reason to 
engage in a critical analysis of this approach.586  
 
2.2.3. ‘Necessary in a democratic society’ 
In Chapter 2 we established that the ECtHR uses two criteria in assessing whether or 
not an interfering measure is ‘necessary in a democratic society’. The first is that the 
measure responds to a ‘pressing social need’, and the second is that the measure is 
‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’.587 The requirement that a measure is 
necessary implies a careful balancing of the interests and values at stake regarding 
the use of a particular measure.588 This section considers how these principles have 
been applied where an individual is subject to the criminal justice process.  
 
In Funke v France,589 where the applicant argued that French authorities violated his 
Article 6 and Article 8 rights by compelling him to produce self-incriminating 
documents as part of a tax evasion investigation, the ECtHR reaffirmed that in cases 
concerning the disclosure of personal data in a criminal process a margin of 
appreciation should be left to competent national authorities to strike a fair balance 
between the interests at stake.590 However, this margin of appreciation goes hand in 
hand with the supervision of the Strasbourg Court. In McVeigh v United Kingdom,591 
where the applicants complained that the retention of their fingerprints and 
photographs, taken as part of a criminal investigation, violated their Article 8 rights, 
the Commission took the following factors into account when assessing the necessity 
and proportionality of the measures: 
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(i) No criminal proceedings had been brought against the applicants and no 
reasonable suspicion had been established against them; 
(ii) The records had been kept separate from the normal system of criminal 
records, and were retained solely for the purpose of preventing terrorism; 
(iii) The critical importance that the retention of such information can have in 
the detection of those responsible for terrorist offences; and   
(iv) The serious threat posed by organised terrorism in the United Kingdom at 
the time.592 
 
Considering the above factors, the ECommHR concluded that the measures were 
necessary in the interests of public safety and for the prevention of crime. In this 
relatively early case in the jurisprudence of the Commission, where the informational 
privacy interests of those subject to the criminal justice process were under 
consideration, the Commission took into account various factors including the limited 
use of the information by the police, and the importance of retaining such 
information. Despite an acknowledgment from the ECommHR that the information 
was retained when the applicants were no longer suspected of committing any 
offences, the ECommHR found no violation, giving weight to the threat posed by 
terrorism and their limited potential uses. In this case the four-part proportionality 
test, discussed in Chapter 2,593 was implicitly drawn upon to determine whether a 
violation of Article 8 had in fact occurred. Of the four factors listed above, we can see 
that the first suggests that there may be no rational connection between the aim of 
preventing crime and the interference with the Article 8 rights of the applicant; the 
second factor seems to show that the Commission recognises that the means are 
minimally intrusive; and the final two factors show that the Commission assessed the 
extent to which legislative objective was sufficiently important to justify an 
interference.  
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However, in subsequent cases, the Strasbourg institutions were less exacting in 
assessing the extent to which it approached balancing Article 8 rights against 
conflicting goods in the criminal justice context. In Friedl v Austria,594 the 
Commission held that the collection and retention of photographs of the applicant 
was ‘necessary in a democratic society’, as the ‘relatively slight’ interference into the 
applicant’s private life was justified in the interests of the prevention and detection of 
crime. This conclusion was reached notwithstanding the Commission’s 
acknowledgment that no criminal proceedings were brought as a result of the 
collection of the photographs, there existed no reasonable suspicion against the 
applicant in relation to any specific offence, and domestic authorities never pursued 
any form of prosecution against the applicant after identifying him, in view of ‘the 
trivial nature of the offences’ in question.595 The Commission noted that a broad 
operational justification for such retention practices existed, and characterised the 
interference as ‘relatively slight’.596 In doing so, the Commission did not delve into a 
detailed constitutional check on the necessity of the measures, taking account of 
whether they responded to a pressing social need, and considering whether the 
measures were proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.597 It reasoned that they 
plainly did so based on the minimal extent of the interference. 
 
This, and other rulings of the ECommHR and ECtHR around this time,598 provoked 
criticisms that insufficient weight was afforded to the informational privacy interests 
of individuals in its proportionality assessments, with one commentator suggesting: 
‘The Strasbourg institutions seem to find more and more difficulty in recognising the 
fundamental nature of privacy and the plain fact that it does not require blood (but 
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595 ibid at [66]. 
596 ibid at [66]. 
597 See for example, Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1981) 4 EHRR 149 at [61]; Rees v United Kingdom 
(1986) 9 EHRR 56.  
598 See Murray, n 507; Herbecq v Belgium, App nos 32200/96 and 32201/96 (ECtHR, 14 January 1998). 
See also P. De Hert and S. Gutwirth, Making sense of privacy and data protection (IPTS-Technical Report 
Series, 2003) 111-162. 
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technology) to violate it.’599 Although the Commission and Court adopted a fairly 
broad scope for the right to respect for private life in cases at this time, it also made 
a distinction between personal information that merits protection, and that which 
does not, and this seemingly had an impact upon the level of scrutiny applied in 
subsequent assessments of the necessity of the interfering measures considered.600  
 
Recalling Z v Finland,601 the ECtHR considered whether the seizure of the applicant’s 
medical records, their inclusion in her husband’s investigation file (which was created 
as part of a criminal process against him), and the subsequent publication of the 
applicant’s identity and medical condition in the domestic Court of Appeal’s judgment 
violated her rights under Article 8. The ECtHR noted at the outset that the protection 
of such sensitive personal data was of ‘fundamental importance’ to a person’s 
enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private life.602   
 
Assessing whether the retention and disclosure of the medical information was 
justified in this case, the court took the position that the infringement caused to the 
individual’s privacy interests through the application of the measures was especially 
serious due to the stigmatising effect it may have on the applicant, and the effect the 
breach of patient confidentiality could have on public confidence in the health 
service.603 In assessing whether the measures were rationally connected to the ends 
sought, the court determined that the interference was in the ‘weighty’ public interest 
of prosecuting the applicant’s husband for attempted manslaughter.604 The court also 
examined the domestic law to ensure that there were ‘adequate and effective 
safeguards’ against abuse in the collection and retention of the information.605 This 
may have been an early indication of the court’s inclination to consider the adequacy 
																																								 																				
599 P. De Hert, ‘Balancing Security and Liberty Within the European Human Rights Framework: A Critical 
Reading of the Court’s Case Law in Light of Surveillance and Criminal Law Enforcement Strategies After 
9/11’ (2005) 1 Utrecht Law Review 68-96 at 89. 
600 ibid at 77. 
601 Z v Finland (1998) 25 EHRR 371.  
602 ibid at [95].  
603 ibid at [96]-[97].  
604 ibid at [106]. 
605 ibid at [107]. 
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of the safeguards in place as part of a combined analysis of the different clauses in 
Article 8(2). Taking the above into consideration, the court found that the collection 
of this information and its inclusion in the investigation file were not in violation of 
Article 8.  
 
The question of the disclosure of this information in the Court of Appeal’s judgment 
was considered separately. The ECtHR ruled that publishing the applicant’s identity 
and health condition in the Court of Appeal judgment violated her Article 8 rights 
because ‘[t]he Court of Appeal had the discretion, firstly, to omit mentioning any 
names in the judgment permitting the identification of the applicant and, secondly, to 
keep the full reasoning confidential for a certain period and instead publish an 
abridged version of the reasoning, the operative part and an indication of the law 
which it had applied.’606 In other words, the fact that less intrusive measures could 
have been taken, but were not, had a decisive bearing on the court’s proportionality 
assessment.  
 
By way of this intensive proportionality assessment, Z v Finland has been said to 
enhance the effectiveness of Article 8.607 This proportionality assessment does not 
just direct attention to how the relevant interests have been weighted against each 
other; it also directs attention to the relative weights which are attached to the 
competing interests under domestic law.608 This means that, for the interfering 
measure to be considered proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, it must not 
only fulfil an interest that takes precedence over the individual’s enjoyment of his 
Article 8(1) rights. The domestic court must also give sufficient regard to the 
protection of the individual’s Article 8(1) rights in pursuing those interests.  
 
																																								 																				
606 ibid at [113]. 
607 Y. Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the 
Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001) 75. 
608 This, according to Feldman, is one area where the principle of proportionality departs from the 
Wednesbury test employed by judges in England and Wales. See D. Feldman, ‘Proportionality and the 
Human Rights Act 1998’ in E. Ellis (ed.) The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 1999) 117-144 at 128. 
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In Peck v United Kingdom,609 the ECtHR noted the seriousness of the interference 
with the applicant’s right to respect for private life when public authorities disclosed 
CCTV images of him in a state of distress to media outlets. It also noted that CCTV 
systems play an important role in the prevention and detection of crime.610 In 
assessing the proportionality of the disclosure, the ECtHR emphasised the fact that 
the local Council could have achieved its crime prevention objectives through less 
onerous means:  
[t]he Court notes that the Council had other options available to it to allow it to 
achieve the same objectives. In the first place, it could have identified the 
applicant through enquiries with the police and thereby obtained his consent 
prior to disclosure. Alternatively, the Council could have masked the relevant 
images itself.611 
 
Although the court accepted the Government’s argument, that the disclosure of the 
footage pursued a legitimate aim, sufficient safeguards to ensure its compatibility 
with Article 8 did not accompany the disclosure, which was to a degree far exceeding 
what the applicant could have foreseen at the material time. This case marked a 
turning point in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR for cases concerning the 
informational privacy of those subject to the criminal justice process. The court 
considered the proportionality of the measure, incorporating the minimally intrusive 
means test, in forming the conclusion that the measures had indeed violated the 
applicant’s Article 8 rights. Using this rigorous approach to balancing, the court 
assessed the necessity of the measure in question without engaging in debates 
concerning the degree of privacy interference associated with a particular measure.  
 
Returning to S and Marper v United Kingdom,612 the court provided perhaps its 
clearest example of the application of a necessity test in the criminal justice context 
when finding that the ‘blanket and indiscriminate nature of the powers of retention of 
the fingerprints, cellular samples, and DNA profiles of persons suspected but not 
convicted of offences’ constituted a disproportionate interference with the Article 8 
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rights of the applicants.613 The ECtHR began its examination of the necessity of the 
measures by considering how the laws regulating the collection and retention of DNA 
samples and profiles and fingerprint data from arrestees compared to other 
Contracting States:  
In the great majority of the contracting states with functioning DNA databases, 
samples and DNA profiles derived from those samples are required to be 
removed or destroyed either immediately or within a certain limited time after 
acquittal or discharge. A restricted number of exceptions to this principle are 
allowed by some contracting states.614 
 
The court held the position of Scotland, as part of the United Kingdom, to be of 
particular significance, as this legal jurisdiction had much more restrictive policies on 
the collection and retention of DNA data from non-convicted individuals than the rest 
of the UK at this time.615 Here, the court identified the system of indefinite retention 
in place in England and Wales as an outlier amongst the Contracting States. This 
deviation from the general consensus amongst Contracting States narrowed the 
margin of appreciation afforded to the state in this area, and the court put emphasis 
on this point in its assessment of the necessity of the measures.616 This fact seems to 
have underpinned the court’s firm rejection of the Government’s arguments 
regarding the proportionality of the measures.  
 
In assessing proportionality, the ECtHR took into account the statistical evidence 
which, according to the Government, made the impugned measures indispensable in 
the fight against crime.617 This led the court to conclude that the retention practices 
had contributed to the detection of crime to some degree. However, the court was 
also quick to highlight the limitations of this information, and the fact that this 
information does not establish that the successful identification and prosecution of 
offenders could not have been achieved without the permanent and indiscriminate 
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retention policies in place.618 In taking this information into account, the ECtHR went 
beyond an analysis of the quality of the laws in question and focused on the weight 
of the different arguments concerning the effectiveness of the legal regime in 
practice. The lack of a strong evidence base showing that the retention of such 
information - from individuals who had not been convicted - was necessary to detect 
and prevent crime swayed the court towards finding a violation of Article 8.  
 
Furthermore, the ECtHR took account of the indiscriminate nature of the power of 
retention in England and Wales, noting that the material may be retained irrespective 
of the gravity of the offence in question or the age of the offender, and that the 
retention is not time limited.619 This, according to the court, could be especially 
harmful to minors, and led to an over-representation of ethnic minorities on the 
database.620 The court also noted the risk of stigmatisation stemming from the fact 
that the applicants were subject to the same treatment as convicted persons. Finally, 
the court took account of the fact that the retention policies of England and Wales 
differentiated the personal information of those subject to the criminal process from 
those who had voluntarily given DNA samples. The latter group could request that 
their samples be destroyed under s. 64(3) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984.621  
 
The conclusion of this assessment was a strongly worded judgment that the 
measures were not ‘necessary in a democratic society’ and had violated the 
applicants’ Article 8 rights. The in-depth proportionality review surveyed a range of 
different substantive effects of the retention practices in England and Wales, both on 
the capability of the police to prevent and detect crime, and on the countervailing 
privacy related interests of individuals. This is a welcome development for cases 
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pertaining to the privacy of those subject to the criminal justice process. Such an 
approach moves the court beyond a ‘safe’ analysis of the formalistic qualities of legal 
rules towards a full evaluation of the substantive effects of these rules as they are 
applied in their social context. Hints that the court may be moving towards a so-
called combined approach, embracing a fuller analysis of the substantive effects of an 
interfering measure, and how these should be balanced against competing interests, 
can be seen in subsequent cases.622 However, it is noteworthy that in subsequent 
DNA cases, where the applicants have been convicted of criminal offences and the 
retention period is not indefinite, the ECtHR has granted a larger margin of 
appreciation to domestic lawmakers to assess the extent to which retention tariffs 
are proportionate.623 This shows that where a public interest justification for an 
interference is stronger and the Contracting State is not an outlier in the use of an 
interfering measure, the ECtHR is willing to act deferentially, affording a wider 
margin of appreciation to domestic legislators.  
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has shown that the ECHR framework broadly recognises that measures 
used against those subject to the criminal justice process can set back their privacy 
related interests in numerous ways. Article 8(1) has sufficient scope to cover a range 
of surveillance measures, interrogation techniques, and other forms of personal 
information collection, processing, and dissemination. The broadening of the scope of 
Article 8(1) in this area is a welcome development. In consistently determining that 
the mere storage of information pertaining to an individual’s private life interferes 
with Article 8(1), the court ensures that the retention of such information should only 
occur if the criteria in Article 8(2) are met by the Contracting State. Whilst this 
seemingly strengthens the protection offered by Article 8, the ECtHR then seems to 
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give with one hand and take with the other, as not all personal information falls 
within the scope of ‘private life’. From here, the manner in which personal 
information is processed becomes just one factor in determining whether or not the 
information falls within the scope of Article 8(1). However, in Perry, the court 
indicated that where collected personal information is processed by a public 
authority, this will usually result in an interference with Article 8(1), even where the 
information collected – in this case, video footage of the applicant in public space - 
does not per se fall within the scope of ‘private life’. In short, whilst the ECtHR, to its 
detriment, has not fully explored how privacy interests can be set back through the 
collection of information through surveillance methods that do not involve any 
subsequent processing or use, the court has demonstrated that it recognises many of 
the complex ways privacy interests can be set back as part of a criminal process.  
 
Considering the multiplicity of ways in which physical invasion, and the collection, 
processing, and dissemination of personal information by a public authority can set 
back individuals’ privacy interests in the criminal justice context, it is not clear why 
the ECtHR has created a distinction between personal information that falls under the 
protection of Article 8, and that which does not. Whilst, in recent years, the 
broadening of the scope of Article 8(1) has prevented this distinction from being too 
narrow to protect the privacy interests of those subject to the criminal justice process 
in cases brought before the court, it remains to be seen what impact this distinction 
may have on the police use of newer technologies to collect, process, and 
disseminate the personal information of those subject to the criminal justice process.  
 
The ECtHR’s (increasing) recognition of the various ways in which the collection, 
processing, and dissemination of personal information can set back privacy related 
interests enhances the scope of Article 8, which should in turn provide for a higher 
level of protection for these interests for those subject to the criminal justice process. 
However, for this broader scope to have real bite it is important that the criteria 
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under which a Contracting State can interfere with Article 8 are theoretically cogent 
and applied with sufficient rigour. As part of the ‘in accordance with the law’ 
requirement, the court has developed a number of principles for determining whether 
there exists a legal basis for an interfering measure. The court assesses not only the 
extent to which a legal basis exists, but also the quality of the legal basis in terms of 
its foreseeability and compatibility with the rule of law. Consequently, the court has 
taken a notably strong stance against the police use of surveillance measures over 
the last quarter century, which has led to the development of a fairly comprehensive 
legal framework regulating such surveillance measures in England and Wales. 
However, in these surveillance cases, the court tended to find a violation of Article 8 
through a formal analysis of the domestic legal framework in place, without delving 
into the necessity of the interfering measures. This, according to a number of 
commentators, led to a situation where the court did not fulfil its so-called ‘political’ 
function in assessing how a balance should be struck between the use of modern 
technologies in the fight against crime, and individual privacy interests.624 In S and 
Marper and MM, the court seems to have taken steps to address this misgiving by 
combining the legality analysis with an analysis of the necessity of the interfering 
measures in question. The result, particularly in S and Marper, was an in-depth 
review of the necessity of the measures, giving due regard to the substantive effects 
of the interfering measures in each case. It remains to be seen whether these cases 
mark a permanent sea-change in the approach of the Strasbourg Court. 
 
The ECtHR has developed a four-part proportionality assessment in its jurisprudence. 
This structured approach to assessing the proportionality of an interfering measure is 
a strength of the ECtHR jurisprudence in this area. However, this test has not been 
applied in a consistent or systematic fashion. The ECtHR affords a wide margin of 
appreciation to Contracting States to balance the privacy rights of those subject to 
the criminal process against broader societal interests where it is appropriate to do 
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so. However, in S and Marper, the ECtHR showed that where a Contracting State 
develops legislation that interferes with such privacy interests to a significant degree, 
without adequate justification, it will step in to redress the balance between privacy 
interests and a Government’s legitimate crime prevention aims.  
 
Subsequent chapters of this thesis examine the relationship between domestic laws 
and the ECtHR in terms of the protection such laws afford to the privacy interests of 
those subject to the criminal justice process. These chapters will consider the extent 
to which the approach of the ECtHR has influenced the domestic legal framework in 
the context of contemporary police investigations. Finally, conclusions will be drawn 
regarding the extent to which these legal frameworks afford adequate protection to 
the privacy interests of those subject to the criminal justice process. The domestic 
law will be assessed through an analysis of the following three policing measures, 
which set back individual privacy interests in different ways: (i) overt police 
photography; (ii) DNA and fingerprint data retention; and (ii) non-conviction 
information disclosure as part of an Enhanced Criminal Record Certificate. These will 
be three ‘case-studies’ to test the normative framework developed in the first three 
chapters of this thesis. 
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4 Overt Photography  
This chapter constitutes the first ‘case-study’. It serves as an exemplar of the 
interdisciplinary method for assessing the English legal framework regulating police 
setbacks to privacy interests occasioned primarily through physical invasion and the 
collection of personal information. It considers whether the domestic legal framework 
regulating the collection and retention by the police of photographs of those subject 
to the criminal justice process affords adequate recognition and protection to privacy 
related interests.  The chapter comprises two parts. Part 1 looks at the development 
of the legal framework governing such collection and retention in England and Wales. 
This shows how the domestic courts have interpreted and applied the jurisprudence 
of the ECtHR in the context of overt police surveillance. Part 2 engages in a 
discussion of the extent to which the legal framework in England and Wales accords 
with Article 8 ECHR, and with the philosophical principles on the scope and normative 
value of privacy covered earlier in this thesis. Recommendations are made regarding 
how the domestic law should develop in this area. Before engaging in this analysis, a 
brief discussion of the types of measures that will and will not be included in this 
chapter is in order.  
 
This chapter focuses on taking and retention of photographs of individuals subject to 
the criminal justice process by the police. The taking and retention of such 
photographs can be distinguished from their processing and from their dissemination. 
Whilst it is accepted that photographs taken by the police during the course of an 
investigation may be processed and disseminated, and that the privacy issues 
pertaining to these activities may overlap, the focus here is exclusively on the law 
pertaining to the taking and retention of such photographs and any relevant privacy 
issues which may arise. Moreover, to limit the scope of this analysis to a manageable 
size, and avoid conflating issues surrounding two very different ways in which the 
police take photographs of those subject to the criminal process, this analysis focuses 
on the taking of photographs as individuals occupy publicly accessible spaces for 
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surveillance or intelligence gathering purposes, and not on the taking and retention 
of photographs of arrestees for identification purposes, which is governed by a 
separate legal framework.625 Provisions governing the surveillance of homes and 
other spaces not readily accessible to members of the public are also excluded. The 
focus is on the use of such targeted surveillance against individuals as they traverse 
publicly accessible spaces. Such overt surveillance is often used in the policing of 
public protests. It is generally a proactive and preventive tool, which is not primarily 
geared towards criminal prosecution. It is also a hard case. Despite the fact that such 
overt photography has been challenged numerous times on the grounds that it 
violates privacy rights, it is not obvious whether this activity, when carried out by the 
police, sets back the privacy interests of the individual in every case. Consequently, 
this is an interesting case-study against which we can test the normative model 
developed in this thesis, and assess the extent to which English law protects the 
privacy interests of those subject to the criminal process. The judgment of the 
domestic courts in R (Wood) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis,626 and the 
taking of photographs by the police in this and similar contexts, will feature centrally 
in this chapter. 
 
1. How is Targeted Overt Surveillance Regulated?  
There is currently no statutory basis in England and Wales specifically providing for 
the police to take and retain photographs of individuals who are not under arrest, for 
the purposes of preventing or detecting crime. Instead, the police have traditionally 
relied upon common law powers to govern such information gathering and retention 
activities. In particular, Rice v Connolly627 provides:  
[I]t is part of the obligations and duties of a police constable to take all steps 
which appear to him necessary for keeping the peace, for preventing crime or 
for protecting property from criminal injury. There is no exhaustive definition of 
the powers and obligations of the police, but they are at least those, and they 
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would further include the duty to detect crime and to bring an offender to 
justice.628 
 
 
For many years, in this relatively un-litigated area of the law, it was accepted that 
these implicit powers were sufficient to govern the overt taking of photographs of 
individuals by the police in order to investigate, prevent, or detect crime.629 However, 
what might once have been an uncontroversial area of the law has become contested 
in the wake of advances in technology and changes in police strategies, particularly 
in relation to public protest. Such changes have resulted in a proliferation of police 
information gathering and retention, which includes the collection of overtly-taken 
photographs of individuals as they occupy public space. This has raised questions 
over whether the implicit common law powers said to permit police overt 
photography are sufficient to meet the demands of Article 8 ECHR. 
 
This particular practice received a prominent challenge in the case of R (Wood) v 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis,630 where the claimant, Wood, a campaigner 
against the arms trade, was photographed by the police while legitimately attending 
the Annual General Meeting of a company connected to the arms trade in which he 
had bought a single share.631 The claimant argued that, among other things, the 
taking and retention of these photographs by the police violated his rights under 
Article 8 ECHR. The legal framework regulating overt police image collection can be 
explicated through a detailed examination of this case.  
 
1.1 The Wood Case 
Wood was a media co-ordinator employed by an unincorporated association known as 
Campaign Against the Arms Trade (CAAT). Wood had no criminal convictions and a 
clean criminal record. The defendant Commissioner took the view that there was a 
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630 See R (Wood) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2008] HRLR 34. 
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real possibility of disruption at the AGM of Reed, a company with ties to the arms 
trade, and that unlawful activity might occur. A number of officers were deployed to 
the AGM, including an ‘Evidence Gathering Team’ of three uniformed officers and a 
civillian police staff photographer.632  
 
Wood attended the AGM after purchasing a single share in Reed. His purpose was to 
learn more about Reed’s involvement in the arms trade and ask appropriate 
questions. As the claimant was leaving the meeting, at which his participation was 
confined to asking one unobjectionable question, the Evidence Gathering Team took 
photographs of him. The police suggested that the photographs were taken because 
the claimant was seen standing with other members of CAAT who had been ejected 
from the AGM for jeering. The collected photographs were retained on the basis of 
fears of unlawful activity occurring at a subsequent event to be held in September 
2005, and because of Wood’s association with others who had convictions for 
unlawful activities at related events. Wood complained that he felt scared and 
intimidated by the police following him and asking him for his identity. Wood also 
complained that he felt uncomfortable that information may be kept about him 
indefinitely and may be used without his knowledge.633  
 
The claimant sought a declaration that the Commissioner had acted in breach of his 
Article 8 ECHR rights, an order requiring the destruction of any photographs or 
photographic records, and a declaration that the current practice overt photographic 
surveillance practice was unlawful.  
 
In the High Court, McCombe J dismissed the application, ruling that the taking and 
retention of a person’s photograph by the police in a public street did not generally 
interfere with that person’s Article 8(1) rights and that, in any case, an interference 
would be lawful, proportionate, and necessary for the purposes of Article 8(2) ECHR. 
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In considering whether the taking of photographs constituted an interference with 
Article 8(1), McCombe J noted that the House of Lords in Campbell v MGN Ltd634 
unanimously agreed that the mere taking of photographs, absent any retention, did 
not amount to an interference with Article 8(1).635 McCombe J also quoted the ECtHR 
decision in Von Hannover v Germany636 at length. This case concerned the collection 
and publication of photographs of Princess Caroline of Monaco engaged in various 
activities such as shopping, skiing, and holidaying on a private beach in Monaco. 
Whilst the ECtHR held that there had been an interference with Article 8(1), this 
finding hinged on the publication of the photographs, and not their mere collection.637 
 
Furthermore the ECtHR focused in part on whether the applicant could be said to 
have a ‘reasonable’ or ‘legitimate’ expectation of privacy in the circumstances.638 
McCombe J relied on Murray v Express Newspapers plc,639 to determine that the 
‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ standard is a threshold test for Article 8 
engagement. In Murray, the applicant, a child of a well-known author, successfully 
argued through his parents that his Article 8 rights had been violated when 
photographs of him, taken as he walked down a public street, were published in the 
Sunday Express.640  
 
McCombe J determined that the ‘mere taking of a person’s photograph in a public 
street may not generally interfere with that person’s right of privacy under Article 
8.’641 Moreover, McCombe J drew on the case of Gillan642 (where the House of Lords 
found that whilst the police use of stop and search powers might constitute an 
interference with Article 8(1), it would not necessarily do so)643 which, in his view, 
indicates that ‘not every intrusion even by police, if otherwise lawful, into the 
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ordinary comings and goings of persons passing on the street will involve an 
interference with those persons’ rights under Article 8.’644  
 
According to McCombe J’s interpretation, for an intrusion by the police to interfere 
with an individual’s Article 8 rights, the individual must hold a reasonable expectation 
of privacy, and the intrusion must reach a certain level of seriousness. In applying 
these principles to the immediate case, McCombe J drew on the ECommHR and 
ECtHR authority in X v United Kingdom,645 Friedl v Austria,646 and Perry v United 
Kingdom.647 As has been discussed in previous chapters, these cases generally 
support the view that where the police take photographs in public places, and where 
such photographs are used for limited purposes, this will not, generally speaking, 
pass the requisite threshold for Article 8(1) engagement.648 Of the cases mentioned 
above, only Perry held there to be an interference with Article 8(1). McCombe J 
observed that Perry can be distinguished from Wood, on the basis that the former 
case concerned the covert taking of photographs and these were subsequently 
processed and disseminated at the applicant’s trial.649 Thus, McCombe J found that 
the taking of photographs, in the context of the Wood case, did not interfere with the 
claimant’s Article 8(1) rights.650 
 
However, McCombe J agreed with the claimant to the effect that the circumstances 
regarding the collection and retention must be considered together in assessing 
whether there has been an interference with Article 8. As there had been no domestic 
cases dealing with the retention of photographic material by the police at that time, 
and S and Marper had not yet reached the ECtHR, McCombe J relied on the judgment 
of the House of Lords in S and Marper v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police in 
forming the view that there had been no interference with Article 8(1). In Marper, the 
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House of Lords inclined to the view that Article 8(1) was not engaged through the 
indefinite retention of fingerprint, DNA sample, or DNA profile data, and that, if in the 
alternative there was such an interference, it was ‘very modest indeed’.651 McCombe 
J also cited early ECommHR judgments652 to lend support to his view that the use of 
lawfully obtained photographs by the police for the purpose of a criminal 
investigation will not engage Article 8(1). McCombe J’s interpretation of prior 
Strasbourg and domestic authorities led him to conclude that there had been no 
interference with Article 8.653 
 
McCombe J went on to consider whether an interference would be justified in any 
event. On the question of whether the measures were ‘in accordance with the law’, 
the claimant submitted that the Commissioner’s reliance on common law powers 
permitting the collection of the photographic data was insufficient for the purposes of 
Article 8(2). This is because existing case law did not define with sufficient precision, 
clarity, and accessibility the circumstances under which the police may exercise these 
powers. However, McCombe J took the view that provisions in the Data Protection Act 
1998 reinforced the legal basis by providing controls on the taking and retention of 
data by the police, notwithstanding the fact that these controls are subject to 
exceptions where the data are collected or retained for the purposes of preventing or 
detecting crime.654 Finally, McCombe J gave short shrift to the question of necessity, 
once again relying on the House of Lords’ ruling in S and Marper, in finding that the 
measures were plainly ‘necessary in a democratic society’.655  
 
In 2008 the claimant appealed McCombe J’s ruling.656 The Court of Appeal held that 
the activities of the police had violated the claimant’s Article 8 rights, allowing the 
claimant’s appeal. Laws LJ gave a detailed dissent outlining what he viewed to be the 
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correct interpretation of Article 8(1), and drawing on the cases of Von Hannover v 
Germany, and S and Marper v United Kingdom, a judgment that was not available to 
the High Court in the Wood case. Laws LJ persuasively reasoned that any attempt to 
encapsulate the scope of ‘private life’ in a single idea ‘can only be undertaken at a 
level of considerable abstraction.’657 From here, Laws LJ provided a considered, and 
what has since proven to be influential,658 breakdown of the tests that need to be 
applied in assessing whether or not there has been an interference with Article 8(1) 
in particular circumstances.  
 
Laws LJ first described personal autonomy as the central value protected by Article 
8(1). According to Laws LJ, personal autonomy ‘marches with the presumption of 
liberty enjoyed in a free polity: a presumption which consists in the principle that 
every interference with the freedom of the individual stands in need of objective 
justification.’659 However, Laws LJ warned that there exist three safeguards for 
ensuring that the core values protected by Article 8 are not interpreted so widely that 
its claims become unreal or unreasonable.660 These are as follows: (i) a measure 
threatening or assaulting the individual’s right must attain a ‘certain level of 
seriousness’ for Article 8 to be engaged; (ii) the ‘touchstone’ for Article 8(1)’s 
engagement is whether the claimant enjoys on the facts a ‘reasonable expectation of 
privacy’; and (iii) the breadth of Article 8(1) may be curtailed by the scope of the 
justifications available to the state pursuant to Article 8(2).661 In support of the first 
of the ‘safeguards’, Laws LJ cited the following comments of Lord Bingham in the 
Gillan case:  
It is true that "private life" has been generously construed to embrace wide 
rights to personal autonomy. But it is clear Convention jurisprudence that 
intrusions must reach a certain level of seriousness to engage the operation of 
the Convention, which is, after all, concerned with human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and I incline to the view that an ordinary superficial 
search of the person and an opening of bags, of the kind to which passengers 
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uncomplainingly submit at airports, for example, can scarcely be said to reach 
that level.662 
 
For the second safeguard, the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’, Laws LJ cited the 
Von Hannover judgment, and domestic authorities in Campbell v MGN Ltd and Murray 
v Express Newspapers plc.663 According to Laws LJ’s interpretation, these cases 
suggested that ‘while an individual’s personal autonomy makes him the master of all 
those facts about his own identity of which the cases speak, his ownership of them 
depends by law on there being a reasonable expectation in the particular case that 
his privacy will be respected.’664 Thus, in describing the reasonable expectation 
standard as a ‘touchstone’, Laws LJ viewed this as an obligatory condition for Article 
8 engagement.  
 
Finally, the third safeguard against too broad an application of Article 8 is, simply 
put, Article 8(2). Laws LJ noted that Article 8(2) justifications might cut to the quick 
a broadly applied Article 8(1). In this regard, Laws LJ observed that Article 8(1) 
should cover a broad range of activities the state might pursue against the individual, 
but that, equally, the state may have a small hurdle to clear in terms of justifying the 
pursuit of this activity:  
[W]here state action touches the individual’s personal autonomy, it should take 
little to require the state to justify itself, but equally –if (and I repeat, this is 
critical) the action complained is taken in good faith to further a legitimate aim 
– a proper justification may be readily at hand.665 
 
In applying this interpretation to the present case, Laws LJ began by asserting that, 
on the instant facts, the distinction between the taking and retention of the 
photographs was unhelpful. Nevertheless, he did consider whether Article 8(1) was 
engaged by the taking of photographs in the context of this case, concluding that, 
save for any aggravating factors, this would not engage Article 8(1).666 Laws LJ drew 
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on Campbell v MGN Ltd to support his position.667 The distinguishing feature, 
according to Laws LJ, between Campbell and the immediate case was ‘the fact or 
threat of publication in the media, and not just the snapping of the shutter.’668  
 
Laws LJ did accept that the taking of photographs in public may in some 
circumstances engage Article 8, for example, where the act ‘may be intrusive or even 
violent, conducted by means of hot pursuit, face-to-face confrontation, pushing, 
shoving, bright lights, barging into the affected person’s home.’669 However, the 
immediate case did not involve anything remotely so objectionable, notwithstanding 
the fact that the pictures were taken by individuals acting on behalf of the state. 
Thus, for Laws LJ, the real issue in this case concerned whether the taking of 
pictures, along with any subsequent retention and processing amounted to a violation 
of Article 8. That is to say, to assess whether or not Article 8(1) is engaged, it is 
necessary to assess the extent to which the taking and subsequent use of the 
photographs sets back privacy interests.670 In finding that there was in fact an 
interference with Article 8(1), Laws LJ summarised the activities of the police in the 
immediate case as follows:  
The Metropolitan Police, visibly and with no obvious cause, chose to take and 
keep photographs of an individual going about his lawful business in the streets 
of London. This action is a good deal more than the snapping of a shutter. The 
police are a state authority. And as I have said, the claimant could not and did 
not know why they were doing it and what use they might make of the 
pictures.671 
 
Moreover, Laws LJ asserted that his finding was supported by the judgment of the 
ECtHR in S and Marper v United Kingdom, where it was determined that ‘the mere 
storing of data relating to the private life of the individual amounts to an interference 
within the meaning of Article 8.’672  
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Turning attention to Article 8(2), Laws LJ first judged the interfering measure to be in 
clear pursuit of a legitimate aim, namely the ‘prevention of disorder or crime’. He 
went on to agree with McCombe J’s judgment that the common law powers to detect 
and prevent crime provided an adequate basis for the interference. This line of 
reasoning is based on the assertion that the degree of precision required in the law is 
relative to the degree to which the measure interferes with the Article 8(1) rights of 
the applicant. As, in the immediate case, Laws LJ viewed the interference as modest, 
the legality requirement was satisfied by the general common law power.673 Laws LJ 
observed that it was not necessary to consider whether the legality requirement 
might be met by other provisions such as those contained in the Data Protection Act 
1998.  
 
On the question of whether the measures were ‘necessary in a democratic society’, 
Laws LJ distinguished Wood from S and Marper pinpointing the following factors:  
Pictures of the claimant were taken because the police believed that he had 
contact with EA who had a history of unlawful activity, and there was the 
possibility that he had been involved in unlawful activity in the meeting from 
which EA had been ejected. The taking of pictures had in no way been 
aggressively done. The retention of the pictures was carefully and tightly 
controlled. The claimant’s image was not placed on any searchable database, 
far less a nationwide database indefinitely retained.674 
 
Laws LJ went on to acknowledge a range of factors which weighed in favour of the 
claimant (any link between the claimant and EA was disputed; the claimant is a 
person of good character; any suspicion that the claimant was involved in criminal 
activity must quickly have dissipated after the photographs were taken).675 However, 
Laws LJ ultimately concluded, in dissent, that the continued retention of the images 
to monitor the claimant’s conduct at the upcoming event was proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued. 
 
Dyson LJ agreed with the reasoning of Laws LJ on the question of Article 8(1) 
engagement. However, Dyson LJ determined that the interference with the claimant’s 
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Article 8 rights was disproportionate and in violation of Article 8.676 In forming this 
conclusion, Dyson LJ emphasised the weak evidence base for an association between 
the claimant and EA; and that the police knew the claimant ‘had not been ejected 
from the meeting and … was not guilty of any misconduct outside the hotel.’677  
 
Dyson LJ began his balancing analysis with recognition that, whilst the interference 
was not of the utmost gravity, it could not be dismissed as inconsequential.678 From 
here, his Lordship held that, whilst the fact that the claimant had been seen briefly in 
the company of EA after the AGM may have provided a basis for taking and retaining 
the photographs for a few days after the event, this did not provide a basis for 
protracted retention.679  
 
Dyson LJ concluded the appeal should be allowed. Lord Collins, in agreement, noted 
the chilling effect that the ‘very substantial’ police presence at the event would have 
on the exercise of lawful rights.680 Secondly, and unlike the other judges, Lord Collins 
placed emphasis on the fact that the claimant was followed by a police car, and then 
questioned by four police officers, before being followed by two officers on foot as 
they attempted to ascertain his identity.681 Added to this, Lord Collins focused on the 
fact that the claimant was of good character and had not been involved in any 
misconduct at the AGM. Whilst Lord Collins agreed with Laws LJ and Dyson LJ that 
Article 8(1) was engaged, and the measures taken by the police pursued a legitimate 
aim, his Lordship sided with Dyson LJ on the issue of proportionality. Like Dyson LJ, 
Lord Collins expressed no conclusive view on whether the measures were ‘in 
accordance with the law’ for the purposes of Article 8(2). 
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1.2 Developments Post-Wood 
The Wood case did not serve as the catalyst for any significant legal or political 
reform in this area. As Lord Collins indicated at the end of his judgment, the last 
word had yet to be said on the implications for civil liberties of the taking and 
retention of images in the ‘modern surveillance society.’682 One issue that was not 
conclusively resolved in the Wood case was whether or not such an interference, 
supported solely by implicit common law powers, can be considered ‘in accordance 
with the law’. This will be addressed in the next part. Wood was subsequently 
influential in the application of Article 8 in other cases where individuals are 
photographed as part of a criminal process. Though these cases do not all directly 
focus on overt collection and retention of photographs of those subject to the criminal 
process, taken from public space, they give useful insights into how the domestic law 
in this area has developed. These judgments form part of an ongoing judicial 
dialogue concerning the correct interpretation of Article 8 in this area.  
 
In R (C) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis,683 the claimants complained 
that the refusal of the defendant Commissioner to delete records, including custody 
photographs and written information, taken from them after their separate arrests 
for rape and actual bodily harm, violated their rights under Article 8 ECHR. The court 
unanimously allowed the claim in relation to the retention of the custody 
photographs. In the leading judgment, Richards LJ declined to consider whether the 
taking of the custody photographs engaged Article 8(1) as the taking and retention of 
the photographs should be considered in the round when assessing the applicability 
of Article 8.684 Drawing heavily on S and Marper v United Kingdom, Richards LJ ruled 
that the retention of photographs, as personal information containing ‘external 
identification features’, constituted an interference with the claimants’ Article 8 
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rights.685 Richards LJ also drew upon Reklos v Greece, where the ECtHR stated that ‘a 
person’s image constitutes one of the chief attributes of his or her personality, as it 
reveals the person’s unique characteristics and distinguishes the person from his or 
her peers.’686 Thus, Richards LJ reasoned that recent Strasbourg authority had 
superseded previous authority in cases such as Friedl v Austria and X v United 
Kingdom, which suggested that the retention of such photographs will not in and of 
itself constitute an interference with Article 8(1).   
 
Richards LJ then considered whether or not the claimant’s case was consistent with 
domestic authority. In considering Laws LJ’s dissent in Wood, Richards LJ observed 
that his Lordship’s conclusions regarding the status of the reasonable expectation of 
privacy standard as the ‘touchstone’ of Article 8’s engagement relied on Strasbourg 
decisions prior to S and Marper v United Kingdom. Instead, Richards LJ ruled that, as 
this was not the specific test applied in S and Marper, and the ECtHR judgment in PG 
and JH v United Kingdom made clear that factors beyond the individual’s reasonable 
expectations of privacy in a given situation can come into play,687 this test was not 
determinative of Article 8’s engagement.688 Nonetheless Richards LJ inclined to the 
view that, even on the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy test’, the claimants’ Article 
8 rights had been engaged. 
 
From here, Richards LJ ruled that the legal basis for the interference, contained in 
section 64 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Management of 
Police Information Code of Practice, had sufficient clarity to comply with Article 
8(2).689 However, Richards LJ accepted that there may have been a problem with the 
accessibility and foreseeability of the Code of Practice as ‘there does not appear to be 
any published statement that the defendant’s policy with respect to custody 
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photographs is simply to follow the Code and guidance.’690 Following the lead of S 
and Marper v United Kingdom, Richards LJ ruled that the measures did not strike a 
fair balance between the Article 8(1) rights of the claimants and the legitimate aim of 
preventing disorder or crime. Richards LJ focused on the absence of any distinction 
between the retention of photographs for convicted and non-convicted persons; the 
length of the retention periods; and the age of one of the claimants in reaching this 
conclusion.691 
 
Notably for the present discussion, the judgment of Richards LJ challenged Laws LJ’s 
suggestion in Wood that ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ delineates the scope of 
Article 8. This issue has significant implications for those subject to the criminal 
justice process, as subsequent sections of this analysis will show. In Kinloch v HM 
Advocate,692 the appellant complained that the police violated his rights under Article 
8 ECHR through the unauthorised use of surveillance measures against him as he 
occupied publicly accessible space. The police covertly monitored the appellant and, 
after he was observed carrying bags to and from numerous premises and vehicles, 
searched him. This search revealed large quantities of money on his person.693 
Taking a view that seems on the face of it to be somewhat at odds with that of 
Richards LJ’s in the C case, Lord Hope ruled that whilst Article 8(1) can cover a ‘zone 
of interaction’ in public, this does not apply where ‘a person knowingly or 
intentionally involves himself in activities which may be recorded or reported in 
public, in circumstances where he does not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.’694 Applying these principles to the instant facts, Lord Hope stated:  
[I]t could not reasonably be suggested that a police officer who came upon a 
person who has committed a crime in a public place and simply noted down his 
observations in his notebook was interfering with the person’s right to respect 
for his private life. The question is whether it makes any difference that notes 
of his movements in public are kept by the police over a period of hours in a 
covert manner as part of a planned operation, as happened in this case. 
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I think that the answer to it is to be found by considering whether the appellant 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy while he was in public view as he 
moved between his car and the block of flats where he lived and engaged in his 
other activities that day in places that were open to the public.695 
 
The appeal was dismissed. Whilst his Lordship did not categorically state that the 
existence of such an expectation is the ‘touchstone’ or determinative issue in 
deciding whether Article 8 is engaged beyond the facts in Kinloch, significant 
emphasis was placed on this test.   
 
In Mengesha v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis,696 the claimant sought 
judicial review of the decision of the police to require individuals contained by police 
cordon during the policing of a trade union march to provide their name, address, 
and to be filmed whilst doing so in order to be released from the containment. In his 
leading judgment, Moses LJ held that the collection of the information, as a price for 
leaving the containment, was not lawful. Moses LJ also held that the taking and 
retention of this information engaged Article 8(1), and could not be justified under 
Article 8(2) of the ECHR.697 In finding that Article 8 had been engaged, Moses LJ held 
that, even in the absence of a reasonably held expectation of privacy in the 
circumstances of the containment, Article 8 was engaged because the police collected 
and retained personal information to be linked with future police use.698 
 
Relying on the judgment of Lord Collins in Wood, Moses LJ determined that the 
interference could not be considered ‘in accordance with the law’ as there was no 
statutory power to take and retain film of the claimant and no published policy 
applicable to the interfering measure taken. Thus, there had been a violation of 
Article 8.699 Moses LJ formed the view that this interference, which used overt 
photography methods, required a legal basis beyond the implicit common law powers 
to collect information to investigate and detect crime.  
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In two cases in 2015, the Supreme Court went some distance towards setting out the 
general principles for interpreting whether or not the taking and retention of personal 
information from those subject to the criminal process, as they occupy publicly 
accessible space, will constitute a violation of Article 8 ECHR. The first decision is R 
(Catt) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis,700 and the second is In re JR38.701 
The Catt case concerned the storage by police of electronic data pertaining to the 
applicants. In different circumstances the two applicants had personal information 
about their activities noted down and retained by the police as they occupied publicly 
accessible space. The first applicant, Catt, argued that the retention by police of 
information about his attendance at several protests against the arms trade, which 
included written notes of his activities and a photograph, violated his Article 8 rights. 
The second applicant, T, argued that the retention by the police for twelve years of 
information relating to allegations made against her for non-violent offences was 
likewise in violation of her Article 8 rights. Neither applicant suggested that the 
collection of the information, which was obtained overtly and through non-intrusive 
means, violated their Article 8 rights. After the Court of Appeal found that the 
retention practices in both cases were not justified under Article 8(2),702 the 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis appealed. 
 
The Supreme Court ruled that whilst the retention practices in each case engaged 
Article 8(1), they satisfied the criteria in Article 8(2) (with Lord Toulson dissenting on 
this point in Catt). Lord Sumption’s answer to the question whether Article 8(1) was 
engaged, is summarised in the following observations:  
In common with other jurisdictions, including the European Court of Human 
Rights and the Courts of the United States, Canada and New Zealand, the 
Courts of the United Kingdom have adopted as the test for what constitutes 
“private life” whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
relevant respect… In one sense this test might be thought to be circular. It begs 
the question what is the ‘privacy’ which may be the subject of a reasonable 
expectation. Given the expanded concept of private life in the jurisprudence of 
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the Convention, the test cannot be limited to cases where a person can be said 
to have a reasonable expectation about the privacy of his home or personal 
communications. It must extend to every occasion on which a person has a 
reasonable expectation that there will be no interference with the broader right 
to personal autonomy recognised in the case law of the Starsbourg Court. This 
is consistent with the recognition that there may be some matters about which 
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, notwithstanding that they occur in 
public and are patent to all the world. In this context mere observation cannot, 
save perhaps in extreme circumstances, engage Article 8, but the systematic 
retention of information may do.703 
 
Lord Sumption summarised the tendency of recent Strasbourg and domestic 
authorities, concluding that ‘it is clear that the state’s systematic collection and 
storage in retrievable form even of public information about an individual is an 
interference with private life.’704 In considering whether the measures were ‘in 
accordance with the law’, Lord Sumption observed that the exercise of common law 
powers to collect and store information is subject to an ‘intensive regime of statutory 
and administrative regulation’ under the Data Protection Act 1998, and various 
guidance documents on the management of police information provided for in a Code 
of Practice issued under section 39A of the Police Act 1996.705 Briefly, the effect of 
these provisions is that only as much personal information as is necessary and 
proportionate to collect for a legitimate policing purpose should be collected, and the 
same rule applies for the retention of this information.  
 
Catt and T relied on the cases of MM v United Kingdom706 and R (T) v Chief Constable 
of Greater Manchester Police,707 which both concerned the disclosure of criminal 
records information to potential employers. In each case, the principle that an 
interfering measure cannot be ‘in accordance with the law’ if the provisions for it 
contained no safeguards against abuse or arbitrary treatment of individuals was 
confirmed. However, Lord Sumption distinguished the immediate cases from these 
authorities on the basis that there was no disclosure to third parties of the 
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information collected and stored, and the threat of future disclosure was strictly 
limited to policing purposes and was subject to internal proportionality review.708 
Taking into consideration the facts that no intrusive means were used to obtain the 
information, and the information was not to be disclosed to the public, Lord Sumption 
characterised the interference with the applicants’ rights in both cases as minor. 
From here, Lord Sumption reasoned that the retention of the information relating to 
Catt was proportionate. Despite the fact that Catt had no convictions for violent or 
disorderly behaviour and was generally considered to be of good character, Lord 
Sumption observed that the retention formed an important piece of the ‘jigsaw’ of 
information that police need to manage public protests:  
Most intelligence is necessarily acquired in the first instance indiscriminately. Its 
value can only be judged in hindsight, as subsequent analysis for particular 
purposes disloses a relevant pattern. The picture which is thus formed is in the 
nature of things a developing one, and there is not always a particular point of 
time at which one can say that any one piece of the jigsaw is irrelevant. The 
most that can be done is to assess whether the value of the material is 
proportionate to the gravity of the threat to the public… The fact that some of 
the information in the database relates to people like Mr Catt who have not 
committed and are not likely to commit offences does not make it irrelevant for 
legitimate policing purposes.709 
 
Lord Toulson rejected this broad ‘jigsaw’ principle in his dissent on this point, stating:  
[T]hat does not explain to my mind why it should be thought necessary to 
maintain for years after the event information on someone about whom the 
police have concluded (as they did in July 2010) that he was not known to have 
acted violently and did not appear to be involved in the coordination of the 
relevant events or actions.710 
 
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the retention of personal information in 
the case of T was proportionate as this was subject to a flexible policy of intermittent 
review, and the information was deleted from police records within a reasonable 
time-frame.  
 
In the second case, In re JR38, a majority of the Supreme Court held that 
dissemination to local news outlets of the appellant’s photograph – taken as he 
																																								 																				
708 n 700 at [15]. 
709 ibid at [31]. 
710 ibid at [65]. 
183	
	
participated in sectarian rioting – did not engage his rights under Article 8 ECHR. 
Lord Kerr and Lord Wilson dissented on this point but nonetheless held that any such 
interference was justified under the criteria in Article 8(2). The appellant was 14 
years old at the time of the incident, and the court was divided on whether or not the 
fact that he could not be said to hold a reasonable expectation of privacy was 
determinative of whether or not Article 8(1) was engaged.711 
 
Relying mainly on Laws LJ’s interpretation of Von Hannover v Germany in the Wood 
case, Lord Toulson did not consider that the dissemination constituted an interference 
with the appellant’s Article 8 rights. Lord Toulson observed that the ‘touchstone’ of 
Article 8(1) is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances of the case, the 
individual can be said to hold a reasonable expectation of privacy.712 
 
Holding that the test encompasses contextual factors such as the age of the 
appellant, and the use to which the photographic material will be put, Lord Toulson 
reasoned that the test was to be applied broadly.713 Drawing parallels with the 
Kinloch case, Lord Toulson observed that, when Strasbourg authorities speak of a 
protected zone of interaction which Article 8 protects, ‘they are not referring to 
interaction in the form of a public riot.’714 Lord Clarke concurred with Lord Toulson 
insofar as holding the measures did not engage Article 8(1).715 
 
Lord Kerr’s dissent on this issue is noteworthy for the purposes of this analysis; 
not least because it provides a contrasting interpretation of many of the 
authorities cited by Lord Toulson. Lord Kerr did not view the Von Hannover 
judgment as authority for elevating the reasonable expectation of privacy to the 
status of a ‘touchstone’ test of Article 8(1) engagement, pointing out that the 
ECtHR did not rule that, absent such an expectation, there could be no 
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engagement of Article 8(1). According to his Lordship, that court did not consider 
the issue. Rather, it merely highlighted that where such an expectation exists this 
will be taken into account in assessing whether or not the interfering measure falls 
within the scope of Article 8(1).716 Lord Kerr also viewed the PG and JH v United 
Kingdom case as clearly indicating that the reasonable expectation of privacy test 
is not a necessary precondition of Article 8 engagement. Moreover, his Lordship 
thought it significant that in the domestic cases of Campbell v MGM Ltd and 
Murray v Express Newspapers plc it was not ruled that the reasonable expectation 
of privacy was ‘a sine qua non of Article 8 engagement.’717 Whilst in Campbell Lord 
Nicholls referred to the test as a ‘touchstone’, Lord Kerr suggested that this should 
be understood as ‘an expression connoting no more than a means by which the 
significance of the material to be assessed is considered’, and not as an obligatory 
condition.718  
 
The status of the reasonable expectation of privacy test in the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR is clearly a source of ongoing controversy in the most senior domestic 
courts. It is important to understand what the significance of the test is, and what 
it should be, when assessing the extent to which the collection and retention of 
photographs, taken from those subject to the criminal process as they occupy 
publicly accessible space, falls within the scope of Article 8. The merits of the 
arguments on both sides of the debate will be explored in the next section. The 
development of this area of the law raises numerous interesting questions over 
how each of the limbs of Article 8 is applied domestically, and the impact this 
might have on those subject to the criminal process. Such questions will be drawn 
out and discussed in the remaining sections of this chapter.  
 
																																								 																				
716 ibid at [57]. 
717 ibid at [59]. 
718 ibid at [59]. 
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2. Discussion 
In what follows the legal framework detailed above will be subject to critical scrutiny, 
drawing on principles emerging from the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the 
philosophical literature covered in previous chapters. The focus will be on establishing 
whether or not the domestic legal framework regulating the taking and retention of 
photographic images of those subject to the criminal justice process, as they occupy 
public space, recognises and affords adequate protection to their privacy related 
interests. The extent to which these interests are recognised turns on a consideration 
of how the scope of Article 8(1) has been interpreted in this area in domestic courts, 
and whether or not the scope afforded is broad enough to cover the range of ways in 
which such information gathering activities can set back privacy interests. This 
analysis forms the first part of the discussion. The second section will focus on the 
framework for assessing the extent to which the use of such measures is justifiable in 
a particular case. This requires consideration of how the domestic courts have 
interpreted the jurisprudence of the ECtHR relating to Article 8(2) ECHR in cases 
covering the sorts of police activity considered in this analysis.  
 
2.1 The Overt Photography of Suspects: How should we 
determine whether Article 8 is engaged?  
Can the mere taking of photographic images of those subject to the criminal process 
by the police, as they occupy publicly accessible space, engage Article 8(1), absent 
any retention of such information? Is the existence of a ‘reasonable expectation of 
privacy’ an obligatory condition of Article 8(1) engagement, or just one factor to 
consider in assessing whether Article 8(1) is engaged by a particular measure? A 
logical starting point for formulating answers to these questions is to establish how 
the taking and retention of such photographs might set back privacy interests in the 
first place.  
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2.1.1. How are privacy interests set back through the collection and 
retention of photographic images?  
In 1997 Nissenbaum warned of the dangers to privacy posed by practices of public 
surveillance, suggesting that these practices had fallen outside the scope of 
predominant theoretical approaches to privacy.719 Part of the reason for this neglect, 
according to Nissenbaum, lies in the fact that the terms ‘private’ and ‘public’ are used 
as a way of demarcating a dichotomy of realms:  
In some contexts, for example, the term “private” indicates the realm of 
familial and other personal or intimate relations, while the term “public” 
indicates the civic realm or realm of the community outside of this personal 
one. In some contexts, “public” indicates the realm of government institutions 
in contrast with the realm of “private” citizens or “private” institutions (such as 
corporations).720 
 
Thus, privacy applies to areas that are ‘private’ and not ‘public’. The result, according 
to Nissenbaum, is that the value of privacy in public space is often overlooked. 
Additionally, the value of privacy in public space may be overlooked because it is not 
considered as normatively valuable as it is in the private sphere and, therefore, can 
be easily overridden in favour of other interests.  
 
Rachels, as we saw in Chapter 1, argues that the normative value of privacy lies in its 
functional use in the development of social relationships.721 Privacy, according to this 
view, is important because it allows us to control access to personal information and 
more intimate aspects of the self.722 Such a view of the normative value of privacy 
inevitably depletes the weight of the claim to privacy in public space because, 
generally speaking, the information about an individual that can be accessed by 
monitoring public space tends to be more innocuous and less intimate than the 
information that could be accessed from observing the same individual in his or her 
home or in a ‘private’ setting. Thus, it is much easier to morally and legally justify 
																																								 																				
719 H. Nissenbaum, ‘Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of Privacy in Public’ (1998) 17 
Law and Philosophy 559-596 at 564. 
720 ibid at 567-8. 
721 Chapter 1, Part 2.1. 
722 J. Rachels, ‘Why Privacy is Important’ (1975) 14 Philosophy and Public Affairs 323-333 at 329. 
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overriding individual privacy interests in favour of other interests when an 
interference with individual privacy takes place in space demarcated as ‘public’. 
 
The protection of privacy can lead to restraints on the freedom of others. This is 
especially true when protecting the privacy of individuals as they occupy public 
space. For example, if I choose to enter public space and openly voice my political 
opinions then it may be unreasonable for me to expect that this information can later 
be suppressed. After all, such suppression may result in a restriction on the freedom 
of others to observe, record, or publicly respond to such opinions. Whereas such a 
restriction might seem reasonable in situations where that individual has intruded 
upon my private space, it is much more difficult to justify where I have voluntarily 
disclosed this information in public. 
 
This is not to say that individuals cannot maintain an interest in limiting access to 
themselves as they occupy publicly accessible space. This becomes more salient as 
advances in information technologies over the last thirty years have increased the 
threat posed to privacy interests in public space. Before advances in surveillance 
technology such as CCTV surveillance, and before the internet age, privacy could 
perhaps be well enough protected through the protection of private residences and 
vehicles. A relatively small number of legal prohibitions and social conventions could 
protect individuals from having their personal and intimate spheres arbitrarily 
interfered with.723 However, advances in technology have made it easier to collect 
personal information about an individual and subject him or her to increasingly 
intrusive scrutiny as he or she occupies public space.724 Furthermore, individual 
personal data is more accessible without the need to intrude into the private sphere, 
																																								 																				
723 Whilst such social conventions may or may not be recognised in law, there is a depth of sociological 
literature to suggest that social conventions exist in contemporary western societies, to dictate the 
etiquette of public life. Such social conventions rule out intrusive curiosity, surreptitious observations, and 
identification requests of individuals as they go about their business in public space without some trumping 
justification. See for example, E. Goffman, Behaviour in Public Places (New York: Free Press, 1963); T. 
Nagel, ‘Concealment and Exposure’ (1998) 27 Philosophy and Public Affairs 3-30; B. vS-T. Larsen, Setting 
the Watch: Privacy and the Ethics of CCTV Surveillance (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011) 21-36. 
724 See, for example, A. von Hirsch, ‘The Ethics of Public Television Surveillance’ in A. von Hirsch, D. 
Garland and A. Wakefield (eds.), Ethical and Social Perspectives on Situational Crime Prevention (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2000) 59-77 at 65. 
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as individual personal data becomes increasingly, and permanently, available 
online.725 
 
Public CCTV moves the goalposts insofar as privacy in public is concerned, as it 
allows authorities to subject the individual to quite intensive scrutiny, breaking 
traditional boundaries and social conventions regarding the extent to which 
individuals would usually be subject to scrutiny as they pass through public space.726 
The actions of the police in the Wood case set back the privacy related interests of 
the claimant. It has been well documented in philosophical literature on privacy that 
overt observations can have a disruptive effect on an individual’s interests in limiting 
access to him-or herself. As Larsen highlights, whilst people might expect to be the 
subject of passing observations from others as they occupy publicly accessible space, 
when such observations are undertaken by an agent of the state, and are carried out 
in a systematic or targeted manner, this can become more problematic.727  Indeed, in 
Wood the claimant was not photographed as part of a crowd, or, as in the Friedl 
case, to assess the character and manifestation of a public protest.728 Rather, he was 
the subject of a targeted attempt by the police to identify him through the collection 
of his photographic image and attempts to follow him down the street.  
 
According to Feldman, individuals in society occupy multiple social spheres, which 
represent areas marked off from those not included inside the sphere (e.g. the 
workplace, social clubs, family, and friendship circles).729 Privacy, then, can ensure 
the maintenance of these different spheres and the extent to which an individual 
might have a claim to privacy is moderated by the circumstances of a particular case. 
By extension, although any protection from scrutiny when occupying public space is 
																																								 																				
725 The individual concerned often voluntarily relinquishes such personal information. However, such data 
may have been made increasingly accessible by another source such as a news agency or private 
organistaion. H. Nys, ‘Towards a Human Right ‘to Be Forgotten Online’?’ (2011) 18 European Journal of 
Health Law 469-475. 
726 Larsen, n 723, 41-55. 
727 ibid 59-60. 
728 Friedl v Austria (1996) 21 EHRR 83 at [49]. 
729 D. Feldman, Secrecy, Dignity or Autonomy? Views of Privacy as a Civil Liberty’ (1994) 47 Current Legal 
Problems 41-71 at 45-48. 
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reduced (when compared with the protection from such scrutiny an individual should 
be afforded in the home, for example), this does not mean that Wood opened himself 
up to the level of scrutiny he actually experienced. The overt and targeted 
surveillance Wood was subjected to ‘carries with it a clearly implied threat that the 
fruits of the surveillance may be used for purposes adverse to the interests of the 
person being watched.’730 
 
In support of his finding that the actions of the police in Wood did not engage Article 
8(1), McCombe J observed that the claimant had been monitored in a public street, 
in circumstances where a police presence could not have been unexpected.731 
However, this treatment of Wood’s complaint seems to miss how the targeted 
photography in this case might set back privacy interests to a significant degree. 
Cohen notes how sustained public observation can threaten privacy interests, by 
moderating behaviour:  
[T]he experience of being watched will constrain, ex ante, the acceptable 
spectrum of belief and behaviour. Pervasive monitoring of every first move or 
false start will, at the margin, incline choices toward the bland and the 
mainstream. The result will be a subtle yet fundamental shift in the content of 
our character, a blunting and blurring of rough edges and sharp lines. But 
rough edges and sharp lines have intrinsic, archetypal value within our culture. 
Their philosophical differences aside, the coolly rational Enlightenment thinker, 
the unconventional Romantic dissenter, the skeptical pragmatist, and the 
iconoclastic postmodernist all share a deep-rooted antipathy toward unreflective 
conformism. The condition of no-privacy threatens not only to chill the 
expression of eccentric individuality, but also, gradually, to dampen the force of 
our aspirations to it.732 
 
Cohen shows how such monitoring can have a corrosive impact on personal 
autonomy. Where the police, as a state authority, take and retain photographs of a 
specifically targeted individual or group of individuals it is not difficult to see how this 
might have a moderating effect on behaviour. The police were there to gather 
intelligence on a particular group of people connected to a protest movement, and 
the claimant was monitored and had his personal information collected as a direct 
																																								 																				
730 ibid at 61. 
731 n 630, 835. 
732 J.E. Cohen, ‘Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object’ (2000) 52 Stanford Law 
Review 1373-1438 at 1425-1426. 
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result of his involvement with that group. To be targeted in such a way is, as the 
claimant complained, likely to be ‘unsettling and intimidating’.733 As Benn puts it, 
sustained observation of an individual can be objectifying: ‘[f]inding oneself an object 
of scrutiny, as the focus of another’s attention, brings one to a new consciousness of 
oneself, as something seen through another’s eyes.’734 When the other is the state, 
such observation and information collection can be coercive.735 In the context of how 
the police photography and ‘evidence gathering’ was employed in this particular case, 
the effect of the police activities is such that it may operate as a form of social 
control, dissuading the claimant from participating in legitimate and peaceful political 
activities and protests, or at least wrongly make him uncomfortable in doing so, for 
fear of being targeted and having intrusive information gathering and processing 
measures used against him. Lord Collins recognised the effect that such police 
activity might have on the claimant’s political activities: ‘[w]hen I first read the 
papers on this appeal, I was struck by the chilling effect on the exercise of lawful 
rights such a deployment would have.’736 As Dyson LJ observed: ‘[t]he retention by 
the police of photographs taken of persons who have not committed an offence, is 
always a serious matter.’737 
 
In the High Court, McCombe J held, without the benefit of the Strasbourg decision in 
S and Marper, that the collection and retention of the photographs in Wood did not 
interfere with Article 8(1) ECHR. As well as citing a number of Strasbourg and 
domestic authorities in support of this conclusion,738 McCombe J gave weight to the 
following factors in support of his position: (i) the claimant was photographed in a 
public street, in circumstances in which police presence could not have been 
unexpected; (ii) the images were to be retained, without general disclosure; (iii) the 
																																								 																				
733 n 626, 129. 
734 S. Benn, ‘Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons’ in J. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds) Privacy: 
Nomos XIII (New York: Atherton Press, 1971) 1-26 at 7. 
735 A. Roberts, ‘A Republican Account of the Value of Privacy’ (2014) European Journal of Political Theory 
1-25 at 4-5. 
736 n 626 at [92]. 
737 ibid at [85]. 
738 See Lupker v Netherlands, App no 18395/91 (ECommHR, 7 December 1992); n 728; Perry v United 
Kingdom (2004) 39 EHRR 3 at [40]; n 636 at [51]. 
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retention of the images was not part of the compilation of a general dossier of 
information concerning the claimant.739 The ECtHR approach to determining an 
interference with Article 8(1) in such cases draws on the following factors: (i) the 
context in which the photographs are taken (in public using overt photography is less 
likely to interfere);740 (ii) the nature of the information collected (i.e. the extent to 
which the information collected contains personally identifiable information);741 and 
the use to which any information might be put (where information is to be retained 
for longer periods or processed, it is more likely to occasion an interference).742  
 
At first glance the general ECtHR approach, and the cases cited by McCombe J, seem 
to support his conclusion that the police did not engage the applicant’s Article 8(1) 
rights. However, aspects of McCombe J’s reasoning are problematic. Firstly, with 
regard to the taking of photographs, McCombe J relies on the judgment of the ECtHR 
in Friedl v Austria. In this case the ECtHR found that the taking and retention of the 
photographs of the applicant by the police as he participated in a public 
demonstration did not engage Article 8(1). However, McCombe J overlooked the 
distinguishing features of the immediate case. For example, McCombe J did not seem 
to acknowledge that the police in Wood went to quite extensive lengths to identify 
the claimant, unlike the public authorities in Friedl.743 Moreover, in PG and JH v 
United Kingdom, a case also cited by McCombe J in support of his conclusion, the 
ECtHR ruled that once a ‘systematic and permanent’ record of material pertaining to 
an individual’s activities in public is created, private life considerations may arise.744 
As Andrew Roberts highlights: ‘[i]f the creation of a systematic or permanent record 
of personal information including the identity of the subject constitutes an 
interference with the subject’s art.8 rights, as the European Court’s decisions seem 
to suggest, then as a matter of logic, the taking of such information for the sole 
																																								 																				
739 n 630, 835-836. 
740 n 728 at [49].  
741 S and Marper, n 672 at [86]. 
742 Rotaru v Romania (2000) 8 BHRC 449 at [46]. 
743 n 728 at [50]. 
744 n 687 at [57]. 
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purpose of compiling this kind of record must also attract the protection of 
art.8(1).’745 
 
The ECtHR’s ruling in S and Marper v United Kingdom, where it was held that the 
mere storing of data relating to the private life of the individual will engage Article 
8(1), put the matter beyond doubt.746 Furthermore, the context in which the 
information was taken seems to exacerbate the interference with the claimant’s 
Article 8 rights. All of this was appropriately recognised in the Court of Appeal. As 
Laws LJ observed, the action was a good deal more than the snapping of a shutter.747 
Leaving aside the invasive features that the police followed the claimant down the 
street and into an underground station to ascertain his identity, the overt 
photography in this case was of sufficient gravity to constitute at least a moderately 
serious interference with Article 8(1) because: (i) it was carried out by the police and 
targeted specifically at the claimant; (ii) the photographic information was to be 
retained and subject to processing as the police attempted to aggregate the 
information in the images with details of the claimant’s identity; and (iii) the police 
did not present the applicant with any reason for taking the photographs, a factor 
which is bound to heighten the applicant’s sense of insecurity and intimidation, whilst 
potentially having a ‘chilling effect’ on his exercise of his autonomy-based privacy 
interests. Thus, in answer to Laws LJ’s first Article 8(1) safeguard, the overt 
photography in Wood as part of the criminal process did achieve the level of 
seriousness necessary for Article 8 engagement. Of course, each particular instance 
of overt police photography is different and, therefore, establishing whether Article 8 
is engaged requires careful consideration of the facts of each particular case. 
However, due to the chilling effects of such overt photography on personal 
autonomy, this analysis demonstrates that, as a general rule, where the police take 
photographs of specific subjects as they occupy publicly accessible space, and this 
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747 n 626 at [45]. 
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results in the creation of a systematic or permanent record of those subjects’ 
personal information (i.e. the photograph is stored or processed), this will expose the 
individual to a level of official scrutiny such that in every foreseeable case he or she 
should have the protection of Article 8(1).  
 
2.1.2. Overt photography and the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ 
The second safeguard Laws LJ described as ensuring that the core values protected 
by Article 8 are not interpreted so widely as to render its claims unreal or 
unreasonable was that the ‘touchstone’ for Article 8(1)’s engagement is whether the 
claimant enjoys on the facts a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy.748 This has been a 
controversial point in the domestic case law, as we have seen. However, the 
dominant approach of the domestic courts, especially in cases where the privacy 
interests of those subject to the criminal process are at issue, has been that Article 
8(1) cannot be engaged absent the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
This section considers the extent to which the reasonable expectation of privacy is a 
‘touchstone’ test for Article 8 engagement in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, and the 
extent to which it should be. It concludes that, though the ECtHR jurisprudence is 
admittedly equivocal, the Strasbourg Court does not elevate the reasonable 
expectation of privacy to the status of a precondition for Article 8 engagement. The 
dominant domestic interpretation of this aspect of Article 8 consequently unduly 
narrows the scope of the privacy protection that should properly be afforded to those 
subject to the criminal process.  
 
In support of the reasonable expectation ‘touchstone’, Laws LJ relied on von 
Hannover v Germany. In that case, the ECtHR first determines that there is a ‘zone 
of interaction’ of a person which, even in a public setting, may fall within the scope of 
private life.749 It then states:  
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The Court has also indicated that, in certain circumstances, a person has a 
“legitimate expectation” of protection and respect for his or her private life. 
Accordingly, it has held in a case concerning the interception of telephone calls 
on business premises that the applicant “would have had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy for such calls”.750 
 
Laws LJ also cited domestic authorities in Campbell v MGN Ltd751 and Murray v 
Express Newspapers plc752 in support of this position. In Murray Sir Anthony Clarke 
MR offered further insight into what this test demands:  
As we have seen it, the question whether there is a reasonable expectation of 
privacy is a broad one, which takes account of all the circumstances of the 
case. They include the attributes of the claimant, the nature of the activity in 
which the claimant was engaged, the place at which it was happening, the 
nature and purpose of the intrusion, the absence of consent and whether it was 
known or could be inferred, the effect on the claimant and the circumstances in 
which and the purposes for which the information came into the hands of the 
publisher.753 
 
Thus, any assessment into what entails a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ requires 
a consideration of a range of different factors such as the personal attributes of the 
claimant and the circumstances under which the intruding measures are employed. 
Although this test is to be applied broadly, any commitment to Laws LJ’s contention 
that this test is a precondition of Article 8, is a commitment to narrowing down the 
scope of Article 8 to protect only those activities and circumstances where an 
individual, at the time of the interference, holds a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in those circumstances. In In re JR38, where a 14 year-old boy was photographed as 
he participated in sectarian rioting, this meant that the police did not have to justify 
as lawful or necessary their decision to publish the boy’s image to local news outlets, 
irrespective of the consequences the subsequent publication might have on the 
child’s private life.  
 
The notion that the reasonable expectation of privacy is a precondition of Article 8(1) 
engagement does not seem satisfactory. First, and perhaps most importantly, the 
elevation of this test is seemingly at odds with ECtHR jurisprudence. Support for the 
																																								 																				
750 ibid at [51]. 
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reasonable expectation standard is drawn from the above extract in Von Hannover v 
Germany, which states that ‘in certain circumstances’, an individual may have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.754 Indeed, it seems the existence of such an 
expectation would strengthen an individual’s claim to Article 8 protection in some 
contexts. However, the extract does not appear to suggest, let alone explicitly state, 
that absent such an expectation, Article 8 cannot be engaged. Moreover, the 
approach of Laws LJ seems to be at odds with the ECtHR’s decision in PG and JH v 
United Kingdom, where the court states:  
There are a number of elements relevant to a consideration of whether a 
person’s private life may be concerned by measures effected outside a person’s 
home or private premises. Since there are occasions when people knowingly or 
intentionally involve themselves in activities which are or may be recorded or 
reported in a public manner, a person’s reasonable expectations as to privacy 
may be a significant, although not necessarily conclusive, factor.755 
 
Thus, it seems that where an individual’s activities are recorded as he or she 
knowingly involves him or herself in activities in public the question of whether or not 
the individual holds a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances is not a 
conclusive factor in assessing whether Article 8 is engaged. In In re JR38, Lord 
Toulson viewed this passage as obscure, and also noted that it pre-dated the Von 
Hannover judgment.756 His Lordship also suggested that this passage does not imply 
that, even in the absence of a reasonable expectation of privacy, Article 8 may be 
engaged. However, another extract from the PG and JH judgment seems to give an 
example of where this might be the case when it is stated: ‘[a] person who walks 
down the street will, inevitably, be visible to any member of the public who is also 
present. … Private life considerations may arise, however, once any systematic or 
permanent record comes into existence of such material from the public domain.’757 
Moreover, in ECtHR cases since Von Hannover, the applicant’s reasonable 
expectations of privacy are seldom mentioned and, where they are, the ECtHR simply 
declares that such expectations exist rather than using the test as a normative 
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standard for the engagement of Article 8.758 The prevailing approach in ECtHR 
jurisprudence seems to focus on the extent to which privacy interests are set back by 
the particular interfering measure and the nature of the interfering measure in terms 
of its impact upon the applicant’s life, rather than on the applicant’s expectations of 
privacy.759 
 
Furthermore, as Lord Kerr observes, the domestic authorities which Lord Toulson and 
Laws LJ rely on in support of their interpretation of Article 8(1) do not suggest that 
the reasonable expectation of privacy test is ‘an indispensable criterion for the 
engagement of Article 8.’760 Whilst understood in its broadest terms, the reasonable 
expectation standard can incorporate factors such as the personal attributes of the 
claimant, it can do so only insofar as such factors might be said to form part of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.761 However, for a number of reasons, any 
interpretation of Article 8 which relies on the applicant to hold a reasonable 
expectation of privacy at the time of the interference runs the risk of unduly 
narrowing the scope of Article 8, particularly for those subject to the criminal justice 
process.  
 
Firstly, when attempting to assess whether or not Article 8 is engaged by focusing on 
the applicant’s reasonable expectations of privacy, one’s focus is shifted from 
assessing how a measure sets back the individual’s privacy interests towards the 
extent to which it is justifiable to afford Article 8 protection to the particular activity 
the applicant was engaged in at the time of the interference; a factor better 
considered as part of the court’s Article 8(2) inquiry. Lord Toulson’s judgment in JR38 
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illustrates the problem. In support of his conclusion that Article 8(1) was not engaged 
by disseminating the photograph, Lord Toulson observed that a ‘member of a crowd 
engaged in a violent disturbance in a public place’ has no reasonable expectation of 
protection from the police seeking the help of the public to identify those involved; 
and the violence occurring at the interface where the sectarian rioting occurred was 
exposing vulnerable people to fear and risk of injury.762 Thus, according to Lord 
Toulson, the applicant could not expect to keep private his criminal activities. 
However, this approach pre-empts the question of whether the measures are 
necessary under Article 8(2), and narrows the scope of Article 8 protection. It focuses 
on the harms to society and countervailing interests which should properly be 
balanced against the applicant’s privacy interests. These are not factors that give an 
indication of the effect the measures taken by the police had on the applicant’s right 
to respect for private life.763 
 
Exclusive focus on the extent to which the applicant holds a reasonable expectation 
of privacy may overshadow other potentially relevant considerations. Whilst such 
expectations may be an important factor in assessing the extent to which the 
applicant’s privacy interests have been set back by a particular measure, they do not 
tell the whole story. For instance, let us imagine that in JR38 the police not only 
disseminated the images to local news outlets for identification purposes, but also 
disseminated them to national and international news sources for the purpose of 
humiliating the applicant. This would surely set back the applicant’s privacy interests 
to such a significant degree that it could not ever be considered proportionate. 
However, on Lord Toulson’s interpretation of Article 8(1), this would not seem to 
matter as, at the time the pictures were collected, the applicant could not have 
reasonably expected that his image would not be collected or disseminated due to 
the public and criminal nature of the activities in which he was engaged. If, as Lord 
Kerr suggests and Lord Toulson seems not to dispute, the dissemination of the 
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images set back the applicant’s privacy interests to a significant degree, this should 
engage the applicant’s Article 8(1) rights and it should fall to the police to justify the 
dissemination as lawful and necessary. It is submitted that English law’s elevation of 
the reasonable expectation of privacy test could successfully be challenged and it is 
hoped that, if it is, the ECtHR clarifies how domestic courts can consistently assess 
whether a measure is likely to engage Article 8(1).  
 
Laws LJ’s third safeguard against too broad an application of Article 8 is that the 
breadth of Article 8(1) protection may be curtailed by the scope of available 
justifications under Article 8(2). In other words, the final hurdle for a successful 
Article 8 claim to overcome is the threefold test for whether or not an interfering 
measure can be justified by a Contracting State. Attention will now turn to this third 
safeguard and its application to overt photography.  
 
2.2. When is Targeted Photographic Surveillance Justified?  
Once it is established that a measure engages Article 8(1), it falls to the Contracting 
State to justify its use as (i) in accordance with the law; (ii) in pursuit of a legitimate 
aim; and (iii) necessary in a democratic society. This section of the analysis considers 
how each of these requirements is met by the police when justifying the use of overt 
and public photography against those subject to the criminal process in England and 
Wales. 
 
2.2.1. In accordance with the law 
When the Wood case reached the Court of Appeal Laws LJ held that the taking and 
retention of the claimant’s photographs was ‘in accordance with the law‘, whilst Lords 
Collins and Dyson LJ expressed no view on the matter. Laws LJ agreed with 
McCombe J in the court below that implicit common law powers provided sufficient 
legal basis for the ‘relatively modest’ interference with the claimant’s right to respect 
for private life. This conclusion rests on two premises, first, that the intrusion was, as 
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Laws LJ puts it, ‘no more than modest’;764 and second, that the degree of precision, 
clarity, and foreseeability required of the domestic law by the Strasbourg Court 
depends on the nature of the interfering measure, to the effect that more serious 
intrusions require more clarity and precision whereas ‘modest’ interferences demand 
less of the domestic law in this regard. 
 
In support of the second premise, Laws LJ relied on the judgment of Lord Hope in 
Gillan v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, where his Lordship stated:  
As the concluding words of para 67 of the decision in Malone v United Kingdom 
7 EHRR 14 indicate, the sufficiency of these measures must be balanced against 
the nature and degree of the interference with the citizen’s Convention rights 
which is likely to result from the exercise of the power that has been given to 
the public authority.765 
 
In Malone, the ECtHR held that the UK Government’s interception of the applicant’s 
communications was not ‘in accordance with the law’.766 However, the ECtHR did 
acknowledge that, due to the nature of secret surveillance, the requirement of 
foreseeability cannot mean, as it might in other cases, that the applicant should be 
able to foresee when he or she is likely be subject to such measures. This, of course, 
would defy the point of undertaking such measures in the first place.767 
 
According to Laws LJ, the Malone judgment supports the notion that the quality of 
the law in question can vary depending on the particular measure used. Furthermore, 
Laws LJ cited the decision of the ECtHR in Murray v United Kingdom, a case where 
the taking and retention of photographs of the applicant as part of a criminal process 
was held to satisfy the legality requirement on the basis of common law powers 
regulating the interference.768 Regarding the extent to which the common law powers 
met the quality of law requirement in Article 8(2) the Court stated:  
The taking and, by implication, also the retention of a photograph of the first 
applicant without her consent had no statutory basis but, as explained by the 
trial court judge and the Court of Appeal, were lawful under the common law. 
The impugned measures thus had a basis in domestic law. The Court discerns 
																																								 																				
764 n 626 at [54]. 
765 n 642, 352. 
766 Malone v United Kingdom (1985) 7 EHRR 14 at [80]. 
767 ibid at [67]. 
768 Murray v United Kingdom (1995) 19 EHRR 193 at [94]-[95]. 
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no reason, on the material before it, for not concluding that each of the various 
measures was “in accordance with the law”, within the meaning of Article 
8(2).769 
 
 
Cumulatively, for Laws LJ, the following factors indicated that the interference in 
Wood was ‘in accordance with the law’: (i) the modest nature of the interference in 
the immediate case; (ii) the rulings in Malone and other domestic authorities that the 
quality of law requirement varies in terms of its demands depending on the nature of 
the interfering measure; and (iii) the ruling in Murray, which suggests that implicit 
common law powers provide sufficient legal basis for an interfering measure of a 
similar nature to that employed against the claimant in Wood. 
 
Mr Wood argued that, whilst the common law powers might provide an outline of a 
domestic legal basis for the interference, these do not satisfy the requirements of 
certainty and precision set forth in Malone and the case of Silver v United Kingdom. 
He also submitted that, whilst, admittedly, Murray post-dates these authorities, this 
case dealt only with the source of the power to take photographs and not with other 
established requirements that the law be sufficiently precise, certain, and 
accessible.770  
 
Laws LJ’s conclusion relies on his characterisation of the interference as modest. 
Drawing on philosophical principles and ECtHR jurisprudence, the previous section 
attempted to demonstrate that the activities of the police were in fact likely to 
represent quite a serious interference with the claimant’s right to respect for private 
life. If this analysis is correct, then it follows that a more robust legal basis for the 
interference would be needed to satisfy the legality requirement. However, even if 
the above analysis is rejected, Laws LJ’s conclusions still warrant further 
investigation. Laws LJ plausibly highlighted how the ECtHR’s judgment in Murray 
poses problems for the notion that the actions of the police in Wood were not ‘in 
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accordance with the law’. As Laws LJ observed, in this case the ECtHR not only ruled 
that common law powers provided an adequate legal basis for the taking and 
retention of photographs of an individual subject to the criminal process, but also 
upheld Malone, and expressly distinguished the circumstances differentiating the two 
cases.771 
 
The ECtHR’s judgment in Murray seems out of step with more recent ECtHR 
jurisprudence. In Rice v Connolly it was held that there is no exhaustive definition of 
the powers of the police at common law, but that it is part of their obligations to take 
all steps necessary for keeping the peace, for preventing crime or property from 
criminal injury, and to detect crime and bring offenders to justice.772 However, in S 
and Marper v United Kingdom, the Strasbourg Court viewed the similarly worded 
conditions attached to the storing and use of fingerprint data – which notably contain 
less identifiable data than photographic images – as insufficiently precise.773 
Moreover, in MM v United Kingdom, the ECtHR criticised the ‘generous approach’ of 
domestic courts to the exercise of police powers to retain personal information.774 In 
MM the court set out these principles for the retention of such information:  
The Court considers it essential, in the context of the recording and 
communication of criminal record data as in telephone tapping, secret 
surveillance and covert intelligence-gathering, to have clear, detailed rules 
governing the scope and application of measures; as well as minimum 
safeguards concerning, inter alia, duration, storage, usage, access of third 
parties, procedures for preserving the integrity and confidentiality of data and 
procedures for their destruction, thus providing sufficient guarantees against 
the risk of abuse and arbitrariness.775 
 
Whilst the ECtHR did not expressly mention the collection and storage of 
photographic images in the passage above, it is difficult to see how, given the nature 
of the identifiable information that would inevitably be contained within such images, 
different rules would apply to the storage of this information. As Lord Sumption 
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observed in Catt, ‘[t]here is no longer any doubt about the application of Article 8 to 
the systematic retention of processable personal data, and the test of justification 
has become more exacting since the decision of the Strasbourg court in S [and 
Marper] v United Kingdom 48 EHRR 1169.’776 
 
These considerations do not necessarily mean that the interference was not ‘in 
accordance with the law’. Concluding that the interference was in accordance with 
the law on the basis of the common law power, Laws LJ viewed it as unnecessary to 
enter into a debate as to whether or not the legality requirement might be met by 
the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998.777 However, these provisions might 
provide the precision and certainty that the common law power seems to lack. 
 
In assessing whether or not the collection and retention of photographs of an 
individual subject to a criminal process is in accordance with the law, Lord 
Sumption’s approach in Catt is preferable. Whilst this case concerned the collection 
and retention of electronic data about the respondents in general (not limited to 
photographic information), Lord Sumption paid close attention to how the activities of 
the police accorded with the Data Protection Act 1998, and how these provisions met 
the demands of Article 8 more generally. Lord Sumption noted the following elements 
of the domestic legal framework: (i) common law powers granted to the police to 
obtain and store information for policing purposes; and (ii) statutory and 
administrative regulations including the Data Protection Act 1998, a Code of Practice, 
and other guidance documents on the management of police information.778 He 
succinctly summarised the substance of these elements as follows:  
So far as they are relevant to the present appeals, the data protection 
principles are as follows:  
Principle 1 is that personal data may not be “processed” at all unless it is 
necessary for a relevant purpose. In the case of the police, the relevant 
purposes are the administration of justice and the exercise of any other 
function of a public nature exercised in the public interest.  
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Principle 2 is that personal data may be obtained only for lawful purposes and 
may not be further “processed” in a manner incompatible with those purposes. 
Principle 3 is that the data must be “adequate, relevant and not excessive” for 
the relevant purpose. 
Principle 5 is that the data must not be kept for longer than is necessary for 
those purposes.  
Principle 7 is that proper and proportionate measures must be taken against 
the unauthorised or unlawful “processing” of the data.779 
 
 
In concluding that English law’s combination of these elements met the legality test 
under Article 8, Lord Sumption stated:  
The Data Protection Principles themselves constitute a comprehensive code 
corresponding to the requirements of the EU Directive and the Convention. The 
effect of the first principle, read in conjunction with the requirements of 
Schedule 2, is that data cannot be obtained, recorded, held, or used by the 
police unless it is necessary for them to do so for the purpose of the 
administration of justice or the performance of their other functions. The fifth 
principle prevents the retention of data for any longer than is necessary for this 
purpose. These principles are supplemented by a statutory Code of Conduct and 
administrative Guidance compliance with which is mandatory. The relevant 
functions of the police are limited to policing functions which are clearly and 
narrowly defined in para 2.2 of the statutory Code of Practice.780 
 
Without delving into an exhaustive analysis of this particular legislative framework, it 
is plain that the relevant data protection principles cited above are formulated with 
sufficient precision and certainty and are publicly accessible to the extent necessary 
to satisfy the legality requirement under Article 8(2). These principles set forth that 
the police may collect or retain personally identifiable information only when it is 
strictly necessary to do so for a specified policing purpose. Whether or not in a 
particular case the activities of the police, in exercising the discretion conferred upon 
them by this statutory legal framework, are in fact necessary for this legitimate 
policing purpose falls to a consideration of the remaining two criteria in Article 8(2).  
 
2.2.2. In pursuit of a legitimate aim 
The legitimate aim requirement stipulates that an interfering measure may only be 
applied if it is done so in the pursuit of a particular prescribed purpose listed in Article 
8(2). As far as the focus of this chapter is concerned, the legitimate aim requirement 
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is not controversial. It is difficult to foresee any circumstance where the police 
lawfully collect and retain photographic images of an individual from public space 
where this is not also done in pursuit of a legitimate purpose. Usually, the purpose in 
question will be the prevention of disorder or crime, or otherwise in the interests of 
public safety.  
 
2.2.3. Necessary in a democratic society 
For the interference to meet the final requirement in Article 8(2), it must respond to 
a ‘pressing social need’ and be ‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’.781 The 
former component requires that the reasons advanced in justification are ‘relevant 
and sufficient’.782 The latter requires a fair balance between the competing interests 
at stake, taking into consideration whether the measure is minimally intrusive.783 In 
England and Wales, a four-part proportionality test has been developed which 
broadly covers the same sequence of tests that is applied by the ECtHR. The 
domestic test, outlined in the cases of Huang v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, R (Aguilar Quila) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and 
Bank Mellat v HM Treasury,784 comprises the following four questions: (i) is the 
legislative objective sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right?; (ii) 
are the measures which have been designed to meet the objective rationally 
connected to doing so?; (iii) are the measures no more than is necessary to 
accomplish the objective?; and (iv) do they strike a fair balance between the rights of 
the individual and the interests of the community?785 This test is in accordance with 
the four-step structure of rights analyses adopted in numerous other jurisdictions.786 
 
																																								 																				
781 Olsson v Sweden (1989) 11 EHRR 259 at [67]. 
782 See Ploski v Poland, App no 26761/95 (ECtHR, 12 November 2002); Stoll v Switzerland (2007) 44 
EHRR 53 at [101]; jointly dissenting opinion of Judges Sajó, Keller, and Lemmens in Hämäläinen v Finland, 
App no 37359/09 (ECtHR, 16 July 2014) at [12]. 
783 See Z v Finland (1998) 25 EHRR 371 at [96]. 
784 Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] 2 AC 167, 187; R (Aguilar Quila) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] 1 AC 621; Bank Mellat v HM Treasury [2014] AC 700. 
785 Bank Mellat, ibid, 790. 
786 M. Klatt and M. Meister, The Constitutional Structure of Proportionality (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012) 8-10; J. Rivers, ‘Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review’ (2006) 65 Cambridge Law 
Journal 174-207. 
205	
	
Although the proportionality assessments in the domestic cases detailed above do 
intermittently allude to aspects of this four-part proportionality analysis in parts, with 
the exception of Lord Kerr’s dissent in In re JR38, none follows it in a systematic 
fashion. This section will identify some of the failings of the proportionality 
assessment undertaken in Wood, before drawing on the four-part proportionality test 
to indicate how such an analysis should be undertaken in cases where the police 
overtly take and subsequently retain photographs of individuals in publicly accessible 
spaces as part of a criminal process.  
 
In Wood, McCombe J’s proportionality analysis was brief: 
  
It seems quite clear to me that, if there was an interference with the claimant’s 
rights under Art.8, it was entirely proportionate. The police have common law 
powers and duties to prevent and to investigate crime. Here was a meeting at 
which genuine fears had arisen as to potential criminal activity. Two of those 
attending the meeting had been ejected; the precise circumstances were not 
known. The claimant was seen associating with one of those who had been 
removed from the meeting. There were also fears of criminal disruption at the 
DSEi in September 2005. To my mind, it was entirely reasonable and 
proportionate for the police to photograph persons who, as it might turn out, 
had been engaged or might be likely to engage in criminal disorder.787 
 
From this we can discern that, according to McCombe J, as the circumstances of the 
case indicated that the claimant might have been engaged in criminal disorder, the 
supposed interference was plainly proportionate. McCombe J does not, in his 
articulated reasoning, show that he has undertaken any detailed consideration of the 
four prongs of the proportionality assessment adopted by the ECtHR. This is 
unsurprising given that earlier in the same judgment McCombe J had ruled that the 
activities of the police in photographing and retaining photographs of the claimant did 
not interfere with his Article 8 rights. Commenting on this case, Andrew Roberts 
questioned the point of this hypothetical and perfunctory analysis:  
[t]here is little value in proceeding on the rather vague notion that there might 
have been “a modest interference” with an applicant’s privacy, without having 
considered the nature of any such interference. A clearly defined public interest 
consideration will always prevail in these circumstances.788 
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A fuller analysis was undertaken by the Court of Appeal. Laws LJ held that the 
interference was proportionate. Whilst acknowledging several factors militating in 
favour of finding a violation, Laws LJ noted that the claimant’s photograph was taken 
in the course of a ‘properly controlled operation for perfectly good policing reasons’ 
and was retained for a legitimate reason. Accordingly, the collection and retention 
must fall within the operational discretion that the police properly possess.789 Whilst 
Laws LJ did acknowledge the interference and give weight to factors favouring the 
applicant’s complaint, he did not explore in much detail how the competing interests 
interacted with one another, and did not explain how the interfering measures were 
rationally connected to the legitimate aim pursued by the police. The assessment 
from Laws LJ set out the interests on either side, as he saw them, and then 
amounted to what seemed like a peremptory statement of preference rather than an 
exercise in constitutional rights balancing.  
 
In a more detailed balancing exercise, Dyson LJ began by describing the interference 
as one that was not of ‘the utmost gravity’; but, nonetheless, one that could not be 
dismissed as inconsequential.790 Dyson LJ then commented on the extent to which 
the measures were rationally connected to the legislative objective:  
Within a few days of the annual general meeting the retention of the 
photographs could not rationally be justified as furthering the aim of detecting 
the perpetrators of any crime that may have been committed during the 
meeting. There was no realistic possibility that evidence that a crime had been 
committed at the meeting would only be obtained weeks or months after the 
event. The meeting was well attended. There were Reed officers and private 
security officials present who were on the lookout for troublemakers and who 
did indeed eject two of them (although there is no evidence that even they 
committed any offence).791 
 
Thus, Dyson LJ concluded that any retention beyond a few days could not be 
rationally connected to the objective of detecting and prosecuting crimes committed 
at the AGM. Moreover, Dyson LJ reasoned that the retention after this time was not 
rationally connected to the objective of preventing or detecting future crime at 
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subsequent similar meetings, noting that the claimant’s behaviour at the AGM had 
been beyond reproach, notwithstanding the ‘intimidating experience he experienced 
at the hands of the police.’792 This analysis, which Lord Collins agreed with, is sound. 
Dyson LJ considered both the nature of the interference and the importance of the 
legitimate aim pursued. Without explicitly referring to the four-part analysis, he 
focused on how there was nothing on the facts of the immediate case to suggest that 
the claimant was any more likely to commit an offence than any other citizen of good 
character who happened to attend the AGM. Thus, the measures were not rationally 
connected (i.e. there was no evidence base in the circumstances) to the objective of 
preventing disorder or crime.  
 
Let us now apply the elements of the four-part proportionality test adopted by the 
ECtHR to cases where the police overtly photograph individuals as part of a criminal 
process as they occupy public space.  
 
2.2.3.a. The objective of the interference 
In answering this question much turns on the particular objective pursued through 
the use of the interfering measure. As has been discussed, ordinarily, the police will 
employ overt photography in public spaces in the pursuit of the ‘prevention of 
disorder or crime’ or ‘in the interests of public safety’. However, due to the vast 
range of circumstances in which the police might resort to such a measure, and the 
myraid ends which the police might hope to advance, the question of whether, 
generally speaking, the police use of overt photography in public pursues a 
sufficiently important objective to justify an interference with Article 8 is 
imponderable. One can only assess the importance of the objective pursued on a 
case-by-case basis.  
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It might seem that this figurative box will be ticked wherever a measure can be said 
to pursue a stated legitimate aim. However, the domestic courts may, and in all but 
the most clear-cut cases, should further consider at this stage whether or not the 
specific objective pursued (rather than the broadly stated legitimate aim) is of 
sufficient importance to the realisation of the stated legitimate aim to warrant the 
use of the measure. In Gaughran,793 where the Supreme Court ruled that the 
indefinite retention of the applicant’s biometric data following conviction for drink 
driving offences was not in violation of Article 8, Lord Kerr elucidates this distinction 
in his dissenting opinion:  
It is, I believe, necessary to recognise the distinction between the legislative 
provisions which authorise the retention of samples etc and the policy of using 
those provisions to retain them indefinitely. The justification of, on the one 
hand, the enactment of statutory provisions which permit retention and, on the 
other, the use of those provisions to devise a policy to retain without limit must 
be considered separately.794 
 
Applied to overt photography, whilst common law powers coupled with the Data 
Protection Act 1998 might provide a general framework for the police to take and 
retain photographs in pursuit of a legitimate aim, assessment of whether specific 
uses of a measure are ‘sufficiently important’ in a particular case is considered as 
part of the ‘necessary in a democratic society’ analysis.  
 
This is perhaps the easiest limb of the proportionality requirement for the state to 
satisfy in justifying its use of an interfering measure. In each of the domestic cases 
reviewed in this chapter the police taking and retention of photographs has pursued a 
legitimate aim and was undertaken for a proper policing purpose. In Wood and Catt, 
for example, the two appellants were neither convicted nor formally suspected of any 
involvement in crime or disorder and the measures pursued by the police had little 
hope of fulfilling the legitimate aim and objective pursued. Yet this detracts nothing 
from the fact that the objective of preventing crime and disorder at public 
demonstrations is an important function of the police; a function that is, by any 
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plausible account, sufficiently important to provide a basis for interfering with a 
Convention right. However, this is merely the starting point for the proportionality 
analysis. Next, the domestic court must consider whether or not there exists a 
rational connection between the objective pursued by the police and the measures 
used to achieve this objective. 
 
2.2.3.b. A rational connection between the measure and the objective 
As part of its inquiry into the proportionality of the measures, the relevant court 
should consider whether or not the interfering measure is capable of achieving its 
objective.795 With respect to those subject to police photography in publicly 
accessible space as part of a criminal process the question becomes: is the collection 
and retention of photographs in a particular case capable of preventing disorder or 
crime, or realising another legitimate aim? This test puts a burden on the police to 
positively establish that the interfering measure is rationally connected to the 
objective. But what is a rational connection? In Bank Mellat v HM Treasury,796 Lord 
Reed JSC quoted the Canadian Supreme Court case of Lavigne v Ontario Public 
Service Employees Union,797 where it was stipulated that the ‘inquiry into “rational 
connection” between objectives and means to attain them requires nothing more 
than showing that the legitimate and important goals of the legislature are logically 
furthered by the means government has chosen to adopt.’798 Lord Reed JSC 
editorialised:  
The words “furthered by” point towards a causal test: a measure is rationally 
connected to its objective if its implementation can reasonably be expected to 
contribute towards the achievement of that objective. The manner in which the 
courts should determine whether that test is satisfied requires careful 
consideration.799 
 
The ‘reasonable’ standard seems to connote that the courts should assess the extent 
to which there is an objective basis for suggesting that the measures will further the 
aims pursued by the police in using them. Lord Kerr’s opinion in Gaughran supports 
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this interpretation, and considers how this test might have been applied 
unsatisfactorily in cases pre-dating S and Marper v United Kingdom:  
A connection between the aim of a measure and its terms, in order to qualify as 
rational, must be evidence-based… Mere assertion that there is such a 
connection will not suffice, much less will speculation or conjecture that the 
connection exists. The fact that the interference can be characterised as 
“relatively slight” … does not diminish the need for the justification to be 
established positively.800  
 
Recalling Laws LJ’s judgment in Wood, in concluding that the taking and retention of 
photographs were proportionate, Laws LJ stated that this had been done ‘for 
perfectly good policing reasons’ and in pursuit of a legitimate aim, but advanced no 
basis for suggesting that the taking and retention of photographs of the claimant (a 
non-convicted person, of good character, who was not suspected of any wrongdoing 
at the AGM) was rationally connected to the aim of preventing disorder or crime. This 
cannot be enough to satisfy the rational connection test. Whilst not necessarily 
requiring the police to demonstrate how the claimant’s particular details will assist in 
preventing or detecting future crime, ‘rational connection’ does require the police to 
demonstrate at a minimum that the power to collect and retain such photographs in 
this and other circumstances can reasonably be expected to further those ends in a 
significant way.  
 
The facts of Wood indicate that there was little to suggest that there existed a 
rational connection between the interfering measures and the objectives pursued by 
the police. It can be positively established, on the basis of the claimant’s attendance 
at the AGM combined with his known association with the Campaign Against the 
Arms Trade, that there was a reasonable likelihood that he was attending the AGM to 
protest against this group, or at least gather information about the organisation on 
behalf of the Campaign Against the Arms Trade. He also had a brief conversation 
with an individual who had been ejected from the event and had been known to 
create disorder at similar events. However, this information alone does not suggest 
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that the claimant (as an individual of good character with no criminal convictions) 
was reasonably expected to participate in any kind of criminal activity or disorder 
which could have been detected or prevented by the measures taken by the police. 
None of the judges in either the High Court or the Court of Appeal gave reasons to 
suggest that there was such a likelihood. Without some objective evidence base to 
support the proposition that the interfering measures were reasonably likely to 
positively assist the police in preventing disorder or crime, singling out the claimant 
and the use of interfering measures were not justified. That is not to say that there 
could be no rational connection between the collection and retention of the claimant’s 
photographic information and the legitimate objectives pursued by the police; it is to 
say that it falls to the state authority in question to show that such a connection 
exists.  
 
In Catt, the police did provide a detailed explanation of the nature of the rational 
connection between the retention of the personal information of the respondent (a 
90-year-old man with no convictions for violence or disorder) and the need to 
prevent or detect crime. DCS Tudway of the Metropolitan Police set out the reasons 
as follows:  
(1) [The personal information] is retained in order to enable the police to make 
a more informed assessment of the risks and threats to public order 
associated with demonstrations forming part of an identifiable campaign, 
and the scale and nature of the police response which may be necessary in 
future. 
(2) It is retained in order to investigate criminal offences where there have 
been any, and to identify potential witnesses and victims. 
(3) It is retained in order to study the leadership, organisation, tactics and 
methods of protest groups which have been persistently associated with 
violence, and other protest groups associated with them. Links between 
protest groups are potentially important. There is a significant correlation 
between participation in a group such as Smash EDO and other extremist 
groups such as animal rights activists. The evidence is that out of 242 
smash EDO activists recorded in the database at the time when these 
proceedings were begun, 42 also had links with animal rights protest 
groups. There is considerable cross-fertilisation of ideas between different 
extremist causes on tactics and methods.801  
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Lord Sumption highlighted that these were all proper policing functions, and that the 
evidence that retention of information of the kind involved in the immediate case 
would help fulfil these functions was, at the least, credible.802 Lord Sumption went on 
to set out how the nature of intelligence-led policing is such that it is difficult to 
ascertain the value of one ‘piece’ (namely, Mr Catt’s personal information) of the 
‘jigsaw’ of police intelligence at any particular time. Thus, the fact that some of the 
information recorded in the database relates to people like Mr Catt, who has not 
committed and is not likely to commit offences, does not make it irrelevant in 
ascertaining the composition, organisation, and leadership of protest groups who are 
persistently associated with crime and disorder at public protests – a legitimate aim 
and sufficiently serious objective to warrant interfering with an individual’s Article 8 
rights.803 
 
Lord Sumption’s judgment and the evidence provided by the police taken together, 
offer a basis for asserting that the interference in this case is rationally connected to 
the legitimate aims of the police in preventing and detecting crime. It is difficult to 
dispute the notion that, in attempting to manage and effectively police public 
protests undertaken by groups that are known to engage in criminal and disorderly 
activities at such protests, it might be useful for the police to obtain information not 
only of those attendees known to participate in such violence, but also of known 
associates and other attendees. Such intelligence gathering assists the police in 
understanding the way such groups operate in terms of their patterns and strategies, 
and to investigate any crimes committed. Essentially, what Lord Sumption describes 
is the ‘intelligence-led’ strategy of policing, which has become increasingly popular 
worldwide as police forces seek to move beyond reacting to incidents without an 
overarching strategy towards a more systematic and pro-active style of crime 
investigation and prevention. As Ratcliffe observes:  
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[i]ntelligence-led policing emphasises analysis and intelligence as pivotal to an 
objective, decision-making framework that prioritises crime hot spots, repeat 
victims, prolific offenders and criminal groups. It facilitates crime and harm 
reduction, disruption, and prevention through strategic and tactical 
management, deployment and enforcement. This definition … recognises the 
evolution from whack-a-mole policing that arrests offenders with no 
overarching strategy, to one that places significant emphasis on data and 
intelligence analysis as a central component of police strategic thinking.804  
 
Button et al outline the important role such policing strategies can have at public 
protests: 
The gathering of accurate intelligence has been one of the most important 
strategies of the police. Without this police managers do not know if there are 
going to be a dozen or several hundred protesters turning up to a protest site, 
or indeed the exact location of it. This clearly has important implications for the 
accurate and effective deployment of police resources. As a result the police 
have actively pursued ‘intelligence led’ policing strategies in dealing with 
environmental protests, in the first instance to address tactical issues.805  
 
It might therefore be concluded that it is rational for the police to collect and retain 
photographs of individuals in publicly accessible places in a wide range of 
circumstances, even if such individuals are not involved in, or even suspected of 
being involved in, offending behaviour. In assessing the extent of a rational 
connection, much turns on the facts of the particular case considered, and it is for 
the police to justify any claim or assertion to a rational connection with a reasonable 
objective evidence base. However, to justify such an interference as ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’ all things considered, the police must clear the third and fourth 
hurdles of the proportionality analysis. 
 
2.2.3.c. Minimally intrusive measures 
The third stage of the proportionality assessment requires the court to consider 
whether or not the interference is to the minimum degree necessary to achieve the 
legitimate objectives pursued, and no more. In Bank Mellat v HM Treasury, Lord Reed 
JSC described the ‘no more than necessary’ stage as requiring a test of ‘whether a 
less intrusive measure could have been used without unacceptably compromising the 
																																								 																				
804 J.H. Ratcliffe, Intelligence-Led Policing (2nd edn. Oxford: Routledge, 2016) 5. 
805 M. Button, T. John, and N. Brearley, ‘New Challenges in Public Order Policing: The Professionalization of 
Environmental Protest and the Emergence of the Militant Environmental Activist’ (2002) 30 International 
Journal of the Sociology of Law 17-32 at 29. 
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achievement of the objective’.806 Furthermore, his Lordship stipulated that this test 
demands that the interfering measure must be one that ‘it was reasonable for the 
legislature to impose’, and that courts should not ‘substitute judicial opinions for 
legislative ones’ as to where the precise line of necessity should be drawn.807 This 
parallels the margin of appreciation that is afforded to allow state authorities 
appropriate discretion in determining to what extent a measure is minimally intrusive 
having regard to practicalities and costs at the local level.808 A degree of such 
discretion is necessary to prevent the courts from replacing the well-reasoned view of 
the legislator or state authority with their own. However, the third limb cannot be 
satisfied where it is apparent that a less intrusive method of achieving the objective 
is available to the public authority.   
 
In In re JR38, Lord Kerr explained how the actions of the police met the ‘no more 
than necessary test’. The police had explored a number of less intrusive options for 
identifying the appellant before publishing his images via local media outlets:  
The painstaking approach taken by the police service to the objective of 
identifying young offenders such as the appellant has been explained by Chief 
Inspector Yates and Superintendent Robinson. Internal police inquiries were 
made; community leaders and social services were asked whether they could 
identify those involved; and it is ironical that the appellant and his father were 
shown the photograph that was later published. Had they identified the 
appellant, no publication would have occurred.809 
 
The police demonstrated that dissemination of the appellant’s photographs occurred 
after a range of other less intrusive steps had been taken. Moreover, it is noteworthy 
that the images of the appellant were disseminated to local media outlets. Whilst this 
may have serious repercussions for the appellant and his reputation in the local 
community, the interference would be more serious and, arguably, more than is 
necessary, if the images were disseminated to national media, which could publish 
the appellant’s image to a much larger portion of the public. 
 
																																								 																				
806 Bank Mellat, n 784 at [74]. 
807 ibid at [75]. 
808 ibid. 
809 n 658 at [77]. 
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In Catt, Lord Sumption and Lord Toulson disagreed on the question of whether the 
retention of photographs and other personal information about the claimant 
constituted the least onerous means to achieving the objective. Lord Sumption noted 
the following facts: (i) the material was not usable or disclosable for any purpose 
other than policing; (ii) the retained material was periodically reviewed for retention 
or deletion according to rational and proportionate criteria based on an assessment of 
danger to the public and value for policing purposes; and (iii) the labour involved in 
sifting the claimant’s information from all of the nominal records in which he was 
included would be excessively burdensome for the police.810 Lord Toulson saw 
matters differently, in concluding that the measures had violated the claimant’s 
Article 8 rights:  
 
It was suggested that it would place too great a burden on the police to have to 
review constantly the information retained on individuals whose names appear 
in their database to see whether there was sufficient cause to keep the 
information. As the Court of Appeal observed, there was no evidence from the 
police that this would be over-burdensome. On the contrary, the thrust of the 
evidence was that they do carry out regular reviews. As I have said, a review 
was carried out a few months before these proceedings were begun. The police 
obviously had to review their information about Mr Catt in deciding whether to 
retain his photograph. We know what view they formed. There is no evidence 
from the police to suggest, and I see no basis to conclude, that there would 
have been any real burden in deleting their historic records of his attendances 
at protest events.  
 
Lord Toulson suggests that the retention period went beyond the minimum time that 
would be necessary for the police to fulfil their objectives. Whilst the interference 
might be rationally connected to legitimate objectives, Lord Toulson suggests that 
the period of continued retention of the claimant’s personal information went beyond 
what was necessary for the police to fulfil these objectives. This conclusion is based 
on the ECtHR decision in MM v United Kingdom that, as the information recedes into 
the past, its operational relevance diminishes. Moreover, Lord Toulson rejected the 
administrative burden argument. Indeed, this argument seems unsubstantiated.  
Reviews are part and parcel of the process of managing police information, and 
without presentation of compelling evidence from the police to the contrary, it is 
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unclear why it would be justifiable for the police to prolong an interference with the 
claimant’s Article 8 rights beyond the minimum time necessary to fulfil legitimate 
policing functions. 
 
2.2.3.d. A fair balance? 
At the final stage of the proportionality analysis, the courts are required to consider 
the extent to which the measures strike a fair balance. This involves the following 
three dimensions: (i) clear and full recognition of the rights of the individual; (ii) the 
importance of pursuing the objective must be established; and (iii) an assessment 
must be made as to whether pursuit of the objective strikes a fair balance with 
respect for the individual’s rights.811 An illuminating way of determining the weight of 
the interference and of the objective pursued is through the use of Alexy’s triadic 
scale, which was discussed in Chapter 2.812 
 
Viewed in the abstract, the right to respect for private life and the prevention and 
detection of crime are of fundamental constitutional importance. There is as little to 
be gained from living in a society where wanton disorder and criminality are the 
prevalent norm, as there is from living in a dystopian surveillance society, where the 
autonomy and dignity of the individual can be compromised at will by state 
authorities. Thus, the two considerations must compete on equal terms.813 In 
assessing the seriousness of an interference, it is necessary to consider the facts of 
the particular case. However, some general principles have emerged from the 
analysis so far. As a threshold matter, whenever the police take photographs of an 
individual and this results in the generation of a processable image, this will be 
sufficient to engage Article 8(1). Though not to be mistaken for a trivial matter, let 
us call this a ‘light’ interference with Article 8(1). As has been discussed, this 
interference occurs notwithstanding the fact that the image has been taken from 
																																								 																				
811 Klatt and Meister, n 786, 157.  
812 The triadic scale consists of the following three stages: light, moderate, and serious. See Chapter 2, 
Part 3.  
813 In this respect see Campbell, n 663 at [113]. 
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publicly accessible space, and notwithstanding any ‘reasonable expectations of 
privacy’ the individual may or may not hold. Other circumstantial factors may 
increase the seriousness of the interference. If the measures used are secret, or if 
the measures are overt but invasive of the personal space of the individual, this will 
increase the seriousness of the interference. Furthermore, increases in the retention, 
processing and dissemination of any collected information will increase the 
seriousness of the interference in turn. Thus, whenever the police collect from 
publicly accessible space photographic images of the individual and then generate a 
permanent record of such images this will, with certainty, constitute anything from 
light to serious interference with the individual’s Article 8 rights.  
 
The second stage of the exercise requires the relevant court to determine the weight 
of the objective pursued through the use of the interfering measure. Any measure 
which pursues one of the legitimate aims stated in Article 8(2) is at least meritorious 
enough to compete with the weight of an interference in the metaphorical balancing 
exercise. However, in ascertaining the weight that should properly be attached to a 
particular objective pursued through the interference, much turns on the facts of a 
particular case. As with assessments of the weight attached to an interference, two 
broad factors must be considered: (i) the salience of the objective to achieving the 
aim; and (ii) the certainty with which the objective will be realised through the use of 
the measure.  
 
From here, the weight of the interference and the weight of the objective must be 
balanced. If the interference with the Article 8 right outweighs the need to realise the 
legislative objective, then the applicant’s rights have been violated, and if the 
importance of achieving the objective outweighs the interference with the individual’s 
rights then the use of the measure is justified. In the event of a tie (for example, 
where the pursuit of the objective would certainly impose a moderate interference 
with the individual’s right to respect for private life, and the failure to pursue the 
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objective would certainly cause a moderate set back to the police’s aim to prevent 
disorder or crime), the judiciary has the discretion to determine whether or not the 
use of the measure strikes a fair balance.814 
 
Extending this framework to Wood we can establish the following: (i) the interference 
with Wood’s right to respect for private life was, at least, slight. He was 
photographed in public space by the police, the photographs were systematically 
recorded and retained by the police, and he was followed by police officers as they 
tried to ascertain his identity. The objective pursued through the interfering 
measures was ‘to gather intelligence, primarily by taking photographs and making 
notes which may be of subsequent evidential value should offences be committed or 
disorder break out.’815 Whilst this is undoubtedly an important objective, and the 
threat of crime and disorder could also be characterised as moderately serious (a 
protest breaking out inside the AGM would at least disrupt a lawfully organised 
meeting, and at worst may foreseeably result in violence or disorder breaking out at 
the meeting), the targeted measures used against the claimant do not seem to strike 
a fair balance. His limited association with the protest group and his purchasing of a 
single share in a company in this context do not seem to provide an adequate basis 
for suggesting that he, as a man with no previous arrests or convictions, posed 
anything other than a very slight risk of being involved in disorder or crime at the 
event. Thus, it is only with a very low level of probability that the police can suggest 
that the pursuit of the slightly serious interfering measures would in fact help them 
realise the objective pursued. Thus, the balance must tilt in favour of the Article 8 
rights of the claimant. To justify a measure which would, in every foreseeable 
instance, occasion a slight to moderate interference with the right to respect for 
private life, the police must show, at the least, that there is a strong possibility that 
the use of the measure would be of at least slight assistance in preventing or 
																																								 																				
814 Klatt and Meister, n 786, 13. 
815 n 626 at [93]. 
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detecting crimes which would have a slight to moderate protective dividend on the 
rights of those at risk of falling victim.  
 
In Catt, the broad operational benefits in preventing and detecting crime at public 
protests were justified as a basis for the ‘relatively slight’ interference with the 
respondent’s Article 8 rights. Furthermore, the interference with the respondent’s 
Article 8 rights was seen as striking a fair balance as it would help to ‘enable the 
great majority of public demonstrations which are peaceful and lawful to take place 
without incident and without an overbearing police presence.’816 Although not 
explicated by the court, the balancing exercise of the majority seemed to consist of 
the following stages: (i) categorising the interfering measure as slight; (ii) 
establishing that the collection and retention of the respondent’s information served 
‘important’ policing functions in the service of preventing disorder and crime; and (iii) 
finding that the use of the measure for the specified period struck a fair balance 
between the rights of the respondent and the police need to prevent and detect 
crime. 
 
If these premises were accurate (despite conclusions to the contrary in the preceding 
analysis) this is an appropriate approach to the balancing exercise. The slight 
interference to the individual’s Article 8 rights is ‘outweighed’ by the serious, or to 
use the court’s language, ‘important’ policing functions served through the use of the 
measure. The fundamental problem in Catt is the accuracy of the premises 
themselves. The retention of photographic information for such an extended period of 
time should be considered no less than a moderately serious interference with an 
individual’s right to respect for private life. Furthermore, the police did not put a 
strong evidence base forward for suggesting that the broad policing objectives were 
in fact served by the retention of images of non-convicted, peaceful protesters such 
as the respondent. Moreover, the suggestion that the retention of the respondent’s 
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data would facilitate peaceful protests by limiting the need for an overbearing police 
presence is unsupported by the facts of the case. As has been discussed above, 
surveillance measures such as those employed against the respondent can have a 
chilling effect on legitimate dissent and protest. One need look no further than the 
facts of the Wood case to substantiate this fear. This consequence surely negates any 
of the benefits such data collection and retention from innocent citizens would have 
on their participation in a public demonstration.  
 
Conclusions 
English law regulating the collection and retention of overtly taken photographs of 
those subject to the criminal process is increasingly recognising and affording 
protection to individual privacy interests. Domestic courts are persuaded that overt 
police photography of individuals occupying public space is sufficiently serious an 
intrusion into the private sphere of that individual to warrant the protection of Article 
8. However, progress in this area does seem to have been hampered by English 
judges’ interpretation of the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ standard, which is 
sometimes indexed in the ECtHR jurisprudence pertaining to Article 8 cases. The 
elevation of this standard to a ‘touchstone’ test of Article 8 has produced an undue 
narrowing of the scope of Article 8 protection for those subject to the criminal 
process, particularly as they occupy publicly accessible spaces. The potential 
consequences of this interpretation of Article 8 are exemplified in the majority 
judgments in In re JR38, where the tunnelled focus on the appellant’s reasonable 
expectations blocked off consideration of whether or not the dissemination by the 
police of images of a child engaged in criminal activities was lawful and 
proportionate. This misguided domestic interpretation of the scope of Article 8 - 
which might have been avoided if pertinent ECtHR jurisprudence was less confusing – 
unduly narrows the privacy protection available to those subject to the criminal 
process.  
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The principles contained within the Data Protection Act 1998 offer the outline of a 
legal framework which meets the requirements in Article 8(2) pertaining to the clarity 
and precision of the law. Whilst common law powers also regulate the taking and 
retention of photographs of those subject to the criminal process, these do not 
provide sufficient detail as to the scope of the discretion that is conferred upon the 
police to determine when such photographic images can be produced or for how long 
they can be retained. In Wood, Laws LJ viewed implicit common law powers as 
providing a sufficient legal basis for the interfering measures used against the 
claimant. This conclusion cannot be accepted. Any measure that sets back privacy 
interests to such a degree that Article 8 is engaged is sufficiently serious that the 
legal basis regulating the police use of the measure must set out, with clarity and 
precision, the scope of the discretion conferred upon the police to use the measure.  
 
Finally, this chapter has drawn attention to various inconsistencies in the domestic 
application of the proportionality assessment in the cases considered. The domestic 
courts do seem to have moved away from the perfunctory exercise of characterising 
an interference as ‘minor’ and then concluding that the public interest pursued clearly 
overrides the individual’s rights, without any detailed consideration of how these 
countervailing interests interact. However, there is no systematic approach to the 
proportionality analysis. Whilst each of the four prongs of the proportionality 
assessment are referred to at various points in the case-law, there are notable 
inconsistencies in the way this assessment is applied. This chapter has drawn 
attention to some of these inconsistencies and has sought to demonstrate how they 
might be redressed through a systematic application of the four-pronged 
proportionality test. The next chapter switches attention to the retention and 
processing of personal information taken from those subject to the criminal justice 
process. In particular, issues surrounding the retention of DNA and fingerprint data 
taken from non-convicted persons will be considered. 
 
222	
	
5 Retaining and Processing Fingerprint 
and DNA Data 
Over the last quarter of a century, the growing technological and legal capacity of 
authorities to retain and analyse DNA and fingerprint samples has increased the 
assistance such materials can offer in the identification, prosecution, and elimination 
from inquiries of suspected offenders as part of a criminal investigation. However, 
the retention of such information as part of a criminal process raises principled 
concerns regarding individual privacy interests. Chapter 5 summarises the 
development of the legal framework regulating these measures, paying attention to 
the broader policy context. Questions are then posed and explored regarding the 
extent to which the current legal framework adequately protects the privacy interests 
of those subject to the criminal process.  
 
The chapter has two parts. Part 1 presents a brief history of the development of 
English law’s framework for the retention of fingerprint and DNA data taken from 
those arrested as part of a criminal process. Against this backdrop, in the second 
part, the disparity between the decisions of domestic judges and the decision of the 
ECtHR in S and Marper817 will be explored. From here, the domestic legal framework 
as it has developed in response to the S and Marper judgment will be evaluated 
drawing on the jurisprudential analysis of previous chapters. Finally, conclusions will 
be drawn regarding the extent to which the current legal framework is ECHR-
compatible and normatively cogent in terms of the privacy protection it affords to 
those subject to the criminal process.  
 
1. The Development of the Legal Framework 
As originally enacted, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE 1984) 
distinguished between different types of samples that may be taken from those in 
police custody in the following way:  
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• Fingerprints – these are prints taken from fingers and palms. 818  
• Non-intimate samples – these include samples of hair (other than pubic hair);  
samples taken from or underneath a nail;  swabs taken from any part of a 
person’s body other than a body orifice; and footprints or similar impressions 
of any part of a person’s body other than a part of the hand.819 
• Intimate samples – an intimate sample is described as a sample of blood, 
semen, or any other tissue, fluid, urine, saliva, or pubic hair, or a swab taken 
from a person’s body orifice.820 
 
PACE 1984 specified that, in the absence of the individual’s consent, his or her 
fingerprints may be taken if he or she has been charged with a recordable offence, or 
where an officer of at least the rank of superintendent has reasonable grounds for 
suspecting the involvement of the person whose fingerprints are taken in a criminal 
offence and the fingerprints will tend to ‘prove or disprove his involvement’.821 Non-
intimate samples could be taken only under similar circumstances, except that a 
superintendent could authorise the taking of such samples only if the person was 
suspected of being involved in a ‘serious arrestable offence’.822 Intimate samples 
could only be taken with consent, and if authorised by an officer with the rank of at 
least superintendent. However, under section 62 PACE 1984, if an individual were to 
refuse to provide such a sample, adverse inferences could be drawn at trial.823 This 
part looks at how laws governing retention expanded post-PACE 1984 before 
subsequently contracting following the judgment of the ECtHR in S and Marper. 
 
1.1 From PACE 1984 to S and Marper 
Soon after the enactment of PACE 1984, powers to take fingerprints and non-
intimate samples (redefined to include mouth swabs that are commonly used to 
																																								 																				
818 Section 65 PACE 1984 (as originally enacted). 
819 ibid.  
820 ibid. 
821 Section 61 PACE 1984 (as originally enacted). 
822 Such offences are defined as those likely to cause serious harm, threaten national security or result in 
substantial financial gain and loss. Examples include murder, robbery or rape. See section 63 PACE 1984. 
823 Section 62 PACE 1984. 
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extract a DNA sample from an arrestee)824 significantly expanded as the capacity of 
technology to extract ever-more personal information from such samples increased. 
Under section 57 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (CJPOA 1994), 
following a series of recommendations from The Royal Commission on Criminal 
Justice,825 PACE 1984 was amended to allow the police to take DNA samples from 
anyone charged with a recordable offence, irrespective of whether or not DNA 
evidence was immediately relevant for the offence for which the person was 
charged.826 Soon after this development, the National DNA Database (NDNAD) was 
established to store in electronic form the DNA profiles of those who went on to be 
convicted of recordable offences.827 The rationale underpinning this expansion was to 
utilise modern technology to its fullest potential in the fight against crime, as the 
Home Secretary at the time, Michael Howard declared: ‘[The Government’s 
proposals] help bring the law into line with the capabilities of modern technology. The 
full force of modern science will be brought to bear upon the modern criminal.’828 
 
Whilst these developments were met with some resistance by human rights 
organisations, such as Liberty,829 media and public support for the expansion of such 
technologies in the fight against crime, to which politicians and police forces were 
only too keen to respond, largely overwhelmed this. Though this section of the 
analysis is not concerned with explaining the social and contextual factors which may 
have contributed to the expansion of police powers to collect and retain DNA data, it 
																																								 																				
824 See the amendments to PACE 1984 detailed in Police and Criminal Evidence Act (Codes of Practice) (No 
3) Order 1995, SI 1995/450. 
825 See: The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, Report of The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice 
(Cm 2263) (London: HMSO, 1993) 14-16. 
826 Sections 55 and 57 CJPOA 1994 (as originally enacted). 
827 DNA samples contain biological matter taken from the individual, often in the form of a mouth swab. 
The coding regions of the sample contain all of the individual’s genetic information including information 
about racial indicators, medical predispositions, and physical attributes. DNA profiles are derived from the 
non-coding regions of the DNA sample. The profile is essentially a number identifying the sample from 
which it is derived. This can be uploaded to the NDNAD and subsequently matched to other samples from 
the individual, such as samples recovered from a crime scene. It is generally accepted that these contain 
less personally identifiable information than DNA samples. Fingerprints are usually scanned electronically 
from an arrestee. These are said to contain the least identifiable information out of the three types of data 
considered. Fingerprints reveal no information about the individual beyond the unique pattern of his or her 
skin on the body part (usually a finger or palm) from which the “print” is derived: see D. Wilson, Genetics, 
Crime and Justice (Cheltenham: Edwin Elgar, 2015) 24-27; P. Hughes, DNA Fingerprinting Research Paper 
96/44 (House of Commons Library: 27 March 1996) 24.  
828 HC Deb, 3 November 1994, c1335. 
829 Hughes, n 827, 25.  
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is noteworthy that these developments emerged in the midst of what sociological 
commentators have described as the ‘punitive turn’, where crime control is said to 
have been politicised and, in response to public demand, political parties clamoured 
to be seen as ‘tough on crime’.830 Despite legislative amendments, fingerprints and 
DNA samples taken from those subject to the criminal process were still to be 
destroyed (subject to certain exceptions) as soon as practicable after the finalisation 
of proceedings in which the individual was cleared. The legal position concerning 
police powers to retain DNA samples from those subject to the criminal process after 
the establishment of the NDNAD was clarified by then Home Secretary, David 
Maclean:  
Samples taken from people who are acquitted or not proceeded against will be 
retained if another person from whom a sample has been taken in the same 
investigation is convicted of an offence. These samples may be needed for 
further comparative analysis if it is subsequently suggested that there has been 
a miscarriage of justice. DNA profiles will be retained in a searchable form on 
the DNA database only if the suspect is convicted of or cautioned for a 
recordable offence or if action against that individual is ongoing.831 
 
Thus, the position of the Government and the law was clear: but for very specific and 
limited exceptions, the police were to destroy any DNA samples and delete any 
profiles derived from such samples if, at the conclusion of their investigation, the 
individual was subject to any disposal other than a criminal conviction or caution. 
Over the next ten years the Government’s approach to the retention of non-convicted 
persons’ DNA and fingerprint data would change considerably. 
 
Two legislative developments, the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 
and the Criminal Evidence Act 1997, extended the powers of the police to search 
profiles across the United Kingdom, and to take without consent non-intimate 
samples from prisoners convicted of certain serious offences. In July 1999, in an 
attempt to bring legislation up-to-date with advances in fingerprint and DNA 
																																								 																				
830 These social and contextual factors were surveyed in the introduction. See generally: A. Bottoms, ‘The 
Philosophy and Politics of Punishment and Sentencing’ in C. Clarkson and R. Morgan (eds.) The Politics of 
Sentencing Reform (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) 17-50; D. Garland, The Culture of Control (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001).  
831 HC Deb, 31 October 1995, vol 265 c166W. 
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technology, the Home Office published a consultation document, Proposals for 
Revising Legislative Measures on Fingerprints, Footprints and DNA Samples.832 
Among the many proposals that were made in this document were suggestions that 
PACE 1984 should be amended to provide powers to take fingerprints without 
consent at any location;833 and that officers of inspector rank or above should be 
permitted to give authorisation to take fingerprints or samples without consent.834  
 
Though such proposals would have had the effect of expanding police powers to 
collect and retain DNA and fingerprint data, the document is written in terms which 
seem to address practical issues rather than pursuing an expansionist agenda.835 
Then two legal challenges to the use of the DNA of non-convicted persons at trial put 
the expansion of powers to retain DNA and fingerprint data on the domestic political 
agenda. In R v Weir,836 the appellant challenged his conviction of murder. The 
appellant was first arrested for drugs-related offences and had a DNA sample taken 
from him and submitted for DNA profiling. The case against him was subsequently 
discontinued and all charges were dropped. At this stage, under section 64(1) of 
PACE 1984, the sample should have been destroyed and the profile deleted as soon 
as practicable after that date. However, crucially, the profile was not deleted. The 
following year the appellant’s DNA profile was matched against a DNA sample taken 
from the scene of a murder and, on this basis, the appellant was arrested and 
eventually convicted of murder.837 However, the Court of Appeal quashed the 
appellant’s conviction on the grounds that his DNA profile should not have been 
retained by the police, and therefore, the subsequent evidence derived from it should 
not have been admitted at trial.838 In the second case, Attorney General’s Reference 
(No.3 of 1999),839 the House of Lords overruled a decision in the Court of Appeal in 
																																								 																				
832 Home Office, Proposals for Revising Legislative Measures on Fingerprints, Footprints and DNA Samples 
(London: The National Archives, 31 July 1999).  
833 ibid 4. 
834 ibid 5. 
835 ibid 11. 
836 R v Weir (2000) 97 LSG 37. 
837 ibid at [2]. 
838 ibid at [6]. 
839 Attorney General’s Reference (No 3 of 1999) [2001] 2 AC 91. 
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which it was held that improperly obtained DNA evidence was inadmissible.840 The 
defendant in this case was first acquitted of burglary in August 1998 but the DNA 
profile taken upon his arrest, which should have been deleted under PACE 1984, was 
retained on the NDNAD. In October 1998, a DNA profile obtained from swabs taken 
from an elderly victim of rape and assault was found to match the retained DNA 
profile of the defendant. Thus, the House of Lords considered whether, in cases 
where a prosecution is based on such DNA evidence, the trial judge has the 
discretion to permit a prosecution to proceed, notwithstanding the terms of PACE 
1984.841 In his leading judgment, Lord Steyn held that the Court of Appeal’s rulings 
in the immediate case and in Weir were incorrect.842 Furthermore, in considering 
whether the use in the trial of the sample, which should have been destroyed, 
constituted a violation of the appellants’ Article 8 ECHR rights, Lord Steyn stated:  
If the construction I have adopted is correct "the interference" is "in accordance 
with law", the critical point being that admissibility is governed by judicial 
discretion under section 78. And "the interference", so qualified, is plainly 
necessary in a democratic society to ensure the investigation and prosecution of 
serious crime. There is plainly no breach of Article 8.843 
 
Whilst in this case there was no detailed consideration of the extent to which arrestee 
DNA retention is compatible with Article 8 ECHR, Lord Steyn’s comments encouraged 
the New Labour Government to begin legislating new powers for the police to retain 
the DNA and fingerprint data of individuals subject to the criminal process who did 
not go on to be convicted of an offence. A month after Attorney General’s Reference 
(No.3 of 1999), then Home Secretary Jack Straw presented the Criminal Justice and 
Police Bill to the House of Commons, which set forth the Government’s plans to 
extend police powers to retain DNA and fingerprint data.844 The Home Secretary’s 
comments when introducing the Bill in the House of Commons contextualise the 
Government’s rationale for extending these powers. He stated:  
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842 ibid 120. 
843 ibid 119. 
844 See Criminal Justice and Police Bill (2000-2001) (House of Commons, 18 January 2001).  
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DNA profiling is a very powerful tool—an objective form of evidence. Its value 
lies as much, if not more, in its ability to exclude the innocent as in its ability to 
convict the guilty. When the police investigate a case, if they do not proceed 
with a prosecution or the suspect is acquitted, they routinely retain all the 
records of the investigation, including the notes of interviews with suspects and 
other interviewees. That has always been the case. The police would not dream 
of throwing away their memory on the off chance that the offender may or may 
not commit a further offence. Yet the law requires that the most objective and 
powerful forms of evidence—fingerprints and DNA—have to be destroyed if a 
conviction does not follow from the taking of the sample in question. 
 
This has already led to serious miscarriages of justice. In two recent cases, R. v 
B and R. v Weir, compelling DNA evidence that linked one suspect to a rape and 
the other to a murder could not be used, and neither suspect could be 
convicted, because it turned out that at the time when the matches were made, 
the defendants had either been acquitted of another crime, or a decision had 
been made not to proceed with the offences for which the DNA profiles were 
originally taken. Under the existing provisions, the profiles should have been 
destroyed.845 
 
These comments are indicative of the New Labour Government’s stance, which 
emphasised the probative benefits of the expansion of the NDNAD, whilst 
simultaneously giving scant regard to the privacy interests which may be set back by 
the retention of this biometric information. However, the Bill was not met with cross 
party support. Liberal Democrat MP, Simon Hughes, voiced concerns that the Bill had 
been brought before Parliament with little debate over the competing issues at 
stake.846 Hughes also objected that the Bill seemed to distinguish non-convicted 
persons who are subject to criminal proceedings from the rest of society on an 
arbitrary basis:  
The Liberal Democrats have never signed up to people who have not consented 
having their DNA held after being found not guilty or when a case does not 
proceed. Doing so represents a big step forward—in my view, a dangerous step 
forward in civil liberty terms. Of course DNA is helpful, but if the Government 
think that it would help if everybody's DNA was held, let them say, "When a 
baby is registered, a sample has to be supplied to the registrar of births, 
marriages and deaths." That, effectively, is what the Bill suggests.847   
 
Further concerns, that the retention policies represented an unjustified interference 
with the Article 8 rights of those subject to the criminal process and that the policies 
were an outlier among other Council of Europe Member States, were raised in the 
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847 HC Debate, 29 January 2001, vol 362 cc72-73. 
229	
	
House of Lords debates.848 Notwithstanding these arguments, the Bill was passed. 
Section 64 of PACE 1984 was amended by section 82 of the Criminal Justice and 
Police Act 2001 (CJPA 2001), which provides that fingerprints or samples taken from 
a person in connection with the investigation of an offence may be retained and used 
for purposes related to the prevention or detection of crime, the investigation of an 
offence, or the conduct of a prosecution.849  
 
Shortly afterwards the amendments to PACE 1984 were challenged on the basis that 
they were incompatible with Article 8 ECHR. As we have seen in Chapter 3, in the 
case of S and Marper the ECtHR would eventually determine that the domestic DNA 
and fingerprint data retention regime under PACE 1984 violated the applicants’ rights 
under Article 8 of the ECHR.850 However, in the Divisional Court, Leveson J had 
trouble finding that the retention of DNA and fingerprint samples engaged Article 8 in 
any form.851 In any event, the Divisional Court was in no doubt that the measures did 
not violate Article 8.852  This decision was affirmed in the Court of Appeal, where Lord 
Woolf CJ put the Divisional Court’s doubts about the applicability of Article 8 to rest in 
finding that the retention of personal information in this context constituted a minor 
interference with Article 8(1).853 On one hand, Lord Woolf CJ held that because 
fingerprint and DNA samples are materials that contain personal information, the 
retention of such materials requires legal justification.854 This broad interpretation of 
the scope of Article 8 seems to go beyond the jurisprudence of the ECtHR to include 
any personal information within the scope of Article 8 protection. On the other hand, 
in characterising the interference as minor and insubstantial, Lord Woolf CJ seemed 
to downplay the impact such broad and extensive retention policies under the PACE 
1984 regime could have on individual privacy interests. 
 
																																								 																				
848 See generally, HL Debate, 02 April 2001. vol 624 cc655-716. 
849 See section 82 Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001.  
850 n 817.  
851 R (S and Marper) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [2002] EWHC 478 (Admin) [21]. 
852 ibid at [49]-[51]. 
853 R (S and Marper) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [2002] EWCA Civ 1275 at [33].  
854 ibid at [32]. 
230	
	
Approaching the question of justification for the interference, Lord Woolf CJ agreed 
with the Divisional Court, giving weight to the limited purpose for which the DNA and 
fingerprint samples could be used, and the consequences of the domestic retention 
policies prior to the enactment of the CJPA 2001.855 With regard to the question of 
whether Article 14 ECHR had been violated, Lord Woolf CJ held that the DNA 
retention policies did not discriminate against any individuals, and dismissed the 
appeals.  
 
Waller LJ agreed with Lord Woolf CJ, further remarking on the issue raised by Liberty 
as intervenors that the retention of DNA samples as well as profiles ought to 
constitute a violation of Article 8 because of the greater risk of future abuses of this 
information. In finding that the interference was proportionate to the legitimate aim, 
Waller LJ stated:  
First the retention of samples permits (a) the checking of the integrity and 
future utility of the DNA database system; (b) a reanalysis for the upgrading of 
DNA profiles where new technology can improve the discriminating power of the 
DNA matching process; (c) reanalysis and thus an ability to extract other DNA 
markers and thus offer benefits in terms of speed, sensitivity and cost of 
searches to the database; (d) further analysis in investigations of alleged 
miscarriages of justice; and (e) further analysis so as to be able to identify any 
analytical or process errors. It is these benefits that must be balanced against 
the risks identified by Liberty.856 
 
 
Sedley LJ added that the rule of law would prevent an opening of a ‘Pandora’s box’ of 
unknown uses of DNA samples as technology advances.857 However, Sedley LJ 
departed from the majority in concluding that the Chief Constable should be required 
to consider in each case whether the individual from whom samples are retained is 
free of ‘any taint of suspicion’ and in that case delete his or her profile. 
 
This judgment seemed to bolster the Government’s expansionist aims with regard to 
the collection and retention of DNA and fingerprint data, and the Criminal Justice Act 
2003 subsequently gave the police the power to collect and retain such data from 
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anybody arrested for a recordable offence in England and Wales.858 When introducing 
the proposals for this legislative change in the House of Commons, then Under-
Secretary for the Home Department, Bob Ainsworth, cited the Court of Appeal 
judgment in S and Marper to assuage concerns about civil liberties.859  
 
At the second reading of the Criminal Justice Bill in the House of Lords, Lord Thomas 
of Gresford issued a prescient warning of the dangers of expanding police powers to 
collect and retain DNA and fingerprint data on the back of the judgment in S and 
Marper, because this case was likely to be challenged.860 However, the challenge in 
domestic proceedings was once again to prove unsuccessful. The House of Lords 
dismissed the claimants’ final appeal in S and Marper, making the following findings:  
 
(i) Article 8(1) ECHR was not engaged by the retention of the DNA or fingerprint 
samples and profiles (Baroness Hale dissenting); 
(ii) Insofar as the retention of fingerprints and samples under section 64(1A) of 
PACE 1984 constituted an interference with the applicants’ Article 8(1) rights, 
such interference was modest and objectively justified under Article 8(2) as 
being necessary for the prevention and detection of crime;  
(iii) That the difference in treatment between the applicants and those who had 
not been required to provide fingerprint or DNA samples did not violate Article 
14 of the ECHR; and 
(iv) The retention policies in place were lawful.861 
 
Lord Steyn ‘inclined’ to the view that the retention of the fingerprints and DNA 
samples did not interfere with Article 8(1), considering that, if there was an 
interference, it was ‘very modest indeed.’862 In coming to this conclusion, Lord Steyn 
relied on the opinion of Leveson J in the Divisional Court, the witness statement of Dr 
Bramley explaining how such DNA and fingerprint samples are retained and used by 
																																								 																				
858 Sections 9 and 10 Criminal Justice Act 2003 (as enacted).  
859 HC Debate, 19 May 2003, vol 405 c699. 
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the police, and the findings of the European Commission on Human Rights 
(ECommHR) in the cases of McVeigh, O’Neill and Evans v United Kingdom863 and 
Kinnunen v Finland.864  
 
In a dissenting opinion, Baroness Hale focused on the fundamental impact that this 
form of retention can have on privacy related interests:  
If the taking and use of the information is an interference, it is difficult to see 
why the retention, storage or keeping of that information is not also an 
interference. Storing information almost inevitably involves someone else 
knowing it. It is an interference with privacy for someone to know or have 
access to private information even if they make no other use of it. The mere 
fact that someone has read my private correspondence or seen my bank 
accounts is an interference with my privacy even if that person tells no one else 
what he has seen.865 
 
This is a nuanced point, recognising privacy interests which may be set back in ways 
unrelated to an individual’s freedom to exercise his or her personal autonomy. 
Baroness Hale seemed to focus on the deleterious impact privacy intrusions might 
have on the dignity of the individual, ‘injuring the individual in his very humanity’.866 
 
Despite ‘inclining’ to the view that there was no interference with Article 8(1), Lord 
Steyn considered the question of whether or not the retention of the samples was 
justified under Article 8(2). Lord Steyn concluded that the powers and discretion 
conferred on the Chief Constable under section 64 of PACE provided an adequate 
legal basis for interference for the legitimate aim of preventing or detecting crime.867 
Turning to the question of proportionality, Lord Steyn concluded that, cumulatively, 
the following factors qualified the retention of DNA and fingerprint samples and 
profiles as proportionate in effect:  
(i) the fingerprints and samples are kept only for the limited purpose of 
detection, investigation, and prosecution of crime; (ii) the fingerprints and 
samples are not of any use without a comparator fingerprint or sample from the 
crime scene; (iii) the fingerprints and samples will not be made public; (iv) a 
person is not identifiable to the untutored eye simply from the profile on the 
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865 n 861 at [73]. 
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database, any interference represented by the retention being minimal; (v) 
and, on the other hand, the resultant expansion of the database by the 
retention confers enormous advantages in the fight against serious crime.868 
 
Lord Steyn then addressed Sedley LJ’s dissenting judgment, in the court below, that 
the data of those freed from ‘any taint of suspicion’869 should be destroyed. Lord 
Steyn thought that this would involve the police in ‘interminable and invidious 
disputes’ and that such considerations are ‘apposite to the question whether there 
are less intrusive but realistic means available to achieve the legislative purpose.’870 
In finding that the policies were proportionate, Baroness Hale stated that: ‘The whole 
community, as well as the individuals whose samples are collected, benefits from 
there being as large a database as it is possible to have’871 and, in a similar vein, 
Lord Carswell observed that, ‘the larger the database, the less call there will be to 
round up the usual suspects. Instead, those amongst the usual suspects who are 
innocent will at once be exonerated.’872 
 
Further amendments to PACE 1984 were introduced as part of the Serious Organised 
Crime and Police Act 2005.873 This led to a situation where (save for a number of 
limited exceptions) the police were empowered to retain fingerprints, footwear 
impressions, samples and data derived from such samples, taken from an individual 
subject to a criminal process irrespective of whether the individual went on to be 
convicted of any offence, and irrespective of whether the individual was arrested for 
a serious or minor offence, provided that this was done for purposes related to the 
prevention or detection of crime, the conduct of a prosecution, or the identification of 
a deceased person.874 As noted, this expansive regime was once again challenged, 
this time successfully, when S and Marper reached the Grand Chamber of the 
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873 Sections 117 and 118 Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005. 
874 See section 64(1A) PACE 1984 (as amended). For a full discussion see E. Cape, ‘The Protection of 
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ECtHR.875 The Strasbourg Court unequivocally found that the retention of DNA and 
fingerprint samples and profiles did constitute an interference with Article 8(1) of the 
ECHR.876 Furthermore, the ECtHR found that the ‘blanket and indiscriminate’ nature 
of the retention polices under the PACE 1984 regime could not be considered 
‘necessary in a democratic society’ and accordingly violated the applicants’ Article 8 
rights.877 
 
1.2 Developments Post-S and Marper v United Kingdom: 
Proportionality or pushing the boundary?  
In response to the judgment from the Strasbourg Court, the New Labour Government 
issued a consultation paper, Keeping the Right People on the DNA Database.878 In it, 
the then Home Secretary, Jacqui Smith, expressed her commitment to comply with 
the ECtHR ruling in S and Marper, whilst still maintaining the fullest public protection 
benefits of the NDNAD.879 The consultation paper proposed the destruction of all DNA 
samples taken from a suspect arrested for a criminal offence after a DNA profile had 
been made or after a maximum of six months, depending on which came first.880 The 
Government also suggested that, for all but serious violent, sexual, or terrorism-
related offences, those arrested but not subsequently convicted of a recordable 
offence would have their profiles automatically deleted after six years.881 
Furthermore, the paper addressed the concerns of the Strasbourg Court relating to 
the retention of DNA samples, profiles, and fingerprint data of children, outlining a 
six-year period for the retention of such non-conviction data where it is taken from 
																																								 																				
875 n 817.  
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877 ibid at [125]. 
878 Home Office, Keeping the Right People on the DNA Database: Science and Public Protection (London: 
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879 ibid at [2.2]. 
880 ibid at [2.4]. 
881 Those who are arrested but not convicted of the more serious offences detailed would have their DNA 
profiles automatically deleted after twelve years and those providing DNA samples voluntarily would not 
have their profiles stored on the National DNA Database. See ibid at [2.4]. 
235	
	
children.882 In all cases, parallel limitations would apply to the retention of fingerprint 
data as to the retention of DNA profiles. 
 
These proposals were amended as part of the Crime and Security Bill so that no 
distinction would be made between the retention periods based on the offence for 
which an individual was arrested. In the case of children convicted of criminal 
offences, the retention period was reduced to three years.883 Despite these 
amendments, the proposals were met with intense criticism when put before the 
House of Commons on the grounds that the retention powers were still too broad to 
respect the Article 8 rights of those subject to the criminal justice process.884 In a 
report scrutinising the Bill, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights 
expressed concern that the Government’s approach stretched the ECtHR’s decision in 
S and Marper to its limit.885 Among other things, the Committee criticised the 
Government’s proposals on the grounds that the six-year retention period for those 
not convicted or charged with an offence was disproportionate and potentially 
arbitrary, and the proposals were said to discount the stigmatising effect of the 
inclusion of the samples of innocent people on the National DNA Database.886 
 
Despite the shortcomings identified by the Committee, the Crime and Security Bill 
was enacted, with some minor amendments, as the Crime and Security Act 2010. 
However, the new DNA and fingerprint retention provisions were not brought into 
effect following a change of Government in the 2010 General Election.887 Instead, the 
Conservative-led Coalition Government introduced the Protection of Freedoms Bill, 
which sought to address the ECtHR decision in S and Marper. In another report, the 
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Joint Committee on Human Rights welcomed the new Bill for its enhancement of the 
legal protection of human rights and civil liberties.888 In particular, the Committee 
endorsed the Government’s view that the proposals in the Protection of Freedoms Bill 
were more in line with the Scottish model of DNA and fingerprint data retention 
(which is much more restrictive in its non-conviction retention policies) and, 
consequently, were more likely to be ECHR-compatible than the proposals in the 
Crime and Security Act 2010.889 However, the Committee did suggest that without 
fuller statistical information on the operation of the NDNAD it would not be possible 
for it to confirm the proportionality of the proposed measures.890 
 
The Protections of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA 2012) received Royal Assent in May 
2012. The PoFA 2012 made extensive changes to the retention regime set forth in 
PACE 1984 amending sections 63F to 63H. The effect of the (somewhat complicated) 
new provisions is that, where an arrestee does not go on to be convicted of an 
offence, any fingerprints or DNA profiles taken from that individual (section 63D 
material)891 must be destroyed no later than the conclusion of the investigation or, if 
the individual is charged, at the conclusion of any criminal proceedings.892 The 
section 63D material can be speculatively searched against national databases upon 
its collection. This does engage privacy interests, but is not the focus of this chapter. 
However, there are several complex provisions that effectively make it possible for 
the police to retain such data at the conclusion of criminal proceedings in the 
following, specified circumstances: 
 
1.2.1. Individuals arrested for or charged with ‘qualifying offences’, but 
not subsequently convicted 
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If the section 63D material is taken from an individual in connection with a ‘qualifying 
offence,’893 but the individual is not subsequently convicted, then the material can be 
retained indefinitely only if the individual has a previous conviction for a recordable 
offence.894 If the individual does not have a previous conviction, then the retention 
period will differ according to whether the individual was charged with the qualifying 
offence or only arrested. In the case of the former, the police can retain the section 
63D material for three years. However, if the individual is arrested but not 
subsequently charged, then the police can still retain the material for three years but 
only with the consent of the Commissioner for the Retention and Use of Biometric 
Material (a role created under PoFA 2012, section 20).895  
 
1.2.2. Individuals arrested for or charged with minor offences, but not 
subsequently convicted 
PoFA 2012 section 4 inserts section 63H into PACE 1984. This provides that where an 
individual is arrested or charged with, but not convicted of, a minor offence,896 any 
collected section 63D material must be destroyed, unless the individual has been 
previously convicted of a recordable offence that is not an ‘excluded offence’.897 In 
such cases, where the individual has a previous conviction for a non-excluded 
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offence, section 63D material may be retained indefinitely.898 There are further 
provisions for those who are subject to the criminal process. If, for instance, an 
individual receives a Penalty Notice for Disorder, the police are empowered to retain 
any section 63D material for two years.899 Furthermore, such materials can be 
retained for two years (with the possibility of renewal), where they would otherwise 
be destroyed, if a responsible chief officer of police deems that such retention is 
necessary in the interests of national security.900  
 
The retention of biological DNA samples is subject to separate retention provisions. 
PoFA 2012 section 14 inserts section 63R into PACE 1984, which governs the 
retention, use, and destruction of physical DNA samples. Like section 63D material 
(including DNA profiles), DNA samples must be destroyed where it appears to a chief 
police officer that they have been taken unlawfully or as a result of mistaken identity. 
In addition, DNA samples must be destroyed once a DNA profile has been derived 
from the sample, or six months after the sample has been collected (if this date 
comes before a profile is created).901 This period can be extended if a chief police 
officer applies to a District Judge to retain the sample for a longer period on the 
grounds that the sample may be needed for use in a subsequent trial.902 Any DNA 
sample retained under these provisions may only be used for purposes related to the 
proceedings for which the sample was taken, though a speculative search of the 
National DNA Database is permitted.903  
 
2. Justifying Non-Conviction Retention 
Various justifications have been advanced for the collection and retention of DNA and 
fingerprint information from those subject to the criminal process. Arguments for 
curtailing the rapid expansion of the National DNA Database have similarly multiplied 
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over the last twenty years. This section considers how, unfortunately, the rationality 
of arguments has not always prevailed over political and legal influence in this area.  
 
When addressing the justifiability of the interferences with Article 8(1) in S and 
Marper, the domestic courts found that the interference in question was ‘in 
accordance with the law’ and ‘in pursuit of a legitimate aim’ for the purposes of 
Article 8(2). To an extent, the ECtHR concurred with this view in finding that the 
retention of the applicants’ fingerprint and DNA records had a clear basis in domestic 
law, and that the law was not ‘insufficiently certain’ to comply with Article 8 ECHR.904 
If anything, the new PoFA 2012 provisions only increase this certainty, outlining the 
length of retention dependent on the offence and disposal. The provisions also outline 
the scope of the discretion conferred upon the Biometrics Commissioner to determine 
the length of retention in certain specified circumstances. That retention pursues the 
legitimate aims of preventing disorder or crime and/or ensuring public safety is also 
an uncontroversial point. The greatest area of divergence between the analyses of 
the domestic courts and that of the ECtHR was on the final criterion in Article 8(2): 
whether the interference was ‘necessary in a democratic society’. This requires that 
the interfering measures respond to a ‘pressing social need’ and are ‘proportionate’ 
to the legitimate aim pursued.905 The balance of this chapter highlights the 
differences between the domestic courts and the ECtHR in confronting these issues, 
before assessing the extent to which the PoFA 2012 regime surmounts the final 
hurdle of Article 8(2). 
 
As a starting point in assessing the proportionality and necessity of the measures, it 
is instructive to have a clear view on how, and to what degree, such retention sets 
back privacy interests generally. From here, the current retention regime can be 
assessed drawing on the structured proportionality test developed in the domestic 
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cases of Quila906 and Bank Mellat.907 This test, as discussed in Chapter 2, consists of 
four limbs, which are broadly followed in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and a range 
of other domestic jurisdictions as a method of adjudicating competing rights.908  
 
The following analysis is divided into three sections. The first two sections 
demonstrate how the domestic courts in S and Marper betrayed a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the normative value of privacy. This seeming lack of 
understanding, along with different approaches to interpreting Article 8(2) criteria, 
produced a stark contrast between the decisions of the domestic courts and that of 
the ECtHR. The third section considers whether or not the proposals in PoFA 2012 
pertaining to the retention of arrestees’ DNA and fingerprint data go far enough to 
redress the balance between state power and the privacy interests of those subject 
to the criminal process to satisfy the requirements of liberal legality and the ECHR.   
 
2.1 Article 8(1): To what extent does non-conviction 
retention set back privacy interests?  
In the Divisional Court, Leveson J made the following observations which were 
central to his conclusion that the retention of such samples did not engage Article 8: 
(i) ‘a person can only be identified by fingerprint or DNA sample either by an expert 
or with the use of sophisticated equipment or both; in either event it is essential to 
have some sample with which to compare the retained data’909; (ii) in the context of 
the retention in S and Marper, ‘the material stored says nothing about the physical 
makeup, characteristics or life of the person to whom they belong’;910 and (iii) in 
Kinnunen v Finland,911 the ECommHR had observed that the retention by the police 
of personal information about the applicant (including fingerprints and photographs 
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of the applicant) after his acquittal in a criminal matter ‘did not constitute an 
intrusion in [the applicant’s] privacy.’912 
 
Whilst Leveson J’s arguments have merit, they overlook many important factors 
which should be considered when assessing whether the retention of such personal 
information engages Article 8(1). First, although the retention of such information, 
separate from its collection, involves no interference with the physical privacy 
interests of the individual (i.e. it does not involve any form of disruption to bodily 
integrity), it does interfere with informational privacy interests. 
 
When assessing the extent to which individual privacy interests are set back by the 
retention of personal information, much depends upon the nature of the personal 
information that is retained. Leveson J observed that, in the context of the case, the 
retained material did not reveal anything related to the private lives of the individuals 
from which it originated.913 However, this observation conflates details regarding the 
nature of the information and details concerning the context in which such 
information is used. The samples retained contain information that is personally 
identifiable to applicants (to varying degrees) notwithstanding the context in which 
they are stored or used, or how they might be used in the future. As Baroness Hale 
highlighted:  
They are not kept for their intrinsic value as mouthswabs, hairs, or whatever. 
They are kept because they contain the individual’s unique genetic code within 
them. They are kept as information about that person and nothing else.914 
 
Even fingerprints, which contain less identifiable information than DNA samples and 
profiles, are undoubtedly personal information. The data taken from the individual 
can subsequently be linked back to the individual in a wide range of circumstances, 
albeit with the assistance of sophisticated technology. From here it is useful to 
consider whether the retention of personal information in itself sets back privacy 
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related interests. The ECtHR held that the retention of DNA samples per se was 
sufficient to engage Article 8(1), but did not go this far when it came to fingerprints 
and DNA profiles.  
 
However, the philosophical analysis developed in previous chapters suggests that 
such retention does set back privacy related interests.915 Informational privacy 
interests broadly protect the individual from the use, misuse, and fear of use and 
misuse of any personally identifiable information.916 These are the interests the 
individual holds in limiting the access others (persons, private, or public bodies) have 
to information about him or her. Such interests are diverse and may also be 
compromised through security breaches and the loss of personal information.917 
Where an individual’s informational privacy interests are respected, the individual can 
expect a degree of control over how his or her personal information will be used by 
others.918 Therefore, by maintaining a system of mandatory retention of such 
personal information, the Government discounted the applicants’ personal choices 
regarding the use of the information in question and accordingly failed to respect the 
privacy related interests of the applicants insofar as these interests facilitate 
autonomous decision making.919 Such informational privacy interests can be set back 
notwithstanding the subjective preferences of the applicants. As Hughes argues:  
As privacy plays a fundamental role in facilitating social interaction, any 
invasion of privacy is inherently harmful and X does not need to establish that 
he or she has suffered any particular harm for Y’s act to constitute an invasion 
of privacy.920 
 
This amounts to an exercise of control over the individual on behalf of the state. The 
individual’s preferences for whether the state can store his or her personal 
																																								 																				
915 Chapter 3, Part 1.3. 
916 C. Fried, ‘Privacy’ (1968) 77 Yale Law Journal 475-493 at 482; J. W. DeCew, In Pursuit of Privacy: Law, 
Ethics, and the Rise of Technology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997) 75.  
917 See generally Wilson, n 827; D. Solove, Understanding Privacy (Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 2008) 117-136. 
918 However, as discussed in Chapter 1 of the thesis, the control-over-information view of privacy is too 
narrow, focusing exclusively on individual choice: Chapter 1, Part 1.3. See also, Solove, ibid 29. 
919 This much has since been determined by the ECtHR in the case of Bouchacourt v France, where it was 
held that: ‘the mere storing by a public authority of data relating to the private life of an individual’ 
constituted an interference with Article 8(1): see Bouchacourt v France, App no 5335/06 (ECtHR, 17 
December 2009) at [57]. 
920 K. Hughes, ‘A Behavioural Understanding of Privacy and its Implications for Privacy Law’ (2012) 75 
Modern Law Review 806-836 at 821. 
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information are disregarded. Thus, in principle, the storing of X’s personally 
identifiable information by Y sets back X’s privacy related interests, wherever X is the 
Government storing such information in the context of criminal proceedings.  
 
If this principle is accepted, as it has been by the ECtHR, the next step is to consider 
the degree to which the storing of DNA and fingerprint information, in the context of 
a criminal process, sets back privacy related interests. One further objection to non-
conviction information retention relates to the potential ways such information might 
be used against the individual in the future. As technology has advanced, it has 
increased the extent to which personal information about genetic traits and familial 
history can be gleaned from such biometric information.921 In the House of Lords, 
Lord Steyn observed that any concerns about this potential for future processing 
were not relevant as judicial decisions about future scientific developments and uses 
of DNA samples can be made when the need arises.922 However, the ECtHR thought 
otherwise:  
In the Court’s view, the DNA profiles’ capacity to provide a means of identifying 
genetic relationships between individuals … is in itself sufficient to conclude that 
their retention interferes with the right to the private life of the individuals 
concerned. The frequency of familial searches, the safeguards attached thereto 
and the likelihood of detriment in a particular case are immaterial in this 
respect.923 
 
 
The court is referring to the potential for the information to be processed in future as 
relevant in determining the applicability of Article 8(1), irrespective of the safeguards 
that are currently in place to prevent such abuses.924 This approach focuses on the 
effect that the retention of an individual’s personal information has on the individual 
regarding his or her concerns and fears about how this information can be used and 
might be used in the future, rather than solely focusing on the objective risk that 
																																								 																				
921 Wilson, n 827, 24-70. 
922 n 861 at [29]. 
923 n 817 at [75]. 
924 There have been a number of cases brought before domestic courts regarding the use of profiles on the 
National DNA Database for purposes other than the prevention and detection of crime. In a recent case 
before the Court of Appeal, the applicant successfully argued that his Article 8 rights had been violated 
when his DNA information, which was stored on the NDNAD, was used for a paternity test as part of a local 
authority’s child care proceedings. Police took the DNA sample from the crime scene of his wife’s murder; 
a crime for which the applicant was tried and convicted. See: In re Z (Children) [2015] 1 WLR 2501. 
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such information may be used to offset the individual’s privacy related interests. 
Such retention is a form of permanent surveillance, which puts power over intimate 
information about the individual into the hands of the police, irrespective of how that 
individual wishes such information to be used. The issue with Lord Steyn’s ‘we can 
cross that bridge when we come to it’ fig leaf is that it overlooks the extent to which 
the mere existence of such a potential from the retention of DNA samples can 
produce an inhibiting effect in the individual, even if such fears of information misuse 
are misplaced, as is argued by Roberts and Taylor:  
 It is the effect on the individual of the risk arising from the action taken by the 
state that constitutes the interference with his private life … If widespread 
storing of DNA samples can engender such anxiety in the population at large, 
presumably that anxiety is heightened in those whose DNA samples are 
stored.925 
 
These presumptive anxieties echo what Lyon describes as the setbacks to privacy 
related interests brought about through the ‘function creep’ of an individual’s 
personal information, where ‘subsequent novel uses are devised for existing technical 
systems, which are added to the original panoply of functions.’926 The potential for 
other uses of the personal information collected is significant, especially in the case 
of DNA samples and profiles. Hypothetically speaking, information stored on the 
NDNAD, which can already identify behavioural genetic predispositions in an 
individual, could potentially be used by a future authoritarian Government to subject 
individuals to oppressive crime-control or eugenic orientated measures. This potential 
alone may cause feelings of anxiety, powerlessness, and vulnerability in the 
individual.927 Whilst it might be the case that the existence of such anxieties is 
worthy of consideration when assessing the extent of an interference with Article 
8(1) (and I think it is), this begs the empirical question: do such anxieties exist in 
the first place?  
 
																																								 																				
925 A. Roberts and N. Taylor, ‘Privacy and the DNA Database’ (2005) 4 European Human Rights Law Review 
373-186 at 384 (emphasis in original). 
926 D. Lyon, ‘The Border is Everywhere: ID Cards, Surveillance, and the Other’ in E. Zureik and M. Salter 
(eds.) Global Surveillance and Policing: Borders, Security, Identity (Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 2005) 
66-82 at 67. 
927 Chapter 3, Part 1.3.4. 
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In the Court of Appeal in S and Marper, Lord Woolf determined that the extent to 
which the retention of relevant materials interfered with individual privacy interests 
depended to a significant degree on the ‘cultural traditions of a particular state.’928 
According to Lord Woolf:  
[A]t least for a substantial proportion of the public there is a strong objection to 
the state storing information relating to an individual unless there is some 
objective justification for this happening. The objection to the storage is 
reflected in the appreciative public response to novels such as Aldous Huxley’s 
Brave New World and George Orwell’s 1984.929 
 
In the House of Lords, Lord Rodger questioned the notion that there was a greater 
cultural resistance in Britain than in other European states towards the collection and 
retention of personal information:  
I am doubtful whether the reaction of the educated public at the time to novels 
published many years ago can be taken as an accurate reflection of British 
public opinion in the very different conditions of today. Recent press reaction to 
the failure of police and other bodies to store information about those 
suspected of sexual offences might well point to a rather different attitude.930 
 
 
In any case, Lord Rodger stated, the public attitude to the retention would not be 
decisive.931 Neither line of reasoning is particularly instructive when attempting to 
ascertain the extent to which privacy interests are set back by the retention of 
personal information. Generally speaking the public are concerned about privacy and 
security. The landscape of public opinion in this area is surely more complicated than 
the reasoning above would suggest. Lord Steyn did not subscribe to Lord Woolf’s 
interpretation either, observing that the ECHR is an international instrument and, as 
such, only the ECtHR should authoritatively expound its authentic interpretation.932 
However, Lord Steyn did concede that cultural traditions might be a relevant factor 
when assessing the proportionality of the measures and whether they fall within the 
margin of appreciation that is afforded to Contracting States.933 Leaving aside the 
myriad methodological problems that would inevitably arise if one were to attempt to 
gauge existing social norms of privacy using some form of empirical analysis, it is 
																																								 																				
928 n 853 at [32]. 
929 ibid at [34] (emphasis in original). 
930 n 861 at [64]. 
931 ibid at [65]. 
932 ibid at [27]. 
933 ibid at [27]. 
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submitted that this is irrelevant when assessing whether or not the applicants’ 
privacy related interests were set back in this case. Accordingly, prevailing cultural 
preferences should not be a significant factor in determining the scope of Article 8.  
 
Whilst it is true that privacy norms vary temporally and geographically,934 the view 
that human rights protections such as those conferred in Article 8(1) should only 
extend so far as to reflect existing privacy norms in a particular country is 
problematic because such a conception of the scope of the right to respect for private 
life would contain no normative component.935 This is essential in developing a right 
which protects not only the interests which social norms dictate are acceptable, but 
also what a minority of the population should be able to expect in terms of respect 
for their private lives (recalling that human rights are often invoked to protect the 
interests of minority groups being overridden by majority interests).936  
 
On one view, the sharpest challenge to the state retention of DNA lies in the 
avoidance of stigmatisation. According to Campbell,937 the most pernicious effect of 
non-conviction DNA and fingerprint retention is that it amounts to an expression of a 
lingering suspicion on behalf of the state, through the differential treatment of those 
subject to the criminal process.938 Campbell goes on to suggest that, notwithstanding 
the fact that such information is not published by the state, the individual internalises 
the stigmatisation by virtue of the state treating him or her differently on the basis of 
potential guilt or risk of offending.939 Indeed, there exists a body of criminological 
literature which suggests that such ‘labelling’ of the individual by the state can be 
detrimental to his or her functioning and flourishing in society by narrowing available 
																																								 																				
934 For example see J. Whitman, ‘The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty’ (2004) 113 
Yale Law Journal 1151-1196. 
935 Chapter 4, Part 2.1.2. 
936 n 920. 
937 L. Campbell, ‘A Rights-based Analysis of DNA Retention: “non-conviction” databases and the liberal 
state’ [2010] 12 Criminal Law Review 889-906 at 905. 
938 ibid. 
939 ibid at 903. 
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life opportunities and adversely effecting his or her reputation and self-esteem.940 
One resolution to this particular problem might be to create a population-wide 
database, which holds DNA and fingerprint data for everybody and consequently does 
not have any discriminatory or stigmatising effects.941 This is levelling down, plain 
and simple. Whilst such a response may address the stigmatisation point, it would 
also entail a grossly disproportionate interference with the privacy interests of 
citizens at large, and represent a seismic shift away from the political principles of 
limited state intervention and respect for personal autonomy, which are prevalent in 
the criminal justice system and the ECHR.942 As Campbell highlights, concerns about 
stigmatisation are more appropriately dealt with by ‘limiting rather than expanding 
the scope of the database.’943 
 
Taken together, the potentially stigmatising effect of retention, the inhibiting effect it 
may have on the individual, and the setbacks such retention will inevitably cause to 
information-based privacy interests are certainly significant considerations. The 
extent of their significance will depend upon the circumstances of each particular 
case. For example, where an individual is a child, retention of private information 
may be particularly stigmatising, as the ECtHR ruled in S and Marper. The length of 
time such information is retained and the quality of this information (in terms of the 
extent of what it reveals about the individual) are also relevant variables. This 
analysis indicates that where such DNA or fingerprint information is retained on the 
basis that the individual has been subject to a criminal process, but not convicted, 
this will set back the individual’s privacy interests to such a degree that it engages 
Article 8(1) and, thus, must satisfy the criteria in Article 8(2). The remaining sections 
of this chapter consider the extent to which the PoFA 2012 provisions governing non-
																																								 																				
940 See E. Lemert, Human Deviance, Social Problems and Social Control (Englewood, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 
1967); D. Downes, P. Rock, and E. McLaughlin, Understanding Deviance (7th edn. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016) 160-184. 
941 See D.H. Kaye and M. Smith, ‘DNA Databases for Law Enforcement: The Coverage Question and the 
Case for a Population-Wide Database’ in D. Lazer (ed.) DNA and the Criminal Justice System: The 
Technology of Justice (Cambridge, MA: MIT. Press, 2004) 247-284 at 283. 
942 n 937 at 905. 
943 ibid. 
248	
	
conviction retention are proportionate, drawing on the standard four-limbed 
proportionality analysis. 
 
2.2 Article 8(2): Are the new tariffs proportionate?  
One feature common to most of the domestic rulings in S and Marper was that the 
interference constituted by the retention of the personal information was 
characterised as ‘minor’, if it existed at all. From here, any value in the protection 
and detection of crime deriving from its retention was ruled to comfortably override 
any interference with the Article 8(1) rights of the applicants. The judgment of Lord 
Brown encapsulates this sentiment:  
In short, it seems to me that the benefits of the larger database … are so 
manifest and the objections to it so threadbare that the cause of human rights 
generally (including the better protection of society against the scourge of 
crime which dreadfully afflicts the lives of so many of its victims) would 
inevitably be better served by the database’s expansion than by its proposed 
contraction.944 
 
 
On this view, the community benefits, encompassing benefits to the applicants 
themselves, trump the supposed set back to the applicants’ privacy related interests, 
and as a result there is no violation of Article 8. This conclusion rests on the following 
three premises: (i) any interference with the applicants’ Article 8(1) rights is minor; 
(ii) this interference is outweighed or trumped by the benefits of the interference; 
and (iii) these two factors combined serve as a basis for the justification of the 
measures.  
 
Regarding the first premise, as we have seen, the domestic courts, particularly in the 
House of Lords, did not take full account of the extent to which the retention of the 
samples and profiles containing the personal information of the applicants could set 
back their privacy related interests. This has ramifications when assessing the 
proportionality of the measures as it decreases the weight that will be attributed to 
the concerns of the applicants in any subsequent proportionality assessment. 
																																								 																				
944 n 861 at [88]. 
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However, even with a full understanding of the extent to which the retention of such 
personal information sets back privacy related interests, the task of establishing 
whether the interfering measures were justified requires the consideration of a 
number of factors which interact with one another in complex ways. First, the 
retention of DNA and fingerprint data can secure the human rights of those from 
whom the data are taken, as Lord Carswell and Baroness Hale highlighted in the 
House of Lords.945 If it is true, as Baroness Hale suggests it is, that the whole 
community benefits from there being ‘as large a database as it is possible to have’,946 
this suggests that the proportionality question cannot be reduced to a balancing 
exercise between the personal privacy interests of the applicants and the community 
interests in preventing and detecting crime, as these two sets of interests are 
interwoven.  
 
In his leading opinion, Lord Steyn determined that the limited purposes for which the 
stored samples were used and the benefits conferred by the expansion of the 
NDNAD, taken together, meant that the retention policies at the time were 
proportionate.947 By contrast, the Strasbourg Court focused on the fact that the 
retention system in England and Wales was an outlier among other Contracting 
States,948 that there was a lack of empirical support for the extensive reach of the 
measures,949 the indiscriminate nature of the retention system;950 and the 
stigmatising effect of retention.951 Consequently, the House of Lords and the ECtHR 
came to strikingly different conclusions on the extent to which the measures were 
proportionate to the legitimate aim they sought to achieve. Part of the reason for this 
divergence can be attributed to the majority in the House of Lords’ failure to 
recognise the extent to which the retention of the materials sets back the privacy 
																																								 																				
945 ibid at [78] and [88]. 
946 ibid at [78]. 
947 ibid at [38]. 
948 n 817 at [108]. 
949 ibid at [116]. 
950 ibid at [119]. 
951 ibid at [123]. 
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interests of those subject to the criminal process. However, this is clearly not the sole 
factor leading to the disparity in the respective judgments.  
 
The domestic courts consistently found that the retention of the samples of all 
arrestees was indispensable to the prevention and detection of crime.952 However, 
drawing upon a report published by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics,953 the ECtHR 
highlighted the limitations of this empirical evidence base, which was said to justify 
the retention practices:  
The figures do not reveal the extent to which this “link” with crime scenes 
resulted in the convictions of persons concerned or the number of convictions 
that were contingent on the retention of the samples of unconvicted persons.954  
 
In the Report, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics observed that such statistics ‘give no 
indication of the significance of the DNA in the police investigation’ and concluded: ‘if 
there is no further, more detailed evidence that retaining the bioinformation of 
arrestees will achieve improvements in crime control, the interference with 
individuals’ liberty cannot be justified.’955 Furthermore, the statistical evidence cited 
in support of the indefinite retention did not show that the indefinite retention of this 
information, instead of time-limited retention, was necessary for the prevention or 
detection of crime. In view of the philosophical anlaysis demonstrating the extent to 
which the retention of personal information interferes with Article 8(1), the lack of an 
empirical foundation to support the indefinite retention of this information posed 
significant problems for any claims that the measure was proportionate. It has not 
been established that the objectives of the retention could not be achieved through 
less intrusive means, such as the imposition of time limits on the period of retention.  
 
 
																																								 																				
952 ibid at [92]; See: Chapter 3, Part 2.3. 
953 An independent body composed of clinicians, lawyers, philosophers, and geneticists established by the 
Nuffield Council.  
954 n 817 at [116]. 
955 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The Forensic Use of Bioinformation: Ethical Issues (Cambridge, Cambridge 
Publishers Ltd, 2007) 43-44.  
251	
	
The ECtHR also took issue with the fact that the retention powers were exercised 
indiscriminately in England and Wales.956 The indefinite retention of the samples of all 
arrestees implies that no distinctions are drawn which recognise the differences 
between those subject to the criminal justice process. This concern was also raised 
by Sedley LJ in the Court of Appeal:  
Of those who come lawfully into the hands of the police in the course of 
investigation but are not convicted, there will inevitably be some who ought 
never to have been suspected, much less charged; and others who ought 
without doubt to have been convicted but for one reason or another have not 
been.957 
 
In the House of Lords, Lord Steyn observed that any attempt to restrict the retention 
powers of the police based on the nature of the offence, the age of the offender, or 
the degree of suspicion would ‘not confer the benefits of a greatly extended database 
and would involve the police in interminable and invidious disputes about offences of 
which the individual had been acquitted.’958 However, this observation does little to 
demonstrate the proportionality of the retention policies. The notion that, because a 
greatly extended database benefits the aims of accurate and efficient law 
enforcement it is necessary to retain the samples of all arrestees indefinitely, seems 
opportunistic. No attempt is made to strike a fair balance between the privacy 
interests of arrestees and the law enforcement benefits of retaining their biometric 
material. This is presumably why the ECtHR gave short shrift to this line of argument. 
 
One might suggest, as Leveson J did in the Divisional Court, that such a policy does 
not arbitrarily single out arrestees, and that there is a qualitative difference between 
compelling members of the public to provide fingerprints and bodily samples merely 
because the police would find them useful on the one hand, and not requiring the 
police to give up such data which they have lawfully obtained as part of a criminal 
process on the other.959 However, as the ECtHR pointed out, the same indefinite 
retention policies do not apply to DNA and fingerprint data collected by the police 
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958 n 861 at [39]. 
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from those not suspected of committing an offence (for example, those who 
volunteer to provide a DNA sample as part of a DNA dragnet).960 In such cases, the 
police have always been required to destroy the biometric data after they had been 
speculatively searched against other profiles on the NDNAD.  
 
2.3 Non-Conviction Retention Post-S and Marper: Rational, 
minimally intrusive, and fair?  
The decision of the ECtHR in S and Marper v United Kingdom has had a considerable 
impact on the domestic law regulating the retention of arrestees’ DNA and fingerprint 
data. In the subsequent cases of R (GC) v Commissioner of Police of the 
Metropolis,961 and Re Gaughran’s Application for Judicial Review,962 which examined 
conviction retention, the issue of whether the retention of DNA samples, profiles and 
fingerprints engages Article 8(1) is put beyond dispute. As we have seen, the 
legislative responses of both the New Labour Government, in the Crime and Security 
Act 2010, and the Coalition Government in the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 
sought to address the ECtHR’s findings regarding the proportionality of the measures.  
 
The new retention periods for samples and profiles generated from those arrested or 
charged but not subsequently convicted of any criminal offence represent a 
significant step forward in bringing the retention regime into compliance with Article 
8, affording adequate privacy protection to those subject to the criminal justice 
process and addressing the concerns raised by the ECtHR in S and Marper. Limits on 
the retention of arrestees’ samples have been introduced, taking account of the 
seriousness of the offence in respect of which they were taken, criminal record, and 
the age of the suspected offender.963 However, the introduction of such limits on the 
																																								 																				
960 A DNA dragnet is an investigation technique whereby a subset of a local population is identified on the 
basis that their physical characteristics (race, sex etc.) match those of a DNA sample taken from a crime 
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961 R (GC) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2011] UKSC 21.  
962 Re Gaughran’s Application for Judicial Review [2015] UKSC 29. 
963 See sections 3 and 5, Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. 
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retention of this biometric material does not in itself equate to proportionality. This 
section assesses the proportionality of the measures in view of the preceding analysis 
on the extent to which such retention sets back privacy interests, drawing on the 
four-limbed proportionality test mentioned above.964 
 
2.3.1. The objective of the interference 
The first limb of the proportionality analysis is the easiest to clear. It requires the 
Government to show that the objective pursued through the interfering measure is 
sufficiently important to justify limiting the fundamental right in question. That the 
objective of the prevention of disorder or crime is sufficiently important to justify the 
retention of the DNA and fingerprint data of some of those arrested or charged in 
connection with a criminal offence for a certain amount of time was accepted in S 
and Marper v United Kingdom.965 Whilst this limb is not a mere formality, the 
objective of preventing and detecting future crimes through increasing the 
expediency with which those who pose a threat to the public can be processed 
through the criminal justice system is clearly sufficiently important to provide the 
basis for an interference. 
 
2.3.2. The existence of a rational connection between the objective 
and the means 
To qualify as rational and avoid arbitrariness, the link between the measure and its 
aims should be evidence-based.966 The crucial question in the immediate case is: can 
the retention of DNA and fingerprint data from persons arrested or charged with, but 
not subsequently convicted of, a ‘qualifying offence’ reasonably be expected to 
contribute to the prevention and detection of crime? Whilst it is tempting to assume 
that the more biometric data the police hold, the greater will be their chances of 
																																								 																				
964 See R (Quila) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 45 at [45]; Bank Mellat v HM 
Treasury (No. 2) [2013] UKSC 39. See Chapter 2, Part 2.3. 
965 n 817 at [105]. 
966 See Bank Mellat, n 964 at [92]; N. Taylor, ‘Case Note: Re Gaughran’s Application for Judicial Review’ 
[2015] 10 Criminal Law Review 809-811 at 811. 
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identifying offenders in the future, there is a lack of evidence to support the claim 
that non-conviction retention will make such a contribution in any significant way. As 
Lord Kerr highlighted in his dissenting opinion in Gaughran, where the DNA retention 
of convicted persons was at issue:  
The usefulness of the assembly of a pool of personal data to assist with the 
detection of crime was rejected in S and Marper as justification for interference 
with the article 8 right and should also be in this case. Without proof as to the 
likelihood of reoffending, there is no obvious, or rational, connection between 
the current policy and reducing crime.967 
 
The retention tariffs seem to operate on the assumption that those suspected, but 
not convicted, of committing more serious offences are more likely than other non-
convicted persons to commit offences for which DNA and fingerprint data has 
probative value in the future. However, there is no evidence base to support this 
assumption. In its legislative scrutiny of the Protection of Freedoms Bill, the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights expressed its concern that ‘accurate statistical 
information about the operation of the National DNA Database does not appear to 
have been routinely gathered.’968 Furthermore, the Committee recommended that 
the Government should be required to gather information about the proposals in the 
Protection of Freedoms Bill and regularly publish information and statistics on the 
different categories of biometric information retained.969 PoFA 2012 requires the 
NDNAD Strategy Board to publish its governance rules, a statistical breakdown of the 
NDNAD, and guidance to police forces on the early deletion of records from the 
NDNAD.970 However, so far, this statistical breakdown of the utility of the NDNAD 
tends to summarise the number of crimes solved using searches on the NDNAD as a 
whole, giving no indication of how many crimes are solved through the storage of 
non-conviction DNA and fingerprint data. Whilst, in one sense, any retention must at 
least marginally increase the chances of future detection, the ‘rational connection’ 
limb requires more than a de minimis furtherance of the legitimate aim. It requires 
an empirical basis supporting the inclusion of some portions of the non-convicted 
																																								 																				
967 Re Gaughran’s Application for Judicial Review, n 962 at [67]. 
968 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Legislative Scrutiny: Protection of Freedoms Bill, (HMSO 2011) HL 
Paper No.195 (Session 2010-2012) 37. 
969 ibid. 
970 Home Office, National DNA Database Strategy Board Annual Report 2013-14 (London: HMSO, 2014).  
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population on the National DNDA Database for extended periods of time, and the 
exclusion of others.  
 
Research has also cast doubt on the Government’s approach in limiting the period of 
retention based on the seriousness of the offence for which the individual was first 
arrested. For example, Townsley, Smith, and Pease found that criminal careers are 
not homogeneous, and that there is a lack of evidence to suggest that the offence an 
individual is first arrested or charged in connection with is in any way a useful 
measure of the offences she is likely to go on to commit.971 Drawing on a longitudinal 
study of males from a working class area of London, research from Kazemian, Pease, 
and Farrington suggests that the deletion of DNA profiles of younger offenders may 
be particularly detrimental for subsequent serious crime detection rates.972 This 
research supported the earlier findings of Townsley, Smith and Pease that criminal 
careers tend to be heterogeneous and, consequently, retention policies based on the 
seriousness of the offence for which an individual is first arrested are not 
supported.973 In a comparison of the performance of DNA databases in European 
countries, research by Santos, Machado, and Silva suggested that the inclusiveness 
of a country’s policies with regard to the retention of DNA from non-convicted 
arrestees does not necessarily translate into greater output in terms of person-stain 
matches.974 Whilst these studies give some indication of the potential shortcomings 
of the PoFA 2012 categories of retention periods for arrestees’ DNA and fingerprint 
data, none claim to have provided a sufficiently robust empirical basis to support or 
oppose the proportionality of the Government’s retention policies. Each of the studies 
discussed draws attention to the lack of a systematic empirical research base 
supporting existing retention periods. Without such a basis providing a rational link 
																																								 																				
971 M. Townsley, C. Smith and K. Pease, Using DNA to Catch Offenders Quicker: Serious Detections Arising 
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972 L. Kazemian, K. Pease, and D. Farrington, ‘DNA Retention Policies: The Potential Contribution of 
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between the measures and their objective, it is difficult to ascertain whether or not 
the DNA and fingerprint data taken from non-convicted persons subject to a criminal 
process has any more or less probative value than that of other non-convicted 
persons, or the population at large. Consequently, the Government has not 
established that the aim of preventing and detecting crime is significantly furthered 
through the retention tariffs in the PoFA 2012.  
 
2.3.3. Minimally intrusive means 
The new retention provisions are much less intrusive than both the provisions in 
section 64 of PACE 1984, as amended by the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, 
and the proposed provisions under the Crime and Security Act 2010. However, this is 
not sufficient to satisfy the ‘minimally intrusive means’ limb of the proportionality 
analysis. To do so, the measures must impair the right as little as is necessary to 
achieve the legislative objective. Though there are ongoing academic disputes over 
what is required of the public authority at this stage,975 even on a conservative 
interpretation that ‘the claimant bears the evidential and persuasive burden of 
showing that at least one alternative measure is at least equally effective and less 
intrusive’,976 the PoFA 2012 provisions fail. A less intrusive but more effective 
retention policy would selectively retain such non-conviction information taking into 
consideration not only the offence which initiated proceedings against the individual, 
age, and previous arrests, but also the certainty with which we might say the 
individual is likely to have committed the offence for which the information is 
processed. This can only be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Retention is not as 
stigmatising or harmful as a criminal conviction. Thus, the criminal burden of proof 
would be too high a threshold for public authorities to pass before retention can be 
justified. However, any minimally intrusive retention policy must place some burden 
																																								 																				
975 See C. Chan, ‘Proportionality and Invariable Baseline Intensity of Review’ (2013) 33 Legal Studies 1-21; 
A. Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012) 449-451; J. Rivers, ‘The Presumption of Proportionality’ (2014) 77 Modern Law Review 409-
433 at 427. 
976 Rivers, ibid at 427. 
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on a public authority to filter out those who have been caught up in a criminal 
process and are not even likely to have committed any offence.  
 
A policy based on this principle recognises that criminal investigations and 
prosecutions are inherently messy. They are human processes. Each case is different 
from the next. The fact that an individual has been charged indicates that, at a 
particular time, there existed sufficient evidence to provide a reasonable prospect of 
prosecution (assuming the decision to charge was sound).977 However, between the 
charging of an individual and a non-conviction disposal of the case, many things can 
happen. At one end of the spectrum, irrefutable evidence could come to light putting 
the individual’s innocence beyond question. At the other end, a charged person might 
be acquitted in the face of overwhelming evidence against him or her, due to some 
procedural impropriety. Whilst in circumstances such as the latter the risk posed by 
the individual might be sufficient to justify biometric data retention for the periods 
that are set out in PoFA 2012 tariffs, in the case of the former, any retention would 
rightly be viewed as an opportunistic and arbitrary interference with the individual’s 
Article 8 rights. The current tariffs remain broad and indiscriminate, just less so than 
previously. Thus, it is submitted, the tariffs set out cannot be considered minimally 
intrusive. They still authorise data retention based on general categories of offence, 
without having sufficient regard to the credibility of the information surrounding the 
individual’s arrest or charge to justify retaining the biometric data. Without a strong 
evidence base, such assessments of the individual’s risk can only be made with any 
modicum of accuracy through a case-by-case analysis. However, in light of the 
ECtHR’s judgment in Animal Defenders International v United Kingdom,978 which 
lowered the burden on Contracting States for showing that a measure is minimally 
																																								 																				
977 A recent report from HMIC/HMCPSI showed that in 91.9% of the cases examined, the decision to 
charge an individual was in compliance with the Code for Crown Prosecutors. The report also showed that 
in 34.3% of cases where the decision to charge was taken by the police, it should have been referred to 
the CPS. See: HMIC/HMCPSI, Joint Inspection of the Provision of Charging Decisions (2015), 27. 
978 Animal Defenders International v United Kingdom (2013) 57 EHRR 21 at [109]. 
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intrusive, it is unclear whether the PoFA 2012 provisions could be successfully 
challenged on this ground alone.979 
 
An alternative regime, which could accommodate the certainty variable, might mirror 
the framework regulating the disclosure of non-conviction information as part of an 
Enhanced Criminal Record Certificate (ECRC). ECRCs are often sought by employers 
to vet prospective employees who will be tasked with working in contact with children 
or other vulnerable groups. As part of an ECRC a relevant chief police officer can 
disclose non-conviction information (allegations, failed prosecutions, known criminal 
associates etc.) about an applicant where it is ‘reasonably believed that the 
information is relevant’ and the information ‘ought to be included’ in the certificate.980 
Before making such a disclosure, the chief police officer ‘must have regard’ to the 
Statutory Disclosure Guidance, which outlines ten principles a relevant officer should 
adhere to on each occasion.981 Thus, in making a decision to disclose, relevant 
decision makers must consider the seriousness of the alleged offence, currency, and 
credibility of any information and balance these considerations against the risk to the 
public.982 Moreover, the decision maker must consider giving the individual subject to 
the criminal process an opportunity to make representations where possible. 
Crucially, this Guidance requires relevant chief police officers to demonstrate that the 
disclosure satisfies Article 8 ECHR on a case-by-case basis.983 Such a system avoids 
the arbitrariness of the PoFA 2012 tariffs whilst still ensuring that biometric 
information can be retained from non-convicted persons where such retention 
corresponds to a pressing social need and is proportionate to protect the public. 
 
One possible objection to this case-by-case approach is that it would be impractical 
and overburdensome on the resources of the police. Leaving aside arguments over 
whether such an objection constitutes an appropriate basis for upholding a retention 
																																								 																				
979 See Chapter 2, Part 2.3.		
980 See PoFA 2012 section 82. 
981 Home Office, Statutory Disclosure Guidance (2nd edn, London: HMSO, 2015).  
982 ibid 3-4. 
983 ibid.  
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system which unjustifiably interferes with the fundamental human rights of non-
convicted persons, it is difficult to see such considerations representing a significant 
obstacle to the implementation of a framework which uses a case-by-case approach. 
Whilst an exhaustive costing of such an approach falls beyond the scope of this 
chapter, it is unlikely that it could be any more resource intensive to implement than 
the ECRC disclosure system. The total number of ECRC applications per year is 
typically between 3-4 million, with approximately 1.1-1.2 million of these applications 
matching against local police records.984 Where such a match is made, a relevant 
Chief Police Officer (or staff member acting on his or her behalf) is tasked with 
determining whether it would be proportionate to disclose the relevant information. 
In comparison, the total number of people arrested from March 2015-April 2016 was 
869,209.985 Given that the latter figure includes arrests of those individuals who 
already have their personal information retained on the NDNAD, and those who go on 
to be convicted of the offence for which they have been arrested, the number of 
proportionality assessments the police would be required to undertake seems entirely 
manageable. 
 
2.3.4. A fair balance between the objective and the interference 
The PoFA 2012 policies have intuitive appeal. The retention periods adjust according 
to the seriousness of the offence for which an individual is arrested, the previous 
convictions of the arrestee, the age of the arrestee (i.e. whether the arrestee is a 
minor), and the type of biometric material in question (e.g. DNA samples are 
retained for less time than DNA profiles and fingerprints). Taken at face value, these 
measures might seem proportionate and necessary. They give significantly more 
consideration to the privacy interests of those subject to the criminal process than 
the expansionist policies pursued prior to the S and Marper v United Kingdom 
																																								 																				
984 See: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/dbs-dataset-1-disclosure-progress-information-disclo 
sed-and-update-service-subscriptions and http://hub.unlock.org.uk/knowledgebase/local-policeinformatio 
n-2/. 
985 Home Office, Police Powers and Procedures, England and Wales: Statistical Bulletin 15/16 (London, 
HMSO, 2016) 9. 
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judgment.986 At the fourth limb of the proportionality analysis, the courts are 
required to consider the extent to which the measures strike a fair balance between 
the Government’s objectives and the privacy interests of the individual. As discussed 
in previous chapters, this involves a clear and full recognition of the rights of the 
individual; the recognition of the importance of pursuing the objective; and an 
assessment as to whether the pursuit of the objective can justify limiting the 
individual’s rights.987  
 
First, wherever the police retain the DNA or fingerprint data of an individual as part 
of a criminal process this will be sufficient to engage Article 8(1). This baseline 
measure is at least a ‘light’ interference with Article 8(1). Other circumstantial factors 
may increase the seriousness of the interference. The length of the retention and the 
age of the arrested or charged person at the time the data is collected are significant 
variables, amongst others. Thus, whilst any non-conviction retention can be said to 
constitute at least a ‘light’ interference with Article 8(1), the extent of this 
interference may increase based on the circumstances of a particular case.  
 
The second stage of the exercise requires the supervising court to determine the 
weight of the objective pursued through the use of the interfering measure. Any 
measure which pursues one of the legitimate aims stated in Article 8(2) is at least 
serious enough to compete with the weight of an interference in the metaphorical 
balancing exercise. However, in ascertaining the weight that should properly be 
attached to a particular objective pursued through the interference, much turns on 
the facts of a particular case and a determination of the risk of future offending 
posed by the non-convicted person, which might be prevented or detected through 
DNA or fingerprint retention. Complementary to assessments of the weight attached 
to an interference, two broad factors must be considered: the importance of the 
																																								 																				
986 C. McCartney, ‘The DNA Expansion Programme and Criminal Investigation’ (2006) 46 British Journal of 
Criminology 175-192. 
987 M. Klatt and M. Meister, The Constitutional Structure of Proportionality (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012) 157.  
261	
	
objective to achieving the aim, and the certainty with which the objective will be 
realised through the use of the measure. As the proposals in PoFA 2012 do not 
provide for an assessment of the latter in each case where the police seek to retain 
such data, and as there are demonstrably cases where, absent such an assessment, 
non-convicted arrested or charged persons who pose no more risk than other non-
convicted citizens will arbitrarily have their DNA or fingerprint data retained for long 
periods of time,988 the measures cannot be said to strike a fair balance between the 
need to prevent crime and the Article 8 rights of non-convicted persons. 
 
Conclusions 
The expansion of the National DNA Database was driven by several overlapping, and 
mutually reinforcing policy drivers: over-estimation of DNA evidence as the all-
encompassing crime prevention tool of the future;989 lack of recognition, politically 
and among domestic judges, of the manner and extent to which the retention of DNA 
and fingerprint data can set back the privacy related interests of those subject to the 
criminal justice process; and the political climate from the early 1990s-late 2000s 
when recorded crime was falling but when fear of crime was increasing.990  
 
This thesis has developed a normative model for assessing whether the privacy 
interests of those subject to a criminal process are afforded adequate protection in 
England and Wales. This chapter’s discussion is illuminating in several respects. First, 
it has shown that, in the area of non-conviction arrestee DNA retention, domestic 
judges consistently failed to recognise the impact that such DNA retention can have 
on the privacy related interests of those subject to the criminal justice process. As S 
																																								 																				
988 It does not take a great imaginative leap to conceive of situations arising where the innocence of an 
individual charged with a qualifying serious offence is subsequently put beyond dispute. For example, 
where an individual’s alibi is confirmed post-charge, or where it is conclusively found that a false allegation 
has been made. 
989 See C. McCartney, n 986; R. Williams and P. Johnson, Genetic Policing: The Use of DNA in Criminal 
Investigations (Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 2008); R. Williams, ‘DNA Databases and the Forensic 
Imaginary’ in R. Hindmarsh and B. Prainsack (eds.) Genetic Suspects: Global Governance of Forensic DNA 
Profiling and Databasing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 131-152. 
990 D. Skinner, ‘”The NDNAD Has No Ability in Itself to be Discriminatory”: Ethnicity and the Governance of 
the UK National DNA Database’ (2013) 47 Sociology 976-992 at 978.  
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and Marper progressed through the domestic courts, it seemed all too easy for 
judges to characterise the interference with privacy interests constituted by DNA and 
fingerprint retention as minor, paying minimal attention to exactly how such 
retention can set back individual privacy interests. Even in the Court of Appeal, 
where an interference with Article 8(1) was recognised, the court’s reasoning 
betrayed a lack of understanding of the normative value of privacy. Given the parlous 
state of the law governing the privacy protection afforded to arrestees’ biometric 
information, the ECtHR’s judgment in S and Marper has been transformative not only 
in bringing domestic law into alignment with other Contracting States in this area, 
but also by requiring domestic judges to pay more detailed attention to privacy 
interests. 
 
This second case-study highlights the significant role the ECtHR plays in interpreting 
the scope of Article 8 ECHR and how this has served to enhance the privacy 
protections for those subject to the criminal justice process in England and Wales. 
The chapter demonstrated, however, that, as far as the development of a 
proportionate legal framework regulating DNA and fingerprint retention is concerned, 
we are not yet out of the woods. The PoFA 2012 provisions have undoubtedly 
increased the level of privacy protection afforded to those subject to the criminal 
process. The question of whether DNA and fingerprint retention engages Article 8(1) 
has been answered resoundingly in the affirmative in English law. Moreover, these 
provisions restrict the extent to which such data can be retained from young persons 
and those arrested or charged with minor offences. However, blanket retention in 
cases where an individual is arrested or charged but not convicted is neither rational, 
minimally intrusive, nor fair. The Statutory Disclosure Guidance regulating ECRC 
disclosure offers a potentially superior model or template for how decisions to retain 
personal information from arrestees or charged persons should be made, not only 
having regard to the age of the individual subject to the criminal process and the 
seriousness of the alleged offence, but also to the likelihood that the circumstances 
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surrounding a particular case indicate that retention may make a significant 
contribution to the prevention or detection of crime. This chapter has argued that the 
PoFA 2012 tariffs are incompatible with English law on its own terms. The current 
risk-averse approach of domestic legislators does not afford adequate privacy 
protection to innocent individuals, adding further pains to an already coercive process 
without adequate justification. 
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6 Non-Conviction Information Disclosure 
as Part of an Enhanced Criminal Record 
Certificate 
Does the legal framework regulating the dissemination of personal information as 
part of an Enhanced Criminal Records Certificate (ECRC) recognise, and afford 
adequate protection to, the privacy related interests of those who have been subject 
to the criminal justice process? Dissemination occurs when personal information 
about the individual is revealed.991 This can set back privacy related interests in a 
number of ways. However, the dissemination of personal information linking an 
individual to a criminal investigation or prosecution can have particularly pernicious 
effects. As many commentators have noted, such dissemination can stigmatise or 
disqualify the individual.992  
 
This chapter focuses on the dissemination of such non-conviction information as part 
of an Enhanced Criminal Records Certificate (ECRC). For the purposes of this chapter 
‘non-conviction’ information refers to any personal information that may be disclosed 
by the police on an Enhanced Criminal Record Certificate, which does not directly 
pertain to any criminal convictions or cautions the applicant might have. The 
certificates are often sought by employers where a job applicant or volunteer seeks 
to work in a position of trust which requires frequent contact with children or other 
vulnerable groups. Concerns are raised regarding the extent to which the framework 
regulating the disclosure of non-conviction information as part of an ECRC strikes a 
fair balance between privacy interests and countervailing interests such as public 
safety and the prevention of crime. 
 
 
																																								 																				
991 D. Solove, ‘A Taxonomy of Privacy’ (2006) 154 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 477-560 at 523. 
992 T. Nagel, ‘Concealment and Exposure’ (1998) 27 Philosophy and Public Affairs 3-30 at 3; D. Solove, 
Understanding Privacy (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2008) 101-171; P. Rumney and R. 
Fenton, ‘Rape, Defendant Anonymity and Evidence-Based Policy Making’ (2013) 76 Modern Law Review 
109-133 at 127. 
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1. The Development of the Legal Framework  
The Police National Computer (PNC) holds around 10 million nominal records. These 
are created when an individual is arrested, cautioned, convicted, reprimanded, or 
warned in respect of a recordable offence or certain other minor offences.993 The 
Police National Database (PND) stores ‘soft’ or non-conviction intelligence about 
individuals. This includes details of investigations and allegations which do not lead to 
an arrest or one of the disposals listed above. Information on the PND is usually held 
for six years but may be held for longer for investigations into serious crime.994 The 
police provide non-conviction information to the Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) 
when it is requested for a criminal record check, provided that the police deem the 
information to be relevant and proportionate.  
 
The DBS carries out criminal record checks for specific positions, professions, 
employment, offices, works, and licences included in the Rehabilitation of Offenders 
Act 1974 (Exceptions) Order 1975 and the Police Act 1997.995 The three main levels 
of criminal record check are as follows:  
(i) Basic Check – peculiarly, individuals in England and Wales can apply to 
Disclosure Scotland for a basic check. These are normally used for 
employment positions not exempted from the Rehabilitation of Offenders 
Act 1974 (ROA 1974) and contain information regarding unspent 
convictions.996 
(ii) Standard Criminal Record Certificate (SCRC) – this criminal records check 
reveals information about an individual’s ‘spent’ and ‘unspent’ criminal 
																																								 																				
993 Home Office, ‘Nominal Criminal Records on the Police National Computer - GOV.UK’ (2015) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/nominal-criminal-records-on-the-police-national-
computer/nominal-criminal-records-on-the-police-national-computer> accessed 29 December 2015. 
994 NPIA, Code of Practice: on the operation and use of the Police National Database (London: The 
Stationary Office, 2015).  
995 Disclosure and Barring Service, A Guide to Eligibility for DBS Checks (London: OGL, 2015) 1. 
996 ‘Spent’ convictions do not have to be disclosed by the individual when applying for most jobs or in other 
situations such as when applying for a mortgage. When a conviction becomes spent depends upon a range 
of factors including the age of the offender at the time of the conviction, and the seriousness of the offence 
committed. 
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convictions, cautions, reprimands, and warnings, unless these have been 
‘filtered’ under new filtering rules.997  
(iii) Enhanced Criminal Records Certificate (ECRC) – the ECRC contains all the 
information contained on a SCRC, and can additionally list any relevant 
information held on local police records such as ‘soft intelligence’ and other 
non-conviction information. This level of check is used for certain positions 
included in the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (Exceptions) Order 
1975 and prescribed in section 113B, of the Police Act 1997.998 The 
majority of positions for which a job applicant will undergo an ECRC 
require the applicant to work in close contact with children or vulnerable 
adults. 
 
Thus, it is only where an individual is the subject of an ECRC that the DBS may 
disseminate information pertaining to his or her involvement in a criminal process 
that did not result in a finding or admission of guilt.999  
 
1.1 A Brief History of Legal and Political Developments in 
Non-Conviction Disclosure 
In 1954 a working party of chief officers of police outlined some of the fundamental 
principles which have underpinned the development of criminal records disclosure 
policy since that time:  
It has been a fundamental rule that police information should not be used 
except for the purposes for which it was acquired, and therefore that it should 
not be disclosed to persons in authority, however responsible, other than those 
concerned with police functions, unless the consideration of public interest is 
sufficiently weighty to justify departure from this general rule.1000 
																																								 																				
997  In May 2013, the Government introduced new filtering rules which remove certain convictions and 
cautions from DBS checks automatically. Eligible offences are normally minor and can be filtered after an 
amount of time up to 11 years depending on the age of the offender at the time of the offence, and the 
type of disposal received (i.e. caution or conviction). For further information see: Disclosure and Barring 
Service, DBS Filtering Guide (London: Ministry of Justice, 2013). 
998 Statutory Disclosure Guidance (2nd edn. London: Home Office, 2015). 
999 This analysis is not focused on the regulation of other forms of criminal record check, such as those that 
might be carried out as part of national security vetting for certain government positions. See Ministry of 
Defence, ‘National Security Vetting’ (2012) <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/security-vetting-and-
clearance> accessed 9 January 2016.  
1000 See Home Office, Disclosure of Criminal Records for Employment Vetting Purposes, Cm 2319 (London: 
HMSO, 1993) 4. 
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This suggests that (from at least this time) there has been a consistent recognition 
that criminal records disclosure can have a detrimental impact upon the individual’s 
life, and such disclosures should only be made where the interests of the individual 
are outweighed by the public interest. At common law, there is a presumption that 
any personal information, which is not generally available to the public and comes 
into the possession of a public body during the course of performing its public duties, 
ought not to be disclosed except where disclosure is judged necessary for the 
protection of the public.1001 Thus, it has long been recognised that a blanket policy of 
disclosure cannot be justified at common law.1002 Unlike the expansion of powers to 
retain DNA in the 1990s, the movement towards a new legislative framework for the 
regulation of criminal records disclosure took place against the background of a clear 
recognition that such dissemination is potentially deleterious to privacy interests. 
However, the increasing demand for criminal records disclosure as part of the 
employment recruitment process was driven at least in part by popular concern 
about crime. In 1983 a four-year-old child was sexually assaulted and murdered by a 
man who had been able to obtain work as a baby-sitter, despite previously being 
convicted of several serious sex offences against children.1003 In response to this 
crime (and the public reaction which followed) the Government issued a circular, 
which suggested that where an individual would have substantial access to children 
as part of a particular role, disclosures should include details of cautions, bind-overs 
and detected cases.1004 A further Home Office Circular in 1988 extended such 
disclosures to include ‘acquittals or decisions not to prosecute where the 
circumstances of the case give cause for concern.’1005 
 
The increased demands these changes put on the systems for criminal records 
keeping and disclosure, which were then still only partially computerised, propelled 
																																								 																				
1001 See R v Devon County Council, Ex parte L [1991] 2 FLR 541. 
1002 See, for example, R v Chief Constable of the North Wales Police, Ex parte AB [1999] QB 396, 428. 
1003 n 1000, 4. 
1004 HOC 45/1986. 
1005 HOC 102/1988.  
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the case for the reform of criminal records disclosure. In 1990, a Home Affairs 
Committee inquiry into the maintenance and use of criminal records proposed that 
the police should be relieved of the burden of disclosing criminal records to eliminate 
disparities between the policies of different forces.1006 The Committee proposed the 
establishment of an independent agency to maintain and disclose criminal records. 
Notably, it also proposed that only records relating to recordable offences should be 
made available for vetting purposes.1007 However, following an Efficiency Scrutiny of 
the proposals, this limitation was dropped in cases where child protection concerns 
existed.1008 In 1993, the Home Office issued a consultation paper, Disclosure of 
Criminal Records for Employment Vetting Purposes, which proposed legislation to 
establish a central vetting body, define the criteria for vetting, and define the type of 
information that should properly be disclosed in various contexts.1009  
 
In response, the Government produced a White Paper in June 1996.1010 This accepted 
the proposals for the establishment of an independent criminal records agency and 
proposed three levels of criminal record check that are broadly similar to the current 
Basic Check, SCRC, and ECRC. The proposed enhanced check would give details of 
minor convictions, cautions and non-conviction information in addition to any 
information disclosable on a standard check. This would be available where 
prospective employees or volunteers may have unsupervised contact with children 
and young people under 18, as well as for gaming and lottery licensing.1011  
 
Later in 1996, the Police Bill1012 was published. Part V of the Bill implemented the 
criminal records proposals set out in the White Paper. Regarding ECRCs, the Bill 
proposed that these would be issued on joint application between the individual and 
																																								 																				
1006 See Home Affairs Committee Third Report, session 1989-1990 (London: HMSO, 1990). 
1007 Generally, recordable offences are imprisonable offences; they could attract a sentence of 
imprisonment. However, some non-imprisonable offences are also classed as recordable: ibid at [41]. 
1008 Home Office, The National Collection of Criminal Records: Report of an Efficiency Scrutiny (1991). 
1009 Home Office, n 1000, 20. 
1010 Home Office, On the Record: the Government’s proposals for access to criminal records for 
employment and related purposes in England and Wales, Cm 3308 (London: HMSO, 1996). 
1011 ibid. 
1012 HL Bill 10 1996/1997. 
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the registered body seeking the check. The Bill also stipulated that non-conviction 
information would only be supplied as part of an ECRC where such information is 
deemed relevant to the interests of the prevention and detection of crime.1013 At the 
Bill’s second reading in the House of Lords, concerns were raised that untested and 
inaccurate personal information might have an injurious effect on an individual’s 
pursuit of certain careers.1014 
 
At the same reading, Baroness Hilton questioned whether ECRCs should be extended 
to include vulnerable groups other than children.1015 At the Committee stage a 
number of amendments were debated. An amendment to require the publication of 
guidelines for chief police officers on which factors might properly be taken into 
account, and which should be ignored, as part of an ECRC was not accepted.1016 
Baroness Blatch did not see a need to legislate in this area as the White Paper made 
it clear that information disclosed as part of an ECRC may include ‘details about 
known associates where the association gives rise to concern’, decisions not to 
prosecute, and acquittals where the circumstances of the case give rise to concern, 
but may not include details of allegations which cannot be substantiated.1017 
Baroness Hilton maintained, however, that the information contained in the White 
Paper was not adequate. Such information does not form part of regulations and 
does not constitute a formal guideline. Furthermore, the guidance in the White Paper 
allowed for acquittals to be disclosed as part of an ECRC:  
Acquittals are surely matters for the judicial system of the country and cannot 
be used as part of someone's criminal record. I do not believe that it is a matter 
for the opinion of the chief officer, however compelling the Police Service may 
consider the evidence. If a court has found that someone is not guilty, to all 
intents and purposes that person has been found innocent of that charge. I do 
not understand that that can be a matter of opinion for the police.1018  
 
 
																																								 																				
1013 ibid. 
1014 HL Debate 11, November 1996, c820. 
1015 ibid c829. 
1016 HL Debate, 2 December 1996, cc544-547. 
1017 ibid c545. 
1018 ibid c546. 
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The Government extended ECRCs to those working in certain capacities with 
vulnerable adults.1019 There was cross-party recognition that the disclosure of non-
conviction information as part of an enhanced check could significantly set back the 
privacy interests of the individual. Nonetheless, the Police Act 1997 was enacted on 
21 March 1997, and sections 115 and 116 provided for ECRCs. The disclosure of 
ECRCs was confined to those regularly caring for, training, supervising, or being in 
sole charge of persons aged under 18, or vulnerable adults, to sensitive areas of 
licensing, and the appointment of the judiciary.1020 Section 115(7) set out that the 
chief officer of every relevant police force should provide, as part of an ECRC, any 
information which in his or her opinion ‘might be relevant’ and ‘ought to be included 
in the certificate.’1021  
 
Soon after its enactment, the Police Act 1997 was inherited by the New Labour 
Government. In 1998, the Government announced that it would implement the Police 
Act 1997 and would introduce a new criminal records agency, the Criminal Records 
Bureau.1022 The programme to establish the Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) was 
initiated in 1999. However, due to various administrative delays, the service did not 
become operational until March 2002.1023 The CRB had a bumpy beginning due to 
problems caused by a high demand for disclosure, an unanticipated preference for 
paper-based applications from employers, and employers favouring enhanced 
criminal records checks (which were available for the same price as standard 
checks).1024 
 
The murder of two schoolchildren, Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman, (commonly 
known as the Soham murders) would bring the issue of vetting and enhanced 
																																								 																				
1019 HL Deb 20 January 1997, c533. 
1020 See sections 115(3)-(5), Police Act 1997. 
1021 Section 115(7), Police Act 1997. 
1022 See Home Office, Criminal Records Bureau to Strengthen Child Protection Safeguards (Press Release, 
14 December 1998); T. Thomas, ‘Employment Screening and the Criminal Records Bureau’ (2002) 31 
Industrial Law Journal 55-70 at 65. 
1023 National Audit Office, Criminal Records Bureau: Delivering Safer Recruitment (London: The Stationary 
Office, 2004) 1. 
1024 ibid. 
271	
	
criminal records disclosure into mainstream political discourse. On 17 December 
2003, Ian Huntley, who had previously been investigated by the police in relation to 
eight separate sexual offences from 1995 to 1999, was convicted of the murders. 
This caused ‘widespread public disquiet’ when it came to light that Huntley’s previous 
dealings with the police were not disclosed as part of the vetting process carried out 
by Cambridgeshire Constabulary at the time of Huntley’s appointment as a school 
caretaker at the primary school attended by his victims.1025 Home Secretary David 
Blunkett set up the Bichard Inquiry, which would assess the effectiveness of 
intelligence-based record keeping, vetting practices, and information sharing between 
different agencies.1026 Before the findings of the Inquiry were published, Baroness 
Walmsley captured the public mood regarding the importance of sharing and 
disclosing non-conviction information to protect children:  
While caution must be applied … to protect the human rights of applicants, the 
children's charities support the use of soft details because of the simple fact 
that as many as 90 per cent of paedophiles are never convicted… We must 
recognise that those who offend against children are often clever and devious 
people who will exploit any loophole that exists. We must address that with the 
utmost priority because they are clever fish who will find any little hole in our 
net and slither through it.1027  
 
 
The Bichard Inquiry duly recommended a number of ‘net-repairing’ measures 
including the extension of the enhanced disclosure regime to cover all posts that 
involve working with children and vulnerable adults;1028 the clarification of registered 
bodies’ precise responsibilities for checking the identity of applicants;1029 and the 
extension of databases that are accessed by the CRB.1030 One of the main failings of 
the authorities in the case of Ian Huntley was the failure of Humberside Police, which 
had previously investigated Huntley for sex offences on several occasions, to pass 
this intelligence on to Cambridgeshire Constabularly, which conducted the vetting of 
Huntley on behalf of the school. This failing and the aftermath of the Bichard Inquiry 
would eventually lead to the creation of the Police National Database (PND). This 
																																								 																				
1025 M. Bichard, The Bichard Inquiry Report HC 653 (London: The Stationary Office, 2004). 
1026 ibid 1. 
1027 HL Debate 2 March 2004, cc 625-626. 
1028 n 1025, 144. 
1029 ibid 145. 
1030 ibid 147. 
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database operates at the national level, allowing police forces across the United 
Kingdom to share information with one another immediately.1031 
 
Against the backdrop of these political and legal developments, the enhanced 
disclosure regime under section 115 of the Police Act 1997 was challenged in R (X) v 
Chief Constable of West Midlands Police.1032 The claimant was applying for a position 
as a social worker, which involved caring for and supervising persons under the age 
of 18. His potential employer sought information about him from the Criminal 
Records Bureau and the claimant duly applied for an ECRC. The claimant sought 
judicial review of the defendant Chief Constable’s decision to include as part of this 
ECRC information that he had previously been charged with, but not subsequently 
convicted of, two counts of indecent exposure.1033 
 
Under the ‘Other Relevant Information’ section of the ECRC, the Chief Constable 
disclosed information about the prior allegations, the claimant’s response in a police 
interview that he ‘did not think’ he had committed the offences but could not 
remember, and that the case was discontinued.1034 The claimant challenged the ECRC 
on the grounds that it was incompatible with his rights under Article 8 ECHR.1035 
Providing further support to the notion that the privacy interests at stake in this area 
are consistently recognised, Wall J held that there was an interference with Article 
8(1) on the facts of the case; this was common ground between counsel and not 
elaborated on.1036 Regarding the question of justification for the interference, Wall J 
noted that section 115(7) ‘gives a very wide and apparently subjective discretion to 
the Chief Constable.’1037  
 
																																								 																				
1031 See National Policing Improvement Agency, Code of Practice on the Operation and Use of the Police 
National Database (London: The Stationary Office, 2010). 
1032 R (X) v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [2004] 1 WLR 1518. 
1033 ibid 1520. 
1034 ibid 1521. 
1035 ibid 1521. 
1036 ibid 1530. 
1037 ibid 1536. 
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Wall J observed that the common law principles governing disclosure in that case 
would: 
[n]eed to be applied all the more stringently (a) when one is dealing with 
information about a person who has not been either convicted of a criminal 
offence or found on the balance of probabilities to have committed an act of 
indecency by a judge in civil proceedings; and (b) where the identity of the 
person who is alleged to have committed the act details of which it is intended 
to disclose is in issue.1038 
 
Wall J also noted that the disclosure must respond to a pressing social need, the 
nature and extent of which depending upon the facts of each case. This requires a 
rigorous balancing exercise in accordance with Article 8 and relevant common law 
principles.1039 Wall J also observed that ‘the Chief Constable should form his opinion 
that the information is relevant and should be disclosed because, viewed objectively, 
it is, taken as a whole, reliable.’1040 Wall J turned to the facts of the immediate case, 
observing that the opinions of the relevant chief police officer, the officers 
investigating the initial allegations against the claimant, and the CRB staff member 
referred to as S regarding the guilt of the claimant weighed far too heavily in the 
decision to disclose the non-conviction information as part of the ECRC.1041 Wall J 
allowed the claim and refused leave to appeal, citing the fact that his decision 
depended heavily on the facts of the case and that the applicable law was not 
essentially in dispute among his reasons. Notwithstanding Wall J’s ruling, Kennedy LJ 
granted leave to appeal on 24 March 2004.1042 
 
The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the Chief Constable’s appeal. Lord Woolf CJ 
ruled that, whilst the disclosure of personal information as part of an ECRC may 
engage Article 8(1) - notwithstanding the fact that it was the claimant who applied 
for the ECRC - section 115 of the Police Act 1997 does not in principle contravene 
Article 8.1043 
																																								 																				
1038 ibid 1535. 
1039 ibid 1536. 
1040 ibid 1538. 
1041 ibid 1539. 
1042 R (X) v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [2005] 1 WLR 65, 69. 
1043 ibid 72. 
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Turning to the immediate case, Lord Woolf CJ observed that the transcript from the 
police interview was unfavourable to the claimant’s case as X did not emphatically or 
promptly deny the accusation. Thus, in Lord Woolf CJ’s judgment, it was not 
unreasonable for the police to conclude that the claimant had been correctly 
identified as the perpetrator of the indecent exposure.1044 Lord Woolf CJ also 
determined that a requirement for the Chief Constable to give the claimant 
opportunities to make representations would impose too heavy a burden on the 
police, especially having regard to the language of section 115, which he interpreted 
as putting the Chief Constable under a duty to disclose any information which might 
be relevant unless there was a good reason not to do so.1045  
 
From this standpoint, Lord Woolf CJ had little trouble finding the disclosure satisfied 
Article 8(2) as well:  
[A]s long as the Chief Constable was entitled to form the opinion that the 
information disclosed might be relevant, then absent any untoward 
circumstance which is not present here, it is difficult to see that there can be 
any reason why the information that “might be relevant”, ought not be included 
in the certificate.1046 
 
 
Lord Woolf CJ took no issue with the lack of detail or explanation in the balancing 
exercise undertaken by the relevant chief officer. Whilst conceding that it would be 
regrettable if the information disclosed did not relate to the claimant, Lord Woolf CJ 
suggested that the claimant’s position would be no worse than if the prospective 
employer had asked the claimant whether he had been charged with a criminal 
offence.1047 Concurring, Mummery LJ emphasised the prospective employer’s rights 
and freedoms, and the rights and freedoms of the vulnerable persons the claimant 
may come into contact with through his chosen career.1048 Furthermore, Mummery LJ 
observed that since there had been no arguments on whether the disclosure engaged 
																																								 																				
1044 ibid 76. 
1045 ibid 81. 
1046 ibid 82. 
1047 ibid 83. 
1048 ibid 84. 
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Article 8(1) he must not be interpreted as accepting that Article 8(1) was applicable 
in the case.  
 
This judgment set a low threshold for non-conviction disclosure as part of an ECRC. 
The extent to which the threshold harmonises with adequate protection of privacy 
interests will be discussed later in this chapter. Subsequent cases confirmed this 
approach,1049 and, following reports in January 2006 that a number of convicted child 
sex offenders were working in schools, the powers to disclose non-conviction 
information were expanded.1050 On 5 April 2005 the Department of Health published 
a consultation document, Making Safeguarding Everybody’s Business: A Post-Bichard 
Vetting Scheme.1051 The proposals within this document aimed to build on the 
existing barring lists and Criminal Record Bureau services to provide a 
comprehensive and centralised vetting system.1052 This would involve the expansion 
of the eligibility criteria for enhanced disclosure as part of employment vetting to 
include all staff who work in child or vulnerable adult-related settings;1053 the 
creation of a two-tier barred list based on the degree of contact a potential employee 
might have with children or vulnerable groups;1054 and the establishment of the 
Independent Barring Board, which would become known as the Independent 
Safeguarding Authority (ISA).1055 These changes would be implemented under the 
Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006. However, these provisions do not need 
close scrutiny for our purposes as the ECRC system was ultimately to be retained and 
would remain the main mechanism through which non-conviction information would 
be disclosed in the employment context. 
																																								 																				
1049 See R (B) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWHC 579 (Admin) at [55]; R 
(Pinnington) v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police [2008] EWHC 1870 (Admin); R (SL) v 
Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2008] EWHC 1442 (Admin) at [13]. Whilst in the latter case, 
Laws LJ quashed the ECRC, he did so applying the standard in R (X). The detailed scrutiny of the 
justification for disclosure in this case was more exacting than others post-R (X), which may have been 
indicative of a softening stance towards applicants on behalf of the judiciary: see C. Baldwin, ‘Necessary 
Intrusion or Criminalising the Innocent? An exploration of modern criminal vetting’ (2012) 76 Journal of 
Criminal Law 140-163 at 151. 
1050 HC Debate 12 January 2006, cc 435-436. 
1051 M. Hodge and S. Ladyman Making Safeguarding Everybody’s Business: A Post-Bichard Vetting Scheme 
(Department of Health, 2005). 
1052 ibid 3. 
1053 ibid 5. 
1054 Section 2, Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Bill 2006 [HL]. 
1055 Sched 1, Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Bill 2006 [HL]. 
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1.2 R (L) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis: 
Bringing the law to ‘common sense’ levels?  
In October 2009, the Supreme Court in R (L) v Commissioner of Police of the 
Metropolis dismissed a challenge to the enhanced criminal records disclosure scheme 
under section 115 of the Police Act 1997.1056 As in R (X) v Chief Constable of the 
West Midlands Police, the case concerned the disclosure of non-conviction 
information as part of an ECRC. In dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court 
provided clarification of the law governing ECRCs. The claimant (referred to as “L”), 
underwent criminal records checking as part of her employment by an agency, which 
provided staff for schools. Through the agency, the claimant worked as a midday 
assistant in a secondary school, supervising children at lunchtimes.1057 The ECRC, 
which was disclosed to the agency, showed that the claimant had no previous 
convictions or cautions. However, the Chief Constable provided details of the 
claimant’s son’s (referred to as “X”) listing on a child protection register due to the 
claimant’s alleged lack of ability to care for him; the claimant’s refusal to cooperate 
with social services; and information that X had a previous conviction for robbery.1058 
 
In his leading judgment, Lord Hope considered whether or not the scheme under 
section 115 of the Police Act 1997 interferes with Article 8(1). The defendant 
Commissioner submitted that there was no interference with Article 8(1), first, 
because some of the information disclosed in the ECRC was in the public domain 
anyway; and second, because the claimant had herself applied for the certificate. 
Lord Hope found that, as Article 8 comprises the right to establish and maintain 
relationships with others and because the enhanced disclosure involved sharing 
information about the claimant, which had been collected and stored by the police, 
																																								 																				
1056 R (L) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2010] 1 AC 410. 
1057 ibid 410. 
1058 ibid 411. 
277	
	
such disclosure is likely to engage Article 8 in virtually every case.1059 Lord Neuberger 
also found that Article 8(1) was engaged through the disclosure, as an adverse ECRC 
will often shut off employment opportunities for the applicant in a large number of 
different fields: 
[E]ven where the ECRC records a conviction (or caution) for a relatively minor, 
or questionably relevant, offence, a prospective employer may well feel it safer, 
particularly in the present culture, which, at least in its historical context, can 
be said to be unusually risk-averse and judgmental, to reject the applicant.1060  
 
 
Regarding the argument that Article 8(1) is not applicable because the claimant 
herself applied for the ECRC, Lord Hope accepted that applicants consent to ECRC 
disclosure, ‘but only on the basis that their right to private life is respected.’1061 
Dissenting on this point, Lord Scott took the view that Article 8(1) could not be 
engaged as the claimant ‘invited the exercise by the chief police officer of the 
statutory duty imposed by section 115(7).’1062 Thus, according to his Lordship, Lord 
Hope’s proposition was an impossible one because the ‘any information’ to which 
section 115(7) refers is bound to include information pertaining to the private life of 
the individual making the application.1063 Lord Neuberger was unimpressed by this 
interpretation, observing that it could circumvent Convention rights across the 
board.1064 
 
Turning attention to Article 8(2), Lord Hope determined that the decision to disclose 
non-conviction information under section 115 of the Police Act 1997 boiled down to a 
question of proportionality.1065 Thus, given the fact that disclosure in almost all cases 
will interfere with Article 8(1), and that the regime set forth in section 115 is not 
incompatible with Article 8, the question of whether or not a decision to disclose 
under this framework is justified falls to an analysis of the final limb of Article 8(2), 
																																								 																				
1059 ibid 423. 
1060 ibid 438. 
1061 ibid 433. 
1062 ibid 436. 
1063 ibid 436. 
1064 ibid 439-440. 
1065 ibid 432. 
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which requires courts to consider whether or not the measure is proportionate to its 
aim, and necessary.  
 
The majority of the Supreme Court (Lord Scott dissenting) determined that the 
decision in R (X) v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police put the rights of 
vulnerable groups above the privacy interests of job applicants. Lord Hope cited 
guidelines given to chief police officers to assist them in making an enhanced 
disclosure which explicitly put the interests of vulnerable groups above the interests 
of ECRC applicants in support of his conclusion.1066 Furthermore, Lord Hope noted 
that the use of the ECRC scheme had substantially increased since the establishment 
of the CRB, thus increasing the weight of the interference caused by the scheme.1067 
According to Lord Hope, the interpretation of section 115(7) in R (X) v Chief 
Constable of the West Midlands Police, that any information a chief police officer 
reasonably believes ‘might be relevant’ for the ECRC should be disclosed unless there 
is good reason not to disclose it, is inconsistent with the language of the Police Act 
1997, which in itself affords wide discretion to Chief Police Officers.1068  
  
For the majority, where the disruption to applicants’ private lives is as great as, or 
greater than, the risk posed to vulnerable groups, careful consideration is required 
before disclosure. The majority ruled that in cases of doubt applicants should be 
given the opportunity to make representations. However, in the immediate case, due 
to the relevance and accuracy of the information in question, and the potential risk to 
children, the disclosure struck a fair balance.  
 
R (L) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis established that, as all enhanced 
disclosures are likely to interfere with an individual’s rights under Article 8(1), the 
police should consider two issues when determining whether to disclose non-
																																								 																				
1066 ibid 427-429. 
1067 ‘The number of disclosures of information by means of ECRCs has exceeded 200,000 for each of the 
last two years (215,640 for 2007/2008; 274,877 for 2008/2009). Not far short of 10% of these disclosures 
have had section 115(7) information on them (17,560 for 2007/2008; 21,045 for 2008/2009).’ ibid 432. 
1068 ibid 433. 
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conviction information. First, whether the information is reliable and relevant; and 
second, whether it is proportionate to disclose the information.1069  
 
On 15 June 2010 the new Coalition Government announced its plans to halt the 
expansion of the vetting and barring scheme and bring criminal records and barring 
checks ‘back to common-sense levels.’1070 The Government undertook a review of 
criminal record information disclosure, which was conducted by the Independent 
Advisor for Criminality Information Management, Sunita Mason. The first phase of the 
review, published in February 2011,1071 recommended the restriction of individual 
eligibility for enhanced criminal record checks to those working unsupervised or in 
regular contact with children or vulnerable adults, and the introduction of a filter to 
remove, where appropriate, old and minor conviction information.1072 With regard to 
non-conviction information, Mason made the following recommendations to make the 
non-conviction disclosure regime simpler and fairer:  
 
(i) the test used by Chief Officers to make disclosure decisions is amended 
from “might be relevant” to “reasonably believes to be relevant”;1073  
(ii) ‘the development of a statutory code of practice for police to use when 
deciding what information should be disclosed’;1074  
(iii) ‘the development and use of a common template to ensure that a 
consistent level of information is disclosed to the individual with clearly 
set out reasons for that decision’;1075 and 
(iv)  the development of an open and transparent representations process 
overseen by an independent expert rather than by the police.1076 
 
																																								 																				
1069 J. Beard and S. Lipscombe, The Retention and Disclosure of Criminal Records (House of Commons 
Library Briefing Paper CBP6441, 12 August 2015) 8. 
1070 HC Debate 15 June 2010, cc 46-47. 
1071 S. Mason, A Common Sense Approach: A review of the criminal records regime in England and Wales – 
Report on Phase 1. 11 February 2011. 
1072 ibid 28. 
1073 ibid 33. 
1074 ibid 34. 
1075 ibid 35. 
1076 ibid 41. 
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The Government implemented the review’s recommendations in section 82 of the 
Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA 2012).1077 The Government also published 
detailed guidance to assist the police in decisions regarding the disclosure of non-
conviction information as part of an ECRC. A Quality Assurance Framework (QAF), 
published jointly by the DBS and the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC),1078 set 
out the general approach whereby a chief police officer should consider the gravity, 
reliability, and relevance of the information, and the period of time that has elapsed 
since the relevant events took place.1079 Alongside the QAF, the Home Office 
published the Statutory Disclosure Guidance for providing information as part of an 
enhanced disclosure.1080 This guidance detailed the following principles among others 
to be applied in determining whether or not information should be included as part of 
an ECRC:  
(i) There should be no presumption either in favour of or against providing a 
specific item or category of information. 
(ii) Information must only be provided if the chief officer reasonably believes it 
to be relevant for the prescribed purpose. 
(iii) Information should only be provided if, in the chief officer’s opinion, it 
ought to be included in the certificate (having regard to Article 8 ECHR). 
(iv) The chief officer should consider whether the applicant should be afforded 
the opportunity to make representations.1081 
 
Both the QAF and the statutory guidance are documents to which a relevant Chief 
Police Officer must have regard under section 113B(4) of the Police Act 1997, as 
amended by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. 
 
																																								 																				
1077 Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Explanatory Notes, section 82.  
1078 Then named the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) 
1079 Officers Quality Assurance Framework (version 9) (London: Disclosure and Barring Service-Association 
of Chief Police, 22 January 2014). 
1080 n 998. 
1081 ibid. 
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2. Assessing Non-Conviction Disclosure  
That the dissemination of information concerning an individual’s involvement in a 
criminal justice process to his or her potential employer can - and in most cases, will 
- set back his or her privacy related interests has been relatively uncontroversial 
among domestic judges and politicians. However, the reasons for this recognition are 
varied. Replicating the structure of the preceding two chapters, the following 
discussion first focuses on the merits and limitations of the reasoning of judges 
pertaining to this coverage question (i.e. why, and to what extent, does disclosure 
set back privacy related interests?), before moving on to consider whether, and to 
what extent, the disclosure of such information can be justified in principle. 
 
At the outset we can see that the framework regulating non-conviction information 
disclosure in this context is more exacting than the framework regulating DNA and 
fingerprint data retention. It offers a higher threshold for the police to pass before an 
interfering measure can lawfully be taken. The following analysis explores this 
apparent discrepancy.  
 
2.1 Article 8(1): To what extent does non-conviction 
disclosure set back privacy interests? 
One of the reasons for which the disclosure of personal information as part of an 
ECRC is considered a serious interference with the right to respect for private life 
might, somewhat unexpectedly, have more to do with the principle in criminal 
procedure law that one should be presumed innocent until proven guilty, than 
relating to privacy concerns. Throughout the development of law and policy in this 
area, there has been an intuitive recognition that the disclosure of non-conviction 
information bears upon the presumption of innocence. The argument surfaced in R 
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(X) v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police,1082 and again in Mason’s review of 
non-conviction disclosure.1083 
 
The presumption of innocence is a component of the right to a fair trial, which is a 
higher order human right than the right to respect for private life in the jurisprudence 
of the ECtHR.1084 While vetting checks as part of an employment process are not a 
trial, it is easy to see how the sharing of information about allegations or other soft 
intelligence stored in police records might be construed as an affront to the 
presumption of innocence. From the employer’s perspective, the aim of obtaining this 
non-conviction information is, ultimately, to draw inferences about, or assess the 
character of, the individual concerned, and to assess the risks he or she might pose 
to the interests of the employer’s company or organisation. Where the information 
sought does not relate to convictions but rather to allegations, failed prosecutions, or 
police intelligence, its dissemination to those who are making assessments of an 
individual, and are in a position to restrict his or her life choices, is more problematic. 
This is not least because it is unclear that the information made available is true. 
Notwithstanding any affront to the presumption of innocence occasioned, the central 
concern, as will be demonstrated, is that the dissemination of such information 
interferes with the private life of the individual. This point is perhaps best 
demonstrated in the facts of R (L) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, where, 
despite the truth of the information concerned being beyond dispute, its disclosure 
was held to interfere with Article 8(1) ECHR. However, a closer analysis of the 
presumption of innocence is needed to comprehend the relationship between this 
principle, which is frequently invoked as an objection to non-conviction disclosure, 
and privacy interests. 
																																								 																				
1082 n 1032, 1535. 
1083 S. Mason, A Balanced Approach: Safeguarding the public through the fair and proportionate use of 
accurate criminal record information (London: Home Office, 2010) 26. 
1084 The right to a fair trial (Article 6) enjoys the status of a ‘strong’ right, meaning that it cannot, in 
theory, be limited or trumped by other competing interests, whereas the right to respect for private life 
(Article 8) is a ‘qualified’ human right, which has much weaker status in comparison. See: A. Ashworth, 
‘The Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Violating a Fundamental Right: Pragmatism Before Principle in the 
Strasbourg Jurisprudence’ in P. Roberts and J. Hunter, Criminal Evidence and Human Rights: Reimagining 
Common Law Procedural Traditions (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012) 146-161 at 147.  
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In its narrow sense, the presumption of innocence is a principle in criminal procedure 
which puts the burden of proof on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused. 
This narrowly formulated understanding of the presumption of innocence, which has 
roots at common law,1085 has two components: (i) a rule requiring the state to bear 
the burden of proof and (ii) a rule requiring that the burden will be discharged when 
guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.1086 However, the presumption can 
be understood in a broader sense, as a fundamental principle of political morality, 
carrying robust implications for procedural fairness generally.1087 The former 
understanding of the presumption of innocence is plainly irrelevant to the process of 
disclosing non-conviction information. The enhanced disclosure process is not a 
criminal trial seeking to determine guilt. It is simply a process whereby relevant 
organisations can obtain information held by a public authority with a view to making 
informed decisions about the suitability of an individual for a particular post. 
However, such disclosures might be understood as an affront to the presumption of 
innocence, particularly when this principle is understood as a general presumption 
that the treatment of an individual should be consistent with his or her innocence.1088 
In R (AR) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police,1089 Raynor J held that the 
disclosure of rape allegations made against a taxi driver (“AR”) as part of an ECRC 
did not breach the presumption of innocence under Article 6(2) ECHR. The defendant 
Chief Constable disclosed the information on the basis that, in his opinion, it was 
’more likely to be true than false’ and ‘[a]lthough the applicant was found not guilty 
																																								 																				
1085 See Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462, 481-482. 
1086 P.J. Schwikkard, Presumption of Innocence (Kenwyn, SA: Juta, 1999) 29. 
1087 Understood in this broader sense, the presumption of innocence can be regarded as reinforcing other 
fundamental human rights, such as the right to liberty, fair trial rights, and the right to respect for private 
life. See, for example: R. Munday, ‘Name Suppression: An Adjunct to the Presumption of Innocence and to 
Mitigation of Sentence’ [1991] Criminal Law Review 680-753 at 757; P. Roberts and A. Zuckerman, 
Criminal Evidence (2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 223; H.L. Ho, ‘The Presumption of 
Innocence as a Human Right’ in P. Roberts and J. Hunter (eds.), Criminal Evidence and Human Rights: 
Reimagining Common Law Procedural Traditions (Oxford: Hart, 2012) 259-283; L. Campbell, ‘Criminal 
Labels, the European Convention on Human Rights and the Presumption of Innocence’ (2013) 76 Modern 
Law Review 681-707 at 690. 
1088 This is described by Stumer as a ‘second facet’ of the presumption of innocence (see A. Stumer, The 
Presumption of Innocence: Evidential and Human Rights Perspectives (Oxford: Hart, 2010) 38), though, 
arguably to the detriment of his analysis, he does not address this facet of the presumption of innocence in 
detail. See P. Roberts, ‘Loss of Innocence in Common Law Presumptions’ (2014) 8 Criminal Law and 
Philosophy 317-336 at 322. 
1089 R (AR) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2013] EWHC 2721 (Admin). 
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by the jury, the test for criminal conviction is beyond all reasonable doubt, which is 
higher than that required for CRB disclosure purposes.’1090 
 
AR relied on the decisions of Hrdalo v Croatia,1091 and Allen v United Kingdom,1092 in 
submitting that, in disclosing the acquittal, the authorities treated the individual as if 
he were guilty.1093 Raynor J dismissed the argument, observing first that the 
information disclosed did not, as AR had suggested, imply he was guilty. Rather it 
suggested that, notwithstanding the acquittal, he may have committed the offences 
in question.1094 Consequently, Raynor J held that the presumption of innocence had 
not been breached.1095 This is a fine line. However, the present discussion will not 
probe deeply into debates concerning the scope and normative value of the 
presumption of innocence. For this analysis, it is sufficient to say that arguments that 
the disclosure of non-conviction information poses a threat to the presumption of 
innocence are rooted in a broad interpretation of the presumption, broader than that 
recognised under Article 6(2) ECHR.1096 Even if the disclosure of contested non-
conviction information with the insinuation that the individual concerned may have 
committed a crime does not offend against the presumption of innocence, it certainly 
is more problematic than the disclosure of verifiably true information.  
 
																																								 																				
1090 ibid at [13]. 
1091 Hrdalo v Croatia, App no 23272/07 (ECtHR, 27 September 2011) at [54]. 
1092 According to the ECtHR ‘[i]n keeping with the need to ensure that the right guaranteed by Article 6 § 2 
is practical and effective, the presumption of innocence also has another aspect. Its general aim, in this 
second aspect, is to protect individuals who have been acquitted of a criminal charge, or in respect of 
whom criminal proceedings have been discontinued, from being treated by public officials and authorities 
as though they are in fact guilty of the offence charged. In these cases, the presumption of innocence has 
already operated, through the application at trial of the various requirements inherent in the procedural 
guarantee it affords, to prevent an unfair criminal conviction being imposed. Without protection to ensure 
respect for the acquittal or the discontinuation decision in any other proceedings, the fair trial guarantees 
of Article 6 § 2 could risk becoming theoretical and illusory. What is also at stake once the criminal 
proceedings have concluded is the person’s reputation and the way in which that person is perceived by 
the public. To a certain extent, the protection afforded under Article 6 § 2 in this respect may overlap with 
the protection afforded by Article 8.’ See Allen v United Kingdom, App no 25424/09 (ECtHR, 12 July 2013) 
at [94]. 
1093 n 1089 at [50]. 
1094 ibid at [55]. 
1095 The Court of Appeal recently affirmed Raynor J’s decision. The appellate court ruled that, as the 
statements on the ECRC were limited and cast no aspersion on the correctness of the acquittal, there was 
no violation of Article 6(2). See R (AR) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2016] 1 WLR 4125. 
1096 The scope of Article 6(2) ECHR is limited to those ‘charged’ with a criminal offence (i.e. those 
specifically investigated by the police). Moreover, the ‘voicing of suspicions regarding an accused’s 
innocence’ can fall outside the scope of Article 6(2): Sekanina v Austria (1994) 17 EHRR 221 at [29]. For a 
comprehensive discussion of the scope of Article 6(2) see: Campbell, n 1087 at 682-688. 
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It is reasonable to suggest that, in merely providing personal information to a third 
party so that the third party can assess the suitability of an individual for particular 
forms of employment, a public authority is not treating an individual as though he or 
she is guilty of an offence, or expressing a belief in the guilt of the individual. After 
all, it is not the police determining the suitability of the applicant or imposing 
restrictions on his or her employment prospects.1097 This suggests that non-
conviction ECRC disclosure would not typically offend against Article 6(2) unless an 
opinion is expressed that the individual is guilty of an offence.1098 However, it is 
important not to rest on the assumption that the police and the DBS adopt a passive 
role in creating the information that is disclosed, and in determining which 
information should be disclosed and how it should be presented. Such an assumption 
overlooks not only the role of the Chief Police Officer in making such disclosures, but 
also the potential for such records to be tainted with the biases exhibited by police 
officers and other actors at the point of creation. One need look no further than the 
case of R (X) v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police1099 for an illustration of this 
problem. The Chief Constable respondent had disclosed the following comments in 
the ‘Other Relevant Information’ section of the claimant’s ECRC:  
It is alleged that on 11 December 2001 [the claimant] indecently exposed 
himself to a female petrol station attendant. It is further alleged that this was 
repeated on 7 May 2002. [The claimant] was arrested and interviewed whereby 
he stated that he did not think that he had committed the offence but that he 
was suffering from stress and anxiety at the time. [The claimant], who was 
employed by a child care company at the time of the alleged offences, was 
charged with two counts of indecent exposure, however the alleged victim 
failed to identify the suspect during a covert identification parade, and the case 
was subsequently discontinued.1100 
 
 
The information presents an unfavourable image of the applicant. As Wall J noted, 
the information is partial and ‘carries with it an implication that the claimant was 
guilty, or at the very least the author of the summary believed him to be guilty.’1101 
																																								 																				
1097 This view is expressed by Campbell: ‘[t]hough some members of the public may be induced to view 
the person as risky through the information revealed in [an ECRC], the absence of any official expression 
as to guilt means that the presumption is not relevant in this instance.’ See Campbell, ibid at 700. 
1098 Allen v United Kingdom, App no 25424/09 (ECtHR, 12 July 2013). 
1099 n 1032. 
1100 ibid 1521. 
1101 ibid 1527. 
286	
	
This interpretation is supported by the fact that the summary omits crucial details of 
the investigation which are more favourable to the claimant. For example, the 
summary of the police interview provided above gives a limited and skewed picture 
of conversations that took place between the claimant and investigating officers. In 
the initial police interview, the claimant is asked by officers if he remembers the 
incidents in question, to which he replies that he cannot. Wall J drew attention to the 
leading nature of this line of questioning:  
Any question about any incident which begins with the words: “Do you 
remember doing X?” contains within it the implication that the person 
questioned has something to remember, and was, accordingly, the person who 
committed the act about which he or she is being questioned. In my judgment 
it is unsafe then to treat the answer “No” or “I can’t remember” as incredible 
and to give it the same implication.1102 
 
 
Taken together, both the line of questioning pursued by the investigating officers and 
the summary of the interview led to a particular interpretation of the facts being 
disclosed in the ECRC, which suggests the claimant gave eyebrow-raising responses 
in the interview. The Chief Constable omitted four occasions in the police interview 
where the claimant categorically denied that he had committed the acts of indecent 
exposure in question. Moreover, the ECRC makes no mention of the fact that the 
complainant stated she was ‘100% certain’ she could identify the perpetrator of the 
indecent exposure, before failing to identify the claimant in an identity parade.1103 
Thus the information has been cherry-picked in such a way that is difficult to 
reconcile with a general presumption that the treatment of an individual should be 
consistent with his or her innocence. Whilst such disclosure might not raise problems 
under Article 6 ECHR (owing to the fact that it does not explicitly undermine the legal 
status of the individual), any insinuation, bias, or omission in the presentation of 
information as part of an ECRC, which might be said to offend against the 
presumption of innocence (understood in broad terms), does (at least) seem to 
increase or aggravate the interference with the claimant’s right to respect for private 
life.  
																																								 																				
1102 ibid 1527. 
1103 ibid 1540. 
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Even in the absence of insinuation, omission, or bias on the part of the police, the 
disclosure of non-conviction information pursuant to an ECRC still constitutes a 
serious setback to privacy related interests. This is because the dissemination of 
personal information, particularly of the sensitive type that might be included as part 
of an ECRC, is fundamentally offensive to privacy interests. Recalling the arguments 
developed in previous chapters1104 it is clear that, for a number of reasons, 
dissemination can create significant disruptions to the individual’s private life.  
 
Röessler argues that the reason the protection of informational privacy matters to 
people is that it is ‘an intrinsic part of their self-understanding as autonomous 
individuals (within familiar limits) to have control over their self-presentation’.1105 
Thus, privacy’s value stems from the protection it affords an individual to assert 
control over how he or she presents him or herself to the world, which is said to be 
instrumental to various ends. Other accounts discussed in Chapter 1 provide similar 
conceptions of privacy.1106 These basic insights are useful in developing our 
understanding of how the disclosure of non-conviction information as part of an ECRC 
might represent a significant setback to an individual’s privacy related interests. 
Adequate privacy protection must afford a space to which others have limited access. 
Limits on who can access personal information about the individual, under what 
circumstances, and for what reasons are necessary for protecting various privacy 
interests. For example, Gavison argues that when privacy is understood as limited 
access to the self it is valuable in buttressing liberty, autonomy, and freedom.1107 
Equally, in the context of criminal records, the limiting of access to such personal 
information protects the individual’s reputation. Moreover, such limited access can 
forestall any stigmatisation which might result if the fact that an individual has been 
																																								 																				
1104 See Chapter 3, Part 2 above.  
1105 B. Röessler, The Value of Privacy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005) 116 (emphasis in original). 
1106 See, for example Nagel, n 992; A. von Hirsch, ‘The Ethics of Public Television Surveillance’ in A. von 
Hirsch, D. Garland and A. Wakefield (eds.), Ethical and Social Perspectives on Situational Crime Prevention 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000) 59-77; B. von Silva-Tarouca Larsen, Setting the Watch: Privacy and the 
Ethics of CCTV Surveillance (Oxford: Hart, 2011); A. Marmor, ‘What is the Right to Privacy’ (2015) 43 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 3-26. Chapter 1, Part 1.3.  
1107 R. Gavison, ‘Privacy and the Limits of Law’ (1980) 89 Yale Law Journal 421-471 at 426. 
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excluded from employment were to become widely known.1108 Even in the absence of 
such information becoming widely known in the individual’s community, ECRC 
disclosure can be stigmatising in the same way that DNA retention is stigmatising; it 
amounts to the state treating the individual differently on the basis of potential guilt 
or a perceived increased risk of causing harm to others.1109   
 
Protection against the disclosure of non-conviction information as part of an ECRC 
will guard against irrational judgments based on stereotypes and misinformation in 
the criminal record checking process. It also guards against individuals becoming 
‘prisoners of their past’ through the dissemination of personal information beyond 
anticipated boundaries.1110 It is for these reasons that the ECtHR recognises that 
exclusion from employment can interfere with Article 8(1).1111 In Sidabras v 
Lithuania,1112 a case where the applicants, as former Lithuanian KGB officers, were 
banned from seeking employment in a range of private and public sector positions, 
the ECtHR held that the ban constituted an interference with Article 8(1) as it 
affected ‘to a very significant degree’ the applicants’ ability to develop relationships 
with the outside world and earn a living.1113 Furthermore, a line of Strasbourg 
jurisprudence suggests that an interference with Article 8(1) can occur where 
information pertaining to an individual’s criminal conviction is disseminated.1114  
 
It is submitted that the disclosure by police of personal information, which is likely to 
have a significantly adverse impact upon the employment prospects of the individual, 
																																								 																				
1108 R (Wright) v Secretary of State for Health [2009] 1 AC 739, 754. 
1109 L. Campbell, ‘A Rights-based Analysis of DNA Retention: “non-conviction” databases and the liberal 
state’ [2010] 12 Criminal Law Review 889-906 at 905. 
1110 Solove, n 992, 144-145. 
1111 Niemietz v Germany (1993) 16 EHRR 97 at [29]; Sidabras v Lithuania (2006) 42 EHRR 6. 
1112 Sidabras, ibid. 
1113 ibid at [48]. 
1114 See generally Leander v Sweden (1987) 9 EHRR 433 at [48]; Rotaru v Romania (2000) 8 BHRC 449. 
In Segerstedt-Wiberg v Sweden, the ECtHR also found that public information can fall within the scope of 
private life where it is systematically collected and stored in files held by public authorities, irrespective of 
any subsequent dissemination: Segerstedt-Wiberg v Sweden (2006) 44 EHRR 14 at [72]. Furthermore, in 
MM v United Kingdom, the ECtHR determined that information pertaining to a caution issued by police as a 
disposal for a criminal offence will fall within the scope of the private life if it is disclosed to third parties 
thereafter. However, in this decision the ECtHR found an interference with the caveat that the caution 
becomes part of the individual’s private life only once it ‘recedes into the past’: MM v United Kingdom, App 
no 24029/07 (ECtHR, 13 November 2012) at [189]. 
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will set back the individual’s privacy interests to the point that the protection of 
Article 8 is warranted. Given the numerous ways in which such disclosures can set 
back an individual’s privacy related interests, the interference with Article 8(1) posed 
by the disclosure of such sensitive information about an individual’s past dealings 
with public authorities is a serious one. Whilst, generally speaking, domestic judges 
ruling on cases pertaining to ECRCs have accepted this point, some have expressed 
reservations.  
 
In R (X) v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police,1115 Mummery LJ betrayed 
hints of scepticism towards the notion that non-conviction disclosures interfered with 
Article 8(1) rights:  
Good practice would normally require a prospective employer, who is 
responsible for appointments to positions covered by section 115, to make 
inquiries about criminal charges, as well as about criminal convictions, as they 
“might” be relevant to the decision whether or not to make an appointment. 
Common sense also suggests that a suitable applicant for such a position 
would, in any case, take the precaution of volunteering information about such 
matters to a prospective employer. There is nothing to prevent the applicant 
from also making full representations to the prospective employer about why 
the matters disclosed are, in fact, irrelevant, should be disregarded and do not 
affect his suitability for the position for which he has applied.1116 
 
Mummery LJ emphasised that he should not be understood as agreeing that Article 
8(1) was engaged on the instant facts as he had not heard full arguments on the 
point. However, it is clear from the quoted extract that his Lordship was under-
estimating the importance of protection from such disclosures for privacy related 
interests. Granted, a job applicant could take the precaution of volunteering 
information of his or her involvement in a criminal process to a prospective employer 
and hope that the information would be assessed impartially, giving appropriate 
weight to the interests of the vulnerable persons in question and the interests of the 
applicant. Yet, a non-conviction disclosure regime operating under such hopes is 
surely unrealistic and unfair. Employers working closely with children and vulnerable 
groups are charged with a duty to protect those groups from harm. This is their 
																																								 																				
1115 n 1042. 
1116 ibid 83. 
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primary interest. Accordingly, employers are bound to take a risk-averse approach 
when making decisions to employ people who will come into regular contact with the 
children or vulnerable persons under their care. Unlike chief constables, once the 
non-conviction information is disclosed on an ECRC, employers are under no duty to 
assess the proportionality of any interference with a job applicant’s Article 8 rights 
occasioned by the disclosure. For this reason, Lord Neuberger recognised that an 
adverse ECRC would represent something close to a ‘killer blow’ to applicants’ 
prospects of gaining employment in a field requiring such certificates.1117 Given that 
in all likelihood such disclosure will significantly reduce the chances of the applicant 
gaining employment, it is difficult to imagine how, in the absence of such frank 
disclosure against self-interest, individuals should not be afforded the protection of 
Article 8 to ensure that any information subsequently disclosed by the police is lawful 
and proportionate. Any non-conviction disclosure system operating with such 
unrealistic assumptions regarding what a job applicant will and should share in terms 
of his or her life history and previous contact with the authorities is bound to be 
unbalanced, and consequently unjust. 
 
Lord Scott, in R (L) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis,1118 raised a second 
objection to the notion that such disclosures interfere with Article 8(1). It was 
suggested that Article 8 was not engaged because the applicant, ‘in making the 
application for an ECRC, invited the exercise by the chief police officer of the 
statutory duty imposed by section 115(7).’1119 Consequently, the argument runs, as 
the applicant consented to the disclosure and applied for it, she cannot complain that 
it interferes with her Article 8 rights. In dealing with this objection it is important to 
remember that, whilst it is true that applicants do technically apply for the disclosure 
of non-conviction information as part of an ECRC; they do so in the knowledge that 
																																								 																				
1117 n 1056, 440. Even if the term ‘killer blow’ is overselling the impact of an adverse ECRC, it is well 
documented in the case law that information disclosed on an ECRC is highly likely to jeopardise an 
individual’s job application: see the opinion of Lord Wilson in R (T) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2014] UKSC 35 at [16]-[21].  
1118 R (L), ibid. 
1119 ibid 436. 
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this is a pre-requisite of gaining the employment in question. As Lord Neuberger 
highlights, section 115(7) imposes something of a statutory fetter on applicants in 
the selection process whereby, under Lord Scott’s interpretation, they sign away their 
Article 8 rights in applying for positions eligible for enhanced disclosure.1120 The 
disclosure of non-conviction information as part of an ECRC involves the 
dissemination of sensitive personal information about the applicant. Thus it is 
imperative that any such disclosure satisfies the demands of Article 8(2), irrespective 
of whether the applicant has consented to the disclosure, otherwise legislation such 
as section 115(7) could too easily be used to circumvent Convention rights.1121 As 
Lord Brown more reasonably states: ‘applicants are consenting to the disclosure of 
relevant information to the extent that this is proportionate to the damage this will 
cause to their interests in privacy but no more’.1122  
 
When assessing the degree of the interference occasioned by such disclosure much 
turns on the facts of a particular case. For example, where the disclosed information 
might represent an affront to the presumption of innocence, due to biases in its 
presentation, this will increase the seriousness of the interference with the applicant’s 
Article 8 rights as it is likely to increase the extent to which the disclosure will 
stigmatise and disqualify the applicant. It is difficult to see how any such disclosure 
could satisfy Article 8(2). However, it is important to note that all disclosures of this 
kind are likely to constitute a serious interference. When compared with the retention 
of such information, the dissemination of personal information of this nature will 
usually have a more detrimental impact on one’s ability to pursue a chosen career, 
and thus develop valuable personal relationships. It remains to assess the extent to 
which the disclosure of non-conviction information as part of an ECRC can be justified 
under Article 8(2) ECHR.  
 
																																								 																				
1120 ibid 440. The ECtHR has subsequently held that ‘voluntary’ disclosure in similar circumstances will 
engage Article 8: MM, n 1114 at [189]. 
1121 n 1056, 438.  
1122 ibid.  
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2.2 Article 8(2): When is non-conviction disclosure justified?  
2.2.1. Disclosure ‘in accordance with the law’ 
The disclosure of non-conviction information as part of an ECRC has a basis in 
domestic law in section 115(7) of the Police Act 1997. For the ECRC disclosure 
regime to meet the legality test, section 115(7) must meet the quality of law 
requirement set forth in the ECtHR jurisprudence.1123 As previously discussed, this 
means the law must be adequately accessible and foreseeable, and must indicate, 
with sufficient clarity, the scope of the discretion conferred upon a public 
authority.1124  
 
In R (X) v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police,1125 Lord Woolf CJ found that 
section 115(7) did not per se contravene Article 8(2).1126 This view was endorsed by 
a majority of the Supreme Court in R (L) v Commissioner of Police of the 
Metropolis.1127 However, in both cases, this conclusion was arrived at without a 
detailed consideration of whether or not section 115 of the Police Act 1997 was ‘in 
accordance with the law’. Instead, the cases focused on whether or not the 
legislation had been applied in such a manner that could be considered ‘necessary in 
a democratic society’. In previous chapters, the potential for overlap between the two 
requirements in Article 8(2) has been discussed,1128 and some commentators warn 
against eclipsing the necessity test through an overly rigorous legality analysis.1129 
However, in omitting to engage in any substantial way with the question of whether 
the regime under the Police Act 1997 is ‘in accordance with the law’, the two leading 
domestic authorities in this area may have missed an opportunity to clarify what a 
Convention compliant framework for ECRC disclosure should look like. This section 
																																								 																				
1123 See, for example, Lambert v France (2000) 30 EHRR 346 at [23]. 
1124 Gillan v United Kingdom (2010) 50 EHRR 1105 at [76]-[77]. 
1125 n 1042. 
1126 ibid 71. 
1127 See the opinion of Lord Hope: n 1056, 432. 
1128 Chapter 3, Part 3. 
1129 M.H. Murphy, ‘A Shift in the Approach of the European Court of Human Rights in Surveillance Cases: A 
Rejuvenation of Necessity? (2014) 5 European Human Rights Law Review 507-518. 
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will fill the gap, and in doing so will show that PoFA 2012’s provisions and the 
accompanying guidance meets the demands of lawfulness under Article 8(2). 
 
The domestic courts’ approach is contrary to the one taken in MM v United 
Kingdom,1130 where the ECtHR subjected sections 113A and 113B of the Police Act 
1997 to exacting scrutiny in determining that the disclosure of the applicant’s police 
caution to her prospective employer was not ‘in accordance with the law’.1131 The 
ECtHR held that, much like in cases involving telephone tapping and other direct 
forms of surveillance, measures pertaining to the storage and use of criminal record 
data must have clear and detailed rules concerning their scope; minimum safeguards 
governing the duration, storage, usage, procedures for preserving integrity, and 
confidentiality of data; and must provide sufficient guarantees against the risk of 
abuse and arbitrariness.1132 Assessing the regime for the disclosure of caution 
information under the Police Act 1997, the ECtHR observed:  
No distinction is made based on the seriousness or the circumstances of the 
offence, the time which has elapsed since the offence was committed and 
whether the caution is spent. In short, there appears to be no scope for the 
exercise of any discretion in the disclosure exercise. Nor, as a consequence of 
the mandatory nature of the disclosure, is there any provision for the making of 
prior representations by the data subject to prevent the data being disclosed 
either generally or in a specific case.1133 
 
In light of the cumulative effect of these shortcomings, the court concluded that the 
regime regulating the disclosure of caution data was not ‘in accordance with the law’. 
This judgment is relevant to the disclosure of non-conviction information under 
section 115(7) of the Police Act 1997 as this, too, involves the disclosure of personal 
information held in police records which is likely to land something like a ‘killer blow’ 
on the career prospects of applicants for criminal record certificates.1134  
 
																																								 																				
1130 MM, n 1114. 
1131 ibid at [207]. 
1132 ibid at [195]. 
1133 ibid at [204]. 
1134 Notably, in MM v United Kingdom, the ECtHR referred to passages in R (L) to describe the impact of 
criminal record disclosure on the applicant in MM: ibid at [189]. 
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MM raised further issues regarding how the overlap between the ‘in accordance with 
the law’ and the ‘necessary in a democratic society’ requirements should be 
managed. These questions were taken up again at the domestic level in R (T) v Chief 
Constable of Greater Manchester Police,1135 a case pertaining to the disclosure of 
caution information under Part V of the Police Act 1997; the same framework held to 
be unlawful in MM. Lord Reed, in the majority, ruled that, in light of the judgment in 
MM, the disclosures were not ‘in accordance with the law’. Dissenting on this point 
alone (the court was unanimous in finding a violation of Article 8), Lord Wilson 
suggested that the judgment in MM eroded the distinction between the legality 
requirement and the necessity requirement to an unacceptable degree. According to 
his Lordship, marginalising the latter closes off the margin of appreciation afforded to 
Contracting States when determining whether a measure is necessary and 
proportionate.1136 
 
Lord Wilson rightly observed that the question of whether or not there are adequate 
safeguards requires the consideration of issues which might more appropriately form 
part of a proportionality analysis. However, his Lordship’s argument that its ‘seepage’ 
into the legality analysis is to be resisted and, consequently, that the framework 
regulating the disclosure of caution information was ‘in accordance with the law’ is 
unconvincing. Lord Reed noted that the approach adopted by the ECtHR in MM, which 
took account of safeguards (or lack thereof) in the domestic legal framework in its 
legality analysis, was based on settled case law.1137 Moreover, Lord Reed convincingly 
explained the reasons why the ECtHR considers the adequacy of safeguards as part 
of the legality analysis and not only as criteria of proportionality:  
[I]n order for the interference to be “in accordance with the law”, there must be 
safeguards which have the effect of enabling the proportionality of the 
interference to be adequately examined. Whether the interference in a given 
																																								 																				
1135 R (T) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2015] AC 49. 
1136 ibid 73. 
1137 ibid 94. Indeed, in surveillance cases the ECtHR has held that an interference with Article 8(1) must be 
based on sufficiently precise law which contains safeguards against abuse: Kopp v Switzerland (1998) 27 
EHRR 91 at [72]. Furthermore, in Rotaru v Romania the court held that, due to lack of adequate 
safeguards in the national framework, the use of the applicant’s criminal record was not ‘in accordance 
with the law’: Rotaru, n 1114. 
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case was in fact proportionate is a separate question. The criticism that the 
court [ECtHR] in MM did not allow for any margin of appreciation is therefore 
misplaced. Whether a system provides adequate safeguards against arbitrary 
treatment, and is therefore “in accordance with the law” within the meaning of 
the Convention, is not a question of proportionality, and is therefore not a 
matter in relation to which the court allows national authorities a margin of 
appreciation.1138 
 
 
A proportionality analysis assesses the extent to which there exists a reasonable 
relationship between the objective of an interference and the means used to achieve 
that objective. It weighs this against the seriousness of the interference caused to 
the competing interest. As discussed in Chapter 2, an analysis of proportionality is 
separate from an assessment of the quality of law regulating the measure (and any 
component safeguards against abuse).1139 Thus, while the existence of adequate and 
effective safeguards might be relevant to the proportionality analysis (particularly in 
considering whether the means are minimally intrusive to achieve the objective of 
the interference) it is not central. However, as is plain in the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR, a measure regulated by a legal framework which lacks adequate safeguards 
to protect against abuses of power cannot be said to meet the independent quality of 
law requirement and thus cannot be considered ‘in accordance with the law’, 
irrespective of whether or not the use of the measure is proportionate and necessary. 
 
Beyond this doctrinal clarification, the cases of MM and R (T) v Chief Constable of 
Greater Manchester Police provide a basis for comparison when considering whether 
or not the framework regulating the disclosure of non-conviction information under 
section 115(7) is of sufficient clarity and quality to be considered ‘in accordance with 
the law’. In each case, the ‘cumulative effect’ of the failure to draw a distinction on 
the basis of the nature of the offence for which a caution was administered; the time 
since the offence took place; the relevance of the information to the employment; 
and the absence of mechanisms for independent review, was judged to be 
																																								 																				
1138 n 1135, 95. 
1139 See M. Klatt and M. Meister, The Constitutional Structure of Proportionality (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012) 8. Chapter 2, Part 3. 
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unacceptable.1140 In basing its conclusions on the cumulative effect of the 
shortcomings, the ECtHR introduced an element of uncertainty as we do not have 
any guidance on the particular significance of each aspect of the regime in 
constituting an adequate legal basis for interference. Nonetheless, the current 
framework regulating the disclosure of non-conviction information should be less 
vulnerable to Article 8 attack on the grounds of legality than the framework 
considered in R (T) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police.  
 
In response to the Mason reviews, the Government amended section 115 of the 
Police Act 1997. The amendments replaced the ‘might be relevant’ test with the 
stricter ‘reasonably believes to be relevant test’. The Government also provided for 
individuals to raise disputes before an independent body and set forth that relevant 
decision makers must have regard to new statutory guidance. These two changes 
directly address safeguarding standards mentioned in MM. New statutory guidance 
additionally provides safeguards of the sort mentioned in MM. For instance, the 
Statutory Disclosure Guidance addresses the nature and currency of the offence as 
relevant considerations:  
Information should be sufficiently current: 
The age of the information, coupled with the age of the applicant at the time 
and their conduct in the intervening period, are factors which should be taken 
into account. The older the information the more difficult it will be to form a 
reasonable belief that it is relevant. However, there are other factors, especially 
seriousness, which may mean that even very old information may reasonably 
be believed to be relevant. The currency of information should be considered 
together with the applicant’s specific circumstances.1141 
 
 
It might be argued that the guidance is vague. After all, it gives little indication of 
exactly how, in assessing whether or not information should be disclosed, relevant 
chief police officers should strike a balance between seriousness and currency of the 
information. But this is not decisive when assessing whether disclosure is ‘in 
accordance with the law’. If we accept Lord Reed’s assertion that for any interference 
to be ‘in accordance with the law’ there must exist safeguards, which have the effect 
																																								 																				
1140 n 1135, 96. 
1141 See n 998, 3. 
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of enabling an adequate proportionality analysis, then the safeguards in the form of 
the guidance quoted above comfortably meet this threshold. The guidance directs 
that such factors be condisered in any subsequent proportionality analysis. It does 
not encroach too far into the proportionality analysis by fettering the Chief Police 
Officer’s discretion in assessing the exact weight to be attributed to different factors, 
including age, time, and offence seriousness in the circumstances of the particular 
case. Rather, it points to these as variables to be considered, providing some 
(limited) guidance over how they might be prioritised in a proportionality analysis.1142 
In the two statutory documents to be used by relevant chief police officers, guidance 
is given for all of the safeguarding points mentioned in MM and R (T).1143 The law has 
therefore been reformed to provide adequate safeguards against abuse, meeting the 
quality of law requirement for compliance with Article 8(2).  
 
2.2.2. Disclosure in pursuit of a legitimate aim? 
Some formulations of the proportionality analysis involve a four-stage test in which 
the establishment of a legitimate aim forms part of the analysis.1144 Others entail a 
three-stage test, which takes the establishment of a legitimate aim as the basis for 
the proportionality test rather than being integral to it.1145 The latter is the approach 
adopted by the ECtHR, but the difference between the two approaches seems merely 
semantic and of little practical relevance.1146 In any case it is not foreseeable that 
such disclosure, done in accordance with the law, would struggle to clear the 
legitimate aim hurdle. Where a relevant chief police officer has followed the 
legislative provisions contained in Part V of the Police Act 1997 and its accompanying 
																																								 																				
1142 In this sense comparisons might be drawn between this guidance and the structured discretion relating 
to the admissibility of bad character evidence in section 101 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003: see C. 
Tapper, Criminal Justice Act 2003: Part 3: Evidence of Bad Character [2004] Criminal Law Review 533-
555. 
1143 See generally: Quality Assurance Framework (version 9) (London: Disclosure and Barring Service-
Association of Chief Police, 22 January 2014); n 998.  
1144 J. Rivers, ‘Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review’ (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal 174-207 
at 181; M. Kumm, ‘Political Liberalism and the Structure of Rights: On the Place and Limits of the 
Proportionality Requirement’ in G. Pavlakos (ed.) Law, Rights and Discourse: Themes from the Legal 
Philosophy of Robert Alexy (Oxford: Hart, 2007) 131-167; Klatt and Meister, n 1139, 8. 
1145 D. Grimm, ‘Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence’ (2007) 57 University 
of Toronto Law Journal 838-397; S. Tsakyrakis, ‘Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights? (2010) 7 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 468-493 at 471. 
1146 Grimm, ibid at 388-389. 
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statutory guidance, such disclosure will be made to prevent crime and/or in the 
interests of public safety, since the Chief Police Officer must hold a reasonable belief 
that the information disclosed is relevant for the employer to make decisions 
regarding the risks the applicant might pose to the public. 
 
2.2.3. Disclosure as necessary in a democratic society 
 
2.2.3.a. Is the legislative objective sufficiently important to justify limiting a 
fundamental right? 
The first question involves balancing in the abstract the weight of the competing 
principles. This requires a judgment on whether or not the legislative objective 
(namely the prevention of crime caused by failing to provide information about 
potentially ‘risky’ persons to employers) is sufficiently important to justify limiting the 
fundamental right (the job applicant’s privacy rights). The prevention of crime and 
the protection of the public are self-evidently important objectives. One need look no 
further than the Soham murders to ascertain exactly how high the stakes can be 
when the police fail to adequately manage and disclose so called ‘soft’ intelligence. 
Thus, the aim of the legislation, which accords with at least two of the stated 
‘legitimate aims’ in Article 8(2), is plainly of sufficient importance to provide a basis 
for limiting the right to respect for private life. On the other side of the scales, the 
disclosure of non-conviction information as part of an ECRC can represent a serious 
interference with the individual’s right to respect for his or her private life. Such 
disclosure can be stigmatising for the individual and is highly likely to have a 
significant adverse impact on the individual’s pursuit of his or her chosen career. 
Furthermore, as this information often relates to unproven or untested intelligence, 
such as unsubstantiated allegations, its disclosure can be particularly unfairly 
stigmatising.  
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Whilst, considered in the abstract, these legitimate aims provide a sound basis for 
justifying an interference with the right to respect for private life, this does not 
necessarily mean that the prevention of crime and public safety merit heavier 
weighting than the right to respect to private life. It merely establishes, as a 
threshold matter, that the aims are sufficiently important as a potential basis for 
justifying an interference with the right to respect for private life. In R (L) the 
Supreme Court came to a different conclusion to the Court of Appeal in R (X) 
regarding the abstract weight of the rights at stake. The approach in R (X) gave 
priority to the interests of children and vulnerable groups over the interests of job 
applicants. This can be seen in Lord Woolf CJ’s comments regarding the role of Article 
8(2) where the rights of job applicants collide with those of children or vulnerable 
groups:  
[A]s long as the Chief Constable was entitled to form the opinion that the 
information disclosed might be relevant, then absent any untoward 
circumstance which is not present here, it is difficult to see that there can be 
any reason why the information that “might be relevant”, ought not be included 
in the certificate [ECRC].1147 
 
This approach clearly puts the rights of vulnerable groups and children above those 
of job applicants. To suggest that non-conviction information, so long as it might be 
relevant to the position applied for, should automatically be included in an ECRC 
(save for any untoward circumstances) is to eliminate any need for a detailed 
balancing exercise. The only real threshold to be overcome in most cases is that the 
information concerned is (or rather, might be) relevant for the position. In R (L) Lord 
Hope described how this had led to a system which systematically favoured the rights 
of children and vulnerable groups over job applicants, with reference to a rating table 
in the guidelines used by chief police officers to determine whether or not non-
conviction information should be disclosed post-R(X): 
A striking feature of the rating table is that a tick [which indicates that 
information will be disclosed] appears in every cell where it is said that a failure 
to disclose would cause a severe risk to the vulnerable intersects with a human 
rights category, however severe the disruption that disclosure in that category 
would cause to the private life of anyone. Where the risk that a failure to 
																																								 																				
1147 n 1042, 81. 
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disclose would cause is moderate, careful consideration [over whether or not to 
disclose] is only required if the disruption to the private life of anyone would be 
one grade higher: severe. It is only where the risk that a failure to disclose 
would cause little quantifiable risk to the vulnerable group that careful 
consideration is required if the corresponding human rights category of little 
disruption to private life applies. In all other cases the corresponding human 
rights category is trumped by an equivalent risk category.1148 
 
The table described above directly prioritises the rights of vulnerable groups and 
children over the rights of job applicants. Where the risk to each is equal, in all but 
one case it puts the rights of children and vulnerable groups above job applicants. 
The court in R (L) ultimately determined that such prioritisation was unjust and ‘[t]he 
correct approach … is that neither consideration has precedence over the other.’1149  
 
Indeed, this is surely the correct approach. Often, when privacy interests collide with 
other societal interests, such as the prevention of crime, they are deemed to be of 
marginal importance, selfish, or even anti-social1150 and as such are easily overridden 
when pitted against competing interests. The self-evident interest in protecting 
children and vulnerable groups from harm is a prime example. Pitted against such 
viscerally compelling consequences as those that would result from a vulnerable 
person falling victim to crime it is easy to overlook setbacks to interests deriving 
from such a slippery and ill-defined concept as privacy. Even if the individual privacy 
interests at stake are fully appreciated, these can easily be marginalised as less 
urgent or significant than other interests. Surely – the argument might run – it is 
more important to prevent children coming to harm than to protect a job applicant’s 
personal information? Thus, where privacy ‘gets in the way’ of measures to protect 
children, its value is heavily discounted. 
 
																																								 																				
1148 n 1056, 428. 
1149 In forming this conclusion, Lord Hope relied on the judgment of Lord Nicholls in Campbell v MGN Ltd, a 
case where there was a clash between the Article 8 rights of the applicant and Article 10 ECHR: Campbell v 
MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457, 464. 
1150 Criticisms of the right to privacy which run along these lines have come from a number of different 
angles: see C. A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1989) 187; A. Etzioni, The Limits of Privacy (New York: Basic Books, 1999). 
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However, such a line of argument overlooks the significance of privacy not only as an 
individual right but also as a political and social value. Understood in this way, 
privacy underwrites other democratic values such as the freedom of expression and, 
indeed, security. It is also useful in tempering the power of the state by establishing 
limits on intrusions into the lives of its citizens.1151 As Goold states: ‘in order for 
democracy to flourish, individuals must feel free to choose whom they associate with, 
whom they speak to, and who hears what they say, safe in the knowledge that such 
choices are free from routine scrutiny by the state.’1152 Understood in this broader 
sense, the trade off between privacy, on the one hand, and security and crime 
control, on the other, is no longer one where the individual’s personal and possibly 
reprehensible desire to conceal aspects of his or her self is competing against the 
common welfare of all of society. Rather it becomes two aspects of the common good 
competing against one another. For privacy interests to be taken seriously, they must 
be recognised as being fundamentally important. After all, little is contributed, 
overall, to a defensible conception of the common good if, in the process of 
preventing crimes against one portion of society, we arbitrarily and unfairly impose 
restrictions and pains on other groups.1153 Thus, for the right to respect for private 
life to be fully respected its abstract weight must be considered equal to the 
prevention of crime and disorder. In relation to the chapter’s topical focus, this 
sentiment is perhaps best encapsulated in the first principle of the Statutory 
Disclosure Guidance:  
Principle 1 – There should be no presumption either in favour of or against 
providing a specific item or category of information.1154 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
1151 The view that privacy’s value transcends its utility as an individual protection has been expressed by a 
number of academic commentators: P. Regan, Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social Values, and Public 
Policy (2nd edn. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009); B. Goold, ‘Surveillance and the 
Political Value of Privacy’ (2009) 1 Amsterdam Law Forum 3-6 at 5; A. Roberts, ‘A Republican Account of 
the Value of Privacy’ (2014) European Journal of Political Theory 1-25 at 8. 
1152 Goold, ibid at 5. 
1153 B. Goold, ‘How Much Surveillance is Too Much? Some Thoughts on Surveillance, Democracy and the 
Political Value of Privacy’ in D. Schartum (ed.), Overvaaking i en Rettstat: Surveillance in a Constitutional 
Government (Fagbokforlaget, 2010) 38-48, 46. 
1154 n 998, 3.  
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2.2.3.b. Is there a rational connection between the means and the objective?  
This stage of the proportionality analysis requires an examination of whether the 
legislative measure is capable of achieving the legislative objective.1155 In the case of 
non-conviction disclosure the question may be restated: ‘is there a rational 
connection between the disclosure of non-conviction information as part of an ECRC 
and the prevention of crime?’ The answer depends upon the nature of the 
information disclosed and the circumstances under which it might be disclosable. 
However, as a general principle, the disclosure of relevant and credible non-
conviction information is likely to help prevent crime and protect vulnerable groups 
from coming to harm. This is because, even if an individual has not been convicted of 
an offence, there may be circumstances where the disclosure of non-conviction 
information pertaining to that individual’s ECRC application will plainly reduce the risk 
of harm to children or other vulnerable groups who might otherwise be exposed to 
dangerous individuals. In the case of Ian Huntley, at the time of applying for 
employment as a caretaker in his victims’ school, he had been investigated by the 
police in four separate rape enquiries and one enquiry relating to the indecent assault 
of a child. While he was not convicted of any of these offences, the details of these 
investigations taken together clearly demonstrated that Huntley posed a considerable 
risk to children.1156 Even if an individual such as Huntley does not work at a school or 
other child-centred institution, he may still gain access to vulnerable groups. 
However, the ECRC system, if implemented properly, can certainly block off lines of 
unaccompanied access to such groups. 
 
Non-conviction information need not even pertain directly to the individual making 
the application. For example, if an individual is seeking to set up a childminding 
business from home, and it comes to light that his or her co-habiting partner has a 
string of serious and recent convictions for child sex offences, this will present a clear 
																																								 																				
1155 Klatt and Meister, n 1139, 8. 
1156 These details included the fact that Huntley was in a relationship with a 15 year old girl at the age of 
21, and numerous allegations from unrelated complainants all describing Huntley as the attacker but, due 
to the modus operandi of his attacks, proving unreliable witnesses: see n 1025, 24-51. 
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and significant risk to any children that might be cared for by the applicant. This is 
true notwithstanding the fact that disclosure of non-conviction information may 
infringe the individual’s right to respect for private life.  
 
The original ‘might be relevant’ standard not only puts the rights of children and 
vulnerable groups above the rights of job applicants, it also requires chief police 
officers to disclose information that is not rationally connected to the legislative 
objective, at least in some cases. If a chief police officer is afforded the discretion to 
disclose any information which, in his or her opinion, might be relevant then 
essentially the chief police officer is afforded the discretion to disclose information 
which is not actually relevant at all. Several vignettes in the Mason review illustrate 
the inconsistencies produced by this system of disclosure:  
Example 3: A 16 year old required an enhanced criminal records check in order 
to complete an external work placement as part of her studies. Police 
information was disclosed that she had been arrested aged 13 on suspicion of 
assault. She was never identified as the offender and the Crown Prosecution 
Service advised that no further action would be taken against her. However, the 
information was still disclosed. … 
Example 4: A manager of a care home was arrested following an allegation 
against him by a resident. The police conducted a full investigation and closed 
the matter the following month as no evidence was found. He subsequently lost 
his job as a manager of another care home when this allegation was disclosed 
through police information in an enhanced criminal records check. …   
During my consultation I was also told about a case where a teacher applied for 
an enhanced criminal records check in which police information disclosed that 
he had received a Penalty Notice for Disorder for ‘excessive standing’ at a 
football match.1157 
 
 
Without further information about the facts of each case it is impossible to know how 
the relevant chief police officer formed the opinion that the disclosures ‘might be 
relevant’. However, any rational connection between the nature of the (alleged) 
offence committed, the manner in which proceedings were concluded, and the extent 
to which the information bears upon the applicant’s ability to perform the role applied 
for, seems tenuous. Furthermore, Wall J’s interpretation that that information which 
the chief police officer deems might be relevant must be included ‘unless there is 
some good reason’ against disclosure is inconsistent not only with Article 8, but also 
																																								 																				
1157 n 1071, 30-32. 
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with the language of Part V of the Police Act 1997. The Act states that such 
information must only be disclosed if, in the chief police officer’s opinion, it might be 
relevant and ‘ought to be included’. 
 
Fortunately, this minimalist threshold has been raised after R (L). The new, stricter 
standard requires the chief police officer to disclose any information he or she 
‘reasonably believes to be relevant for the prescribed purpose’, having regard to the 
nature of the information, the time elapsed since its generation, and the credibility of 
the information.1158 At paragraph 13, the Statutory Disclosure Guidance sets forth 
how the new standard ensures a rational connection between the information and the 
objective to be achieved:  
Information must only be provided if the chief officer reasonably believes it to 
be relevant. It should not be disclosed on the basis that, although there is no 
apparent reason to believe that it is relevant, it could conceivably turn out to 
be. Forming a reasonable belief that information is relevant is a higher hurdle 
than merely considering that it might be or could possibly be relevant.1159 
 
The Guidance suggests that the ‘ought to be included’ standard requires the chief 
police officer to consider the impact that disclosure might have on the applicant and 
other third parties, and to justify disclosure accordingly.1160 Under the new statutory 
regime, it is mandated that only information rationally connected to the prevention of 
crime and ensuring public safety can lawfully be disclosed (though of course empirical 
realities may belie the normative standard). 
 
2.2.3.c. Are the measures no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective? 
The third question in the proportionality analysis covers some of the same ground as 
the second. The ‘in the chief police officer’s opinion, might be relevant’ standard is a 
low threshold which leaves room for the disclosure of information that is not 
rationally connected to the legislative objective. In doing so, it also leaves room for 
the disclosure of more information than is necessary to achieve the legislative 
																																								 																				
1158 n 998, 2-3. 
1159 ibid 2. 
1160 ibid 3. 
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objective, i.e. more information than is required for the employer to assess the risk 
that an applicant (or third parties close to the applicant) might pose to children or 
other vulnerable groups.  
 
The ‘unless there is good reason not to disclose’ gloss introduced in R (X), which 
fostered a presumption in favour of disclosure in subsequent cases, further 
compounded the disclosure of more information than is necessary for the relevant 
decision maker to assess the risk the applicant - in taking up the specified 
employment - poses to children and vulnerable groups. In one of Mason’s examples, 
quoted above, she describes how information regarding a Penalty Notice for Disorder 
(PND) was disclosed as part of an ECRC. The PND was issued for ‘excessive standing’ 
at a football match. Taken at face value (and without knowing contextual details), 
this appears to be a striking example of where more information has been disclosed 
than is necessary. Whilst the behaviour in question may indicate undesirable traits of 
character (e.g. that the applicant may be overzealous in his cheering when watching 
football at the weekend), such information does not bear directly on the legislative 
objectives of protecting children or other vulnerable groups from harm and/or 
criminal victimisation.  
 
The Statutory Disclosure Guidance requires relevant chief police officers to consider 
whether the legislative objective could be achieved through less intrusive means. 
After establishing a legitimate aim for disclosure, the next step for relevant chief 
officers is to ‘consider whether there are any other realistic and practical options to 
pursue that aim’ and to ensure that the decision to disclose is ‘no more than 
necessary to achieve the legitimate aim’.1161 Whilst the Guidance does not stipulate 
exactly what other options a chief police officer might consider, it does stipulate that 
the information disclosed should be fact-based and devoid of assumption, 
																																								 																				
1161 ibid 3. 
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supposition, or opinion.1162 Furthermore, both the Statutory Disclosure Guidance and 
the Quality Assurance Framework require that the relevant chief police officer 
considers whether an opportunity should be afforded for the applicant to make 
representations before a disclosure occurs. This procedural safeguard limits the 
extent to which disclosure might offend against the presumption of innocence.  
 
In summary, non-conviction disclosure should only occur where it is reasonably 
thought to be relevant and proportionate to disclose the information. Furthermore, 
such disclosure will only be minimally intrusive where relevant facts are disclosed 
and, in cases where the accuracy of those facts is disputed, applicants should be 
given the opportunity to make representations to correct inaccuracies.  
 
2.2.3.d. Do the measures strike a fair balance? 
To recap, the fourth stage of the proportionality analysis requires that the loss to the 
individual resulting from the infringement of the right must be proportional to the 
gains in terms of pursuing the legislative objective.1163 In the abstract, the right to 
respect for private life and the aims of preventing crime and ensuring public safety 
are both of fundamental importance, before taking account of the facts and 
circumstances of any particular case. Regarding the disclosure of non-conviction 
information, there is some degree of variance in the gravity of disclosure depending 
on the nature of the information disclosed and how it is presented. Under the current 
regulatory framework, limits are set on the information that can be disclosed and on 
its presentation as part of an ECRC, which restrict the extent to which disclosure 
might be said to offend against the presumption of innocence. However, as a general 
principle, the disclosure of non-conviction personal information stored in police 
records has to be considered a significant interference with the rights of job 
applicants owing to the devastating impact such disclosure is likely to have on the 
																																								 																				
1162 ibid 5. 
1163 This is sometimes termed proportionality stricto sensu: see I. Porat, ‘Mapping the American Debate 
over Balancing’ in G. Huscroft, B.W. Miller, and G. Webber (eds.) Proportionality and the Rule of Law: 
Rights, Justification and Reasoning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 397-416, 398. 
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individual’s autonomy and reputation based privacy interests. Any information stored 
in police records which is reasonably believed relevant for ECRC disclosure is highly 
likely to be adverse, and to have a detrimental impact on the applicant’s employment 
prospects. Even if, hypothetically, such information could be interpreted as neutral, 
or somehow even strengthening an application, its disclosure by the police would still 
engage the Article 8(1) rights of the applicant as it deprives the applicant of the 
ability to exercise control over the flow of information about him-or herself. 
Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume that such disclosure at a minimum constitutes 
an interference of moderate seriousness, and could conceivably constitute a serious 
interference with the Article 8(1) rights of the individual. Where a particular ECRC 
disclosure will fall on this spectrum depends upon the nature of the information, its 
presentation on the ECRC, and the circumstances of the particular case. 
 
Given the legitimate priorities of decision makers with a responsibility for protecting 
children and vulnerable groups from harm, and owing to the nature of non-conviction 
information stored in police records (often pertaining to allegations, arrests, 
acquittals, convictions of known associates and other factors which are, justly or 
unjustly, likely to cast a shadow of suspicion over the applicant), it is highly likely 
that the disclosure of such information on an ECRC will constitute a serious 
interference with the applicant’s Article 8(1) rights. The likelihood that the disclosure 
of non-conviction information will seriously interfere with the Article 8(1) rights of the 
applicant in a particular case is high.  
 
The next stage in assessing the existence of a fair balance in the legislative 
provisions requires an assessment of the importance of pursuing the legitimate aims 
through the disclosure of non-conviction information. So, what is the instrumental 
value of non-conviction disclosure in the fight against crime? The purpose of section 
115(7) of the Police Act 1997 is to protect the vulnerable. The non-conviction 
information provided as part of an ECRC can enable employers to make a decision as 
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to the suitability of the individual being employed to work with children and 
vulnerable groups. As has been established, this is a consideration which is of 
fundamental importance. Furthermore, in principle, there is a rational connection 
between safeguarding vulnerable groups from harm and the disclosure of non-
conviction information which is relevant to particular job applications. However, even 
where the principles in the Statutory Disclosure Guidance are followed, this is not a 
guarantee that, in a particular case, the disclosure will have protected an individual 
from harm. This is because it is difficult to predict how an individual will behave once 
employed. Non-conviction information can only provide information indicative of the 
risk that an individual, or third parties close to the individual, might pose to children 
or vulnerable groups. It cannot indicate with certainty whether the employment of an 
individual in a particular position will result in avoidable harm to children or 
vulnerable groups. 
 
For example, in the case of R (L), whilst the Supreme Court overturned the decision 
in R (X), it declined the appellant’s request for the quashing of the decision to 
disclose non-conviction information as part of an ECRC. Lord Hope explained his 
decision:  
There is no doubt that the information that was disclosed about [the appellant] 
was relevant for the purpose for which the ECRC was being required. As for the 
question whether it ought to have been disclosed, insufficient weight was given 
to the appellant’s right to respect for private life. But there is no doubt that the 
facts that were narrated were true. It was also information that bore directly on 
the question whether she was a person who could safely be entrusted with the 
job of supervising children in a school canteen or in the playground. It was for 
the employer to decide what to make of this information, but it is not at all 
surprising that the decision was that her employment should be terminated. 
The consequences that disclosure will have for her private life are regrettable. 
But I can see no escape from the conclusion that the risk to the children must, 
in her case, be held to outweigh the prejudicial effects that disclosure will give 
rise to.1164 
 
The information disclosed, that the appellant’s son was convicted of serious criminal 
offences whilst in her care and she was involved in proceedings alleging neglect of 
her son, was both true and bore direct relevance to the question of whether she 
																																								 																				
1164 n 1056, 434. 
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could be entrusted to look after children. The nature of the information suggested 
that the applicant might be a poor choice for employment as a lunchtime supervisor. 
However, it does not suggest that she is a danger to children or that she might cause 
them physical or sexual harm. Thus, on a generous estimate, we might weight the 
risk of harm to children and vulnerable groups as moderate. That is to say, if the 
applicant is employed and behaves in a manner consistent with the information 
documented in police records, she may not provide adequate supervision to the 
children in her care, which could potentially expose them to harm. This information is 
far from conclusive as to the risk the appellant posed to children when working as a 
lunchtime supervisor. It might plausibly be the case that the appellant has deep 
regrets about the breakdown in her relationship with her son and would, if given the 
opportunity, work exceptionally well as a lunchtime supervisor. She would be working 
as part of a team, and would presumably receive training in the role. Accordingly, it 
is reasonable to conclude that there exists a significant degree of uncertainty about 
whether the disclosure would in fact achieve the legislative aim.  
 
Lord Hope viewed these considerations as sufficient for deferring the risk assessment 
to the applicant’s employer and, in doing so, his Lordship deferred the assessment of 
the extent to which the disclosure is important in pursuing the legitimate aim to the 
prospective employer. As Lord Hope accepted, the consequence is that the 
applicant’s Article 8(1) rights will almost certainly be overridden as the employer has 
a primary interest in preventing harm to vulnerable people, and is not directly 
concerned with protecting the Article 8 rights of the prospective employee. This 
approach seems more precautionary than proportionate.1165 When we assess the 
degree of interference with the applicant’s rights, disclosure will likely constitute a 
moderate to serious interference. In losing her employment and being effectively cut 
off from her chosen career, the employee’s ability to form social relationships with 
others will be restricted. Furthermore, this disclosure, if word were to get around, 
																																								 																				
1165 See further: C. Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). 
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could well be disqualifying and stigmatising for the employee. However, the degree of 
the interference in this particular case was mitigated by the fact that the information 
was true and relatively recent.  
 
We can see that the interference with the right to respect for private life caused by 
the disclosure is moderate to serious, and we can conclude with a high degree of 
probability that this interference will occur. On the other side of the equation, on the 
basis of the non-conviction information stored in police records, it is reasonable to 
believe that the applicant might cause a moderate interference with the rights of the 
children under her care through neglect, and there is a low-moderate likelihood 
whether this interference will come to fruition. Thus the disclosure of the non-
conviction information in this case might well not strike a fair balance between the 
rights of the applicant and the legitimate aim pursued. This is not to say that the 
rights of the applicant will win out in every case. However, for disclosure to be 
justified, the severity of the risk to children and vulnerable groups coupled with the 
epistemic premises underpinning that forecast must outweigh the severity of 
foreseeable harm to the applicant’s privacy interests. 
 
3. Challenges to the Non-Conviction Disclosure Regime 
Post-R (L)  
In R (C) v Secretary of State for the Home Department,1166 the Court of Appeal 
unanimously rejected an appeal from the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester 
Police that a judge’s decision to quash a job applicant’s ECRC was unlawful. C applied 
for a job as a college lecturer teaching children over the age of 16. As part of C’s 
ECRC, the appellant Chief Constable included information about an allegation of 
sexual abuse made against C, along with information that the CPS had concluded 
‘whilst there was no reason to disbelieve the female’s account, there was insufficient 
																																								 																				
1166 R (C) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 175. 
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evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction.’1167 Lord Neuberger 
distinguished the facts in the immediate case from the facts in R (L), and concluded:  
First, the information relates to an allegation of impropriety some 15 years 
before the certificate. Secondly, the accuracy of the information is challenged, 
and the challenge receives some support from the fact that the allegation was 
withdrawn, although it is right to say it was renewed. Thirdly, for reasons given 
by the judge, the allegation was arguably not relevant.1168 
 
From this analysis, it is clear that disclosure could not be justified, as the certainty of 
causing a moderate-to-serious interference with the Article 8(1) rights of the 
applicant could not be overcome by the need to disclose information of questionable 
accuracy. Though the allegation was of an offence of a sexual nature (implying that 
the applicant may have posed a risk of causing serious harm to children and 
vulnerable groups), the degree of uncertainty surrounding the risk posed by the 
applicant based on this information is far too great to justify the disclosure. The court 
reached the correct conclusion, in terms of the principles elucidated in this thesis. 
 
Later in 2011, in R (B) v Chief Constable of Derbyshire,1169 the claimant (B) 
complained that the disclosure of non-conviction information relating to allegations 
made against him as part of an ECRC was disproportionate and in violation of Article 
8. The allegations were made a year before the ECRC was disclosed and related to an 
incident, occurring a month before the allegations were made, where B was alleged 
to have stabbed a man in the chest and attempted to stab the same man’s teenage 
child with a samurai sword, after consuming alcohol. B’s alleged victims had no 
injuries at the time of making the allegation and, after receiving a number of witness 
statements which contradicted the complainant’s version of events, the CPS dropped 
the case against B, concluding that there was no realistic prospect of mounting a 
successful prosecution against him.1170 During a search of B’s house as part of this 
investigation, the police found a number of weapons that he lawfully owned, although 
some ammunition which was found was not stored correctly. In deciding to disclose 
																																								 																				
1167 ibid at [6]. 
1168 ibid at [31]. 
1169 R (B) v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [2011] EWHC 2363 (Admin). 
1170 ibid at [19]. 
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this information, the police determined that the ‘non disclosure of the information 
would be of a higher risk to children and vulnerable adults than the detriment that 
would be caused to the applicant by disclosure and that therefore, disclosure would 
be a proportionate step to take.’1171 
 
Munby LJ gave the leading judgment in the High Court, ruling that there had been no 
violation of Article 8. His Lordship stated that the Chief Constable had not erred in his 
judgment to disclose: details of the allegations made against the applicant; details of 
him allegedly being under the influence of alcohol at the time of the alleged offence; 
or information pertaining to his incorrect storage of firearms.1172 Munby LJ viewed the 
nature of B’s prospective employment, working as a consultant at a Mental Health 
Trust, to be of central significance. Taking the above into account, Munby LJ 
concluded:  
A Mental Health Trust in its position as the claimant’s employer would surely 
want to be made aware of the very disturbing picture presented by the material 
of which the police were aware – a picture, moreover, which the Trust could 
evaluate only if it was given the full picture. For what, surely, was potentially 
disturbing was not just what was alleged to have happened on Boxing Day 
2009 but the fact that it was, or might be, part of a much wider picture 
involving, in addition to the sword allegedly used on that occasion, the 
claimant’s access to firearms which were being stored in breach of the 
requirements of his firearms licence and material suggesting that he also had 
an alcohol problem.  
 
One can perhaps test the matter in this way. Suppose that none of this 
information had been included in the Certificate, and suppose that the claimant 
had then appeared for work under the influence of alcohol and brandishing a 
sword or a gun in front of one of his patients. Would not both the patient and 
the Trust have been justifiably angered – to use no stronger word – if they had 
then discovered what the police had been aware of but had chosen not to 
reveal? The answer is obvious.1173 
 
To take the worst case scenario of what could foreseeably happen if the allegations 
were true and not disclosed and then work backwards is an arbitrary and, with 
respect, bizarre way of approaching a proportionality assessment of this kind. The 
rhetorical question posited by Munby LJ could equally be reversed: if the allegations 
against B were not true, and suppose as a result of the disclosure the applicant was 
																																								 																				
1171 ibid at [25]. 
1172 ibid at [84]. 
1173 ibid at [84]-[85] (emphasis in original). 
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blocked off from his chosen career and stigmatised in his local community, would not 
the applicant have been justifiably angered? Granted, the information about B’s 
incorrect storage of firearms in his possession was true. However, this fact alone 
does not seem to have a direct bearing on the applicant’s suitability for working with 
children or vulnerable groups. The remaining allegations in the ECRC were not 
proven. Furthermore, the evidence which brought into question the credibility of the 
allegations was not mentioned as part of the disclosure. In this case, the 
proportionality analysis of Munby LJ fails to account for the degree of certainty with 
which we know that the competing privacy interests of the applicant and the interests 
of the vulnerable groups are in peril. The allegations of violence and alcohol abuse 
were recent and directly relevant to the position for which the applicant applied. If 
true, it would be reasonable to conclude that in exhibiting this behaviour in his recent 
past, the applicant, taking up his position in a Mental Health Trust, would pose a risk 
of serious harm to children. However, that is a big ‘if’. The allegations were unproven 
and were based on insufficient evidence for the CPS to mount a prosecution against 
B. Thus, due to the significant level of uncertainty regarding whether or not the 
applicant had behaved in the manner described in the ECRC, the disclosure of this 
information, which would certainly constitute a serious interference with B’s Article 
8(1) rights, cannot be said to strike a fair balance. 
 
Fortunately the reasoning of Munby LJ is something of an outlier among the post R 
(L) challenges to non-conviction disclosure. In the subsequent cases,1174 a more 
exacting proportionality analysis was conducted. R (L) v Chief Constable of Kent 
Police also drew attention to a potential problem regarding the inconsistency with 
which such proportionality analyses are applied across different police forces. In this 
case, the Chief Constable of Kent Police disclosed information about historic sex 
abuse allegations made against the applicant (L). These allegations were part of a 
failed prosecution launched against the applicant. Andrews J noted a disparity 
																																								 																				
1174 R (L) v Chief Constable of Kent Police [2014] EWHC 463 (Admin); R (P) v Chief Constable of Thames 
Valley Police [2014] EWHC 1436 (Admin); R (SD) v Chief Constable of North Yorkshire Police [2015] EWHC 
2085 (Admin); R (BW) v Chief Constable of Cambridgeshire Police [2015] EWHC 4095 (Admin). 
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between the proportionality analyses of Kent Police and Hertfordshire Police when L 
had previously been in contact with the latter regarding an ECRC certificate. 
Hertfordshire Police determined that the same information regarding the allegations 
should not be disclosed. Whilst the allegations related to serious sexual assault, they 
were historic, had no corroborating evidence, and stood in isolation as the applicant 
had not come into contact with police either before or since they were made.1175 
Based on this information, it is abundantly clear that Hertfordshire Police struck the 
correct balance. However, the disparity in this and other cases does seem to indicate 
that the Statutory Disclosure Guidance, to which relevant chief police officers must 
have regard, may be in need of clarification in terms of exactly how a fair balance 
between the rights of the applicant and the rights of children and vulnerable groups 
should be struck, taking into account not only the seriousness of the harm that could 
potentially be caused to children or vulnerable groups but also the likelihood of harm 
based on the probative value of the information in question. The Statutory Disclosure 
Guidance and the QAF encompass all of these principles and should be commended 
for doing so. However, the law currently affords too much discretion to chief 
constables to make decisions regarding the importance of these principles and the 
extent to which the applicant’s right to respect for private life should be overridden in 
favour of the competing legitimate aims of disclosure. If police officers are to 
continue to make decisions regarding the disclosure of non-conviction information, it 
is imperative that they fully recognise the nature and weight of the privacy interests 
at stake and the (often high) probability that these interests will be interfered with, 
before weighting these factors accordingly.  
 
Conclusions 
The law regulating the disclosure of non-conviction information as part of an ECRC is 
complex. This doctrinal complexity reflects broader debates about where the line 
between privacy and countervailing interests should be drawn in the context of 
																																								 																				
1175 R (L) v Chief Constable of Kent Police, ibid at [17]. 
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criminal records disclosure. These debates become more complicated, and arguments 
on either side become more entrenched, when the privacy interests at stake tend to 
belong to those who are suspected of wrongdoing, but not convicted; or where the 
wrongdoing in question is confirmed but is not a crime. In contrast to the topics of 
the previous chapters, the seriousness of what is at stake in terms of privacy 
interests has long been acknowledged in domestic law. This, at least in part, is due to 
the intuitive sense that it is fundamentally unjust for the state to treat those who are 
legally innocent as if they are guilty of an offence.  
 
Dissemination of personal information which has the potential to stigmatise and cut 
off certain courses of action also seems more tangibly offensive to privacy interests 
than the mere retention of similar information. It is perhaps for this reason that 
Article 8(1) has consistently been engaged where non-conviction information is 
disclosed as part of an ECRC. However, the development of the legal framework in 
this area does bear resemblances to that regulating the retention of arrestees’ DNA 
and fingerprint data. The combination of technological advances, which allowed for 
more systematic and intrusive retention and subsequent disclosure of such 
information, and public disquiet in the aftermath of the Soham murders fostered a 
presumption in favour of disclosure, confirmed in the R(X) case. This disclosure 
framework, which was clearly disproportionate, was redressed not by the ECtHR as 
had been the case in S and Marper in relation to DNA and fingerprint data retention, 
but by the UK Supreme Court and Parliament.  
 
The new statutory regime under which chief police officers may disclose non-
conviction information as part of an ECRC represents a significant step forward in 
protecting the privacy interests of those who have been subject to the criminal 
justice process. Indeed, the Statutory Disclosure Guidance and the QAF offer much 
better privacy protection than the reforms to the retention of arrestee DNA and 
fingerprint data under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. Relevant chief police 
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officers must now carefully consider whether the disclosure of non-conviction 
information corresponds to a pressing social need and is proportionate. Furthermore, 
the disclosed material itself must be presented in an impartial and balanced way.  
 
However, repeated legal challenges to the disclosure of such information since these 
reforms were implemented indicate that there remains an alarming lack of 
consistency in the application of these provisions amongst not only chief police 
officers, but also domestic judges. There seems to be a lack of clarity in exactly how 
a fair balance should be struck between the privacy interests at stake and the 
competing legitimate aims. In particular, domestic judges and chief police officers 
alike often fail to acknowledge or appropriately manage the epistemic deficit which is 
bound to exist when assessments of the risk an individual poses to children and 
vulnerable groups are made based on partial, untested, and often contested personal 
information. One solution to this lack of rigour and consistency in the proportionality 
analsysis might be to transfer the power to make such non-conviction disclosure 
decisions to an independent body, which might be in a better position than the police 
to view the information objectively. A full analysis of the implications of such an 
approach is beyond the scope of this thesis. As it stands, this chapter has 
demonstrated that, whilst recent legislative reforms have to some extent redressed 
the unjust system of non-conviction disclosure under R (X), renewed efforts are 
needed to ensure that the privacy interests of those subject to this process are 
adequately and consistently protected. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis considered the question: to what extent are the privacy interests of those 
subject to a criminal process recognised and afforded adequate protection in England 
and Wales? One of the underpinning premises motivating this thesis was that whilst 
criminological literature has indicated that crime control has become an increasingly 
proactive, pre-emptive, and preventive pursuit, this theorising cannot generate a 
defensible normative model for assessing the impact of such developments on the 
privacy interests of those subject to the criminal process. Thus, the task was to 
develop such a normative model which can identify where privacy interests are set 
back as part of a criminal process, and to evaluate whether or not these interests are 
afforded adequate protection against the legitimate exercise of police power.  
 
The first stage in developing this normative model required us to clarify the basic 
concepts and establish the theoretical foundations of privacy. A survey of the 
philosophical literature on privacy shows that the concept is difficult to define. No 
attempt to find a common denominator between privacy related interests seems 
entirely satisfactory because privacy is a term used to describe numerous distinct, 
yet related, interests. However, the reductionist claim that privacy is merely 
derivative of other concepts (and, consequently, is not a concept worthy of 
elucidation) can be rejected because privacy tracks dimensions of human experience 
that cannot be captured through discussions of other, overlapping concepts. 
Conceptions of privacy as a control of realms are also rejected as these unduly limit 
the scope of the concept. Such conceptions tend to conflate questions concerning the 
scope of privacy with questions concerning its value.  They also fail to account for 
situations where privacy exists beyond the control of the individual.1176 Instead, our 
conclusion is that privacy is best understood as a condition of limited access. One 
exists in a condition of privacy to the extent that others do not access one, and this 
																																								 																				
1176 See W.A. Parent, ‘Privacy, Morality and the Law’ (1983) 12 Philosophy and Public Affairs 269-288 at 
273. 
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access can take many forms. From this precept, we can assess whether privacy 
interests are engaged in a particular case having regard to the manner in which an 
individual is accessed, and the degree to which an individual is accessed by a 
particular intrusion or interaction. If a particular intrusion accesses the individual in 
such a way that is more than de minimis, then the individual might plausibly suggest 
that his or her privacy has been breached.  
 
Why is the protection of privacy important? Because privacy is valuable in furthering 
dignity and autonomy related interests the individual might hold in different contexts. 
However, it would be misleading to suggest that privacy is valuable only as an 
individualistic right, in conflict with the interests of society. Rather, privacy has pro-
social value as an aspect of the common good.1177 The protection of privacy is a vital 
element for a functioning liberal democratic society, as it affords the individual the 
space within society to form moral judgments and express political preferences free 
from scrutiny. Communitarian arguments - which posit that privacy protections must 
be curtailed as the liberal conception of privacy ignores the demands of public health 
and social responsibility1178 - are rejected.  Such curtailments would put the individual 
at risk of being sacrificed for the interests of the community. Moreover, such 
communitarian arguments tend to downplay the importance of privacy in serving 
collective purposes. Similarly, feminist arguments that privacy protections reinforce 
gender inequality in society tend to overlook circumstances where privacy protection 
may be in the collective interests of women. Whilst feminist and communitarian 
perspectives have added appreciated nuance to debates on the moral and political 
value of privacy, the broad and contextual conception of privacy advanced in this 
thesis helps us to see ways in which privacy interests can be viewed through a lens 
																																								 																				
1177 P. Regan, Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social Values, and Public Policy (2nd edn. Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 2009); B. Goold, ‘How Much Surveillance is Too Much: Some Thoughts 
on Surveillance, Democracy and the Political Value of Privacy’ in D. Schartum (ed.), Overvaaking i en 
Rettstat: Surveillance in a Constitutional Government (Fagbokforlaget, 2010) 38-48. 
1178 A. Etzioni, The Limits of Privacy (New York: Basic Books, 1999) 215. 
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of appropriate norms of behaviour, and other important social goals.1179 Chapter 1 
demonstrated that, on any account of political morality which views human 
flourishing as a central concern, some degree of privacy in certain situations is 
important for various ends.  
 
The next stage in developing a normatively defensible model for assessing English 
law involved an analysis of the framework for protecting privacy interests expounded 
in Article 8 ECHR and the relevant jurisprudence of the ECtHR. In its judgments, the 
ECtHR has interpreted the scope of the application of Article 8 appropriately broadly. 
The purposive and evolutive approach to the interpretation of the scope of Article 8 
has enabled this right to cover a broad array of interests. It recognises that privacy 
can advance many of the autonomy and dignity related interests of the individual, 
which are discussed in privacy scholarship. The ECtHR’s approach of recognising that 
privacy interests are broad and pluralistic, and eschewing a restrictive definition of 
the ‘private life’, is welcomed. However, in setting limits on the scope of Article 8(1), 
the ECtHR has not adopted a consistent threshold test for the application of Article 8. 
Instead the ECtHR has haphazardly referred to the existence of a ‘direct link’ 
between the measure and the applicant’s private life, and to ‘reasonable expectations 
of privacy’. This approach does little to guide domestic lawmakers in applying Article 
8 in various contexts, nor to address legitimate concerns that Article 8 is too 
indefinite to be of much use as a human right. Finally, the court does not in its 
jurisprudence elucidate the political value of privacy. Whilst it is implicit in the 
reasoning of the ECtHR that Article 8 holds pro-social value, the importance of 
privacy protections beyond the benefits they afford the individual is seldom 
articulated in the reasoning of the ECtHR. 
 
Article 8(2) offers the outline of an appropriate and coherent structure for assessing 
whether a breach of Article 8(1) is justified in a particular instance. Interfering 
																																								 																				
1179 J.W. DeCew, ‘The Feminist Critique of Privacy: Past Arguments and New Social Understandings’ in B. 
Röessler and D. Mokrosinska (eds.), Social Dimensions of Privacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2015) 85-103, 101. 
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measures must be regulated ‘in accordance with the law’. Here, the ECtHR takes an 
active role in assessing the quality of domestic provisions in Contracting States, 
considering the foreseeability and accessibility of a domestic provision. Interferences 
are also limited to the public interest aims stated in Article 8(2) (though these are 
interpreted expansively). After these two hurdles are cleared, the final criterion in 
Article 8(2) involves an analysis by the court of whether the interfering measure is 
‘necessary in a democratic society’. This inevitably requires a balance to be struck 
between the public interest or human right pursued and the Article 8 rights of the 
applicant. Here, the court broadly follows the same four-part proportionality analysis 
developed in a number of legal jurisdictions.1180 Whilst the principle of proportionality 
has received trenchant criticism from some constitutional law theorists, it is 
submitted that the four-part analysis provides a structured approach for resolving 
tensions between competing rights and public interests. However, the ECtHR’s 
approach to this balancing exercise, which does not systematically follow the four-
part analysis in every case, might face legitimate criticisms for being too 
impressionistic and reducing the balancing exercise to a mere statement of intuitive 
preference. Moreover, the ECtHR’s interpretation of the ‘minimally intrusive means’ 
limb of the proportionality analysis seems too expansive, permitting domestic 
lawmakers to enact broad right-interfering provisions which are not the least 
intrusive means by which to achieve the legitimate aim in question.1181  
 
Chapter 3 extended the normative model for assessing English law by focusing 
specifically on how privacy interests are set back as part of a criminal process, and 
on the ECtHR framework for protecting such interests contained in Article 8. Drawing 
on other attempts at developing a taxonomy of privacy setbacks, the chapter showed 
that those subject to the criminal process can have their privacy related interests set 
back in numerous ways that are not typically acknowledged in legal provisions and 
																																								 																				
1180 D. Grimm, ‘Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence’ (2007) 57 University 
of Toronto Law Journal 383-397. 
1181 T. Lewis, ‘Animal Defenders International v United Kingdom: Sensible Dialogue or a Bad Case of 
Strasbourg Jitters?’ (2014) 77 Modern Law Review 460-474. 
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principles aimed at ensuring procedural fairness. The ECtHR has confirmed that 
Article 8 can be engaged where information is collected, processed, or disseminated, 
or where an individual has his or her physical space invaded as part of a criminal 
process. The Strasbourg Court has repeatedly given sympathetic treatment to 
concerns that privacy interfering measures are typically more damaging for the 
individual where they are used in the context of a police investigation or operation. In 
this setting such measures can be particularly stigmatising or chilling for the 
individual. To its detriment, the ECtHR has not fully explored how the collection of 
personal information from public space, even in the absence of any processing or 
subsequent storage, will set back privacy interests. Moreover, the ECtHR has paid 
little attention to the political value of privacy, which stretches beyond its utility for 
the individual, in the context of a criminal investigation.  
 
The ECtHR’s approach to interpreting the requirements in Article 8(2) can be laconic. 
Prior to S and Marper v United Kingdom,1182 in cases pertaining to those subject to the 
criminal process the ECtHR would often find a violation of Article 8 on the basis that 
an interference was not ‘in accordance with the law’, without going on to consider 
questions of proportionality and necessity. This had the positive effect of prompting 
domestic legislators to create an adequate legal basis regulating the use of such 
interfering measures in the criminal justice context, particularly in surveillance cases. 
However, the lack of detailed attention to the second and third requirements (‘in 
pursuit of a legitimate aim’ and ‘necessary in a democratic society’) seems to have 
contributed to a lack of consistency in the approach of domestic judges in 
interpreting these requirements. 
 
These first three chapters of the thesis provided a working theoretical model for an 
assessment of English law regulating three activities where police routinely set back 
the privacy interests of those subject to the criminal process. We have seen that 
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policing measures can set back privacy interests in numerous ways, which, unless 
adequately regulated, can be detrimental not only to the targeted individual, but also 
to society. From this precept it follows that Article 8 should be interpreted broadly to 
cover situations where police remove an individual from a condition of limited access 
to any significant degree. For the privacy interests of those subject to the criminal 
process to be adequately protected it is also important that any interfering measure 
is lawful and only pursued to further one of the legitimate aims from Article 8(2). 
Moreover, when assessing whether a measure is ‘necessary in a democratic society’, 
domestic courts and the ECtHR should consider whether a measure is proportionate 
and necessary through a rigorous application of the four-part proportionality test.  
 
The second half of the thesis turned from developing a theoretical model of privacy 
interests in the context of criminal proceedings to testing its practical application in 
three concrete areas of policing activity. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 assessed English law’s 
approach to protecting privacy interests in selected ‘hard cases’, where privacy 
interests are set back as part of a criminal process. Each of these chapters covered a 
different type of privacy interference in an effort to assess the extent to which 
English law has recognised that privacy interests are diverse, and that policing 
measures can set back privacy interests in numerous, often subtle, ways. These 
chapters highlighted various deficiencies in English law’s approach to recognising and 
protecting the privacy interests of those subject to the criminal process. They also 
demonstrated that the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court has had something of a 
transformative impact in this area, forcing domestic legislators and public authorities 
to take privacy interests more seriously. 
 
In Chapter 4, we saw how domestic judges have grappled with a hard case where 
privacy interests are set back through overt police photography. Domestic courts 
have recognised that such photography may engage Article 8(1) where, for example, 
this is accompanied by intrusive or violent conduct. However, these courts have not 
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consistently explained what is wrong with such photography in the absence of 
additional invasive conduct.1183 Drawing on the normative model developed in 
previous chapters, Chapter 4 showed how, in the context of a criminal process, such 
overt photography can have a particularly chilling effect.1184 Overt police photography 
moves the goalposts insofar as privacy in public is concerned, breaking traditional 
boundaries regarding the extent to which individuals would usually be subject to 
scrutiny as they pass through public space.1185 Consequently, as a general rule, where 
the police take photographs of an individual as he or she occupies publicly accessible 
space, this will expose the individual to a level of scrutiny such that in every 
foreseeable case he or she should have the protection of Article 8(1).  Moreover, the 
domestic courts have narrowed the scope of Article 8 in overt surveillance cases by 
making the question of whether the applicant held a reasonable expectation of 
privacy at the time the measures were employed against him or her the litmus test 
for Article 8 engagement. This approach is not consistent with the ECtHR’s 
interpretation of the scope of Article 8, which has occasionally taken the applicant’s 
reasonable expectations of privacy into account, but does not make the existence of 
such an expectation a precondition for the protection of Article 8. In In re JR38, this 
focus on the ‘reasonable expectations’ of the applicant blocked off consideration of 
how the dissemination by the police of the applicant’s image set back his privacy 
related interests.1186 The domestic courts seldom acknowledge the political value of 
privacy to a functioning democratic society and the detrimental effects such 
surveillance measures can have in this regard.  
 
The ‘in accordance with the law’ limb of Article 8(2) was not discussed in detail in 
Wood, where the domestic courts gave short shrift to the claimant’s argument that 
implicit common law powers provided an inadequate legal basis for the 
																																								 																				
1183 See Chapter 4, Part 2.1.1. 
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interference.1187 However, this analysis has shown that these decisions were based on 
an underestimation of the extent of the interference occasioned through overt 
photography. The decisions were also based on Strasbourg case-law predating S and 
Marper v United Kingdom, where a rigorous legality analysis for the retention of 
fingerprint data was applied, notwithstanding that the retention of this information 
was held to constitute only a minor interference by the ECtHR.1188 Chapter 4 also drew 
attention to how the four-part proportionality analysis in Article 8(2) is not 
systematically or consistently applied by domestic courts in this context. Here, 
concerns were raised that domestic judges have tended to apply a low intensity 
review of whether interfering measures are proportionate, which suggests that Article 
8 will not be violated as long as the police can establish a general furtherance of the 
legitimate aim pursued through the use of overt photography. Such an approach 
seems to downplay the potentially deleterious effect of such photography in the 
criminal justice context.  
 
Chapter 5 provided us with the best example of how the ECtHR, through its Article 8 
jurisprudence, has positively affected English law regulating the use of privacy 
interfering measures against those subject to a criminal process. The ECtHR’s 
judgment in S and Marper v United Kingdom,1189 had a transformative impact on 
English law by unequivocally confirming that the retention of arrestee DNA and 
fingerprint information will engage Article 8, and must only be done where the 
criteria in Article 8(2) are met. This landmark judgment seemed to change the 
domestic courts’ approach to interpreting the scope of Article 8 in the criminal justice 
context. Whereas previously judges tended to participate in a perfunctory analysis of 
whether Article 8(1) is engaged, before quickly concluding that any interference that 
might have occurred is easily trumped by the need to prevent or detect crime, more 
recent cases tend to engage in a detailed analysis of how privacy interests might be 
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set back by information retention or processing.1190 Drawing on the normative model 
described above, Chapter 5 established that privacy interests are set back through 
non-conviction DNA and fingerprint retention. Such retention undermines the 
individual’s personal autonomy by depriving him or her of control over how this 
personal information is used by others.1191 Retention is also inhibiting for the 
individual as it creates uncertainty concerning how such information can be used or 
might be used in the future.1192 Finally, retention sets back privacy interests in this 
context as it is stigmatising, amounting to an expression of lingering suspicion on 
behalf of the state, through the differential treatment of those subject to a criminal 
process.1193 The domestic courts now recognise that such retention engages Article 
8(1), and this is a welcome development.  
 
The legislative response to the S and Marper case, contained in the PoFA 2012 
provisions, does not go far enough to ensure that non-conviction biometric 
information is only retained for as long as such retention is a proportionate means of 
preventing crime or ensuring public safety. The retention tariffs for those arrested or 
charged with an offence are automatically applied and allow for retention for long 
time periods even in cases where questions of an individual’s innocence are put 
beyond any plausible doubt. The PoFA 2012 provisions seem to be based on the 
assumption that the biometric information of those arrested for, but not convicted of, 
a serious offence is of more value in the fight against crime than such information 
taken from those arrested for less serious offences. However, empirical research on 
this issue suggests that criminal careers are not homogenous in the way these 
provisions assume.1194 Moreover the current retention tariffs are not minimally 
intrusive. They fail to adequately allow for a consideration of the credibility of the 
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suspicions or evidential considerations that led to the individual being subject to a 
criminal process. Without a strong evidence base supporting non-conviction 
retention, fair assessments of the individual’s risk can only be made on a case-by-
case basis. Consequently, the PoFA 2012 provisions do not strike a fair balance 
between privacy rights and countervailing public interests.    
 
The final case-study focused on the dissemination of information about those who 
have been subject to a criminal process as part of an ECRC. In contrast to overt 
photography and biometric information retention, domestic lawmakers have generally 
recognised that such dissemination will set back individual privacy interests, at least 
to some extent. This increased recognition could be attributed to the type of privacy 
setback in this context. It seems that non-conviction information dissemination is 
likely to have a more tangible and immediate effect on the personal autonomy of the 
individual, compared to the privacy setbacks at issue in the other two case-studies. 
Overt surveillance and DNA retention interfere with the psychological integrity of the 
individual, but are arguably less disruptive to the exercise of his or her personal 
autonomy. ECRC disclosure can involve insinuation or bias by the police, which may 
lead members of the public to view the individual as suspicious. Whilst such 
disclosure does not currently breach the presumption of innocence recognised in 
Article 6(2) ECHR,1195 this does (at least) aggravate the interference with an 
individual’s right to respect for private life. Even in the absence of such insinuation or 
bias, ECRC disclosure constitutes a serious interference with Article 8(1), owing to 
the damaging effect such disclosure is very likely to have on the reputation of the 
individual.1196 Disclosure is likely to stigmatise the individual and effectively cut off the 
path to his or her chosen career. Consequently, such disclosure is likely to 
significantly set back the privacy interests of job applicants.  
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The development of the legal framework regulating ECRC disclosure also bears 
resemblance to the development of that regulating the retention of arrestees’ DNA 
and fingerprint data. A combination of technological advances and public disquiet 
seemed to influence the expansion of police powers to set back privacy related 
interests, which was later curtailed through judicial review. Notwithstanding the 
increased recognition domestically of how privacy interests can be set back through 
such non-conviction dissemination, the law in this area took an expansive turn after 
the Soham murders, permitting disclosure even in instances where the non-
conviction information disclosed was not reasonably considered relevant to the 
position for which the job applicant had applied.1197 The new Statutory Disclosure 
Guidance and the PoFA 2012 reforms set out safeguards against abuse and direct 
chief police officers towards relevant factors that should be considered as part of a 
proportionality analysis. The law governing ECRC disclosure has therefore been 
reformed to provide adequate safeguards against abuse, meeting the quality of law 
requirement for compliance with Article 8(2). However, the domestic courts have not 
consistently applied the four-part proportionality analysis when resolving conflicts 
between the privacy interests of job applicants and the legitimate aims pursued 
through non-conviction disclosure as part of an ECRC. Post-R (L) v Commissioner of 
Police of the Metropolis,1198 repeated challenges to non-conviction disclosure have 
indicated that there remains a lack of consistency in the application of the new 
provisions not only among police officers, but also domestic judges. Whilst some 
judges and chief police officers have favoured a strong presumption against 
disclosure, others have permitted disclosure in cases where there is an alarming lack 
of certainty over whether the individual has committed any offence. Whilst the PoFA 
2012 reforms have to some extent redressed the balance between privacy rights and 
countervailing public interests, the balance often tilts too far in favour of crime 
prevention at the expense of the fundamental rights of those subject to the criminal 
process.  
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Whilst considerable strides have been made to recognise the privacy interests of 
those subject to the criminal process (gone are the days when domestic judges 
dismissed such interferences as minor or inconsequential), these interests are still 
sometimes downplayed. However, the full extent to which the use of privacy 
interfering measures may undermine the dignity and autonomy based interests of the 
individual is not always fully acknowledged in the domestic courts. The following 
specific themes are recurrent in the domestic law reviewed in this thesis. First, 
domestic lawmakers consistently overlook or misunderstand the value of privacy. In 
each of the case studies considered, there has been at least a partial failure amongst 
domestic lawmakers to acknowledge the extent of the socially and individually 
detrimental impact that privacy interfering measures can have when used in the 
context of a criminal process. The first theme provides some explanation for the 
second, which is that the domestic courts’ approach to balancing privacy interests 
against the aims of the police in this context, tends to favour law and order and 
seldom replicates, in full, the four-limbed proportionality test which is implicitly, 
though inconsistently, followed in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.  
 
In each of the three areas of domestic application considered in this thesis, the 
approach of the courts to assessing whether or not the police have exercised their 
powers proportionately has been unsystematic and inconsistent. Moreover, this thesis 
has raised concerns that such inconsistencies may also exist across police forces 
responsible for authorising these privacy interfering measures. In discussing R (L) v 
Chief Constable of Kent Police,1199 for example, we saw how chief constables of two 
different police forces came to radically different conclusions as to whether to 
disclose the same non-conviction information. Whilst this is only a single instance, 
the preceding doctrinal analysis has shown that on numerous occasions police forces, 
following the example of domestic courts, do not consistently have proper regard for 
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the proportionality requirement in Article 8 before authorising the use of privacy 
interfering measures against those subject to the criminal justice process.  
 
This analysis suggests the need for further research focussing on how the privacy 
interests of those subject to the criminal process can be afforded adequate 
protection. A future research agenda might be divided into two strands. The first 
could build on the normative analysis developed in this thesis. I have focused on only 
three policing measures that interfere with the privacy interests of those subject to 
the criminal process. However, as technological developments continue to emerge it 
is important for normative legal scholarship to keep pace. This thesis offers a general 
normative framework, which might be extended to consider how the use of such 
technologies might (or might not) be squared with the demand that the human rights 
of those subject to the criminal process are afforded adequate protection. 
 
The second strand, lending itself to empirical research, might examine the features of 
the decision-making processes in authorising such privacy interfering measures in 
practice. This thesis aimed to answer questions concerning the extent to which the 
privacy interests of those subject to the criminal process are afforded adequate 
protection in the law of England and Wales. However, it is also important to assess 
the extent to which the law is being properly applied by those responsible for 
implementing privacy interfering measures against those subject to the criminal 
process.  
 
This thesis began by briefly summarising a body of criminological scholarship 
suggesting that the non-adjudicatory management of individuals through the criminal 
process will often have pernicious effects on privacy. Detailed illustrations have been 
given throughout the thesis. We have also seen numerous cases in which public 
disquiet about risky groups - usually prompted by a particularly heinous (and rare) 
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crime (cf. R v Weir1200 in Chapter 5, and the Soham murders in Chapter 6) - is met 
with heightened demands for crime control politically and judicially, at the expense of 
privacy related interests. This experience lends support to criminological theorising. 
We have, it seems, slowly been moving towards a risk-averse society, which 
circumvents due process in an attempt to manage potentially threatening individuals 
and groups. This trend, coupled with advances in policing technology, seems to have 
shifted the balance between state power and individual and collective privacy 
interests in favour of the former in the criminal justice context. The extent to which 
recent indications of increased judicial and political recognition and protection of 
privacy interests mark the beginning of a new policy direction in this area remains to 
be seen. You cannot do proper law reform without understanding the real value of 
privacy, in general and specifically in relation to policing those subject to the criminal 
process. And it is precisely this better understanding of privacy in the context of a 
criminal process that this thesis has tried to articulate. 
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